中国不同所有制煤炭企业的市场占有动态竞争均衡

一、引言自 1998年以来 ,国家对煤炭工业加大了宏观调控力度 ,对非法开采和布局不合理的煤矿 ,尤其是对效率低下的集体或私人产权性质的小煤矿采取了“关停并转”等措施 ,使国有和乡镇个体煤炭企业比重发生了重大变化 ,国有产权企业的市场份额显著增加 (见表 1)。煤炭企业市场占有量的这一重大变化引起了人们对不同产权企业市场最优占有水平的思考 :国有和私有产权企业的市场竞争均衡份额应该是多少。为回答这一问题 ,在本文 ,我们主要从不同产权煤炭企业动态竞争的角度分析入手 ,以期获得不同产权企业的市场均衡产量 ,并给出动态竞争均衡的…     

规制承诺不确定条件下的电网投资效应及其政策设计

本文研究规制政策不确定条件下电网投资效应问题。通过对投资回报率规制政策下规制机构与电网企业的完全信息博弈模型分析．得出了电网企业和规制机构分别限制投资和改变规制政策或承诺的最优均衡解．从而得出了规制承诺或政策不确定条件下存在投资不足效应的结论。为了促进电网投资均衡，实现社会福利最大化，规制机构应该用效用函数重新定义投资均衡，将供求均衡状况因素引入投资回报率规制政策中．制定和执行弹性而可信的规制政策。     

唐云的柔性战略

柔性战略是指为更有效地实现目标,在动态的、不确定的环境下,主动适应变化、利用变化和制造变化以提高自身竞争能力而制定一组可选择的行动规则及相应方案。柔性战略增强企业适应能力,使其快速、敏捷地抓住和利用机会,谋求更高的成长绩效水平,促进企业不断创新,创造和保持企业持久的竞争优势     

唐云的柔性战略

柔性战略是指为更有效地实现目标,在动态的、不确定的环境下,主动适应变化、利用变化和制造变化以提高自身竞争能力而制定一组可选择的行动规则及相应方案。柔性战略增强企业适应能力,使其快速、敏捷地抓住和利用机会,谋求更高的成长绩效水平,促进企业不断创新,创造和保持企业持久的竞争优势     

多寡头不确定条件下的矿山企业期权博弈基本价值研究

期权博弈方法把实物期权和博弈论结合起来,在不确定性条件和竞争环境下,为企业提供项目的投资估价和决策,以实现投资项目价值的最大化。竞争环境下的矿山企业博弈参与方不再局限于对称双寡头,而是考虑了序贯均衡阶段的多寡头矿山企业,在进行项目投资决策时,可假设投资初期成本各不相同,建立多寡头矿山企业期权博弈基本价值的价值函数和最佳投资时机进行研究。     

期权理论在企业并购价值评估中的应用

企业并购,是一项高风险的投资决策,是典型的战略投资。而并购的估价又是整个并购成败的关键。目前,传统的评估方法即便是最常用的折现现金流量法,在估值时也往往忽略了并购方隐含的期权价值,而低估了并购的价值,进而可能错过了有利的并购机会。本文拟从期权的角度阐述企业并购和期权的关系,提出企业并购价值评估中,基于期权理论和现金流量折现法的企业价值评估模型。     

企业财务灵活性的价值评估

财务灵活性是指企业动用闲置资金和剩余负债能力，应对可能发生或无法预见的紧急情况，充分把握未来投资机会的能力，因此财务灵活性具有期权的价值。利用B1ack-Scholes期权定价模型对企业财务灵活性的价值进行了评估，并对广义上的最优财务灵活性确定进行了初步分析。     

经理人股票期权价值的理论及应用

股票期权激励的研究和实践中广泛应用布莱克——斯科尔斯模型进行股票期权的公允价值计价,然而对经理人而言的股票期权价值还要考虑经理人的风险偏好、财富的多元化程度等因素的影响。经理人期权价值不等于公司期权成本的基本理论可以解决及解释在股票期权实践中的一些关键性问题,如期权激励有效性的衡量、激励期权的风险溢价、最优行权价的确定、行权时间的确定。该理论的应用对我国上市公司股权激励的实施也有重要启示。     

用户基础、网络分享与企业边界决定

互联网的出现和应用带来新经济的迅速发展,互联网应用于企业的一个显著特征是使相关企业及其产品获得某种程度的网络外部性。网络外部性的存在有可能改变产品的用户基础或者再造企业采购、工艺流程以及强化营销服务网络,进而使企业的现有边界发生动态调整。基于用户基础的模型表明,网络效应的存在,扩大了两企业进行合作的空间,因此,在某种程度上扩大了企业的横向边界。而引入网络分享因素后,在一定条件下某些上游企业将有积极性创造新的营销系统,从而导致了企业纵向边界的调整变化。     

企业绿色技术创新不确定条件下碳达峰路径优化研究北大核心

绿色技术创新是实现双碳目标的重要路径,企业对不同绿色技术的采纳和投资等行为影响了技术创新效应在减排目标实现中的贡献。本文构建了技术不确定发展下企业最优投资策略的期权博弈模型,分析企业最优投资时机和技术采纳的动态变化。分析表明:(1)绿色技术预期减排收益、不确定程度和投资成本影响企业投资时机,企业出于先于对手研发而占领市场的考量会使投资提前;(2)当收益率先到达两企业同时投资临界值时,两企业会对一项技术进行同时投资,否则企业为争当领导者会在更小的临界点进行投资;(3)企业面临一项成熟技术作为追随者和一项不确定性更高的新技术作为领导者的投资选择时,即使新技术当前收益低于成熟技术,当领导者价值函数值大于追随者价值函数时,企业会跳过成熟技术而率先选择新技术进行投资。     

企业并购的信号博弈分析

井购是市场经济体制下的一种产权交易活动，是并购双方在追求各自利益最大化前提下所进行的信号博弈过程。由于企业井购双方信息不对称性所导致的逆向选择，企业并购市场会出现分离均衡、混同均衡和准分离均衡三种状态，其中只有分离均衡是最理想和最有效率的均衡。文章建立了目标企业与并购企业之间的信号传递博弈模型，提出克服并购双方信息的不对称性和对目标企业进行合理估价是实现分离均衡的最有效方法。     

Endogenous location leadership

We analyze a game of timing where Sellers, which have marginal production cost asymmetries, can delay entry and a commitment to a location in a Hotelling type setting. When cost differences are large enough the game becomes a war of attrition that yields Stackelberg behavior where the high cost firm will delay choosing a location until the low cost firm commits to its position. We find interaction effects between timing and the degree of product differentiation and compute timing/location and mixed strategy equilibria through a range of marginal cost differences. The firms maximally differentiate with moderate cost differences; with somewhat greater cost differences there is intermediate differentiation, and; with large cost differences there is a blockading monopoly. The low cost firm always commits to entry immediately whereas the high cost firm either enters immediately, shortly after the low cost leader, or never, depending on the cost differences. Finally, we find that in equilibrium the duopoly is sustained for a larger range of cost differentials and that differentiation is greater than the social optimum.     

Pricing in revenue management for multiple firms competing for customers

We consider the pricing strategies of multiple firms providing the same service in competition for a common pool of customers in a revenue management context. The firms have finite capacity and the demand at each firm depends on the selling prices charged by all firms, each of which satisfies demand up to a given capacity limit. We use game theory to analyze the systems when firms face either a deterministic demand or a general stochastic demand. The existence and uniqueness conditions of a Nash equilibrium are derived, and we calculate the explicit Nash equilibrium point when the demand at each firm is a linear function of price. We also conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to cost and capacity parameters.     

Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness*

When analyzing firm competition over two strategic variables (e.g., quality and price), it is important to decide whether to model it as a one-stage or a two-stage game. Our analysis focuses on markets in which consumers are not aware of all alternatives. We find that, if consumers are sufficiently unaware, both the one-stage and the two-stage equilibria of the game that explicitly models limited awareness are close to the one-stage equilibrium of the standard game, which assumes full awareness. Therefore, markets in which consumers have limited awareness can be studied with standard models, provided that the one-stage game is analyzed.     

Value of knowledge—Technology strategies in different knowledge regimes

This paper introduces a knowledge-based view of the firm, which enables us to analyze how the firm should build up its technology strategies in order to capture profits from knowledge assets through knowledge creation, replication, integration and transfer. The basic idea is to shed light on the mechanisms that make it possible, first, to create value from knowledge assets, second, to protect the value created by using different protection mechanisms (such as legal means or tacitness) and, third, to share the value created between the innovator, imitators and partners (open innovation model). In our model we derive technology strategies based on different knowledge bases and their characteristics. By means of our simulation experiments we open up some black boxes behind technology strategies that are often launched only as empirical generalizations, such as Freeman’s famous technology strategy typology. Our tool can also be used as a framework when the dynamic effects of technology strategies are traced and empirically scrutinized.     

COLLUSION AND FIGHTS IN AN EXPERIMENT WITH PRICE‐SETTING FIRMS AND ADVANCE PRODUCTION*

We present results from 50‐round duopoly and triopoly experiments. Firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. Most markets evolve either to monopolies as a consequence of bankruptcies or to collusion at the monopolistic price. Evolution is faster in markets with two than in those with three firms. Therefore, over time average price is lower with three than with two. Consumer surplus is higher with three firms, but efficiency is lower in markets with three firms.     

差别化竞争战略与服务增强的内在机理

国内外许多研究者都观察到了制造企业中服务收入占营业收入的比重越来越高、服务的利润贡献越来越大，这一现象即“服务增强”。本文首先将产品界定为既包括有形实体，也包括无形服务的完全产品，然后构造了一个完全信息动态博弈模型来研究这一现象。我们发现，厂商实施服务延伸实体产品差别化的竞争战略，必然导致服务增强的结果，同时，增进厂商利润与消费者总剩余。这一结论，为我国企业通过服务差别化来谋求在全球市场上的可持续竞争优势提供了理论根据。     

The Collusive Equilibrium in a Quantity-Setting Supergame: An Application to Taiwan’s Flour Industry

This paper examines the stability of the collusive equilibrium in Friedman’s repeated game through an empirical study of Taiwan’s flour market. We calculate the payoff streams following a deviation or adherence for each firm. The evidence shows that the specified punishment path is credible, and could sustain the collusive allocation.     

Equilibrium market share—a measure of competitive strength

If an oligopoly is modelled as a non-zero-sum game, then the market shares associated with an equilibrium solution can be interpreted as measuring the competitive strength of the firms. By comparing afirm's equilibrium market share with its actual market share, one can conclude whether the firm has positive or negative growth potential in terms of market share, which has some implications for its investment strategy.     

基于微分博弈的发电商报价模型及其分析

基于微分博弈原理,构建了发电商报价动态模型,在运用Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman方法对其进行求解基础上,针对3家发电商的情况进行了数值仿真分析。分析表明：高边际成本的发电商报价策略的动态均衡会大于其Coumot-Nash均衡,而边际成本较低的发电商报价策略的动态均衡略低于CoumotoNash均衡;随贴现率的增大,发电商的均衡报价策略会经历由递增到递减的变化过程,而学习速度对发电商报价策略的影响则是相反的;当贴现率与学习速度同时变化时,对市场出清价的局部影响较为复杂,但当两者同时逐渐增大时,发电商报价策略的动态均衡会逐渐稳定在较高水平。