The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area: The Role of Modelling Choices and Data Vintages*

We survey the recent empirical literature concerning the cyclical response of fiscal policies in the euro area, finding large differences in results. We show that these differences are heavily influenced by the choices made in modelling fiscal behaviour. We make a case for the use, in assessing policies and in the EMU context, of the standard modelling choice where the discretionary reaction of fiscal policy is directly estimated. Models where the overall reaction to the cycle – which includes the effects of both discretionary actions and automatic stabilisers – is directly estimated tend to suggest either strong pro‐cyclical or strong counter‐cyclical discretionary reactions, depending on how this component is identified. Within the standard model and for the years 1994 to 2008, we show that results are significantly affected by the data vintage (ex post or real‐time). With ex post data, we find an unambiguous indication of a‐cyclicality. Using real‐time data, we find that the output gap matters. However, depending on whether we assess policy intentions or actual policies, euro‐area governments' behaviour radically changes. A plausible interpretation is that in the implementation phase, governments loosen their fiscal stance, giving in to political pressures that are proportional to the scale of the economic difficulties in bad times and the size of the ‘growth dividend’ in good times.     

The Cyclical Relationships Between South Africa's Net Capital Inflows and Fiscal and Monetary Policies

This paper investigates the cyclical relationships between South Africa's post-liberalization net capital inflows and fiscal and monetary policies. Correlation analysis shows that the bulk of South Africa's capital inflows do not have a significant cyclical relationship with fiscal policy but have a procyclical and reactive cyclical relationship with monetary policy. Furthermore, causality analysis finds that fiscal policy reacts to monetary policy and capital flows, whereas capital flows react to monetary policy. Hence, these results suggest that South Africa's policymakers are in a better position to control the country's capital inflows using monetary policy than using fiscal policy.     

Macro‐Fiscal Volatility and the Composition of Public Spending*

Earlier empirical literature has examined some long‐ and medium‐term aspects of macro‐fiscal volatility while leaving its short‐term fiscal impact unexplored. To help fill that gap, we examine the impact of macro‐fiscal volatility on the composition of public spending. To that end, we analyse a panel of 10 EU countries during 1991–2007. Our results suggest that increases in the volatility of regularly‐collected and cyclical revenues such as the VAT and income taxes tend to tilt the expenditure composition in favour of public investment. In contrast, increases in the volatility of ad hoc taxes such as capital taxes tend to favour public consumption spending, albeit only a little. We interpret such volatility innovations as conveying news to the fiscal policymaker about the underlying economic conditions, with especially regularly‐collected and cyclical taxes prompting short‐term cyclical fine‐tuning.     

Fiscal Transparency,Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings

Fiscal transparency can provide policymakers with incentives to adopt better policies by enhancing the public debate on the design and sustainability of fiscal policy and establishing accountability for their implementation. Fiscal transparency can also reduce uncertainty about fiscal policy and fiscal outturns by providing more information on the underlying fiscal position and fiscal risks. Both effects suggest that countries should benefit from adopting transparency enhancing policies through better market assessments of their sovereign risk. In this paper, we investigate whether fiscal transparency has an effect on market perceptions of sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign credit ratings, and if so, through which channels. We find that fiscal transparency has a positive and significant effect on ratings – one standard deviation increase in fiscal transparency increases credit ratings by 0.7 and 1 notches (or steps in the credit rating scale) in advanced and developing economies, respectively – but its effect works through different channels in advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies, fiscal transparency is associated with better fiscal outcomes, leading indirectly to higher credit ratings. In developing economies, the direct uncertainty‐reducing effect of fiscal transparency seems to be more important. Indeed, the effect of fiscal transparency on fiscal performance is found to increase with the level of institutional development.     

Public Investment in Europe: Evolution and Determinants in perspective*

We describe the evolution of public investment and public capital stocks in Europe over the past three decades. Against this background, we analyse the macroeconomic determinants of public investment, with a special focus on its long‐term trend. We find that public investment has been determined by national income, the stance of budgetary policies and fiscal sustainability considerations. Neither the cost of financing nor the fiscal rules embodied in EMU have had a systemic impact on public investment. The significant downtrend that characterises the evolution of public investment in non‐cohesion countries is chiefly determined by drawn‐out episodes of fiscal consolidation, unrelated to EMU.     

Cyclical fiscal policy,credit constraints,and industry growth

What are the effects of cyclical fiscal policy on industry growth? We show that industries with a relatively heavier reliance on external finance or lower asset tangibility tend to grow faster (in terms of both value added and of labor productivity growth) in countries that implement fiscal policies that are more countercyclical. We reach this conclusion using Rajan and Zingales׳s (1998) difference-in-difference methodology on a panel data sample of manufacturing industries across 15 OECD countries over the period 1980–2005.     

Making the Stability Pact More Flexible: Does It Lead to Pro‐Cyclical Fiscal Policies?*

One of the often‐discussed negative aspects of the Stability and Growth Pact is the rigidity of its deficit rule. Several reform proposals aim currently to alleviate the rule in order to allow the automatic stabilisers to operate freely. However, such a reform is likely to cause even further deterioration of fiscal balances in the EMU member countries. The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that, in the past, increasing the structural deficit had a strong negative impact on the degree of anti‐cyclical fiscal stabilisation. This suggests that the reform of the Pact, through higher structural deficits, could decrease rather than increase the scope of anti‐cyclical fiscal actions in the EMU member countries.     

Strengthening Post‐Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the Rise – A New Dataset

Institutions that aim to constrain policy discretion in order to promote sound fiscal policies are once again at the forefront of the policy debate. Interest in fiscal councils – independent watchdogs active in the public debate – has grown rapidly in recent years. In this paper, we present the first cross‐country dataset summarising key characteristics of fiscal councils among International Monetary Fund members. The data document a surge in the number of fiscal councils since the 2008–09 economic and financial crisis, and also illustrate that well‐designed fiscal councils are associated with stronger fiscal performance and better macro‐economic and budgetary forecasts. Key features of effective fiscal councils include operational independence from politics, the provision or public assessment of budgetary forecasts, a strong presence in the public debate and the monitoring of compliance with fiscal policy rules.     

财政刺激政策的难题

在国际金融危机的影响下,许多国家采取加大财政支出的政策促进经济复苏。但是,这些财政刺激政策在现实中却遇到了一些难题:居民边际消费倾向的偏低、大国内的地区差异,以及财政年度平衡制度的弊端等。由于这些难题的存在,单纯依靠增加财政支出规模促进经济复苏的刺激政策的实施效果充满了不确定性。     

Interaction of Government Tiers and Central Banks in a Federation: An Empirical Test

Fiscal rules are necessary to protect monetary policy from the consequences of unsustainable or active fiscal policy for inflation. Monetary unions, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), require even stronger fiscal rules to avoid free riding by regional fiscal authorities on the common monetary policy. By contrast, in a fiscal federation, the federal government internalises the effect of active regional policies on the overall price level. Federal fiscal policy contributes to price stability either by enforcing fiscal rules or by adjusting its own stance. Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), we test whether federal and regional governments in Germany behave in an active or passive way. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on other regions. The German federal government offsets the effect on the price level by running passive policies. The Bundesbank's prime objective of price stability is therefore endorsed by fiscal policy. The results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.     

Public Investment,the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’

The fiscal rules set in the Treaty of Maastricht and in the Stability and Growth Pact have sometimes been criticised as an excessively binding constraint for appropriate counter‐cyclical action. The risk that the rules may permanently reduce the public sector's contribution to capital accumulation has also been pointed out. In this framework, the adoption of a ‘golden rule’ has been suggested. Starting from the recent debate, this paper tackles two questions: (a) the implications of the Pact for public investment and (b) the pros and cons of introducing a golden rule in EMU's fiscal framework, given the objectives of low public debts and adequate margins for a stabilising budgetary policy. The analysis suggests that the rules set in the Treaty and in the Pact may negatively influence public investment spending. However, the golden rule, although intuitively appealing, does not seem to be an appropriate solution to the problem.     

India's fiscal and monetary framework: growth in an opening economy

Since a crisis is a shock impinging on a system, the response can be used to deduce aspects of the system's structure. Analysis of the crisis and recovery suggests aggregate supply in India is elastic but subject to upward shocks. This has implications for cyclical policy and for fiscal consolidation. Both monetary and fiscal policy should identify measures that would reduce costs, while avoiding too large a demand contraction. Specific policies are identified and Indian policies evaluated.     

Fiscal Policy,Business Cycles and Economic Stabilisation: Evidence from Industrialised and Developing Countries*

This paper empirically investigates the responsiveness of fiscal policy to business cycles and the effectiveness of fiscal policy in reducing economic fluctuations. From regressions on the responsiveness of fiscal policy to business cycles, we find that the government's current expenditures and subsidies & transfers move counter‐cyclically, whereas taxes and capital expenditures move pro‐cyclically. Using economic fluctuations in neighbouring countries as an instrumental variable, we show that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates understate the responsiveness of fiscal policy to economic fluctuations. We also find that fiscal policy responds asymmetrically over economic fluctuations. In investigating the effectiveness of fiscal policy in reducing economic fluctuations, we mitigate omitted variable bias by adding four important factors ‐ military expenditures, oil production, economic fluctuations in neighbouring countries and fiscal policy responsiveness to business cycles. The results of effectiveness regressions are consistent with the responsiveness regressions, highlighting the importance of current expenditures, especially subsidies and transfers, in responding to business cycles and stabilising the economy.     

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination,Macroeconomic Stability,and Sovereign Risk Premia

In standard macroeconomic models, equilibrium stability and uniqueness require monetary policy to actively target inflation and fiscal policy to ensure long‐run debt sustainability. We show analytically that these requirements change, and depend on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, when government debt is risky. In that case, budget deficits raise interest rates and crowd out consumption. Consequently, countercyclical fiscal policies reduce the parameter space supporting stable and unique equilibria and are feasible only if complemented with more aggressive debt consolidation and/or active monetary policy. Stability is more easily achieved, however, under procyclical fiscal policies.     

地方政府周期性财政收支、融资依赖与地区出口结构

在财政分权与政治垂直管理的激励体制下,地方政府财政支出的逆周期性弱化。同时,地区间初始禀赋差异和风险异质性则使得地方政府财政政策的周期性特征存在明显的地区差异。本文借鉴Rajan与Zingales(1998)发展的固定效应估计模型,采用2004年我国29个省份29个行业的相关数据,考察了周期性财政政策对地区出口结构的影响。本文研究显示,财政政策逆周期性较强的地区,在外部融资依赖性高的行业出口相对更多,具有比较优势。同时,在控制了人力资本、物质资本和自然资源禀赋等传统比较优势影响因素,以及外部市场接近度、国内市场容量和基础设施等新经济地理的因素之后,本文的结论依然成立。     

Fiscal Policy Shocks in the Euro Area and the US: An Empirical Assessment*

We analyse the impact of fiscal policy shocks in the euro area as a whole, using a newly‐available quarterly data set of fiscal variables for the period 1981–2007. To allow for comparability with previous results on euro‐area countries and the US, we use a standard structural vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, and study the impact of aggregated and disaggregated government spending and net‐tax shocks. In addition, to frame euro‐area results, we apply the same methodology for the same sample period to US data. We also explore the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of variables aiming to control for underlying financial and fiscal conditions. The main new findings are that: expansionary fiscal shocks have a short‐term positive impact on GDP and private consumption, with government spending shocks entailing, in general, higher effects on economic activity than (net) tax reductions; output multipliers to government expenditure shocks are of similar size in the euro area and in the US; the persistence of a fiscal spending shock is higher in the US than in the euro area, which appears to be related to military spending in the US; and fiscal multipliers have increased over the recent past in both geographical areas.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Empowerment: Evolving Concepts and Alternative Measures*

Decentralisation reforms are among the most common and significant public sector reforms, particularly in developing and transitional countries around the world. Despite the importance of the topic to policy practitioners and academic researchers alike and the extensive empirical research on the topic, there is consensus in the literature that the measures of decentralisation that are currently used are unsatisfactory. In response, we propose an alternative measure of fiscal decentralisation based on the notion that decentralisation is more than simply the inverse of centralisation. Following Bahl (2005), we consider fiscal decentralisation as ‘the empowerment of people by the [fiscal] empowerment of their local governments’. Accordingly, we develop a measure of fiscal empowerment that allows us to quantify fiscal decentralisation as the gain in empowerment due to devolution and we analyse the proposed measures of empowerment and decentralisation for a cross‐section of developing, transitional and industrialised countries.     

Cyclically‐Neutral Generational Accounting

This paper introduces a key methodological innovation into generational accounting. By incorporating cyclically‐adjusted balances into the forward‐looking budget projections underlying the concept, we isolate pure policy effects, which render comparisons of the fiscal sustainability indicators obtained across time and countries truly meaningful. We also show that a demographic effect and a debt effect may drive fiscal sustainability measures over time, and establish a routine to control for these effects in the generational accounting framework. An empirical application for Spain illustrates that our proposed decomposition of indicators is empirically relevant. Standard generational accounting suggests that fiscal sustainability in Spain improved substantially in preparing for EMU. However, calculation of the pure policy effects reveals that this has not been the case.     

Fiscal Transfers and Fiscal Sustainability

We examine whether the U.S. and German state governments pursue sustainable fiscal policies taking into account fiscal transfers. Using panel data techniques we investigate whether the debt‐to‐GDP ratio had a positive influence on the primary surplus (Bohn model). We show that including/excluding fiscal transfers changes the results. If fiscal transfers are not included in the primary surplus, the test results do not indicate that the U.S. and German state governments pursued sustainable fiscal policies. Our results also suggest that fiscal transfers were positively related to debt. These findings indicate that intergovernmental transfers have implicitly subsidized debts.     

The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany

In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate the extent to which party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The data set includes 427 German local governments for the period 2000–2004. I exploit a period after a far‐reaching institutional reform that entirely re‐distributed political powers on both the government level and the fiscal supervisor level. The results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co‐partisanship) drive short‐term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left‐wing local governments run higher deficits than their right‐wing counterparts; left‐wing supervisors tolerate higher deficits than right‐wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal supervisors is recommended.