Intra‐provincial Revenue Sharing and the Subnational Government's Fiscal Capacity in China: The Case of Zhejiang Province

This study investigates whether the tax‐sharing system has deteriorated the fiscal capacity of subnational governments by analyzing how fiscal revenues are divided between provincial and sub‐provincial governments. Our study of county‐level fiscal data from Zhejiang Province in China during 1994–2007 shows that intra‐provincial revenue‐sharing rules favor county governments in two ways: (i) they improve county governments ‘fiscal autonomy in terms of using their own revenues; and (ii) they enhance county governments ‘fiscal capacity through province‐to‐county general transfers. In addition, we find that intra‐provincial fiscal revenue‐sharing rules and transfers reduce fiscal disparity between counties.     

Taxation,fiscal capacity,and credible commitment in eighteenth-century China: the effects of the formalization and centralization of informal surtaxes†

This article explores a tax reform in eighteenth-century China that formalized county-level informal surtaxes and centralized control over them in the hands of provincial governors, in an effort to strengthen provincial fiscal capacity. The findings show that this reform increased the frequency of famine relief in cases of exceptional disaster relative to other weather conditions. The study shows that the effects were driven by the new fiscal revenues—public funds—at the governors’ discretion, not by the central government's relief actions, bureaucratic control over lower officials, or other concurrent fiscal reforms. Moreover, the reform facilitated intertemporal smoothing and inter-regional risk sharing. However, the effects declined as soon as the central government broke its promise and began to appropriate provincial fiscal revenues. These findings not only provide evidence that fiscal centralization could enhance the provision of public goods in a premodern context, but also highlight that it was the lack of a credible commitment by the central government to the provincial governments that accounted for the short-lived effects of the reform.     

INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS AND DECENTRALISATION IN INDONESIA

A fundamental restructuring of intergovernmental relations involving decentralisation and expanded autonomy for provincial and local governments is under way in Indonesia. This paper explores the intergovernmental financial system that preceded the new General Allocation Fund (DAU), with particular attention to the old Inpres development grants. Like Inpres, the DAU attempts to address national development objectives, and can be seen as a logical consequence of reform efforts in intergovernmental finance that began long before the demise of the New Order government in 1998. The use of earmarked Inpres grants enabled the central government to ensure that key sectors such as roads, public health and education received adequate attention throughout Indonesia's diverse regions. Local governments' experience with Inpres should help in implementation of the DAU, yet Law 25/1999which restructures fiscal relations between the various levels of governmentmay actually have increased local reliance on the central government.     

分税制改革、城市偏向与中国农业增长

分税制改革因导致中央和地方政府之间财权和事权的不匹配而增加了地方政府的财政压力,从而深刻地改变着地方政府的行为模式。当农业税费全归地方财政收入,农业对经济增长的贡献不断下降而经济增长又成为地方官员政治晋升的主要指标时,面临财政压力的理性地方政府会强化其城市偏向程度,从而损害农业增长。本文运用1978至2009年中国省级面板数据进行的实证分析表明:分税制下的地方财政压力对农业增长特别是粮食增长产生消极影响;非本级财政收入因缓解地方财政压力而有助于农业增长;地方政府对预算外资金的依赖则不利于农业增长。历史和经验证据支持了分税制改革强化地方政府城市偏向的观点。     

Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China, 1994–2002

The question of whether fiscal decentralization has affected economic growth since the 1994 fiscal reform in China is interesting to both policy makers and economists. Using a simple model of endogenous growth that incorporates spending by different levels of government, and a panel data set for 30 provinces for the period of 1994–2002, this paper finds that fiscal decentralization contributes significantly to economic growth. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction that fiscal decentralization can increase economic efficiency. In addition, this paper attempts to investigate how the relationship between fiscal decentralization and provincial growth differs in the different regions considered. For this purpose, the 30 Chinese provinces and regions are categorized into three conventional economic belts that comprise the eastern, central, and western areas. This study finds that the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth vary among these three regions.     

财政转移支付的政治经济学:理论与实证

传统的财政转移支付理论认为中央政府的财政转移支付旨在经济效率和财政均等化，这忽视了影响财政转移支付的政治因素。文章拘建了中央政府以政治稳定为目标，通过向各省的财政转移支付来维持社会稳定的理论模型，利用1995-2009年的省际面板数据发现，国家政治稳定因素在我国的财政转移支付中的效应显著。其中维护国家统一和社会秩序稳定的因素起了主要作用。因此，对我国财政转移支付体系的改革不能仅仅停留在缩小纵向和横向财政失衡上面，必须同时从经济效率和政治稳定的角度来探讨财政转移支付体系的改革。     

改革开放30年财政支出与中国经济增长——基于省级面板数据的实证分析

文章利用改革开放30年的省级面板数据对财政支出与中国经济增长进行了实证性的检验,结果表明,财政支出和居民消费能促进我国经济增长,但存在明显的区域差异。全国、东部和中部的财政支出对居民消费有“挤入效应”,而在西部是“挤出效应”。经济增长变动是财政支出变动的格兰杰原因,“瓦格纳法则”在全国、东部和中部地区都是成立的。     

财政分权，省级官员特征与地方政府债务规模——基于2010-2014年省级政府数据的实证分析

政府债务规模和风险是一级政府关注的重点问题。从财政分权和省级官员特征两个维度,本文考察了地方政府债务规模的影响因素,并在此基础上进一步研究财政分权程度和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的交互影响作用。通过2010-2014年30个省级政府的实证数据进行混合OLS回归,研究发现财政分权程度越高,地方政府债务规模越小。省级官员的年龄过大或过小都会使地方政府债务规模的减小,同时具有企业工作背景的省长和省委书记也会抑制地方政府债务规模的扩张,并且财政分权和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的影响是相互促进的。据此提出建议,合理控制地方政府债务膨胀。     

财政自主与公共支出效率:自地方政府实践维度观察

公共支出效率主要受相对财政自主——地方政府自有收入在支出中的比例——的正面影响。这表明了分权确立独立主体的激励型好处,但更受绝对财政自主——地方政府自有收入——的负面影响,意味着我国分权缺乏相应的控制和问责机制,所谓的财政自主还没有达到规范意义上的要求。因此,我国地方分权应坚持,但配套的公共财政包括公共预算制度更应尽快建立和健全。     

分税制、转移支付与地方政府财政努力

本文实证检验了分税制和转移支付对地方政府财政努力的影响,通过引入空间效应,将总效应分解为直接效应和间接效应。我们发现,地方财政收入分成比例的提高会提高地方政府财政努力程度,财政转移支付依赖越高则地方政府财政努力程度越低,并且地方政府会依据过去的分成比例和财政转移支付来决定其财政努力水平。利用空间计量模型,我们还发现,地方政府之间存在横向模仿行为,横向政府间财政策略存在空间外溢性。     

Local Governments' Fiscal Pressure and the Dependence on Polluting Industries in China

Using a large, unique county‐level panel dataset for China from 1998 to 2006, this paper investigates the relationship between local governments' fiscal pressure and their preference for developing polluting industries. The results show that there exist fiscal pressure effects; namely, a positive link between the fiscal pressure faced by a county and its industrial tax dependence on polluting industries. We also investigate the heterogeneity of the fiscal pressure effects and find that fiscal pressure effects are significant only when local fiscal pressure is sufficiently high up to a certain point, and when there are more earmarked transfers. In contrast to the situation in east China, fiscal pressure effects in central and west China are more pronounced. Therefore, when dealing with environmental problems, policy‐makers need to take local governments' fiscal conditions into account.     

The Elusive Total Budget Outlay of the Japanese Government: An Inquiry into the Japanese National Accounts II

The gross expenditure by the general government sector in the Japanese National Accounts for 1997 was reported to be 180.5 trillion yen. This figure is known to exclude some components of the fiscal activity of the government. Hence, while this figure is well defined, it is incomplete as a measure of the total expenditure of the Japanese government. The Fiscal Statistics issued by the Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, reports that net total outlay of the central government alone for 1997 was 170.0 trillion yen. When the provincial and local governments' outlay is added and adjusted for duplication, the total outlay is estimated at 234 trillion yen. The definition for this figure, however, is quite vague. It is extremely difficult to pin down the total government expenditure from the fiscal records of the government. The measurement of other concepts encounters similar problems. In this paper, we explore reasons why the fiscal records of the Japanese government are so obscure. We also consider what may be done to generate measures of fiscal activities of the Japanese government that are easily interpretable and usable in assessing their macroeconomic impacts. J. Japan. Int. Econ., June 2002, 16(2) pp. 177–193. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104, and NBER. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C82, H10, H50, H60, H70, H80.     

我国政府间事权财权划分的方式演进、面临问题及对策建议

分税制财政分权体制下我国政府间事权财权划分存在事权界定模糊、中央与地方的事权和财力不对称、事权财权划分中缺乏规范的法律界定的问题。构建和完善我国政府间事权财权划分的法治化体系应从修正《中华人民共和国宪法》、制定《中央与地方关系法》、制定中央和地方政府财政收入权划分的法律以及完善《预算法》等方面入手。     

厘清新疆能源资源开发中地方与中央利益关系的建议

作为国家重要的能源产地,在长期的能源资源开发中,新疆自治区政府和中央政府形成了不同的利益分配关系和矛盾,其焦点主要是能源资源矿权的归属和利益分享比例。鉴于新疆在全国能源战略中的地位和民族自治地区的特殊性质,能源开发中所产生的矛盾就不单纯是一种经济问题,而是政治、经济、民族等各种问题和矛盾在能源开发中的综合反映。本文从民族区域自治的视角对厘清新疆能源开发中地方与中央利益关系问题提出了几点建议。     

Fiscal Decentralization or Centralization: Diverging Paths of Chinese Cities

If fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and explains it in a public finance framework. It argues that fiscal decentralization and its economy‐liberalizing effect entail significant short‐term fiscal risk. The more a locality relies on uncompetitive business ownership for fiscal revenue, the less likely fiscal decentralization is to occur. This article compiles a dataset of 20 provincial capitals between 1999 and 2016 to test for the connection between a city's tax base and its fiscal centralization level. It then pairs two “most similar” cities to trace how fiscal security concerns drove their fiscal and economic policies apart. This article adds a micro‐level perspective to the literature on fiscal federalism. By pointing out the fiscal constraints confronting local governments, it offers a new angle to understand the different growth paths of Chinese cities.     

俄罗斯财政分权程度

以财政自主权为主线,基于IMF和OECD不同的评估方法,对俄罗斯财政分权有效性提出了合理解释。虽然俄罗斯财政资源分权处于较高水平,但是定性评估却得出相反的结论。正是法律约束条件下的自主权不足才产生了较强的财政从属性以及非正式自主权的不良激励。这也是中国目前分权财政体制的重要特征。对该问题的研究对提高中国政府的治理效率具有重要的借鉴意义。     

分税制改革与我国财政分权经济增长效应的跨区差异

在Bazm（1990）、Davoodi和Zou（1998）模型的基础上,文章构造了一个财政分权与经济增长关系的模型,并利用相关省级面板数据,实证研究了分税制改革对我国经济增长跨区差异的影响。结果发现,1994年分税制改革后,我国财政分权的经济增长效应呈现出显著的跨区差异,并且财政分权总体上扩大了地区差距。笔者认为,分税制改革后不同地区产业结构与所有制结构的差异所导致的地方政府行为的差异是造成我国财政分权经济增长效应跨区差异与地区差距扩大的重要原因。     

环境规制对工业企业绿色创新效率的影响——基于空间杜宾模型的实证分析

对我国省域工业企业绿色创新效率的测算和财政分权条件下不同环境规制对企业绿色创新效率影响的分析表明,工业企业绿色创新效率具有明显的正向空间集聚效应,财政分权对工业企业绿色创新效率存在显著的抑制作用,不同环境规制工具存在明显差异,财政分权和环境规制的交互效应在“行政命令型”环境规制中尤为显著。不同地区的环境规制以及与财政分权的交互效应具有显著的区域异质性。我国应优化财政分权制度与地方官员绩效考核评价体系,充分考虑环境规制工具与地方财政分权的交互效应,在不同区域选择不同的环境规制工具,制定跨区域的环境规制政策,发挥东部地区绿色创新的优势,进一步完善中西部地区的绿色创新补偿机制。     

Losing autonomy: the Norwegian central bank during the Second World War

In the mid‐twentieth century a number of central banks around the western world lost their operational autonomy and were placed under government control. The origin of these policy changes can be traced to the intellectual and political developments of the interwar era in addition to the introduction of the Bretton Woods monetary system. The Norwegian central bank offers a particularly stark example of this phenomenon: experiencing a rapid decline from its high level of autonomy in the interwar years, to a clear subordination to the government after 1945. Through an analysis of the correspondence between the main policy makers in the exiled Norwegian government and central bank management, this article contributes to the understanding of central bank autonomy by tracing the decisive factors that led to the Norwegian central bank's loss of agency.     

日本政府间财政关系的演变及启示

在对日本的中央和地方政府之间财政关系的形成与发展进行梳理基础上,对日本近年来以三位一体改革及市町村合并为代表的政府间财政制度改革的动向与展望加以分析,并对中国财政体制改革提出对策建议。