Government spending,political cycles,and the cross section of stock returns

Using a novel measure of industry exposure to government spending, we show predictable variation in cash flows and stock returns over political cycles. During Democratic presidencies, firms with high government exposure experience higher cash flows and stock returns, while the opposite pattern holds true during Republican presidencies. Business cycles, firm characteristics, and standard risk factors do not account for the pattern in returns across presidencies. An investment strategy that exploits the presidential cycle predictability generates abnormal returns as large as 6.9% per annum. Our results suggest market underreaction to predictable variation in the effect of government spending policies.     

The Real Options Component and Market Value of Taiwan Technological Companies

Real options valuation has been applied in real investment extensively. However the empirical researches of real options components’ value are seldom studied. This study uses the panel data model to test whether the stock prices of Taiwan listed companies reflect investor’s expectations regarding the value of real options. This article demonstrates that investors cannot ignore the real options components when evaluating stock market value. The results also confirm that the proportion of a firm’s market value not due to assets-in-place is significantly and positively related to the variables of stock beta, skewness of stock returns, size, capital stock, and research and development. In addition, firms with lower firm life cycle have a higher real options value.     

The Piotroski F‐score: evidence from Australia

A market‐neutral strategy that is long [short] stocks with a high [low] Piotroski F‐score generates an index‐weighted 0.8 percent pm on S&P/ASX 200 stocks and 1.4 percent pm on smaller stocks. Equal‐weighted returns are higher and in all cases returns are statistically significant. However, the Carhart model alphas are not statistically significant except in the case of equal‐weighted small cap portfolios. For such portfolios, however, most of the alpha comes from the short side and most institutional investors would find them uninvestable due to capacity constraints. A range of tests indicate that analyst neglect does not explain the F‐score premium.     

Resolving the Presidential Puzzle

Many financial economists are puzzled by the fact that stock returns are higher under Democratic than Republican presidencies. In this paper, we test whether this return differential is explained by risk using a conditional version of the Fama and French (1993) model that allows risk to vary across political cycles. We find that the presidential puzzle can be explained when risk is properly taken into account. Much of the return differential can be attributed to the fact that Democratic presidencies are associated with higher market and default risk premiums than their Republican counterparts.     

Is the presidential premium spurious?

A hotly debated question in finance is whether the higher stock returns under Democratic presidencies relative to Republican presidencies represent abnormal return, risk premium, or mere statistical fluke. This paper investigates whether this presidential premium is due to spurious-regression bias, data mining, or economic policy uncertainty. Decomposing the presidential premium into expected and unexpected components, we find that over two-thirds of the premium is unexpected, which is inconsistent with the spurious regression bias explanation. The presidential premium is not explained by data mining given that it persists in the post-publication period, and remains robust even if we purge returns of their covariation with economic policy uncertainty.     

Political Party Affiliation of the President,Majority in Congress,and Sin Stock Returns

We find that in contrast to the stock market, which performs better during Democratic presidencies, “sin” stocks—publicly traded producers of tobacco, alcohol, and gaming—perform better during Republican presidencies and even more so when the Republican presidency is accompanied by a Republican majority in at least one chamber of Congress. We examine whether sin firms use contributions to establish connections with politicians and find that sin firms contribute more to Republican candidates and that these contributions are greater when Republicans are in power. We also find a positive relation between political contributions and future returns. The relation is stronger for contributions to Republicans.     

Real‐Time Forecasting and Political Stock Market Anomalies: Evidence for the United States

Using monthly data from 1953 to 2003, we apply a real‐time modeling approach to investigate the implications of U.S. political stock market anomalies for forecasting excess stock returns in real‐time. Our empirical findings show that political variables, chosen on the basis of widely used model‐selection criteria, are often included in real‐time forecasting models. However, political variables do not contribute systematically to improving the performance of simple trading rules. For this reason, political stock market anomalies are not necessarily an indication of market inefficiency.     

我国IPO长期市场表现的实证研究——基于超常收益率不同测度方法的比较分析

本文选取1995年1月至2000年12月沪深两市774个A股IPO样本,计算IPO的等权平均、流通市值加权平均和总市值加权平均收益率,并使用不同的市场指数及配比股票组合的收益率加以调整来评价IPO的长期市场表现。经过事件时间和日历时间的实证研究发现:(1)我国IPO在上市后3年内总体上表现出长期强势。(2)IPO长期超常收益率对使用何种参照指标的收益率来调整以及使用何种加权平均方法很敏感。CAR和日历时间研究的结果更明显地表明我国IPO存在长期强势特征,而且使用市值加权平均方法计算的正超常收益率更为显著。(3)Fama-French三因素模型和CAPM模型回归的截距项都表明我国IPO存在正的长期超常收益率。     

Market States and the Effect on Equity REIT Returns due to Changes in Monetary Policy Stance

This study investigates the effect of changes in monetary policy on US equity real estate investment trust (EREIT) returns in lower and higher return ranges during bull, bear, and volatile stock market states using quantile regression. Results show that EREIT returns are sensitive to changes in monetary policy at different EREIT return ranges in different market states. During bull markets, changes in monetary policy have a significant negative impact on EREIT when investors have lower expectations of real estate price increases, but are not effective when investors have higher expectations of real estate price increases. During volatile and bear markets, EREIT returns are not sensitive to changes in monetary policy stance. Results also show that EREIT returns respond positively to stock returns in various states and conditions.     

Long-run Performance after Stock Splits: 1927 to 1996

We measure the postsplit performance of 12,747 stock splits from 1927 to 1996 using two methods to measure abnormal returns: size and book‐to‐market reference portfolios with bootstrapping, and calendar‐time abnormal returns combined with factor models. Between 1927 and 1996, neither method applied to splits 25 percent or larger finds performance significantly different from zero. Over selected subperiods, subsamples of 2–1 splits restricted by book‐to‐market availability requirements display positive abnormal returns using some methods. However, these samples show small or negligible abnormal returns using the calendar‐time method. Overall, the stock split evidence against market efficiency is neither pervasive nor compelling.     

The long-horizon returns behaviour of the Portuguese stock market1

In the last few years several research studies have challenged the traditional weak-form efficiency tests of the stock market. These studies suggested an alternative to the random walk model, containing temporary and permanent components. If stocks follow such a model then the traditional tests, using returns computed for short intervals would be unable to detect them. To investigate the evidence for such models in the Portuguese stock market ten stock indexes were created. This is a pioneer study of the Portuguese stock market, and uses nominal, real and excess returns, computed for longer horizons. Three methodologies were used: variance ratios, ordinary least squares regressions and weighted least squares regressions. The statistical significance of the results was studied using traditional parametric tests as well as non-parametric tests. The evidence is mixed, as the presence of tendencies towards mean aversion and mean reversion were detected. Results also show that the evidence is very sensitive to the methodology used and the signifcance tests performed. These results, however, do not necessarily reject the weak-form market efficiency hypothesis.     

Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Emerging Market Equity Prices

A stock market liberalization is a decision by a country's government to allow foreigners to purchase shares in that country's stock market. On average, a country's aggregate equity price index experiences abnormal returns of 3.3 percent per month in real dollar terms during an eight-month window leading up to the implementation of its initial stock market liberalization. This result is consistent with the prediction of standard international asset pricing models that stock market liberalization may reduce the liberalizing country's cost of equity capital by allowing for risk sharing between domestic and foreign agents.     

Stock Prices,Earnings, and Expected Dividends

Long historical averages of real earnings help forecast present values of future real dividends. With aggregate U.S. stock market data (1871–1986), a vector-autoregressive forecast of the present value of future dividends is, for each year, roughly a weighted average of moving-average earnings and current real price, with between two thirds and three fourths of the weight on the earnings measure. We develop the implications of this for the present-value model of stock prices and for recent results that long-horizon stock returns are highly forecastable.     

Shiller's CAPE: Market Efficiency and Risk

Robert Shiller shows that Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio (CAPE) is strongly associated with future long‐term stock returns. This is often interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency. We present two findings contrary to such an interpretation. First, if markets are efficient, stock returns should be higher than the risk‐free rate. We find that even when CAPE is in its ninth decile, future 10‐year stock returns, on average, are higher than future returns on 10‐year U.S. Treasurys. Thus, the results are largely consistent with market efficiency. Second, consistent with a risk–return tradeoff, we find that CAPE is negatively associated with future stock market volatility.     

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION UNCERTAINTY AND COMMON STOCK RETURNS IN THE UNITED STATES

There is substantial evidence on the influence of political outcomes on the business cycle and stock market. We further hypothesize that uncertainty about the outcome of a U.S. presidential election should be reflected in pre‐election common stock returns. Prior research pools returns based on the party of the winning candidate, assuming that the outcome of the election is known a priori. We use candidate preference (i.e., polling) data to construct a measure of election uncertainty. We find that if the election does not have a candidate with a dominant lead, stock market volatility (risk) and average returns rise.     

FILTER RULE TESTS OF THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SERIAL DEPENDENCIES IN DAILY STOCK RETURNS

In this paper we examine the ability of filter rules to predict variation in expected daily returns for a sample of 120 Dow Jones and S&P 100 stocks from 1963 through 1989. Equally weighted portfolios of filter-rule-traded stocks consistently outperform a buy-and-hold portfolio of the same stocks before accounting for transaction costs. The difference in returns between filter rule and buy-and-hold portfolios is eliminated by one-way transaction costs of 12 basis points. The economic significance of daily stock return autocorrelations is estimated. A marginal 1 percent increase in a first-order autocorrelation increases filter rule returns by an estimated 3.84 percent.     

Stock Volatility during the Recent Financial Crisis

This paper uses monthly returns from 1802 to 2010, daily returns from 1885 to 2010, and intraday returns from 1982 to 2010 in the USA to show how stock volatility has changed over time. It also uses various measures of volatility implied by option prices to infer what the market was expecting to happen in the months following the financial crisis in late 2008. This episode was associated with historically high levels of stock market volatility, particularly among financial sector stocks, but the market did not expect volatility to remain high for long and it did not. This is in sharp contrast to the prolonged periods of high volatility during the Great Depression. Similar analysis of stock volatility in the United Kingdom and Japan reinforces the notion that the volatility seen in the 2008 crisis was relatively short‐lived. While there is a link between stock volatility and real economic activity, such as unemployment rates, it can be misleading.     

The Fiscal and Monetary Linkage between Stock Returns and Inflation

Contrary to economic theory and common sense, stock returns are negatively related to both expected and unexpected inflation. We argue that this puzzling empirical phenomenon does not indicate causality. Instead, stock returns are negatively related to contemporaneous changes in expected inflation because they signal a chain of events which results in a higher rate of monetary expansion. Exogenous shocks in real output, signalled by the stock market, induce changes in tax revenue, in the deficit, in Treasury borrowing and in Federal Reserve “monetization” of the increased debt. Rational bond and stock market investors realize this will happen. They adjust prices (and interest rates) accordingly and without delay. Although expected inflation seems to have a negative effect on subsequent stock returns, this could be an empirical illusion, since a spurious causality is induced by a combination of: (a) a reversed adaptive inflation expectations model and (b) a reversed money growth/stock returns model. If the real interest rate is not a constant, using nominal interest proxies for expected inflation is dangerous, since small changes in real rates can cause large and opposite percentage changes in stock prices.     

Real Options,Volatility, and Stock Returns

We provide evidence that the positive relation between firm‐level stock returns and firm‐level return volatility is due to firms’ real options. Consistent with real option theory, we find that the positive volatility‐return relation is much stronger for firms with more real options and that the sensitivity of firm value to changes in volatility declines significantly after firms exercise their real options. We reconcile the evidence at the aggregate and firm levels by showing that the negative relation at the aggregate level may be due to aggregate market conditions that simultaneously affect both market returns and return volatility.     

Does Idiosyncratic Risk Really Matter?

Goyal and Santa‐Clara (2003) find a significantly positive relation between the equal‐weighted average stock volatility and the value‐weighted portfolio returns on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks for the period of 1963:08 to 1999:12. We show that this result is driven by small stocks traded on the Nasdaq, and is in part due to a liquidity premium. In addition, their result does not hold for the extended sample of 1963:08 to 2001:12 and for the NYSE/AMEX and NYSE stocks. More importantly, we find no evidence of a significant link between the value‐weighted portfolio returns and the median and value‐weighted average stock volatility.