Private Regulation to Appropriate Value from Design Innovations: Implications for Anti-trust Policy

Co-operative ventures among rivals are looked upon in general with suspicion by antitrust authorities. In this paper, we position ourselves in the school of thought that evaluates collusive behavior among rivals with the Schumpeterian concept of dynamic competition in mind rather than the concept of Neoclassical perfect competition. We argue that whenever firms have difficulty in appropriating sufficient returns from their innovations, certain forms of apparently collusive behavior--or, more precisely, 'private regulation'--may actually stimulate investment in innovation and thereby Schumpeterian competition. A study of firms' strategies to appropriate value from design innovations in the Dutch and Italian furniture industry illustrates our arguments.     

Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step-by-Step Innovation

Is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth? This question is addressed in the context of an endogenous growth model with "step-by-step" innovations, in which technological laggards must first catch up with the leading-edge technology before battling for technological leadership in the future. In contrast to earlier Schumpeterian models in which innovations are always made by outsider firms who earn no rents if they fail to innovate and become monopolies if they do innovate, here we find: first, that the usual Schumpeterian effect of more intense product market competition (PMC) is almost always outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate in order to escape competition, so that PMC has a positive effect on growth; second, that a little imitation is almost always growth-enhancing, as it promotes more frequent neck-and-neck competition, but too much imitation is unambiguously growth-reducing. The model thus points to complementary roles for competition (anti-trust) policy and patent policy.     

Trade Marks and Performance in Services and Manufacturing Firms: Evidence of Schumpeterian Competition through Innovation

We develop Lancaster's model of consumer behaviour under product differentiation to analyse Schumpeterian creative destruction. Launching new products with novel characteristics enables firms to temporarily steal market share from rivals. Product launch is monitored by using trade marks, patents and research and development. The dataset covers a large sample of UK service and manufacturing firms. We find that stock market value is positively associated with own trade mark activity and trade mark‐active firms achieve significantly higher value‐added. Greater trade mark activity by competitors reduces net output of firms, but raises their stock market value. This is consistent with the Schumpeterian process of competition through innovation.     

On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition

This paper considers a theoretical model where firms reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities in a collusive market and where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels other than that of the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) reduces the incentive to innovate when innovation is made non‐cooperatively. The reason is that non‐cooperative R&D introduces a negative externality where firms overinvest beyond the effort required to minimize the cost in order to extract profits from the rival firm, and a reduction in product competition helps internalize the externality. In a research joint venture the absence of R&D rivalry leads to contrary results. The main implication is that the validity of the Schumpeterian hypotheses depends on the extent of cooperation at the R&D stage.     

Research and development in the growth process

This paper introduces into Schumpeterian growth theory an important element of heterogeneity in the structure of innovative activity—namely, the distinction between research and development. We construct a simple model of growth to investigate how the (steady-state) rate of growth affects and is affected by the relative mix between research and development. Although we assume for simplicity that the total supply of innovative activity is given it turns out that, with one important exception, the growth rate responds to most parameter changes in the same way as in previous models where growth was determined by the total amount of innovative activity. In particular, the level of research tends to covary positively with the rate of growth, even in the extreme case where the general knowledge that underlies long-run growth is created only by secondary innovations arising from the development process. The exception concerns the effects of competition on growth. Although simpler Schumpeterian growth models implied that increased competition would reduce growth by reducing the incentive to innovate, introducing the distinction between research and development implies that this effect is likely to be reversed.     

Schumpeterian process competition, welfare and laissez-faire: An experiment in artificial economic evolution

A simulation model is used to construct a regime of artificial economic evolution, where Schumpeterian process competition prevails, in the presence of technological uncertainty and bounded rationality. The output decision of the firm is represented by a behavioural algorithm, which allows for the presence of collusive behaviour. The purpose of the experiments is to go some way towards addressing the twin issues of the nature of the relationship between market structure and industry performance in a dynamic setting, and the contention that the evolutionary metaphor implies a laissez-faire stance with respect to policy issues. Under the simplifying assumptions of the model, experiments suggest that industries which generate high average concentration over a given period can compare favourably with industries that generate low average concentration, if the time profiles of both welfare and concentration are analysed. Also, the experiments suggest that the industry will naturally evolve a structure best suited to exploit the technological environment, but despite this there is still a role for intervention into the competitive process.     

Sustaining Collusion under Economic Integration*

In this paper, we aim at investigating from a game‐theory perspective whether trade liberalization can promote a collusive two‐way trade. We show that, under Cournot competition, economic integration is anti‐competitive if collusive trade is a possible outcome of the repeated game; under price competition, the likelihood of collusive trade is a necessary but not sufficient condition for trade liberalization to be pro‐competitive. Furthermore, we show that economic integration may increase the scope for collusion irrespective of the firms’ strategic variable.     

The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs, and Macroeconomic Growth

This articleanalyzes the links between the internal organization of the firmand macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth modelin which firms face agency costs due to the existence of asymmetriesof information and the formation of vertical collusions insidethose firms. To respond to the threat of collusion, optimal collusion-proofincentive contracts depend on the efficiency of collusive sidecontracting within organizations. Collusion affects thereforethe firms' profitability, the incentives to innovate, and, finally,the stationary equilibrium growth rate of the economy. On theother hand, when the growth rate is small, the prospects of long-termrelationships within firms increase the agents' incentives toinvest in a better collusive technology. We then discuss thetwo-way relationships between the structure of internal transactioncosts, organizational technologies, and macroeconomic growth.     

Development as leapfrogging,not convergence,not catch-up: towards schumpeterian theories of finance and development

Our aim is to demark a pathway towards Schumpeterian theories of finance and development. To do this, we offer four basic propositions for discussion. First, we suggest that ‘convergence’ and ‘catch-up’ are, from a Schumpeterian perspective, theoretically inadequate concepts as they frame development narratives similarly to the Rostovian idea of a linear path towards some sort of ‘equilibrium imposed on history’. Leapfrogging by means of innovation and finance is put forward as a better approach to analyzing development trajectories. Second, we contend that rather than the often-assumed convergence among nations, history shows that ‘divergence’ is a more common result of development trajectories; this is especially visible in the last half a century. Third, we outline the key features of this Schumpeterian framework, centered on the concept of leapfrogging through innovation and finance. We conclude by highlighting the essential roles of finance and financial governance within this alternative framework for understanding successful development trajectories, and posit that this construct may be labeled a Schumpeterian entrepreneurial state.     

Sources of technological innovation: Radical and incremental innovation problem-driven to support competitive advantage of firms

A fundamental problem in the field of management of technology is how firms develop radical and incremental innovations that sustain the competitive advantage in markets. Current frameworks provide some explanations but the general sources of major and minor technological breakthroughs are hardly known. The study here confronts this problem by developing a conceptual framework of problem-driven innovation. The inductive study of the pharmaceutical industry (focusing on ground-breaking drugs for lung cancer treatment) seems to show that the co-evolution of consequential problems and their solutions induce the emergence and development of radical innovations. In fact, firms have a strong incentive to find innovative solutions to unsolved problems in order to achieve the prospect of a (temporary) profit monopoly and competitive advantage in markets characterised by technological dynamisms. The theoretical framework of this study can be generalised to explain one of the sources of innovation that supports technological and industrial change in a Schumpeterian world of innovation-based competition.     

Breaking the waves: a Poisson regression approach to Schumpeterian clustering of basic innovations

The Schumpeterian theory of long waves has given rise to anintense debate on the existence of clusters of basic innovations.Silverberg and Lehnert have criticised the empirical part ofthis literature on several methodological accounts. In thispaper, we propose the methodology of Poisson regression as alogical way of incorporating this criticism. We construct anew time series for basic innovations (based on previously usedtime series), and use this to test the hypothesis that basicinnovations cluster in time. We define the concept of clusteringin various precise ways before undertaking the statistical tests.The evidence we find supports only the ‘weakest’of our clustering hypotheses, i.e., that the data display overdispersion.We thus conclude that the authors who have argued that a longwave in economic life is driven by clusters of basic innovationshave stretched the statistical evidence too far.     

On the collusive nature of managerial contracts based on comparative performance

We show that managerial delegation based upon comparative performance may generate collusive outcomes observationally equivalent to those typically associated with repeated games or cross ownership. This happens when rivals’ profits are positively weighted in the managerial incentive scheme. We also identify the level of time discounting at which a repeated game based upon Nash reversion would achieve the same degree of collusion. Accordingly, such managerial contracts should attract the attention of antitrust authorities.     

Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly

We consider an infinitely repeated oligopoly in which at each period firms not only serve the spot market by either competing in prices or quantities but also have the opportunity to trade forward contracts. Contrary to the pro-competitive results of finite-horizon models, we find that the possibility of forward trading allows firms to sustain collusive profits that otherwise would not be possible to achieve. The result holds both for price and quantity competition and follows because (collusive) contracting of future sales is more effective in deterring deviations from the collusive plan than inducing the previously identified pro-competitive effects.     

Schumpeterian competition in heterogeneous oligopolies

The modeling of Schumpeterian competition as a process of innovation, imitation and selection was first presented by Nelson/Winter (1982) in a simulation study and further analyzed in a similar but general analytical formulation by Iwai (1984a, 1984b). Their results concerning the relations between the combination of the different forces of Schumpeterian competition and market structure respectively the distributions of profits are interesting, but restricted to competitive markets. Comparing rules of thumb and satisficing for the Ramp;D decisions the present study analyzes the process of Schumpeterian competition in a heterogeneous oligopoly. Firstly, the authors find for the Ramp;D-concentration relation results contrary to the traditional interpretation of Schumpeter. Secondly, Iwai’s (1984a, 1984b) qualitative results hold in this less restrictive modeling.     

New evidence on the sources of EU countries’ productivity growth—industry growth differences from R&D and competition

Recent studies on productivity growth show how competition affects innovation and TFP growth in OECD countries, but do not explicitly account for sectoral parameter heterogeneity. This paper examines whether competition and innovation have a direct effect on labor productivity growth in EU goods-producing industries separated by three different industry types. The results show that the effect of R&D on labor productivity growth is not equal across industries, but rather depends on the innovation activities of sectors. The same is true for competition and labor productivity growth. The empirical evidence indicates that in unleveled industries (i.e. industries characterized by technologically unequal firms) like Specialized Goods Suppliers and Science-Based Innovators strong labor productivity growth originates with decreased competition and increased R&D, thereby supporting Schumpeterian arguments. The findings suggest Schumpeterian effects in Supplier-Dominated Goods-Producing Industries, but reveal decreasing labor productivity growth in these sectors when competition is strongly restricted.     

(Un)stable vertical collusive agreements

In this paper, we extend the concept of stability to vertical collusive agreements involving downstream and upstream firms, using a setup of successive Cournot oligopolies. We show that a stable vertical agreement, the unanimous vertical agreement involving all downstream and upstream firms, always exists. Thus, stable vertical collusive agreements exist even for market structures in which horizontal cartels would be unstable. We also show that there are economies for which the unanimous agreement is not the only stable one. Furthermore, the Stigler statement according to which the only ones who benefit from a collusive agreement are the outsiders need not be valid in vertical agreements.     

Endogenous product versus process innovation and a firm’s propensity to export

This article provides an empirical analysis of the effects of new product versus process innovations on export propensity at the firm level. Product innovation is a key factor for successful market entry in models of creative destruction and Schumpeterian growth. Process innovation helps securing a firm’s market position given the characteristics of its product supply. Both modes of innovation are expected to raise a firm’s propensity to export. According to new trade theory, we conjecture that product innovation is relatively more important in that regard. We investigate these hypotheses in a rich survey panel data set with information about new innovations of either type. With a set of indicators regarding innovation motives and impediments and continuous variables at the firm and industry level at hand, we may determine the probability of launching new innovations and their impact on export propensity at the firm level through a double treatment approach.     

COMPETITION FOR MARKET SHARE OR FOR MARKET SIZE: OLIGOPOLISTIC EQUILIBRIA WITH VARYING COMPETITIVE TOUGHNESS*

For an industry producing a composite commodity, we propose a comprehensive concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes varying in competitive toughness. Each firm sets simultaneously its price and its quantity under two constraints, relative to its market share and to market size. The price and the quantity equilibrium outcomes always belong to the set of oligopolistic equilibria. When firms are identical and we let their number increase, any sequence of symmetric oligopolistic equilibria converges to the monopolistic competition outcome. Further results are derived in the symmetric CES case, concerning in particular the collusive solution enforceability.     

The effects of probabilistic innovations on Schumpeterian economic growth in a creative region

We analyze the impact that stochastically occurring innovations have on Schumpeterian economic growth in a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida. Our analysis leads to four findings. First, we delineate the so called balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium and then compute the BGP growth rate in our creative region. Second, we discuss why the lower limit of the support of the random variable that describes the outcome of innovation quality improvements, takes the value that it does. Third, we solve the social planner's problem and derive the Pareto optimal growth rate in our creative region. Finally, we compare the BGP and the Pareto optimal growth rates, we discuss when there is either too much or too little innovation, and we conclude by commenting on the implications of our findings for future research on Schumpeterian economic growth in creative regions.