Pricing in revenue management for multiple firms competing for customers

We consider the pricing strategies of multiple firms providing the same service in competition for a common pool of customers in a revenue management context. The firms have finite capacity and the demand at each firm depends on the selling prices charged by all firms, each of which satisfies demand up to a given capacity limit. We use game theory to analyze the systems when firms face either a deterministic demand or a general stochastic demand. The existence and uniqueness conditions of a Nash equilibrium are derived, and we calculate the explicit Nash equilibrium point when the demand at each firm is a linear function of price. We also conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to cost and capacity parameters.     

Mergers in Medicare Part D: Assessing market power,cost efficiencies,and bargaining power

We empirically examine horizontal mergers amongst Part D insurers with the aim of assessing how market power, cost efficiencies, and bargaining power affect premiums and coverage characteristics, including drug access and out-of-pocket (OOP) cost. Our results reveal that market power raises premiums, but this is only a local effect that occurs in markets where the merging firms overlap. Mergers alter the bargaining process with upstream suppliers at both local and national levels, affecting drug access and OOP cost. We find evidence of cost efficiencies when firms restructure by consolidating their plan offerings.     

Computing welfare losses from data under imperfect competition with heterogeneous goods

We study the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) yielded by imperfect competition under product differentiation. When demand is linear, even if prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms can be observed, PWL is arbitrary in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. If in addition the elasticity of demand (resp. cross elasticity of demand) is known, we can calculate PWL in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) equilibrium. When demand is isoelastic and there are many firms, PWL can be computed from prices, outputs, costs and the number of firms. We find that price–marginal cost margins and demand elasticities may influence PWL in a counterintuitive way. We also provide conditions under which PWL increases or decreases with concentration.     

Patent Protection and R&D with Endogenous Market Structure

In a model with endogenous number of innovating firms, we show that whether patent protection increases R&D investment is ambiguous, and depends on the market demand function and the cost of R&D. If the market size increases with number of firms, patent protection reduces R&D investment if the cost of R&D is sufficiently high, and higher product differentiation increases the possibility of lower R&D investment under patent protection. If the market size does not increase with number of firms, patent protection never reduces R&D investment. We find that welfare is lower under patent protection than under no patent protection.     

Stackelberg Independence*

The standard model of sequential capacity choices is the Stackelberg quantity leadership model with linear demand. I show that under the standard assumptions, leaders’ actions are informative about market conditions and independent of leaders’ beliefs about the arrivals of followers. However, this Stackelberg independence property relies on all standard assumptions’ being satisfied. It fails to hold whenever the demand function is non-linear, marginal cost is not constant, goods are differentiated, firms are non-identical, or there are any externalities. I show that small deviations from the linear demand assumption may make the leaders’ choices completely uninformative.     

A note on the excess entry theorem in spatial models with elastic demand

This paper revisits the excess entry theorem in spatial models according to Vickrey [Vickrey, W.S., 1964. Microstatics. Harcourt, Brace and World, New York] and Salop [Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156] while relaxing the assumption of inelastic demand. Using a demand function with a constant demand elasticity, we show that the number of firms that enter a market decreases with the degree of demand elasticity. We find that the excess entry theorem does only hold when the demand elasticity is sufficiently small. Otherwise, there is insufficient entry. In the limiting case of unit elastic demand, the market is monopolized. We broaden our results with a more general transportation cost function.     

Differential Pricing in Intermediate Good Markets

This paper studies differential pricing by an upstream monopolist whose cost to supply the intermediate good differs across buyers in the downstream. It is shown that, different from demand‐based price discrimination, cost‐based differential pricing shifts production efficiently. If total output (and consumer welfare) is weakly increased under differential pricing as opposed to uniform pricing, as is true for weakly convex final market demand functions, social welfare is strictly improved. The analysis is extended to the case in which both the upstream monopolist's cost to serve the downstream firms and the downstream firms’ cost to produce the final good differ.     

Stable heterogeneous cartels

We define a nation of cartel stability which allows firms to perceive the impact of their actions on overall competitiveness in the market. We demonstrate that in an industry with linear demand and diverse linearly increasing marginal cost functions a stable cartel always exists. Furthermore, we examine uniqueness and size of such cartels as well as the impact of cost and demand conditions on their characteristics. In particular, we establish that the most efficient firms will be in the cartel while the less efficient ones will remain outside.     

Diversification of cable television firms into broadband products

This research provides a new perspective to investigate the broadband diffusion in eight states of the U.S. by studying the two-stage entry decisions, namely, upgrading and subsequent product decisions, by the cable television system operators, one of the early dominant players in the broadband market, and examines the role of competition, market characteristics and firm heterogeneity in the cable company's decisions in a dynamic setting. Comparing the empirical results of the decision models of both stages can give new insights into the dynamics of broadband diffusion. The empirical results show that the subsequent product decision is affected more by the demand determinants, while the upgrading decision is affected more by the cost determinants. The results also indicate that policies which aim to reduce the entry cost such as a low city fee can largely encourage firms to upgrade the network, while subsequent policies that help boost the demand can help firms diversify into new digital services early. The effectiveness of competition policy in the broadband diffusion is confirmed in both stages. Strategic responses by cable firms to the presence of RBOCs are more noticeable in the second-staged product decision than in the first-staged upgrading decision.     

The dynamic provision of product diversity under duopoly

This paper builds a dynamic duopoly model to examine the provision of new varieties over time. Consumers experience temporary satiation, and hence higher consumption of the current variety lowers demand for future varieties. The equilibrium can be characterized by a combination of monopolistic pricing and nearly zero profits (competitive timing). In particular, if the cost of producing a new variety is not too low then firms tend to avoid head-to-head competition and set the short-run profit maximizing price. However, firms tend to introduce new varieties as soon as demand has grown sufficiently to cover costs. From a second best perspective, the equilibrium may exhibit excessive product diversity. However, if firms coordinate their frequency of new product introductions, then consumers are likely to be harmed. It is also shown that equilibrium prices are moderated by two factors. First, consumers’ option value of waiting reduces their willingness to pay. Second, competition reduces firms’ incentives to engage in intertemporal price discrimination.     

Competition under capacitated dynamic lot-sizing with capacity acquisition

Lot-sizing and capacity planning are important supply chain decisions, and competition and cooperation affect the performance of these decisions. In this paper, we look into the dynamic lot-sizing and resource competition problem of an industry consisting of multiple firms. A capacity competition model combining the complexity of time-varying demand with cost functions and economies of scale arising from dynamic lot-sizing costs is developed. Each firm can replenish inventory at the beginning of each period in a finite planning horizon. Fixed as well as variable production costs incur for each production setup, along with inventory carrying costs. The individual production lots of each firm are limited by a constant capacity restriction, which is purchased up front for the planning horizon. The capacity can be purchased from a spot market, and the capacity acquisition cost fluctuates with the total capacity demand of all the competing firms. We solve the competition model and establish the existence of a capacity equilibrium over the firms and the associated optimal dynamic lot-sizing plan for each firm under mild conditions.     

Selling cross-border in online markets: The impact of the ban on geoblocking strategies

We develop a model of strategic geoblocking, where two competing multi-channel retailers, located in different countries, can decide to block access to their online store from foreign consumers. We characterize the equilibrium when firms decide unilaterally whether to introduce geoblocking restrictions. We show that geoblocking allows firms to soften competition, but at the cost of lower demand. A ban on geoblocking leads to lower prices, both offline and online. However, when firms can invest in increasing online demand, the ban may have adverse effects on investment and social welfare. We extend our analysis to account for price discrimination and investigate the role of shipping costs.     

The role of elasticity in supply chain performance

This paper develops a model that describes the performance of supply chains based on their elasticities of supply and demand. The model can be used to predict a supply chain's ability to respond to supply interruptions, cost increases, and demand shifts, while also quantifying the degree to which it is prone to the bullwhip effect. The bullwhip effect is a behavioral phenomenon by which orders are distorted as they are transmitted through the chain. Four types of supply chains are identified and their distinct operating characters are examined. The impact of rival firms and the impact of a decoupling point on supply chain performance are also examined.     

Do Merger Efficiencies Always Mitigate Price Increases?

In a Cournot model with differentiated products, we demonstrate that merger efficiencies in the form of lower marginal costs for the merging firms (the insiders) lead to higher post‐merger prices under certain conditions. Specifically, when the degree of substitutability between the two insiders is not too high relative to that between an insider and an outsider, increased efficiencies may exert upward rather than downward pressure on the prices of the merging firms. Our results suggest that in cases where firms engage in quantity competition, antitrust authorities should not presume that efficiencies will necessarily mitigate the anticompetitive effects of the merger.     

Cost Efficiency and Product Mix Clusters across the Spanish Banking Industry

The competitive conditions under which Spanish bankingfirms operate have become much tighter. In these circumstances,inefficiencies should disappear, and if this does not occur,appropriate explanations should be explored. This paper doesexactly that, by estimating cost efficiency scores and assessingwhether they are biased by productive specialization. Thesequestions are not new, unlike the technique employed, whichenables us to evaluate firms' efficiencies by comparing them onlywith those focusing on similar specializations, without the needto specify separate frontiers for different output mixes. Resultsshow that firms' efficiency scores might be downward or upwardbiased when compared with all other firms in the industry, insteadof only with those focusing on similar activities.     

The measurement of conjectural variations in an oligopoly industry

Using independently derived estimates for the market demand elasticity and firm marginal cost, this paper measures the conjectural variations (cv's) of the eight largest U.S. steel firms for the years 1920 to 1972. Comparisons are then made between the measured cv's and those predicted by certain industry conduct hypotheses. Specifically the hypotheses are those for competitive behavior, Cournot behavior, imperfect collusion, and industry profit maximization (perfect collusion). One of the two extreme theories of firm behavior, industry profit maximization, is rejected, but the acceptance or rejection of the other theories depends on the assumptions made about the cost structure of the sample firms.     

Optimal Size in the Waste Collection Sector

The purpose of this study is to analyze the cost structure of a sample of Italian wastecollection firms in order to assess economies of scale and density and, therefore, definethe optimal size of the firms. A total and a variable translog cost function were estimated using panel data for a sample of 30 firms operating at the provincial level over the period 1991–1995.The empirical evidence suggests that franchised monopoly, rather than side-by-sidecompetition, is the most efficient form of production organization in the waste collection industry. Further, the majority of firms are not operating at optimal scale.     

Welfare Changes in the Cournot Setting with an Empirical Application to the Telecommunications Industry

I characterize the efficiency of the Cournot equilibrium and provide bounds for the loss in consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare when the number of firms in the market changes. I only assume that demand is decreasing in price and costs increasing in the quantity produced as long as equilibrium exists. I show how price, demand and average cost, before and after the number of firms in the market changes, can be used to compute these bounds. I apply these bounds to the Portuguese wireline market and conclude that welfare increased significantly when the monopolist was split in 2007.     

Applying Industrial Design and Cost Engineering to New Product Development in Early‐Stage Firms

For early‐stage firms, successful commercialization of each new product is critically important, given the shortage of financial resources, the limited product portfolio, and small staffs typical of such firms. This paper investigates two key contributing factors for new product success in entrepreneurial firms: designing products that are appealing to target users in both form and function and designing products that can be manufactured at an attractive margin so that the new enterprise can generate much needed positive cash flow. These two practices—industrial design and cost engineering—are well studied in the context of larger, established corporations but have not been explored in the context of new ventures. This study focuses on the intensity of individual and combined adoption of design and cost engineering as measured by product development efficiency and effectiveness. The study was conducted on a homogeneous sample of early‐stage firms that develop physical, assembled products where design plays a role. The data collection focused only on the first product developed by each firm respectively. The results show that when implemented together, industrial design and cost engineering enhance both the effectiveness and efficiency of new product development in early‐stage firms, to greater effect than each does individually. Intensive individual adoption of practices had a negative impact on development efficiency measures such as development cost and duration. Only cost engineering individually had a beneficial impact on development effectiveness as measured by product margins. When combined, these two practices had a beneficial impact on both development duration and cost for the company's first commercial product, thereby reducing time‐to‐market and precious cash expenditures while maximizing project breakeven timing. The most successful firms in the study achieved a balance between creative innovation and cost discipline in the NPD process with third‐party design and manufacturing resources. It was found that integrating third‐party design firms into the development process can challenge, simplify, and add additional creative resources to the core entrepreneurial team, maximizing the ability to catalyze beneficial tension between creativity and cost discipline.