Foreign Direct Investment and the Incentives to Innovate and Imitate*

We propose a new channel of FDI spillovers on domestic firms, which operates through imitation of original products. Domestic heterogeneous firms may not introduce any new products, introduce a new product line (innovate), or develop a variety that is a close substitute to an existing product line (imitate). The presence of foreign firms generates incentives for imitation because they introduce original products that are vertically differentiated from domestic products. Using firm‐level panel data for China, we find that increased FDI presence in a given industry leads to more imitation, but not necessarily more innovation, by domestic firms.     

Innovation,imitation and multinationalisation in a North–South model: a theoretical note

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium product variety model of international product cycle with endogenous rate of imitation in the South; and find that a policy of strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South lowers the rate of product innovation, rate of multinationalisation and South–North relative wage if multinationalisation [or, foreign direct investment (FDI)] is the channel of production transfer. These results are significantly different from those obtained in the exogenous imitation model of Lai (J Dev Econ 55(1): 133–153, 1998). So a stronger IPR protection policy adopted by the South may not be interpreted as an incentive to encourage Northern FDI in the South and to raise the rate of innovation in the North.      

知识产权保护、FDI与国际收入转移

"加强知识产权保护能吸引更多外商直接投资(FDI),并能使后发国受益"这一命题能否构成支持加强后发国知识产权保护的论据?文章将知识产权保护对FDI、自主创新、国内模仿和国外模仿的影响纳入三方参与的两阶段动态博弈模型,讨论后发国通过加强知识产权保护来吸引FDI的政策效应。分析认为后发国通过加强知识产权保护能吸引更多FDI,但并不一定能从中获益。因为:FDI偏向进入能够对后发国产生最小收益的产业;加强知识产权保护产生了大量国际收入转移;通过加强知识产权保护,由FDI进入新行业而增加的利润将被已有FDI产业利润的减少所抵消。根据各行业特征选择相应的最优知识产权保护才能使总体福利最大化。     

SOUTHERN INNOVATION AND REVERSE KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVERS: A DYNAMIC FDI MODEL*

We develop a general equilibrium model of endogenous innovation and foreign direct investment (FDI). In the benchmark model, Northern firms innovate with the help of localized spillovers, and a share of new products is transferred to Southern production via FDI. An increase in Southern imitation risk reduces this share. In the extended model, we permit higher‐cost Southern innovation, which yields inefficient specialization in both regions and reduces global growth. However, it generates a U‐shaped relationship between FDI and local imitation. We also allow for “reverse” spillovers in knowledge to Northern innovation, which partially restore global efficiency and growth.     

Intellectual property rights, multinational firms and economic growth

This paper develops a model of North-South trade with multinational firms and economic growth in order to analyze formally the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in developing countries. In the model, Northern firms invent new higher-quality products, multinational firms transfer manufacturing operations to the South and the Southern firms imitate products produced by multinational firms. It is shown that stronger IPR protection in the South (i.e., the adoption and implementation of the TRIPs agreement) leads to a permanent increase in the rate of technology transfer to the South within multinational firms, a permanent increase in R&D employment by Southern affiliates of Northern multinationals, a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap, and a temporary increase in the Northern innovation rate.     

Innovation,Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries

This paper sets up a vertically related market model in which imitation and innovation are endogenously determined to study the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on less‐developed countries. It shows how a less‐developed country switches from imitation to innovation as it develops. It is also found that the relationship between IPR protection and economic development is U ‐shaped. The IPR protection tends to go down and then go up as income rises. This finding also conforms with that in the empirical literature on IPR protection.     

DOES FOREIGN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AFFECT US EXPORTS AND FDI?

Several previous studies have examined the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, exports, and FDI independently. However, very few prior analyses jointly examined the linkages between IPR protection and multiple modes of international transactions. This paper investigates how foreign IPR protection affects how US firms jointly serve overseas markets through exports and FDI. Using both static pooled regressions and a dynamic panel GMM estimator on a panel data of 53 countries, we examine whether stronger foreign IPR protection stimulates US international transactions. The empirical results suggest that foreign countries that strengthen their IPR protection, especially those with strong imitative ability, can attract more international transactions from the USA.     

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AND IMITATION: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF JAPANESE F.D.I. IN CHINA

Abstract.  By using data obtained from a questionnaire survey to Japanese firms in China, we empirically examine the effects of the IPR protection against local illegal imitation. No evidence has been found that patent and trademark registration, which constitutes a part of the IPR protection system, has a protective effect. On the contrary, the results suggest that the patent and trademark registration system may play a role in facilitating local illegal imitation and may be easing technology transfer/diffusion in China.     

Imitation and innovation driven development under imperfect intellectual property rights

Developing countries employ about two-fifth of the world's researchers, originate one quarter of world expenditures on R&D, and their inventions are subject to imitation. Nevertheless, the previous literature focuses on North–South setups in which the South is restricted to imitating northern inventions. To analyze the effects of IPR policies on developed and developing countries, we extend this literature to allow not only for southern innovation and imitation of northern goods, but also for imitation targeted at southern innovations. We find the effects of IPRs on R&D and welfare to be non-monotonic and dependent on innovation efficiency and an innovation threshold in the South. For sufficiently strong IPRs the South engages in original R&D and stronger IPRs promote southern innovation, welfare, and a reduction in the North–South wage gap. Below the threshold, a strengthening of IPR protection fails to promote innovation and decreases welfare. Stronger IPRs exclusively for southern firms can benefit both regions by shifting southern resources from the imitation of northern goods to original southern innovation.     

Endogenous growth and intellectual property rights: A north–south modeling proposal

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model that emphasizes the IPR enforcement effects on growth, in a scenario of north–south technological knowledge diffusion. The economy consists of three sectors, and firms are engaged in step-by-step innovation. In line with the literature, we introduce an IPR parameter that makes imitation more difficult. We find that, in steady state, the increases in IPR protection result in decreases in the growth rate. This result is in line with the literature, which argues that the enforcement of IPR does not always have a positive effect on economic growth. To sum up, we present some suggestions for future research which can help to clarify the relationship between IPR and endogenous growth.     

Intellectual property rights and skills accumulation: A product-cycle model of FDI and outsourcing

This study investigates the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South on innovation, skills accumulation, wage inequality, and patterns of production based on a North–South general-equilibrium model with foreign direct investment (FDI) and international outsourcing. We find that stronger Southern IPR protection raises the extent of outsourcing and reduces the extent of FDI. This increases the proportion of unskilled Southerners and mitigates Southern wage inequality. In the North, stronger Southern IPR protection raises the proportion of skilled Northerners and wage inequality. The effects of international specialization, R&D cost, and Northern population are also examined.     

外资开放引入的创新虹吸是否依然有效——基于知识产权价值激励的动态检验

在全面开放新格局与创新型国家建设战略驱动下，科学研判外资开放的创新虹吸效应至关重要，亟待破解的问题是如何有效撬动外资引入的创新溢出红利。基于内外技术势差探讨FDI创新虹吸的演化逻辑，阐释知识产权价值激励对FDI创新溢出的影响机制，基于中国（内地）30个省份面板数据实证研究发现，外资开放引入的创新虹吸效应并非静态不变，对区域创新发展呈现出边际递减的抑制性影响；借助高强度知识产权价值激励能够有效调节FDI的创新溢出轨迹，以“U”型规律打开外资引入的创新虹吸通道，驱动区域创新发展；知识产权价值激励的调节效应存在一定的空间异质性，对东部地区和中部地区FDI创新溢出的撬动更为有效。研究结论为优化外资开放引入与知识产权价值激励的共轨溢出，赋能创新型国家建设，提供了新的经验依据和路径启示。     

南方最优知识产权保护水平与南方企业自主创新

构建了一个扩展的南北贸易模型,讨论了南方知识产权保护的决定因素及其对南北双方福利的影响。在模型中,南方政府内生决定知识产权保护水平,北方厂商内生决定研发投资水平和市场竞争策略,南方厂商内生决定自主创新或模仿。研究发现:南方的最优知识产权保护水平与北方存在差异;当南方厂商模仿北方厂商的技术时,南方执行最严格的知识产权保护对北方福利和南方福利都造成损害;当南方厂商的创新效率较高时,严格的知识产权保护能激励南方厂商进行自主创新、改善南方福利。     

SUSTAINING THE GOOSE THAT LAYS THE GOLDEN EGG: A CONTINUOUS TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFER

This paper proposes a simple model of the trade-offs perceived by innovating firms when investing in countries with limited intellectual property rights (IPR). The model allows for a continuous treatment of technology transfer and production cost gains occurring through FDI. While it does not consider possible changes in rates of innovation caused by changes in IPR in developing countries, it allows one to uncover a potentially non-monotonic relationship between welfare and IPR in the recipient country.     

Private patent protection in the theory of Schumpeterian growth

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holder's product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.     

Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights in a Product‐cycle Model of Skills Accumulation

This paper examines the effects of stronger intellectual property rights protection in the South based on a North–South general‐equilibrium model with foreign direct investment (FDI). Two types of innovation are considered – innovation targeting all products and innovation targeting only imitated products. We show that for both types of innovation, there will be increases in the innovation rate and Northern wage inequality and a decrease in the proportion of Northern unskilled labor if imitation intensity is sufficiently low. As regards the pattern of production, the extent of FDI will increase while the extent of Northern production and Southern production will decrease.     

Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth

Interest in links between protection of intellectual property and growth has been revived by developments in new growth theory and by the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement. The relationship between the strength of a country’s intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime and rate of growth is ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint, reflecting the variety of channels through which technology can be acquired and their differing importance at different stages of development. We investigate the impact of IPR protection on economic growth in a panel of 79 countries using threshold regression analysis. We show that whilst the effect of IPR protection on growth depends upon the level of development, it is positively and significantly related to growth for low‐ and high‐income countries, but not for middle‐income countries. This suggests that, although IPR protection encourages innovation in high‐income countries, and technology flows to low‐income countries, middle‐income countries may have offsetting losses from reduced scope for imitation.     

Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

This paper examines the growth effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. Stronger IPR protection, which reduces the imitation probability, increases the reward for innovation. However, stronger protection also gradually reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which innovation is easier than in monopolistic sectors. With free entry to R&D, the number of researchers in each remaining competitive sector increases, but the concentration of R&D activity raises the possibility of unnecessary duplication of innovation, thereby hindering growth. Consequently, imperfect rather than perfect protection maximizes growth. Welfare and scale effects are also examined.     

Outsourcing under Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property

The paper examines possible reasons behind expanded outsourcing by modeling outsourcing decisions when intellectual property rights are imperfectly protected. Firms in the North develop higher quality levels of existing products and then decide whether to shift some stages of production to the South. Production in the South lowers costs but entails risk of imitation by Southern firms. In this setting, a lower risk of imitation or larger labor supplies can cause increased outsourcing, a higher rate of innovation, and a lower Northern relative wage. Damage due to lower incomes can be offset by gains in terms of better quality products.     

The role of contracts and intellectual property rights in open innovation

Our exploratory empirical study, based on interviews and a survey of firms, addresses a number of questions on the role of formal contracts and intellectual property rights (IPR) in the context of firm-to-firm open innovation (OI). We find that firms active in OI have a very strong preference for the governance of their OI relationships with other firms through formal contracts. Also, despite the open nature of OI, firms still see IPR as highly relevant to the protection of their innovative capabilities. We find the degree of openness of firms, their formal legal attitude, and the competitive dynamics of their product market environment to be related to the preference of OI firms for IPR. Furthermore, the strength of firms’ internal R&D capabilities increases the positive relationship between openness and the preference for IPR.