The relative contributions of location and preferential policies in China's regional development: being in the right place and having the right incentives

A large part of the literature on provincial inequality in China has found it necessary to include regional dummies in the provincial growth regressions. A smaller but vocal part of the literature has emphasised the granting of preferential policies to explain the faster growth of the coastal provinces. We replace the regional dummies with a measure of the ability to participate in international trade (Geography), and a preferential policy index (Policy). We find that geography and policy had about equal influence on coastal growth (3 percentage points each). Geography affected growth with a much longer lag than policy, however. The policy index was highest for the metropolises (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) and lowest for the central and northwestern provinces. The preferential policies are to a large extent “deregulation policies” that enabled marketization and internationalization of the coastal economies and allowed them to become more like their East Asian neighbours (and competitors). The weak (statistically insignificant) support for conditional convergence is in line with the existence of institutions that retard the income convergence process generated by the movement of labor and capital and by the Stolper–Samuelson mechanism. The household registration system ties the peasants to the land, the monopoly state bank system favors borrowing by state enterprises, and local protectionism reduces inter-provincial trade. Clearly, these institutions need to be deregulated. An effective strategy to develop the western provinces must therefore encompass physical capital formation, human capital formation, and institutional capital formation.