Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?

This study analyzes corporate expenditures for property, plant and equipment (PP&E), and research and development (R&D) for over 2500 US firms from 1988 to 1994. We find no support for the contention that institutional investors cause corporate managers to behave myopically. Indeed, we document a positive relation between industry-adjusted expenditures for PP&E and R&D and the fraction of shares owned by institutional investors. This relation is robust to a variety of empirical tests, including those that account for endogeneity between institutional ownership and firm-level discretionary expenditures.     

The value-relevance of R&D and advertising expenditures: Evidence from Korea

This study examines the value-relevance of R&D and advertising expenditures of Korean firms, using a regression model based on the Ohlson [Contemp. Account. Res. (1995) 661] equity-valuation framework. Results indicate that R&D expenditures are positively associated with stock price, suggesting that capitalizing R&D expenditures is appropriate. The association is stronger for the portion of R&D expenditures that is capitalized, rather than expensed, suggesting that investors agree with management that the capitalized expenditures represent greater future economic benefits. Investors also appear to interpret fully expensed R&D expenditures as positive net present-value investments, however, suggesting that these expenditure should also be capitalized. Additional results indicate that advertising expenditures are negatively associated with stock price, and the magnitude of this negative association is similar to the association between other expenses and stock price. These findings suggest that investors believe the economic benefits of advertising expenditures expire in the current period, similar to other expenses.     

The impact of intangibles on firms’ financial and market performance: UK evidence

This study provides empirical evidence about the effect of intangible assets on firms’ current and future financial and market performance by utilizing a sample the UK FTSE 150 nonfinancial companies. Generally, the findings of this examination reported a strong evidence on the role of intangibles in boosting firms’ performance. In particular, the results indicate that while goodwill (GW) does have a statistically positive effect on firms’ current and future performance, research and development (R&D) is only associated with firms’ future performance. The results of the current research is consistent with the market-based and resources-based theories which posits that intangible investments are the main driving factors of wealth creation in the long-run; Specifically, R&D operations can create new technologies and products that would enhance firms’ performance and value. In addition, the results reveal that both GW and R&D can explain variations in firms’ financial performance measures suggesting that such investments can enhance firms’ earning leading to capitalization such earnings in the market value. Finally, the results of this research provide practical implication for policy makers and managers.     

Industry expertise on corporate boards

Recent surveys indicate that industry expertise is the most sought-after director qualification. Yet evidence on the value of such expertise is limited. This paper shows that firms that are difficult for non-experts to monitor and advise are more likely to appoint industry expert directors. Such appointments also depend on the supply of industry-experienced candidates in the local director labor market. Board industry expertise reduces R&D-based real earnings management and increases R&D investments. The increase in R&D spending is value-enhancing: firms with industry expert directors receive more patents for the same level of R&D, their R&D spending is associated with lower volatility of future earnings, and their value is higher. Finally, industry expertise is associated with CEO termination and pay incentives that encourage R&D investments.     

Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.     

R&D investments,capital expenditures,and earnings thresholds

Prior studies find that firms cut research and development (R&D) expense in response to earnings considerations. We extend this stream of research by documenting that firms narrowly achieving an earnings threshold also report unusually high capital expenditures. In addition, these firms’ total investments (R&D expense plus capital expenditures) do not vary in response to earnings thresholds, which suggests that, on average, reductions in R&D expense are offset by concurrent increases in capital expenditures. Lastly, our research design allows us to infer that the increased capital expenditures are largely R&D investments that are capitalized instead of non-R&D capital expenditures, suggesting that overall investments in R&D are relatively unchanged.     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

Auditor specialization in R&D and clients’ R&D investment-q sensitivity

While research and development (R&D) activities contribute to economic growth via technological innovations, they impose significant uncertainty and agency costs. In this study, we examine the governance role of R&D specialist auditors in affecting clients’ R&D investment decisions. Using a sample of U.S. firms during 2001–2016, we find that R&D specialist auditors’ clients make more efficient investments in the form of a higher R&D investment-q sensitivity. We also find that the reduction in discretionary adjustments of R&D expenses moderates the results. Further, when clients are audited by R&D specialists, their R&D investments are more closely linked to innovative output in subsequent years. Collectively, our results suggest that an auditor’s specialized knowledge induces clients to make better economic decisions.     

The effect of R&D on future returns and earnings forecasts

Prior studies attribute the future excess returns of research and development activity (R&D) firms to either compensation for increased risk or to mispricing. We suggest a third explanation and show that neither the level of R&D investment nor the change in R&D investment explains future returns. Rather, the positive future returns that prior studies attribute to R&D investment are actually due to the component of the R&D firm??s realized return that is unrelated to R&D investment but present in R&D firms. Our results suggest that the excess returns of R&D firms are part of the larger value/growth anomaly. In addition, we show that while future earnings are positively associated with current R&D, errors in earnings expectations by investors and analysts are not related to R&D investment.     

The Effects of Private Investments in Public Equity on R&D Investment in Small and Medium-Size Enterprises

This paper provides evidence that small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) use a portion of private investments in public equity (PIPEs) for current research and development (R&D) investment, hold the rest in liquidity reserves such as cash assets and working capital, and ultimately use these reserves to smooth R&D investment. That is, PIPEs may have a direct effect on R&D investment and an indirect or smoothing effect using liquidity reserves. This paper also shows that innovative SMEs such as venture businesses, inno-biz firms, and management innovative firms are more likely to use PIPEs for R&D investment than are noninnovative SMEs. The implications of this paper are that PIPEs can be used as an important source of external financing to fund R&D investment and can be particularly valuable for R&D investment in innovative SMEs.     

R&D Investments with Competitive Interactions

In this article we develop a model to analyze patent-protected R&D investment projects when there is (imperfect) competition in the development and marketing of the resulting product. The competitive interactions that occur substantially complicate the solution of the problem since the decision maker has to take into account not only the factors that affect her/his own decisions, but also the factors that affect the decisions of the other investors. The real options framework utilized to deal with investments under uncertainty is extended to incorporate the game theoretic concepts required to deal with these interactions. Implementation of the model shows that competition in R&D, in general, not only increases production and reduces prices, but also shortens the time of developing the product and increases the probability of a successful development. These benefits to society are countered by increased total investment costs in R&D and lower aggregate value of the R&D investment projects.     

Mispricing of Research and Development Investments in a Rapidly Emerging and Electronics-Dominated Market

This paper documents prevailing mispricing of research and development (R&D) investments in the Taiwan stock market, a rapidly emerging and electronics-dominated market. Applying stock return data from July 1988 to June 2005, we observe that R&D-intensive stocks tend to outperform stocks with little or no R&D. The R&D-intensity effect cannot be attributed fully to firm size and seasonal effects. The R&D-associated anomaly not only exists but also persists for up to three years. The market apparently undervalues R&D-intensive firms and overvalues non-R&D-intensive firms. Finally, the R&D anomaly is clearer for firms in the electronics industry after 1996.     

How to improve IFRS for intangible assets? A milestone approach

This study focuses on the decreasing relevance of financial information associated with current financial reporting standards for intangible assets. We summarize and compare three approaches to improving financial reporting standards for internally generated intangibles—the recognition approach, the fair value approach and the disclosure approach, among which we focus on the recognition approach. We investigate the impact of current International Accounting Standard 38 on the R&D capitalization policies of the high-tech industry, particularly among medical device firms in China. We conclude that the current recognition criteria are so stringent that they disincentivize firms from capitalizing their R&D investments. A large variation exists in capitalization timing within the medical device industry. Accordingly, we propose the milestone approach to revising financial reporting standards for intangible assets. We suggest that determining the capitalization criteria for intangibles based on the R&D cycle and capitalization timing should be moved forward.     

Earnings Variability and Disclosure of R&D: Evidence from Press Releases

This study explores press releases in the pharmaceutical industry to expand our understanding of how investments in R&D outlays influence uncertainty of future earnings. The findings make two contributions to the literature. First, they provide evidence that equal investments in different R&D ventures are associated with differential variability of future earnings. This result suggests that non‐financial information contained in press releases captures attributes of firm‐specific R&D investments that are not revealed through R&D expenditures reported in financial statements. Second, prior studies have indicated that investments in pharmaceutical R&D are associated with the highest variability of future earnings among all industries. The results, however, suggest that for a large class of low‐risk pharmaceutical R&D investments, the relative variability of future earnings is low and similar to that generated by capital expenditures. The findings hold when we control for endogeneity in voluntary disclosure of press releases.     

Does the Riskiness of R&D Outweigh Its Benefits? The Perspective of US Private Lenders

We investigate the relationship between R&D investments and loan spread. Prior research documents that R&D is associated with greater future benefits and risks, suggesting that the valuation of R&D depends on a tradeoff between the two. Some research finds that bondholders consider that the benefits of R&D outweigh its risks: R&D is negatively associated with bond yields. This is surprising given that debt holders are more concerned about downside risk due to asymmetric payoffs. Using data on private debt from the US, we find an overall positive association between loan spread and R&D intensity, suggesting that the riskiness of R&D appears to outweigh its benefits for private lenders. Furthermore, an asymmetric payoff structure implies that the risks of R&D for lenders increase with default risk. Consistent with this argument, we find a positive association between R&D and loan spread for firms that are smaller, with high default‐risk ratings, unrated (no public debt), or in industries with weaker legal protection. Unrated firms are in the most R&D‐intensive group and make up nearly 60% of the firms with private debt. Consequently, studies that exclude unrated firms are likely to present an incomplete picture of the perspective of debt holders on R&D.     

Corporate Governance and Its Impact on R&D Investment in Emerging Markets

Corporate R&D activities are inherently risky but also difficult to monitor. Against this background, we examine the impact of ownership concentration and legal shareholder rights protection on corporate R&D investments in emerging markets. Based on a comprehensive sample of publicly listed firms from 24 countries, we find that R&D intensity is lower in firms with (strategic) block ownership, and this effect is more pronounced in countries with stronger shareholder rights protection. This suggests that, similar to the situation in developed economies, dispersed ownership, which allows shareholders to diversify their investment risks, is beneficial for corporate R&D and that this effect is intensified by more developed institutions.     

The impact of costly regulation on R&D investment levels and productivity

Prior research finds that risk-taking has declined after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, consistent with the notion that SOX's corporate governance and internal control mandates diverted resources away from corporate risk-taking. We introduce to the accounting literature a new measure of R&D productivity, Research Quotient, to examine whether SOX affects R&D risk-taking and R&D productivity differently and whether the quality of the firm's governance and internal controls, pre-SOX, moderate these relations. While we find the relation between SOX and R&D risk-taking is sensitive to research design choices, we find a consistent positive relation between SOX and Research Quotient. Our evidence indicates that while firms may allocate fewer resources to R&D post-SOX, they concurrently manage their R&D investments more productively. Further, our results are robust to a difference-in-difference design and are stronger for firms with weaker governance pre-SOX.     

Investment policy in family controlled firms

We explore the relation between family ownership and corporate investment policy. Our analysis centers on two incentives, risk aversion and extended investment horizons, which potentially influence the level and type of investments that family firms undertake. We find that family firms devote less capital to long-term investments than firms with diffuse ownership structures. When dividing long-term investment into its two components of R&D and capital expenditures, we note that family firms, relative to nonfamily firms, prefer investing in physical assets relative to riskier R&D projects. Additional tests indicate that family firms receive fewer patent citations per dollar of R&D investment relative to nonfamily firms. Overall, all empirical results indicate that family preferences for lower firm risk, across all family sub-types, affects corporate R&D spending and capital expenditures.     

Board reforms and innovation

We study the effect of board reforms on firms' research and development (R&D) investments utilizing a sample of 41 countries. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that firms invest more in R&D following corporate governance reforms. Of these, two legal reforms — having an independent audit committee and board independence — have a greater impact on R&D investment. Additionally, we show that board reforms have a more pronounced effect on R&D investment in hi-tech industries and the health sector.     

R&D tax incentives: a reappraisal

This paper examines R&D tax incentives in oligopolistic markets. We characterize the conditions under which tax incentives reach the socially desirable level of firm-financed R&D spending. The outcome of the market depends not only on the level of technological spillover in the industry but also on the degree of strategic interaction between the firms. One major result emerges from the model: The socially desirable level of R&D investment is not necessarily reached by subsidizing R&D. When the technological spillover is sufficiently low, the government might want to tax R&D investments, and this result does not necessarily arise because firms are overinvesting in R&D. There are also cases in which an R&D tax is desirable even though firms are underinvesting in R&D compared with the first-best optimum. In practice, this theoretical finding calls for a lower sales tax combined with an R&D subsidy in oligopolistic industries with high technological spillovers, and a lower sales tax combined with an R&D tax in oligopolistic industries with low technological spillovers.