Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs

The hard core of conventional economics consists of a set of four main premises regarding the economy. Simply put they are the law of nature, the individual, certainty, and contracts. Juxtapositioned to these four premises of conventional economics, there are four from personalist economics: institutions, the person, uncertainty and status. In sharp constrast with the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries in economics whose views on economic affairs are grounded in individualism, we think about economic affairs in a market system in terms of personalism. Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs. Here our presentation focuses on three central economic activities: consumption, work and leisure. In addressing these activities we emphasize that (1) human persons are materialized spirits and (2) human nature is two dimensional — individual and social. In our remarks we rely heavily on Emmanuel Mounier and John Paul II.     

The individual and the market: Paul Samuelson on (homothetic) Santa Claus economics

Paul Samuelson often used the term “Santa Claus economics” for mathematical models with empirically unrealistic assumptions. I focus on one particular member of the Santa Claus family that Samuelson was very sceptical about: homothetic general equilibrium models (where all agents have identical homothetic preferences). I argue that Samuelson's concerns about these models provide insights into how he viewed the relationship between the individual and the market, a relationship that has implications for not only his economic theorising, but also his broader political–economic vision. His criticisms are also relevant to some ongoing debates within contemporary economic theory.     

Distinguishing characteristics of ahuman economics

What are the requirements for an economics that is compatible with, and affirmative of, a meaninful image of human nature? Where does conventional economic theory show its most glaring deficiencies in this respect? What are the core human values that need to inform economic thought capable of guiding us in the design and construction of a more humane economic system? Why is the bulk of contemporary heterodox economic thinking antagonistic to the project of a human-centered economics? These are the basic questions addressed and explored in this article.     

Relative and absolute scarcity of nature. Assessing the roles of economics and ecology for biodiversity conservation

Our aim in this essay is to identify and analyze some of the difficulties with interdisciplinary integration of economic and ecological contributions to the study of biodiversity loss. We develop our analysis from a widely accepted definition of economics which is based on the concept of scarcity. Taking a closer look at this notion, we find that economics actually limits itself to a very particular aspect of scarcity, which we denote as relative scarcity. We describe in what respect the economic approach towards biodiversity is based on this notion, and also reflect on the specific understanding of the relation of humans and nature behind the economic approach. We then turn to absolute scarcity as another notion of scarcity, and show that this is not within the scope of economics, but has been a theme of ecology and ecological economics. We describe in which way ecological and ecological–economic approaches towards biodiversity are based on the idea of absolute scarcity, and also reflect on the specific understanding of the human–nature relationship behind this notion of scarcity. Against this background, we discuss the roles of economics and ecology for nature conservation. We conclude that the interdisciplinary integration of ecology and economics requires a philosophical underpinning, and suggest a framework for further research.     

The arrow of time in economics: from Robinson's critique to the new historical economics

Abstract

How time is comprehended in economics is central to the type of discipline to which economics is analogized. Rejecting the symmetrical notion of time in classical physics, Joan Robinson emphasized the importance of ‘historical time’, and hence history. A new generation of economists – including Paul Krugman, Paul David, and Brian Arthur – took up Robinson's challenge, seeking to create a new historical economics by relating random or ‘accidental’ historical events in different ways to the necessity of economic rules, and finding that, as Robinson saw, scale effects were crucial. Their efforts, however, fell short of integrating history into economics.     

Personalist Economics: Unorthodox and Counter-Cultural

There are two reasons why personalist economics lies outside the mainstream. Personalist economics (1) rejects the premises of mainstream economics, and (2) takes exception to certain dominant values of today's culture whereas the mainstream is much more at ease with contemporary Western culture. This paper addresses both reasons and is organized accordingly. In it the author argues that the individualism and the autonomous individual of mainstream economics have their roots in the seventeenth-eighteenth century Enlightenment, that is well before the development of electronic means of communication. Personalism and the acting person of personalist economics emerged during the electronic stage of communication and, the author argues, are much better suited to the twenty-first century. The author calls for a reconstruction of economics which would replace the autonomous individual with the acting person.     

Principles of economic justice: Marketplace and workplace applications

Mainstream economics argues that ethical standards are essentially relative, that they differ from one person to the next, and are entirely outside the limits of legitimate inquiry for economic science. Our view is that there are certain objective ethical standards to be applied that parallel the three modes of human interaction in economic affairs: person to person, superior to subordinate, and member to group. Those standards are given by the principle of equivalence, principle of distributive justice, and principle of contributive justice.     

Management and the representative firm revisited: the modern significance of Marshall's evolutionary economics

In an essay written in honour of Peter Swann, it is second nature to discuss some aspects of the economics of innovation, as that is the very challenging area of economic life where he has added so much to our understanding. I will attempt to do this by posing the problem of how innovation fits into the theory of value. Innovation research continues apace, but its broader systemic implications for how we understand the dynamics of capitalism are in danger of being overlooked. But two important economists, Schumpeter and Marshall, have seen the problem differently and built innovation into their theoretical schemes from the start. Marshall's theory of evolutionary change provides a natural focus for our discussion, and this is reflected in his treatment of management, in his use of the representative firm and in the variation-cum-selection dynamics of his open competitive process. We treat each of these topics and show how his evolutionary dynamics can be expressed in the Fisher/Price dynamics of evolutionary change. More generally, the key to economic development is the uneven nature of innovation and it is the uneven nature that gives economic transformation its evolutionary character. This, I suggest, is the proper legacy of Marshalls economics.     

Demography and welfare economics

The focusing on demographic issues as an important part of welfare-economic assessment shifts the evaluative space in the direction of public discussion and social concern. A commoditycentred view of individual success and social welfare is often used in economics. But the linkage between our economic wealth and our ability to live as we would like has strong limits. This is partly because of interpersonal variations between individuals, but also because of variations in public and social arrangements (for example, for public health care, education and social security). The use of demographic perspectives can enrich economic analysis in several ways. In particular a demographically oriented system of evaluation can not only focus on variables that we all value, but it also gives us the freedom to decide what weights would be most appropriate for the exercise in which we might be engaged. The problem of valuation in welfare economics is ultimately a social-choice issue, requiring the use of explicit judgments on which the society can achieve some consensus through political processes.Lecture presented to the annual meeting of the Austrian Economic Association in Vienna, 24 May 1994. The author is grateful for support from the National Science Foundation for the research on which this paper draws.     

Hayek and Keynes: From a common critique of economic method to different theories of expectations

The methodological positions of Hayek and Keynes contain striking similarities. Both authors opposed empiricist approaches to economics that assign priority to mere observation as the source of knowledge. Both emphasised intentionality, motivation and human agency. Notwithstanding this common ground, they had different conceptions of how beliefs are formed and had different explanations of thought and action in economics. Hayek grounded his explanation on an evolutionary theory of the mind, i.e. on psychological premises, whereas Keynes based his view of belief formation on probable reasoning, where probability is a logical concept. Starting from psychological premises Hayek maintained that individuals act rationally only by following rules. As a consequence, he considered conventional expectations to be the primary guide for agents in economic life. Keynes agreed that conventional expectations actually guide economic behaviour, but he maintained that they are justified only in situations of total ignorance. In conditions of limited knowledge, agents can base their action on reasonable expectations, independently of conventions. Moreover, agents?particularly those institutions responsible for economic policy?ought to shun conventional behaviour in order to counteract its negative social consequences. We argue that Keynes's theory of expectations is well grounded upon his theory of logical probability. Hence his advocacy of discretionary policy is rationally justified.     

Conquering or mapping? Textbooks and the dissemination of human capital theory in applied economics

Textbooks are an important subject for the study of science in general and economics in particular. In this paper, we analyse at the process of the acceptance of human capital theory through its inclusion in economics textbooks by looking at two specialized fields to which this theory became highly influential: labour economics and the economics of education. The analysis will compare the patterns of the dissemination of these new theoretical developments in a more consolidated field and in an emergent field of economics research with a particular focus in the early stages of that dissemination process.     

Transgressing rights: La Via Campesina's call for food sovereignty / Exploring collaborations: Heterodox economics and an economic social rights framework / Workers in the informal sector: Special challenges for economic human rights

Abstract

The notion of rights is a powerful one, but the channels through which they have been promoted and enforced since World War II have militated against the more radical promise of rights. These explorations examine the question of economic rights with an international focus. The contributions touch on such diverse topics as the international peasant federation called La Vía Campesina, heterodox and social economic analyses, and the informal sector. The authors address the question of human rights with respect to the conditions that delimit and enforce these rights, the connections between macroeconomics and human rights, social movements that strive to protect these rights, and the different theoretical approaches to incorporating rights into an academic framework. Though each contribution's methodology and focus are different, the composite takes an important step in evaluating this very critical question of economic rights that greatly affects individual lives, social conditions, economic policies, and the study of economics.     

Principles of economic justice: Marketplace and workplace applications

Mainstream economics argues that ethical standards are essentially relative, that they differ from one person to the next, and are entirely outside the limits of legitimate inquiry for economic science. Our view is that there are certain objective ethical standards to be applied that parallel the three modes of human interaction in economic affairs: person to person, superior to subordinate, and member to group. Those standards are given by the principle of equivalence, principle of distributive justice, and principle of contributive justice. The key to integrating those standards into mainstream economic thinking is to begin with what happens in every exchange involving economic agents who are well-informed and free to act. What is gotten in the exchange is more highly valued than what is given up. However, there must be limits to that gain—identified in mainstream economics as profits, consumer surplus, and economic rent—in order to prevent one party from taking advantage of another and to assure that market exchange serves all economic agents fairly and effectively and not just those with the power and will to turn gain into excess. Mainstream economists argue that sufficient limits are imposed by the “invisible hand.” We argue instead that limits must be imposed more deliberately and directly by human economic agents and that those limits are supplied by the three principles of justice.     

Viewpoint: The economics of hunter‐gatherer societies and the evolution of human characteristics

Abstract.  We argue for attention to the evolutionary origins of economic behaviour. Going beyond this, we argue that the economy of hunting and gathering was the context in which evolution shaped human characteristics that underlie modern economic behaviour. We first reconsider the basic biological question of why aging occurs at all. We then illustrate the usefulness of considering foraging economics by asking why it is biologically advantageous for humans to live long after their reproductive career is over. Further, we argue that foraging economics would have led to the simultaneous exaggeration of intelligence and of longevity that is characteristic of humans. JEL classification: A12, J10     

Selfishness, cooperation, the evolutionary point of view and its implications for economics

The assumed selfishness of market actors could be considered in the context of two perspectives: macroeconomic and microeconomic. The first concerns the market mechanism as the most effective from the social well-being or the wealth of a nation points of view. The latter is based on the premises of the nature of human beings. I have distinguished between two possible ways of understanding selfish forms of behaviour in the market: as rational economic behaviour i.e. the most effective from the gains and losses point of view (i.e. public interests in the works of A. Smith) or as selfish from the psychological point of view (this is mostly presented by J. S. Mill's theory). The first approach seems to be concerned with the creation of the most effective market mechanism from the State's point of view. In the context of historical processes over 400 years, cultural evolution “has been promoting” selfish behaviour; for example, it was widely presented in T. Hobbes' works and then for over 200 years, the theory of A. Smith has been supporting and moulding the institutional context of market and social behaviour. Thus, positive economics describes the market created by the ideas of a neo-classical paradigm, which is based on the normative premises of A. Smith and J. S. Mill. Moreover, the virtual market behaviour described by “effects” (f. e. Veblen's effect) and failures seems to be a manifestation of a discrepancy between market reality and the classical assumptions.The social evolution of human beings has been advantageous to the human species. Moreover, from the social point of view, pro-social behaviour is “natural” as well as desirable and it has been preferred by the cultural evolution. Competitiveness assumes that somebody has to lose, because someone gains. Cooperation looks for gains for all the players. The choice is political, and not imposed by selfishness.     

A Kantian critique of neoclassical law and economics

Abstract

This paper outlines a critique of neoclassical law and economics based on the ethics of Immanuel Kant, focusing on four central topics: efficiency as the sole evaluative criterion for policy-making, hypothetical compensation in Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, the instrumental nature of rights and the assumption of reciprocal causation, and the role of punishment to both society and the individual. This overview addresses issues of concern not just to Kantians, but to anyone dissatisfied with the utilitarian foundations of law and economics and the amoral view of law upon which it is based.     

Presidential address,association for social economics,January 2005

In recent years social economists have been utilizing a broader than conventional perspective for examining the behavior of economic agents. While traditionally the focus has been on the one-dimensional maximizing “individual with this newer approach the focus is on the multidimensional “person.” Thus the name “Personalist Economics.” Long ago the British writer Thomas Carlyle devoted volumes of pages to the sorts of topics and issues that are prominent in the personalist approach. Here are explored some areas of overlap between Carlyle's and today's personalist perspective, and some questions that might be raised about the two approaches.     

Re-framing the urban blight problem with trans-disciplinary insights from ecological economics

Similar to circumstances in the field of economics, market fundamentalism dominates urban blight policy spaces in the U.S. despite criticisms of the paradigm. Unlike the unified alternative that ecological economics (EE) provides to conventional economic theory, however, disagreement over the meaning of “blight” has prevented a commonly held pre-analytic vision and policy agenda from forming in critical blight scholarship. This paper asserts that “applied EE” offers a framework in which to develop such a vision, and to strengthen the inchoate critical blight policy stream. We draw on the EE theory and concepts to argue that blight can be understood as a stock that accumulates in an urban system as a result of underinvestment into real property. Our conceptualization of the problem has several important implications for public policy. A brief illustration compares the relative efficacy of one city's characteristically neoliberal blight policies with more “EE-consistent” policies in a second city to show that the latter might in fact outperform the former.     

The behavioral foundations of Austrian economics

Behavioral and experimental economics present challenges to the neoclassical theory of individual behavior, which is based on individuals making choices within the framework of utility functions that are assumed to have certain well-defined characteristics. Results in behavioral and experimental economics have shown that it is common for individual behavior to systematically deviate from the neoclassical axioms of utility maximization. Austrian economics is also based on axiomatic theories of utility maximization, but the assumptions underlying utility-maximizing behavior are much weaker in the Austrian approach. As a result, they have more solid behavioral foundations and are less subject to challenge by the empirical findings of behavioral and experimental economics. Neoclassical policy conclusions are often overly strong because of its behavioral foundations which are challenged by behavioral and experimental economics and are often misleading because of the comparative static nature of neoclassical welfare economics. For purposes of policy analysis, the Austrian approach provides better insights because of its more realistic behavioral foundations.