Matching public support for private product-innovating R&D: a theoretical analysis

This paper develops a theoretical model of product innovation where research and development (R&D) effort by a monopolist firm is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. The government attempts to aid such efforts with a matching grant. We consider different scenarios depending on whether two parties act simultaneously, act sequentially, or take part in a dynamic cooperative game with a trigger strategy. We also consider cases (i) when the products are exported, (ii) when the firm lobbies for R&D subsidy, and (iii) when the firm is foreign owned. We characterize situations when government intervention increases the chances of product innovation and when it does not.     

On tariff and quality innovation in a market with discrete preferences

In a market for a quality-differentiated good with heterogeneous set of consumers and a local firm facing competitive imports from abroad, we examine private and social incentives for quality innovation. For differential tariff regime, we show that both the private and social gains increase with the tariff protection for the low-quality segment of the domestic market for any given tariff on high-quality imports. But for some very high costs of innovation, the local firm may not undertake a socially desirable innovation. The pro-competitive effect, on the other hand, ensures that quality-distortion-at-the-bottom occurs only for very high levels of tariffs.     

R&D competition between public and private sectors

We investigate a mixed market where a welfare-maximizing public research institute competes against profit-maximizing private firms. We investigate R&D competition by using a standard model of patent races where each firm chooses both its innovation size and R&D expenditure. We find that the innovation size (R&D expenditure) chosen by the public institute is too small (too large) from the viewpoint of social welfare, respectively, and so the government should control the public institute appropriately. We also discuss the welfare implications of privatization of public research institutes.     

R&D subsidies and private R&D expenditures: evidence from Italian manufacturing data

This paper uses a comprehensive firm level data set for the manufacturing sector in Italy to investigate the effect of government support on privately financed R&D expenditure. Estimates from a non‐parametric matching procedure suggest that public assistance has a positive effect on private R&D investment in the sense that the recipient firms achieve more private R&D than they would have without public support. This indicates that the possibility of perfect crowding out between private and public funds can be rejected. Furthermore, in this sample of Italian firms, tax incentives appear to be more effective than direct grants. The paper also examines whether public funding affects the financial sources available for R&D and finds that grants encourage the use of internal sources. The results also show some evidence of positive effects on credit financing for R&D.     

Why some product innovations are licensed and others are not?

We study in a Stackelberg industry the licensing of a product that embodies an innovation (quality-improving product) whose owner may be the firm that plays as a leader or a follower in setting output in the the product market. We find that the innovation is transferred (and social welfare is reduced) if its owner is the market-leader firm. However, if the innovation is in the hands of the market-follower firm, it is not licensed, even though licensing would be welfare enhancing. Thus, subsidizing R&D with the mandatory licensing of the resulting innovation may be a socially desirable policy.     

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.     

Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China

Following the recent literature on institutions and economic growth, we examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate R&D. Using a unique 2003 World Bank survey of over 2400 firms in 18 Chinese cities, we obtain the following findings: (1) property rights protection is positively and significantly related to corporate R&D activity (for both process and product R&D); (2) government services and helping hand are conducive to corporate R&D, while informal payments to government officials are not; and (3) government ownership of firms and direct appointment of CEOs are negatively associated with corporate R&D activities. We also find that corporate R&D is positively related to firm size, and access to finance, but negatively related to product market competition and firm age.     

R&D Strategy in International Mixed Duopoly with Research Spillovers

This paper examines the international mixed duopoly behaviour with research spillovers. Using a two‐stage game with Research and Development (R&D) and output, we investigate the effects of imperfectly appropriable R&D on optimal R&D strategies of a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm across different market interactions: (i) international R&D competition, (ii) only the foreign firm conducts R&D, (iii) only the domestic public firm conducts R&D, (iv) no firm conducts R&D, and (v) research joint venture. The results show that firms' research performances are determined by the degree of spillovers and the optimal R&D strategies involve R&D competition. Spillovers are shown to be socially beneficial and their absence can prove to be a strategic deterrent, with the public firm monopolising the market. Some of these findings contrast with the traditional models of oligopoly (with or without R&D) and mixed oligopoly (without R&D).     

Firm size and types of innovation

We propose a general theory of innovation that illustrates the relative benefits of performing process versus product R&D when firm size is endogenous. A firm's size, scope, and R&D portfolio are shown to reflect the same underlying characteristic of the firm, namely manufacturing efficiency. We demonstrate that efficient firms become larger, have greater scope, and perform more of both process and product R&D. In light of decreasing returns to R&D, this implies small firms obtain more product innovations per dollar of R&D than large firms, which is consistent with evidence we present that small firms are more innovative than large firms as they obtain more patent counts and citations per dollar of R&D.     

Knowledge appropriability, firm size, and growth

Empirical evidence shows that the number of patents per R&D dollar declines with firm size. In this paper, we propose a Schumpeterian growth model that accounts for this evidence. We analyze an economy with firms that engage in cost-reducing innovation resulting from the accumulation of both codified and tacit knowledge: the former occurs through the purchase of patents, while the latter is the result of R&D conducted in-house by firms. We study the relation between knowledge appropriability and market structure, and we show that a shift from patents to in-house research occurs as firm size gets larger. Since innovation statistics concentrate mainly on patents, this process of research reallocation results into an under-estimation of innovative activity and is responsible for the declining ratio of patents to R&D expenditure. Survey data on UK-based firms provide support to our results.     

Countervailing Duties, Foreign Export Subsidies and Import Tariffs

Given that countervailing duties and import tariffs are set in different ways and for different purposes, I re-examine the relationship between countervailing duties, foreign export subsidies and import tariffs under imperfect competition. I find that (i) the optimal countervailing duty depends on the existing import tariff level; (ii) the optimal import tariff is so high that the optimal countervailing duty is zero and hence foreign export subsidization occurs; and (iii) it is more likely for countervailing duties to be imposed on a foreign firm whose government takes no action when other foreign countries reduce or eliminate their subsidies on exports.     

Evidence on the impact of R&D and ICT investments on innovation and productivity in Italian firms

Both research and development (R&D) and information and communication technology (ICT) investment have been identified as sources of relative innovation underperformance in Europe vis-à-vis the USA. In this article, we investigate the R&D and ICT investment at the firm level in an effort to assess their relative importance and to what extent they are complements or substitutes. We use data on a large unbalanced panel data sample of Italian manufacturing firms constructed from four consecutive waves of a survey of manufacturing firms, to estimate a version of the CDM model of R&D, innovation, and productivity [Crépon–Duguet–Mairesse 1998. Research, innovation and productivity: An econometric analysis at the firm level. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 7, no. 2: 115–58] that has been modified to include ICT investment and R&D as the two main inputs into innovation and productivity. We find that R&D and ICT are both strongly associated with innovation and productivity, with R&D being more important for innovation, and ICT investment being more important for productivity. For the median firm, rates of return to both investments are so high that they suggest considerably underinvestment in both these activities. We explore the possible complementarity between R&D and ICT in innovation and production, but find none, although we do find complementarity between R&D and worker skill in innovation.     

Intra-industry spillovers and innovation: An econometric analysis at the firm level

This paper studies spillover effects of innovation at the firm level and the comparability of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators with maximum likelihood estimators of the earlier studies. Two sources of spillovers are identified, i.e. intra-industry R&D expenditure and intra-industry innovation output. This paper estimates a negative R&D spillover effect and a positive output spillover effect. Because of the substitution effect of intra-industry R&D spillovers, the elasticity of patent with respect to firm's own R&D expenditure is greater than those estimated in the earlier studies. With GMM, individual effects are incorporated into the models either by developing proxies for them or attempting to eliminate them.     

Environmental regulations and innovation activity in UK manufacturing industries

We examine the relationship between environmental regulations and innovation, using data from UK manufacturing industry during 2000-2006. We estimate a dynamic model of innovation behaviour, and explicitly account for the likely endogeneity of our measure of the stringency of environmental regulations (pollution abatement costs). Our results indicate that while on the one hand environmental R&D and investment in environmental capital are stimulated by greater pollution abatement pressures, on the other hand there is not a positive impact of environmental regulation on total R&D or total capital accumulation. We find some evidence that this is because more stringent environmental regulations directly lower the optimal expenditure on non-environmental innovations. In addition, we find that environmental R&D may crowd out non-environmental R&D, although there is no evidence that environmental capital crowds out non-environmental capital.     

Does government R&D stimulate or crowd out firm R&D spending? Evidence from Chinese manufacturing industries

We examine whether receiving a government R&D grant stimulates or crowds out a firm’s own R&D spending in Chinese manufacturing industries. Using a database that spans the population of large and medium size privately owned Chinese manufacturing firms for the period from 2007 to 2011, a matching estimator and a matching and difference in‐differences estimator, we find a large firm R&D promoting effect of government R&D: receiving a government R&D grant led to a 4 to 9‐million‐yuan increase in a firm’s own R&D expenditures. This is a significant effect since the average R&D expenditures ranged from 5 to 9 million yuan in the year before receiving the grant. To understand the mechanisms behind this effect, we compare the before‐ and after‐treatment performance and behaviour of the treated and the control firms. We find that the government R&D receiving firms became more profitable following their receipt of the grant. We also find that receiving a government R&D grant increases the likelihood of a firm continuing its R&D performance after receiving the initial grant.     

Do subsidies have positive impacts on R&D and innovation activities at the firm level?

In this paper we analyze whether and how “research” and “development” subsidies influence private R&D activity. Our empirical results show that “research” subsidies stimulate R&D spending within firms while “development” subsidies substitute such spending. At the theoretical level we find empirical support for the market failure argument that private R&D expenditure is best stimulated in areas where the gap between the social and the private rate of return to R&D is high. A policy implication is that technology programs should support research projects in the private sector in order to stimulate to more R&D.     

OPTIMUM-WELFARE AND MAXIMUM-REVENUE TARIFFS IN MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH FOREIGN COMPETITORS

This paper re-examines the important tariff ranking issue under a linear mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and asymmetric costs. We demonstrate that under Cournot competition, when the size of domestic private and foreign private firms become more unequally distributed, optimum-welfare tariff will exceed maximum-revenue tariff. We also show that under Stackelberg competition, when the domestic government protects its domestic sector, it will levy higher optimum-welfare tariffs versus maximum-revenue tariffs; however, when it decides to open its doors more for foreign competitors, it will need to levy higher maximum-revenue tariffs versus optimum-welfare tariffs. The above results remain valid whether the domestic public firm acts as a leader or a follower.     

Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms

The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals finds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign firms are either multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous firms, we find equilibria in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study the case of endogenously chosen tariffs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the socially optimal tariffs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous firms, we find that non-cooperative tariffs promote the existence of low-productivity firms relative to the socially optimal tariffs. This highlights a new source of inefficiency from tariff competition not found in models of homogeneous firms. In addition, we find that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariff when FDI is a potential firm structure is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariff competition.     

Spillovers and the competitive pressure for long-run innovation

This paper discusses the impact of oligopolistic product markets for innovation and growth, highlighting a novel, fundamental role of spillovers. We develop a model of endogenous growth with non-tournament R&D, where spillovers raise the relative R&D efficiency of laggards. A key feature is that the rate of innovation and the market configuration (i.e. the distribution of market shares) are jointly determined. Our results emphasize the role of spillovers in sustaining the competitive pressure that is fundamental for long-run innovation and economic growth.     

Innovation or imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms’ R&D strategy choice

In this paper a firm’s R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firm characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. This yields three types of equilibria, in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms’ equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms’ incentives to engage in R&D, while excessive competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics.