Keynesian, Old Keynesian, and New Keynesian Wage Nominalism

Wage nominalism has long been a puzzle for economists. The original Keynesian explanation related it to a coordination failure in the context of decentralized union bargaining, a problem now in a largely nonunion U. S. labor market. Moreover, Keynesianism assumed wage nominalism as the norm rather than explaining it. New Keynesian explanations, based on implicit contracts, menu costs, and other innovations still do not explain wage nominalism.     

The Union Wage Effect in Japan

Previous studies point to Japanese labor unions’ lack of bargaining power that results from their organization at an enterprise level. However, a detailed examination of the institutional setting backed by the Labor Standard Law and Trade Union Law reveals that unions have strong bargaining power against deteriorating work conditions. This paper examines the effect of unions on wages using the Japanese General Social Surveys 2000–2003, which cover a period of economic stagnation. We find a robust union wage premium for both males and females. A Cotton–Neumark decomposition reveals that about one‐fifth of union workers’ higher wage is explained by the difference in the union and nonunion wage structures. We also can confirm the union wage compression effect using the DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996 ) method. Union workers are likely to think that they will not find jobs with similar compensation packages if they leave their current jobs. In summary, unions in Japan contribute to an increase in the average wage and compress the wage distribution among their workers. This result is reconciled with previous findings by considering the uniqueness of the macroeconomic conditions of the sample period.     

Bargaining over employment as a firm strategic choice

This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the product market may find it optimal to commit to bargaining outcomes with their specific union, which are off the labor demand curve, hence restricting their behavior to non-profit maximizing practices in their product markets. The prediction that power over labor conceded strategically to the union by the firm is negatively linked to union wage power is not rejected on a panel of Belgian firms as well as the prediction that the union bargaining power can be affected by product market structure and other variables affecting union wages.     

工会组织对工资收入的影响：基于制度因素视角——来自英国的经验证据

经济规模、劳动者自身素质及制度等异质性因素,引致劳动力市场具有非完全竞争性的特征,在一定程度上解释了劳动者的工资差异现象。以英国1996和2001年数据为例,在考虑行业与劳动者素质异质性等控制变量情况下,从制度因素视角就工会组织对工人工资的影响进行考察。结果表明,工会成员身份对工人工资作用显著,能产生超过10%的溢价。因此,工会组织的社会生活中的地位与影响力,及其增强工人对雇主议价能力的作用应予重视。     

Wage councils,product markups and wage markdowns: Evidence from Uruguay

In 2005, after a leftist coalition won the national election for the first time, Uruguay returned to sector-level wage bargaining councils with active government participation. We estimate product markups and wage markdowns using firm-level data for the period 2002–2016, and report decreasing wage markdowns and increasing -to a lesser extent- firm-level product markups. We find statistically significant impacts of minimum mandated wages on product markups and wage markdowns, and additional effects of unions on wage markdowns. The evidence suggests that firms operate in monopsonistic labor markets. Though their bargaining power in the labor market was reduced over time as a result of wage councils, firms were able to pass a sizable part of the increases in labor costs to consumers.     

Market Structure, Strike Activity, and Union Wage Settlements

We attempt a synthesis of the industrial relations market structure hypothesis with the modern asymmetric information theory of wage and strike outcomes. The industrial relations literature contains arguments indicating that wage settlements should be positively related to the degree of product market sales concentration and the degree of product market coverage by the union. In our empirical analysis of the periods 1970–1980 (strikes) and 1976–1980 (wages), we find that the relation between trade-adjusted sales concentration and wage settlements is positive at low and intermediate levels of concentration but negative at the highest levels of concentration. The relation is always negative for strike probabilities. We also find that the trade-adjusted per cent of the product market covered by the same union and the percentage covered by other unions are positively related to both wage settlements and strike probabilities.     

Collective Bargaining and the Evolution of Wage Inequality in Italy

Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from the mid‐1980s until the early 2000s, while it has been persistently flat since then. We analyse this trend, focusing on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion. By accounting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown that workers' heterogeneity has been a major determinant of increased wage inequalities, while variability in firm wage policies has declined over time. We also show that the growth in pay dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli di inquadramento, that is, job titles defined by national industry‐wide collective bargaining institutions, for which specific minimum wages apply. We conclude that the underlying market forces determining wage inequality have been largely channelled into the tight tracks set by the centralized system of industrial relations.     

Bargaining Structure and Wage Outcomes in the British Coal Industry

The arguments below use case study and time series data to investigate the relationship between bargaining structure and wage settlements in the British coal industry. Consideration of the different bargaining structures in this industry suggests that bargaining power and wage outcomes are very sensitive to market conditions when the negotiating structure is decentralized; when negotiations are centralized in industry-wide bargaining, power and wage outcomes are quite insensitive to market conditions. These conclusions may help in understanding recent events in this industry and perhaps can be generalized to other cases where bargaining structures are undergoing change.     

Changes in Wage-setting Arrangements and Trade Union Presence in the 1980s

In this paper we detail the results of a retrospective survey of changes in trade union and wage-setting arrangements in the 1980s for a sample of 558 UK companies. Our key findings are as follows. (1) Complete derecognition of unions in a firm was rare even in firms with low trade union density. (2) Partial derecognition in multi-plant firms was more common. Some 13 per cent of companies with recognized unions in 1984 had had at least partial derecognition by 1990. (3) Large falls in trade union density within a firm have also been rare, though small but observable declines have been commonplace. (4) The coverage of the closed shop has substantially declined, and this decline has been most marked in the last five years. Around one-quarter of firms with recognized unions in 1990, however, still had closed-shop arrangement for at least part of their work-force. (5) There has been no clear decline in the prevalence of multi-unionism or multiple bargaining units. (6) There has been a significant move away from national/industry-wide bargaining, towards negotiations at the individual company or more often the establishment level. (7) In the absence of collective bargaining there have been clear moves away from wage-setting by formal external links, such as wages councils and multi-employer agreements, and even away from worker consultation towards more managerial discretion. (8) In deciding wage settlements, managers are increasingly influenced by company performance and less by multi-employer wage settlements.     

Sidney and Beatrice Webb's Institutional Theory of Labor Markets and Wage Determination

Sydney and Beatrice Webb were among the most influential institutional labor economists of the pre‐World War II period yet this portion of their work has fallen out of sight for more than a half‐century. This paper reconstructs the Webbs' theory of labor markets and wage determination and explains how it differs from the rival neoclassical labor theory of Alfred Marshall. Key institutional components of their theory are developed, such as rent theory, institutional pyramid, chain of bargains, inequality of bargaining power, unemployed residuum, and common rule. The Webbs' theory is then used to explain the operation of labor markets and why in the absence of regulation they generate numerous social problems, including widespread poverty wages, excessive work hours and injuries, substantial unemployment, and human capital exploitation. Also described is the set of labor policies the Webbs advocate to solve these problems. Implications for modern labor theory and policy are developed.     

Models of Union Wage Determination: What Have We Learned Since Dunlop and Ross?

This study surveys the development and current status of models of union wage determination since Dunlop and Ross first wrote on the subject in the 1940s. To start, I identify eight empirical dimensions of the union wage effect that models have endeavored to explain and predict. A number of alternative theoretical models are then examined, starting with Dunlop's "economic" and Ross' "political" models and extending to the plethora of models and extensions found in the modern-day literature. Examples include standard monopoly, efficient contract, and bargaining models, as well as offshoots such as median voter, insider-outsider, property rights, and principal-agent models. The article then examines the extent to which these various models generate hypotheses and insights apropos to explaining the eight major empirical dimensions of the union wage effect. The conclusion summarizes what has been learned, the major shortcomings of this literature, and steps for further progress.     

The Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm‐Level Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland

This paper uses a linked employer‐employee dataset to analyze the impact of institutional wage bargaining regimes on average labor costs and within‐firm wage dispersion in private sector companies in Ireland. The results show that while centralized bargaining reduced labor costs within both the indigenous and foreign‐owned sectors, the relative advantage was greater among foreign‐owned firms. The analysis suggests that there are potentially large competitiveness gains to multinational companies that locate in countries implementing a centralized bargaining system. Furthermore, the results provide additional support to the view that collective bargaining reduces within‐firm wage inequality.     

Minimum Cash Wages,Tipped Restaurant Workers,and Poverty

This is the first study to examine the effect of increases in the tipped minimum cash wage—the wage employers must pay to tipped employees—on poverty. Using March Current Population Survey data (1988–2014), we find that tipped minimum cash wage increases are associated with declines in the risk of a tipped restaurant worker living in a poor family (elasticities around –0.2). However, we find little evidence of poverty‐alleviating effects when using the household rather than the family as the sharing unit. This result is consistent with evidence that a substantial share of tipped workers who live in a poor family live in a nonpoor household with persons unrelated by blood, marriage, or adoption who contribute to the household's income. Furthermore, we find that tipped minimum cash wage hikes are associated with increases in the risk of a younger, less‐educated individual living in a poor family or household. Adverse labor demand effects that redistribute income among low‐skilled individuals drive these results. We conclude that raising the tipped minimum cash wage is a poorly targeted policy to deliver income to poor restaurant workers.     

Unobserved Worker Quality and Inter-Industry Wage Differentials*

This study quantitatively assesses two alternative explanations for inter-industry wage differentials: worker heterogeneity in the form of unobserved quality and firm heterogeneity in the form of a firm's willingness to pay (WTP) for workers' productive attributes. Building on hedonic models of differentiated product demand, we develop an empirical hedonic model of labor demand and apply a two-stage nonparametric procedure to recover worker and firm heterogeneities. In the first stage we recover unmeasured worker quality by estimating market-specific hedonic wage functions nonparametrically. In the second stage we infer each firm's WTP parameters for worker attributes by using first-order conditions from the demand model. We apply our approach to quantify inter-industry wage differentials on the basis of individual data from the NLSY79 and find that worker quality accounts for approximately two thirds of the inter-industry wage differentials.     

What Sort of Collective Bargaining Is Emerging in China?

China is experiencing a rapid expansion of what is termed ‘collective bargaining’. The article draws on workplace and sectoral examples to assess what underlies this. Recent changes in labour policy are outlined. Four studies at establishment level describe the use of hybrid representation in response to growing worker activism and internal union reform. Two studies of sectoral bargaining shed light on decentralized decision‐making on pay. Attention is drawn to the growth of employer organizations and increased articulation within the trade union. A form of collective bargaining is emerging where the union draws on state power to improve conditions of employment.     

Labor Market Analysis and Concerted Behavior

In the first part of this paper, the importance of concerted behavior by workers emerges from examination of some prominent theories which set out to explain wage rigidity in the face of declining demand or excess supply without abandoning key elements of competitive theory. In the second part, the imoportance of certain Keynesian and satificing behavioral postulates in motivating concerted worker behavior is suggested by the shortcomings of some contemporary econmic models of the trade union which assume expected utility maximization and accurate knowledge of market conditions under ordinary circumstances.     

The Impact of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strike Activity and Wage Settlements

We examine the effects of collective bargaining legislation, such as (among others) bans on replacement workers and reinstatement rights, on private sector strike activity and wage settlements using Canadian data from 1978 to 2008. Our estimates indicate that this legislation does not have a statistically significant effect on the incidence of strikes. However, we do find that some of the policy variables have a statistically significant effect on strike duration and wage settlements.     

Indicative and Updated Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium in Germany

This study provides updated evidence on the union contract differential in Germany using establishment‐wide wage data and two estimation strategies. It provides pairwise estimates of the union differential based on separate samples of collective bargaining leavers and joiners vis‐à‐vis the corresponding counterfactual groups. We report that average wages increase by 3 to 3.5 percent after entering into a collective agreement and decrease by 3 to 4 percent after abandoning a collective agreement. Excluding establishments that experience mass layoffs does not significantly influence these net findings, although such establishments record wage losses—statistically insignificant for joiners but up to 10 percent in the case of leavers, as compared with the counterfactuals. The backdrop to these new indicative estimates, which are properly conditioned on establishment size and industry affiliation, inter alia, is one of wage stagnation and continuing union decline.     

Political Entrepreneurs and Co‐Managers: Labour Transnationalism at Four Multinational Auto Companies

This article examines labour transnationalism within four multinational automakers. In our sample, we find different forms of labour transnationalism, including transnational collective bargaining, mobilization, information exchange and social codes of conduct. We explain the differences through the interaction between management and labour in the context of the company structure; of particular importance are transnational coercive comparisons by management and the orientations of worker representatives as political entrepreneurs or co‐managers. We conclude that, although intensified worker‐side cross‐border co‐operation has not prevented wage‐based competition in general (due to the lack of between‐firm co‐ordination), it has reshaped employment relations within these multinational corporations.     

Global Collective Bargaining on Flag of Convenience Shipping

The most significant case of transnational union bargaining co‐ordination in existence is in the maritime shipping industry. A global union association, the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), and a global employers’ federation, the International Maritime Employers’ Committee (IMEC), now negotiate over pay scales for seafarers on Flag of Convenience (FOC) ships. These negotiations set the pattern for pay and working conditions for a signifi‐cant portion of the global seafaring work‐force. The ITF brought about global wage bargaining by building and enforcing a global inter‐union consensus between developed and developing countries around a uniform wage rate.