电视平台竞争:从免费模式到付费模式

本文建立了一个电视平台竞争的理论模型。电视台、厂商和观众之间通过一个三阶段博弈决定了电视台的广告数量、收视费用(付费模式下)和节目质量。研究表明:虽然付费模式下电视台向观众收取费用,但是节目质量仍可能低于免费模式并且总是低于社会最优水平。当单个广告给观众带来的干扰成本和电视平台之间差异程度都充分小或者都较大时,付费模式下的社会福利比免费模式下更高。     

Program Quality Competition in Broadcasting Markets

This paper develops a duopoly model where broadcasters first choose their program quality and then their pricing strategy. Two alternative financing schemes are considered: pay‐TV and free‐to‐air. We find that, from a welfare perspective, a pay‐TV regime always generates inadequate quality and advertising, whereas free‐to‐air might produce excessive quality and advertising. In the case of asymmetric competition, a pay‐TV broadcaster always has a stronger incentive to conduct research and development than a free‐to‐air broadcaster does. Both platforms could either over‐ or underinvest. The pay‐TV broadcaster always shows too few advertisements, but the free‐to‐air media might act in the opposite manner.     

网络平台企业免费产品相关市场界定与案例应用——以视频平台为例

平台企业对单边提供免费品，使基于价格变动的SSNIP测试法无法用于判断相关市场。本文以视频平台为例，基于Filistrucchi双边市场测试法，通过将SSNIP测试法中对一边市场的产品价格提升替代为广告时长的增加，改进了基于价格变动的假定垄断测试法，构建了网络平台企业免费产品的SSNDQ模型。在此基础上分析了加入会员收入的情况。主要结论是：（1）虽然传统的SSNIP测试法不适用于免费产品，但是影响用户“注意力”的变量“广告时长”能降低产品质量，是SSNIP测试法中价格的有效替代变量。本文证明了改进的SSNDQ测试法具有一般性，并给出了基于SSNDQ测试法的相关市场判断条件。（2）给出了界定网络平台免费产品相关市场的思路和分析框架、平台付费化趋势下免费产品与付费产品共存状态下的情形，并推导出不同利润差结果下判断平台用户不同行为及相关市场范围的条件。基于这一方法的测试为并购审查和反垄断认定，提供了依据和证据。     

A model of advertising format competition: on the use of celebrities in ads

We develop a model that endogenizes both advertising format – ads with or without celebrity endorsements – and the endorsement fee. Marketing studies suggest that celebrities enhance brand recall and perception of product value. In our model, ads featuring celebrities occur when the product market is large – endorsements are likely for products sold nationally – and when products are sufficiently similar that the persuasive character of advertising looms large in demand – running shoes, beauty products, soft drinks, for example. Celebrity endorsement fees are increasing in market size and in the degree of similarity of the products being advertised.     

Consumption Externalities,Coordination, and Advertising*

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that advertising can have an important function in markets with consumption externalities apart from its persuasive and informative roles. We show that advertising may function as a device to coordinate consumer expectations of the purchasing decisions of other consumers in markets with consumption externalities. The implications of advertising as a coordinating device are examined in the pricing and advertising decisions of firms interacting strategically. Although, at times, the one‐period advertising expense can exceed the one‐period monopoly profit, in equilibrium, consumers will pay a premium for the more heavily advertised brand.     

Paying positive to go negative: Advertisers׳ competition and media reports

This paper analyzes a two-sided market for news where two rival advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information about the quality of their own product (paying positive to avoid negative) and/or to disclose negative information about the quality of their competitor׳s product (paying positive to go negative). We show that competition in the product market does not necessarily prevent the emergence of commercial media bias. Whether or not competing advertisers end up having negative consequences on news accuracy ultimately depends on the extent of correlation in the quality of their products; the lower the correlation, the higher the expected accuracy of the media outlet׳s reports. These findings provide a rationale to explain the observed differences in the extent of commercial media bias across seemingly similar industries or products, within the same media market. The results are robust to the presence of multiple media outlets and to asymmetries between the advertisers. Overall, the paper provides theoretical insights for media regulators and for the empirical literature examining the link between advertising and news contents.     

Envy and pricing of quality in adverse selection

The paper analyzes the optimal pricing of quality when consumers feel envious of other purchase deals. The influence of envy on the optimal pricing of quality varies depending on whether consumers are concerned about envy in payments or in rents. If consumers compare their payments with those of other consumers, the firm has an incentive to produce lower quality than the first-best level for the high valuation consumer and higher quality than the second-best level for the low valuation consumer. Conversely, when consumers’ disutility from envy arises from envy in rents, the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction becomes more serious than in the situation where there is no envy.     

Comparing consumers’ preferences and willingness to pay for non-GM oil using a contingent valuation approach

A contingent valuation method is used in this paper to compare Chinese and Japanese consumers’ preferences and willingness to pay for non-GM vegetable oil. An often ignored issue—the scale factor in a discrete choice model—is explicitly considered, and parameter equality for different data sets is formally tested before reaching a conclusion. Results indicate that in these two countries consumers’ attitude factors and demographic traits have significantly different effects on their purchase intentions, and on average, Japanese consumers are willing to pay a much higher premium for non-GM vegetable oil than Chinese consumers.      

Application of Multivariate Statistical Analysis for Valuation of Copyrights in the Hotel Industry

The aim of this work was to identify comparable markets for the hotel industry in Europe and to compare the fees incurred by hotels for using copyrighted and indirect rights for copyright management organizations. The study covers 21 European countries. Using multivariate statistical analysis methods, these countries were grouped, taking into account gross domestic product per capita and the average daily rate for a hotel room. A detailed comparison of the fees that hotels pay for using music and audiovisual works was conducted for the Central and Eastern European countries characterized by the lowest income and hotel prices. The analysis identified wide variation in the methods for calculating fees, fee amounts, and the relationship to hotel revenues among the various countries.

     

A Theory of Broadcast Media Concentration and Commercial Advertising

We analyze a model in which the interaction of broadcasters, advertisers, and consumers determines the level of nonadvertising broadcasting produced and consumed. Our main finding is that an increase in concentration in broadcast media industries may lead to a decrease in the total amount of nonadvertising broadcasting. The strength of this inverse relationship depends, in part, on the behavioral response of the consumers to changes in advertising intensities. We also present a numerical general equilibrium solution to our model and demonstrate a positive relationship between consumer welfare and the number of firms in the broadcast industry.     

MEDIA ADVERTISING AND BALLOT INITIATIVES: THE CASE OF ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATION

Spending on political advertising increases with every election cycle, not only for congressional or presidential candidates, but also for state‐level ballot initiatives. There is little research in marketing, however, on the effectiveness of political advertising at this level. In this study, we conduct an experimental analysis of advertisements used during the 2008 campaign to mandate new animal welfare standards in California (Proposition 2). Using subjects' willingness‐to‐pay for cage‐free eggs as a proxy for their likely voting behavior, we investigate whether advertising provides real information to likely voters, and thus sharpens their existing attitudes toward the issue, or whether advertising can indeed change preferences. We find that advertising in support of Proposition 2 was more effective in raising subjects' willingness‐to‐pay for cage‐free eggs than ads in opposition were in reducing it, but we also find that ads in support of the measure reduce the dispersion of preferences and thus polarize attitudes toward the initiative. More generally, political ads are found to contain considerably more “hype” than “real information” in the sense of Johnson and Myatt [Johnson, J. P., and D. P. Myatt. “On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing and Product Design.” American Economic Review, 96, 2006, 756–84]. (JEL D12, D72, K32, L66, M37)     

COMMENT—ALCOHOL ADVERTISING IN MAGAZINES AND YOUTH READERSHIP: ARE YOUTHS DISPROPORTIONATELY EXPOSED?

This article investigates the relationship between alcohol advertising in magazines and youth readership, while controlling for a set of magazine and readership variables related to the demand for advertising space. It reconstructs and reanalyzes a data set including count data for alcohol ads placed in 28 magazines in 2001-2003 that was the basis for a previous study, which concluded that alcohol advertisers do not target youths. We address the problem of collinearity in that data set and add an explanatory variable to explicitly model the hypothesis that alcohol advertising is preferentially directed to a young adult audience. We find that the number of alcohol advertisements in magazines increases significantly with the proportion of youth readers, even after controlling for young adult readership. Our results indicate that youths are disproportionately exposed to alcohol advertising and that reducing youth exposure to alcohol advertising remains an important public policy concern. ( JEL L82, L66, M37)     

Pricing Discretion and Price Regulation in Competitive Industries

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative) constrains the captive prices relatively to the competitive ones. Under the Relative regime, captive prices are only weakly lower and competitive prices are always higher than under the Absolute regime. However, the number of competitors and/or their output may be higher under the Relative regime. While the effects on aggregate welfare are ambiguous, there is some evidence that the Relative regime is more likely to increase consumers’ surplus and social welfare the more efficient are the competitors.     

Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods

This paper provides a positive analysis of public provision of excludable public goods financed by uniform taxes or fees. Individuals differing in preferences decide, using majority rule, the provision level and financing instrument. The decisive voter has median preferences in a tax regime, but generally has above median preferences in a fee regime. Numerical solutions indicate that populations with uniform or left‐skewed distributions of preferences choose taxes, while a majority coalition of high‐ and low‐preference individuals prefer fees when preferences are sufficiently right skewed. Public good provision and welfare under fees exceeds that under taxes in the latter case.     

Advertising,learning, and consumer choice in experience good markets: an empirical examination*

This article empirically analyzes different effects of advertising in a nondurable, experience good market. A dynamic learning model of consumer behavior is presented in which I allow both “informative” effects of advertising and “prestige” or “image” effects of advertising. This learning model is estimated using consumer level panel data tracking grocery purchases and advertising exposures over time. Empirical results suggest that in this market, advertising's primary effect was that of informing consumers. The estimates are used to quantify the value of this information to consumers and evaluate the welfare implications of an alternative advertising regulatory regime.