Developing Countries and a New Round of WTO Negotiations

This article summarizes some of the results and findings emergingfrom an ongoing World Bank research and capacity-building projectthat focuses on the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiatingagenda from a developing country perspective. Recent researchsuggests that the potential gains from further multilateralliberalization of trade remain very large. The payoffs associatedwith attempts to introduce substantive disciplines in the WTOon domestic regulatory regimes are much less certain. This suggeststhat the focus of current and future negotiations should beprimarily on the bread and butter of the multilateral tradingsystem—the progressive liberalization of barriers to tradein goods and services on a nondiscriminatory basis. In addition,priority should be given to ensuring that rules are consistentwith the development needs of poorer countries and to helpingdeveloping countries implement WTO obligations.      

Developing Countries' Changing Participation in World Trade

Recent years have seen substantial reductions in trade policyand other barriers inhibiting developing country participationin world trade. Lower barriers have contributed to a dramaticshift in the pattern of developing country trade—awayfrom dependence on commodity exports to much greater relianceon manufactures and services. In addition, exports to otherdeveloping countries have become much more important. Thesechanges have profound implications for the role played by developingcountries in the world economy and trade system.      

MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT TO CAPITAL INFLOWS: LESSONS FROM RECENT LATIN AMERICAN AND EAST ASIAN EXPERIENCE

Capital inflows to some developing countries have increasedsharply in recent years. Impelled by better economic prospectsin those countries, lower international interest rates, anda slowdown of economic activity in the capital-exporting countries,the inflows have furnished financing much needed to increasethe use of existing capacity and to stimulate investment. Butcapital inflows can bring with them their own problems. Typicalmacroeconomic repercussions have been appreciation of the realexchange rate, expansion of nontradables at the expense of tradables,larger trade deficits, and, in regimes with a fixed exchangerate, higher inflation and an accumulation of foreign reserves. Should government intervene to limit some of these side effects—andif so, how? The question is especially pressing in the wakeof the Mexican crisis of December 1994. This article looks foranswers in the experience of four Latin American and five EastAsian countries between 1986 and 1993, examining the effectsof the capital inflows on the economy and comparing the differentways in which these countries responded to the problem of "toomuch" capital.      

HOW MUCH DOES TRADE WITH THE SOUTH AFFECT WORKERS IN THE NORTH?

Does trade with developing countries have a small and benigneffect on workers in industrial countries, as most economistshave maintained, or a large and adverse effect, as the generalpublic and advocates of protection believe? A review of theevidence suggests that neither of these positions is tenable.The methods that economists have conventionally used to measurethe effect of North-South trade are biased downward. The truesize of this effect remains uncertain, but some recent studiessuggest that it is much larger than previously estimated. Tradewith the South has probably significantly altered the sectoralcomposition of employment in the North, shifting workers outof manufacturing and into nontraded services. More important,it has probably significantly worsened the relative economicposition of unskilled workers in industrial countries, and mayalso have aggravated the problem of reconciling low inflationwith low unemployment. Even so, the adverse side effects oftrade with the South are much smaller than is popularly supposed.And the popular remedy—protection—is clearly wrong.What is needed instead is more action by governments to offsetthe reduction in the relative demand for unskilled labor throughtraining and education, job creation, and income redistribution.      

Infrastructure Privatization and Regulation: Promises and Perils

Infrastructure is crucial for generating growth, alleviatingpoverty, and increasing international competitiveness. For muchof the twentieth century and in most countries, the networkutilities that delivered infrastructure services—suchas electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railroads,and water supply—were vertically and horizontally integratedstate monopolies. But this approach often resulted in extremelyweak services, especially in developing and transition economiesand especially for poor people. Common problems included lowproductivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue,and shortfalls in investment. Over the past two decades manycountries have implemented far-reaching institutional reforms—restructuring,privatizing, and establishing new approaches to regulation.This article identifies the challenges involved in this massivepolicy redirection within the historical, economic, and institutionalcontext of developing and transition economies. It also reviewsthe outcomes of these policy changes, including their distributionalconsequences—especially for poor households and otherdisadvantaged groups. Drawing on a range of international experiencesand empirical studies, it recommends directions for future reformsand research to improve infrastructure performance.      

Insights on Development from the Economics of Happiness

The literature on the economics of happiness in developed economiesfinds discrepancies between reported measures of well-beingand income measures. One is the so-called Easterlin paradox:that average happiness levels do not increase as countries growwealthier. This article explores how that paradox—andsurvey research on reported well-being in general—canprovide insights into the gaps between standard measures ofeconomic development and individual assessments of welfare.Analysis of research on reported well-being in Latin Americaand Russia finds notable discrepancies between respondents’assessments of their own well-being and income- or expenditure-basedmeasures. Accepting a wide margin for error in both types ofmeasures, the article posits that taking such discrepanciesinto account may improve the understanding of development outcomesby providing a broader view on well-being than do income- orexpenditure-based measures alone. It suggests particular areaswhere research on reported well-being has the most potentialto contribute. Yet the article also notes that some interpretationsof happiness research—psychologists’ set point theory,in particular—may be quite limited in their applicationto development questions and cautions against the direct translationof results of happiness surveys into policy recommendations.      

WHO WINS AND WHO LOSES FROM VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTS?:The Case of Footwear

Voluntary export restraints have been a popular resort of industrialcountries faced with increasing competition from exports ofdeveloping countries. As a strategy for circumventing the rulesof the GATT (whose regulations preclude increases in tariffs),these nontariff barriers have been rather successful; whetherthey have been as successful in their aim of protecting andstimulating the industry concerned is another matter. This article looks at what happened when industrial countriesimposed—and then removed—voluntary export restraintson the footwear industry during the 1970s and 1980s. Why didprotectionism spread so fast and then dissipate almost as rapidly,and what effects did this coming and going have on the exportingcountries We suggest that industrial countries removed the restraintsbecause they found ?them either superfluous (the expected employmenteffect failed to materialize) or ineffective (the principalexporters maintained their market share during the height ofthe restrictions), or else because the industry was able toadjust by importing footwear at a profit. Predicting the effect of VERs, and determining how best to managethem, are critical questions for developing countries strugglingto improve their export performance in the 1990s. The resultsof detailed study of a representative industry, summarized here,may assist in the prediction and determination.      

HOW WELL CAN METHOD SUBSTITUTE FOR DATA? FIVE EXPERIMENTS IN POVERTY ANALYSIS

No one doubts that good data are essential to sound policymaking.Alas, data are invariably faulty. Methodological solutions todata inadequacies have often been proposed and implemented,but they have been tested only rarely. Yet the methods thatare used may well determine the direction of policy. For example,the particular survey method used—and the way nonsurveydata are interpreted—may be critical in assessing whethera country's strategy for reducing poverty is working. This articleshows how counterfactual experiments can help test the reliabilityof various methods of dealing with common data problems. Well–designedmethods—and they need not be very complicated—canhelp get around the problem, although it appears that substitutingmethod for data is a long way from being perfect.      

INCOMPLETE MARKETS AND COMMODITY-LINKED FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This article provides a framework for appraising new financialinstruments and evaluating the extent to which they can helpalleviate problems of incomplete credit markets and contingentclaims markets in developing countries. Although the issuesinvolved apply to any new financial instrument, we give particularattention to commodity-linked securities because many developingcountries specialize in producing a handful of primary commoditiesand are therefore exposed to substantial commodity price risks.The article looks at the supply of, demand for, and pricingof commodity-linked securities and discusses some issues thataffect their use by developing countries: their special legalstatus as sovereign debt; their feasibility (since to becometruly effective they will require liquid secondary markets);and the construction of an optimal portfolio of external debtobligations. It also discusses the potential for new financialinstruments—particularly commodity-linked securities—asa tool for risk management in developing countries.      

WHEN DO HETERODOX STABILIZATION PROGRAMS WORK?: Lessons from Experience

What advantages and disadvantages does the heterodox strategyoffer to stabilization programs in countries with chronic highinflation? Heterodox stabilization programs, in our definition,are those that support orthodox policies— that is, tightfiscal policy and a fixed exchange rate—with the initial,temporary use of incomes policies— that is, price andwage controls. This evaluation, based on several heterodox programs,successful and unsuccessful, from the 1960s and 1980s in LatinAmerican countries and Israel, affords four principal lessons: * The rapid reduction in inflation at the beginning of heterodoxprograms (which usually comes about at small cost) is the easypart; the problem is to maintain price stability over time. * Incomes policies in heterodox stabilization programs are justifiedonly in countries with high chronic inflation, where persistentinflation is more pervasive and problematic. * There is a case for a bigger fiscal adjustment in heterodoxthan in orthodox programs because of the risk that a programwith price controls may be misperceived as a populist devicefor achieving price stability without adjusting. * The failure of a heterodox program is more likely to destabilizeinflation than is the failure of an orthodox program.      

Counting the World's Poor: Problems and Possible Solutions

As recent discussions have made clear, the apparent lack ofpoverty reduction in the face of historically high rates ofeconomic growth—both in the world as a whole and in specificcountries (most notably India)—provides fuel for the argumentthat economic growth does little to reduce poverty. How confidentcan we be that the data actually support these inferences? Atthe international level, the regular revision of purchasingpower parity exchange rates plays havoc with the poverty estimates,changing them in ways that have little or nothing to do withthe actual experience of the poor. At the domestic level, theproblems in measuring poverty are important not only for theworld count but also for tracking income poverty within individualcountries. Yet, in many countries, there are large and growingdiscrepancies between the survey data—the source of povertycounts—and the national accounts—the source of themeasure of economic growth. Thus economic growth, as measured,has at best a weak relationship with poverty, as measured.      

A BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF NUTRITIONAL PROGRAMS FOR ANEMIA REDUCTION

Using benefit-cost analysis, this article evaluates potentialprograms for reducing iron deficiency anemia, one of the mostprevalent nutritional disorders. It discusses the origins andprevalence of anemia and reviews the literature on consequencesof anemia for work capacity, output, learning, and other variables.Costs and benefits are estimated for two types of programs—medicinalsupplementation and fortification of food with iron—andfor three cases—Indonesia, Kenya, and Mexico. Estimatesof benefits are calculated to include the value of additionalwork output in labor-surplus societies. Under a wide range of assumptions, the benefit-cost ratios arefound to be substantially greater than 1: for dietary fortificationratios ranged between 7 and 70 for the three illustrative countries;for dietary supplementation, the range was from 4 to 38 on themost reasonable set of assumptions. The study concludes thatfield trials should be carried out to see if the findings ofthis study are supported in particular cases.      

INTERPRETING RECENT RESEARCH ON SCHOOLING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Policymakers in developing countries have long been troubledby the undesirable, but apparently unavoidable, choice betweenproviding broad access to education and developing high-qualityschools. Recent evidence, however, suggests that this is a badway to think about human capital development. Grade repetitionand high dropout rates lead to a significant waste of resourcesin many school systems. Students in quality schools, however,respond in ways that reduce such inefficiencies, perhaps evensufficiently to recoup immediately investments in quality. Promoting high-quality schools, however, is more difficult thanmany have thought, in part because research demonstrates thatthe traditional approach to providing quality—simply providingmore inputs—is frequently ineffective. Existing inefficienciesare likely to be alleviated only by the introduction of substantiallystronger performance incentives in schools and by more extensiveexperimentation and evaluation of educational programs and schoolorganizations. Incentives, decentralized decisionmaking, andevaluation are alien terms to education, in both industrialand developing countries, but they hold the key to improvementthat has eluded policymakers pursuing traditional practices.      

Choosing a System of Unemployment Income Support: Guidelines for Developing and Transition Countries

Mounting evidence suggests that excessive job protection reducesemployment and labor market flows, hinders technological innovations,pushes workers into the informal sector, and hurts vulnerablegroups by depriving them of job opportunities. Flexible labormarkets stimulate job creation, investment, and growth, butthey create job insecurity and displace some workers. How canthe costs of such insecurity and displacements be minimizedwhile ensuring that the labor market remains flexible? Eachof the main unemployment income support systems (unemploymentinsurance, unemployment assistance, unemployment insurance savingsaccounts, severance pay, and public works) has strengths andweaknesses. Country-specific conditions—chief among themlabor market and other institutions, the capacity to administereach type of system, and the size of the informal sector—determinewhich system is best suited to developing and transition countries.      

THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY: A Review of Its Operation and Effects on Developing Countries

Policy changes in the European Community (EC)—the world'slargest importer and, since 1986, exporter of agricultural commodities—mayhave significant effects on world markets and developing countries.This article investigates the EC's Common Agricultural Policy(CAP), its history, mode of operation, and the prospects andpossibilities for change, to bring out the implications of thepolicy for developing country exporters and importers. The hypothesisthat evolves differs from that of many studies in proposingthat an agricultural liberalization in the EC is unlikely toeffect any great change in world market prices over the firstfew years. Developing countries' principal gain from a liberalizationof the CAP would derive from increased stability of world marketprices, improved access to export markets, and a reduction inthe uncertainty currently caused by discretionary measures inthe EC.      

Income Risk, Coping Strategies, and Safety Nets

Poor rural and urban households in developing countries facesubstantial risks, which they handle with risk-management andrisk-coping strategies, including self-insurance through savingsand informal insurance mechanisms. Despite these mechanisms,however, vulnerability to poverty linked to risk remains high.This article reviews the literature on poor households' useof risk-management and risk-coping strategies. It identifiesthe constraints on their effectiveness and discusses policyoptions. It shows that risk and lumpiness limit the opportunitiesto use assets as insurance, that entry constraints limit theusefulness of income diversification, and that informal risk-sharingprovides only limited protection, leaving some of the poor exposedto very severe negative shocks. Public safety nets are likelyto be beneficial, but their impact is sometimes limited, andthey may have negative externalities on households that arenot covered. Collecting more information on households' vulnerabilityto poverty—through both quantitative and qualitative methods—couldhelp inform policy.      

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE: A SURVEY

For many developing countries, alternative forms of externalfinance—all forms of finance that are not guaranteed byor mediated through the public sector—have become increasinglyimportant as traditional financing to the public sector hasebbed. Yet a survey of the literature reveals few recent analyticalinsights about alternative financing, which includes foreigndirect investment, project lending, portfolio investment, closed-endequity funds, private nonguaranteed debt, licensing, joint ventures,quasi-equity contracts, and other forms of private, nonrecourselending to private borrowers. The literature offers little solidguidance for distinguishing between alternative and traditionalfinancing with respect to country risk, for establishing themost appropriate and efficient incentive structures and restrictionsin the host country, or for identifying the optimal financingmodes for international firms investing in developing countries.This gap in the analytical literature has important implicationsfor policy formulation. It is not always clear whether a countryis developing incentives and establishing safeguards (for ensuringadherence to project performance requirements) that are mosteffective in attracting alternative forms of finance.      

THE DANGERS OF DECENTRALIZATION

Demand for decentralization is strong throughout the world.But the benefits of decentralization are not as obvious as thestandard theory of fiscal federalism suggests, and there areserious drawbacks that should be considered in designing anydecentralization program. An analysis of these dangers makesit easier to understand some of the real choices. These choicesare not so much whether to decentralize in general, but ratherwhat functions to decentralize, in which sectors, and in whichregions. In many cases the problem is not so much whether acertain service should be provided by a central, regional, orlocal government, but rather how to organize the joint productionof the service by the various levels. In many—if not most—cases, such measures have anenormous potential and could, if properly designed and implemented,significantly improve the efficiency of the public sector. Decentralizationmeasures are like some potent drugs, however: when prescribedfor the relevant illness, at the appropriate moment and in thecorrect dose, they can have the desired salutary effect; butin the wrong circumstances, they can harm rather than heal.This article looks at some of the negative effects of decentralizationin the hope that a better understanding of its dangers willcontribute to a wiser application of potentially desirable decentralizationprograms.      

DEVELOPMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE SOCIAL RATE OF DISCOUNT

This article examines the role of the discount rate in makingdecisions that will have significant implications for the environment.The authors begin by providing a rationale for discounting ingeneral and by describing the main factors that determine thediscount rate. These factors—the private and social ratesof time preference, the opportunity cost of capital, risk anduncertainty, and the interests of future generations—allhave an environmental dimension. The article goes on to examinethat dimension and to explore the connections between the choiceof the discount rate and environmental concerns, such as excessiveexploitation of natural resources, inadequate investment inconservation, and insufficient attention to the irreversibleloss of certain environmental resources. The authors conclude that, in general, environmental concernsare not best addressed by lowering the discount rate—anaction that might have both benefits and costs for the environment.A more promising course would be to incorporate a criterionof sustainability into certain aspects of decisionmaking. Howsuch a criterion could be made operational is touched upon butnot developed in this article.      

DUMPING AND ANTIDUMPING: THE RHETORIC AND THE REALITY OF PROTECTION IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES

A wide gap separates the rhetoric from the reality of protectionin industrial countries. Antidumping is the current realityof that protection. Protectionist interests stretch the definitionof dumping as far as they may to shelter actions against importsunder the antidumping umbrella. This article is about antidumping, in particular about the historyof antidumping regulation and its evolution under the GATT systeminto a major instrument of protection. The thesis is straightforward:antidumping is the fox put in charge of the henhouse—ordinaryprotection with a good public relations program. There is littlein its history to suggest that the scope of antidumping wasever more particular than protecting home producers from importcompetition, and there is much to suggest that such protectionwas its intended scope. The article has three sections. The first looks into the originsof antidumping regulation, the second examines contemporaryregulation (antidumping under the GATT), and the third summarizesthe significance of the first two.