从产品标准的解释看环境税在WTO体制下的法律地位

从GATT/WTO争端解决机制对环境与贸易案件的解释来看,GATT/WTO争端解决机制对"相同产品"概念的解释和"直接竞争或替代产品"概念的解释都朝着扩大解释的方向迈进,这有利于人们将环境保护议题纳入WTO规制之内。GATT/WTO争端解决机制通过对GATT第3条产品标准的扩张解释,逐渐认可了环境保护在多边贸易体制中的合法地位,承认了作为国内税收措施和政府规制措施的环境税在WTO规则中的合法性地位。     

争端解决机制是WTO对全球经济稳定的最独特贡献

GATT——WTO争端解决机制是该两个承前启后的国际组织有效运转的基石与保证,尤其是WTO争端解决机制更是现代国际贸易成熟的争端解决的集大成者。为了对GATT——WTO争端解决机制作全貌的了解,对其全部争端解决实践的数据分析无疑是一重要途径。     

一项国际习惯法规则——国际贸易争端解决中的用尽当地救济规则

在关贸总协定(GATT)与世界贸易组织(WTO)框架下的国际贸易争端,主要是指由于一缔约方采取的贸易政策(或措施)而引起的与他国的争端。GATT/WTO对这类争端都制定了一套争端解决机制,然而“用尽当地救济规则”在这类争端中是否适用,GATT/WTO的有关协议对此均未明确规定,而在实践中,有关国家又经常援引这一规则作为反对GATT/WTO机制对争端解决的管辖权。如何正确认识该规则与GATT/WTO争端解决机制的关系,对于顺利解决     

GATT第20条争端案例下的碳关税征收合法性分析

文章援引GATT第20条豁免条款经典案例,将碳关税合法性纳入WTO争端解决机制"两步走"审核程序。通过剖析争端解决机制对案例的裁决,认为碳关税满足GATT第20条(g)款,同时通过与多边国家协商制定多方认可的碳关税征收的无歧视标准,可通过GATT第20条前言的要求,从而认为碳关税征收满足GATT第20条豁免条款,案例折射出WTO争端解决机制对可耗竭自然资源保护措施的态度由承认其重要性、到肯定再到鼓励,都增加了碳关税征收的可能性。     

对维护国际贸易往来中合法权益的探讨

WTO争端解决机制是WTO众成员在吸收了以往GATT争端解决的经验及教训的基础上发展而来的多边国际经贸争端解决程序规则。它摒弃了GATT“以实力为导向”的国际经贸解决模式,通过设立常设争端解决机构并在程序规则中赋予其对解决各阶段的组织管理职能,增强了WTO框架下国际经济争端解决程度的约束力,从而使其具有一定的“准司法性”特征。在WTO框架下,我们应充分正确运用该机制中的合理规则积极维护我国的经济利益。     

论环境税在GATT第3条中的法律地位——基于“平等对待条款”解释的视角

由于环境税会影响一国的产业竞争力,所以采取环境税的国家通常会在相关立法中制定涉外条款来保护本国产业。从GATT/WTO争端解决机制对GATT第3条"平等对待条款"的解释来看,GATT/WTO争端解决机制倾向于限制各国的环境规制自由,环境保护作为"平等对待条款"免除对象的可能性不大,环境税在GATT第3条中难以获得合法性地位。     

WTO争端解决机制效率的实证研究

争端解决机制的改革是WTO机制相对于GATT机制最大的进步.时至今日,WTO争端解决机制的运行已超过15年,共接受411件贸易争端案件,参与该机制的成员国每年也在增加,然而对其运行效率的研究相对不足.通过对案件数量、发展中国家的参与程度、争端的政策效果、争端解决的时长等方面进行分析,认为WTO争端解决机制基本上实现了其设立目的,但其效率仍需进一步提高.     

WTO争端解决机制的若干不足及其改进

<正> WTO 的争端解决机制相对于原 GATT 争端解决机制是一个巨大的进步,其实际运作数年以来已取得了令人瞩目的成功,赢得了广泛的赞誉。然而 WTO 的争端解决机制并非天衣无缝,近几年的争端解决实践已显露出其存在的一些不足。兹就其若干不足及其改进途径作一些初步探讨。     

论WTO对人民币汇率争端的管辖权

学者们在WTO对人民币汇率争端管辖权的问题上存在较大争议。从WTO争端解决机制的一般管辖权规定看,WTO对人民币汇率争端行使管辖权并不存在实质性障碍,而GATT第15条也无法构成阻碍这种管辖权的有效法律基础。WTO争端解决机构有可能将人民币汇率机制解释为"与贸易有关的外汇措施",而对人民币汇率争端行使管辖权。     

试论WTO准司法性争端解决机制的制度设置

准司法性争端解决机制不同于私力救济与公力救济争端解决机制。其主要依靠社会的力量来解决纠纷。国际经济争端的性质决定了其纠纷适宜通过准司法性争端解决机制解决。这种机制除注重对成员设立有力约束力外,还注重成员间利益的平衡,避免任何法律化、司法化的倾向。相比GATT无意识的准司法性争议解决尝试,WTO在借鉴了GATT的经验教训后,有目的地建立起准司法性争端解决机制：在对成员进行有力约束之余,又排斥法律化的倾向,从而稳重之余又不失灵活性。     

多边贸易体制的博弈机制

以GATT／WTO为代表的多边贸易体制是摆脱贸易政策选择“囚徒困境”的制度性安排．它为各成员参与多边贸易体制提供了一个博弈平台。文章介绍了贸易政策选择“囚徒困境”．并从多边贸易体制的产生、建设者、互惠原则、最惠国待遇原则、争端解决机制、谈判机制等各方面分析了其运行的博弈原理,说明多边贸易体制本身就是一个博弈系统。     

日本与WTO争端解决机制

在GATT时代,日本在争端解决机制中比较被动,败诉相对较多。到了WTO时代,日本开始积极参与WTO争端解决机制,积极运用这一机制维护日本的国际贸易利益,并取得了较大的成功,出现了胜多败少的局面。日本这一变化的内在动力来自日本以入世为契机成功实现了贸易政策从以往的保护主义向自由贸易转换,可以在WTO争端解决机制舞台上以自由贸易的形象示人,并为此进行了WTO争端解决机构上诉机构大法官的人事布局,一直保持了日本人的上诉机构大法官的席位。日本的这一成果可以为我国所借鉴。     

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: A Brief History and an Evaluation from Economic,Contractarian and Legal Perspectives

Any rule‐based system has to include a mechanism for the enforcement of its rules and a means for settlement of disputes about alleged violation of rules. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded in 1947, and its successor the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that subsumed it in 1995, embody rules governing the global trading system as specified in various agreements that their members have entered into over time. Naturally, both had a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). It was a primarily political one in the GATT and was transformed into a largely legalistic one in the multilateral agreement that established the WTO. This paper reviews the history and evaluation of the two DSMs and examines their efficiency based on appropriate criteria. It views them from three alternative and overlapping perspectives: political‐diplomatic, legal‐economic and social. It concludes with a discussion of the unresolved problems in the operation of the WTO's DSM and the prospects of resolving them in the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.     

The Evolution of Japan's Aggressive Legalism

Japan's recent trade policy is sometimes characterised as ‘aggressive legalism’ in the sense that it aggressively utilises the multilateral trade rules embodied in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation in dealing with disputes with its trade partners. This policy may appear to be a marked departure from Japan's past practice of favouring bilateral, non‐legal settlement of trade disputes. Upon closer examination, however, while Japan has been moderately active in using the WTO dispute settlement process for resolving its trade disputes, it behaves more like a country that resorts to surgical strikes on selected targets (usually the United States) under a powerful cover of the European Community. Compared to Japan, Korea's attitude in the WTO is more aggressive. While the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is not content with the status quo and is seeking to expand its aggressiveness in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it faces an uphill battle. One of the difficulties facing trade officials in Japan may be the lack of a national system for lodging WTO complaints, open to any citizens or firms, like Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 or the European Trade Barriers Regulation. Nonetheless, in the historical context, Japan is far more aggressive than in the past in utilising the rules of the GATT/WTO to advance its national interests. It will never revert to the infamous practice of bilateralism and grey area measures.     

Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.     

碳关税:新的绿色贸易壁垒抑或WTO环境保护豁免

有鉴于国际气候变化谈判和条约制定屡遭挫折这一事实,WTO现行法律规则和争端解决机制能够成为判断并纠正单边环境立法行使贸易保护主义之实的有力救济。在判定碳关税是否构成隐形的"绿色壁垒"时,GATT第20条(g)款以及前言部分的规定最有可能成为争端解决机构运用的根本性指标。要获得WTO环境保护条款的豁免,碳关税在设置和实施过程中需符合一系列严格的法律要求。同时,中国出口产品在遭遇发达国家碳关税壁垒时,亦可根据该条款有针对性的质证该措施的立法动机和具体实施环节。归根结底,中国应积极运用WTO法律规则和争端解决机制,保障本国出口产品市场的稳定性和可预期性。     

Curbing Agricultural Exceptionalism: The EU's Response to External Challenge

From 1948 to 1994, the agricultural sector was afforded special treatment in the GATT. We analyse the extent to which this agricultural exceptionalism was curbed as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, discuss why it was curbed and finally explore the implication of this for EU policy making. We argue that, in particular, two major changes in GATT institutions brought about restrictions on agricultural exceptionalism. First, the Uruguay Round was a ‘single undertaking’ in which progress on other dossiers was contingent upon an outcome on agriculture. The EU had keenly supported this new decision rule in the GATT. Within the EU this led to the MacSharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, paving the way for a trade agreement on agriculture within the GATT. Second, under the new quasi‐judicial dispute settlement procedure, countries are expected to bring their policies into conformity with WTO rules or face retaliatory trade sanctions. This has brought about a greater willingness on the part of the EU to submit its farm policy to WTO disciplines.     

WTO框架下的全球贸易争端研究

作为WTO"皇冠上的明珠"的争端解决机制一直是保障多边贸易体制的正常运行的中流砥柱,在缓解、消除全球贸易摩擦与冲突中起到重要作用。然而随着特朗普政府引领的美国"强权主义"回归,挑战了WTO争端解决机制的权威性,对上诉机构的干扰致使上诉机构几近瘫痪。在此背景下本文在对1995-2019年WTO争端案件发展趋势详细分析的基础上,着重研究了特朗普执政以来全球以及中美之间的贸易争端案件。通过对案件和当前WTO争端解决机制发展的最新事态的分析,本文进一步剖析了当前全球贸易争端机制存在的问题以及我国的应对之策,以期能对我国贸易利益的保护有所助益。     

WTO贸易救济措施争端解决的绩效分析——基于动态非平衡面板数据模型系统GMM检验

文章在回顾相关研究的基础上考虑四阶段WTO争端解决程序,根据WTO争端案例结案时长不等的特点和多阶段策略选择难以量化的性质,建立WTO贸易救济措施争端解决绩效动态非平衡面板数据模型,运用系统GMM检验,对WTO贸易救济措施争端解决绩效进行了实证分析。结果表明：积极援引WTO争端解决机制是能够在一定程度上挽回贸易损失的,尤其是双方在争端解决过程中达成的磋商解决、请求专家组中止工作、相互满意解决或者败诉方执行WTO决定等均对申诉方出口贸易具有促进作用;尽快结案将有利于申诉方,而WTO争端解决案件的持续时间越长,越不利于申诉方。