A long-run,short-run,and politico-economic analysis of the welfare costs of inflation

The long-run, short-run, and politico-economic welfare implications of inflation are assessed in a Bewley model of money demand. All agents produce and consume every period, and hold money to self-insure against idiosyncratic risk. The model is calibrated so the equilibrium monetary distribution shares features with US data. The long-run welfare costs of inflation are shown to be large because inflation reduces the ability of money to mitigate risk. However, the beneficial redistributive effect of inflation is magnified along the short-run transition and reduces the overall costs. These short-run benefits result in a majority-rule inflation rate above the Friedman Rule.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Long-Run Links among Money, Prices and Output: Worldwide Evidence

Abstract. Starting from the quantity theory of money we analyse the dynamic relationships between money, real output and prices for an unbalanced panel of 110 economies. Complementary to trivariate analyses we also adopt a P-star model explaining inflation via an equilibrium price level (P-star), which in turn depends on potential output and money. A key issue of the paper is the cross-sectional stability of estimation and inference results. We find cointegration among the considered variables. Particularly for high inflation countries homogeneity between prices and money cannot be rejected. Given homogeneity we find evidence for an error-correction mechanism linking current price changes and the lagged price gap. Parameter estimates indicating the adjustment towards the price equilibrium are larger in absolute value for high inflation countries. The latter results indicate that central banks, even in high inflation countries, can improve price stability by controlling monetary growth.     

Inflation aversion and macroeconomic policy in a perfect foresight monetary model

This paper reexamines monetary non-superneutrality and the optimality of the optimum quantity of money in the money-in-utility Sidrauski model with endogenous fluctuations of the time preference by introducing inflation aversion. It is shown that the long-run superneutrality of the standard Sidrauski model does not hold, and Friedman's optimum quantity of money is not optimal.     

Inflation and Unemployment in General Equilibrium*

When labor is indivisible, there exist efficient outcomes with some agents randomly unemployed, as in Rogerson (1988) . We integrate this idea into the modern theory of monetary exchange, where some trade occurs in centralized markets and some in decentralized markets, as in Lagos and Wright (2005) . This delivers a general equilibrium model of unemployment and money, with explicit microeconomic foundations. We show that the implied relation between inflation and unemployment can be positive or negative, depending on simple preference conditions. Our Phillips curve provides a long‐run, exploitable, trade‐off for monetary policy; it turns out, however, that the optimal policy is the Friedman rule.     

Eurosystem monetary targeting: Lessons from U.S. data

Using a small empirical model of inflation, output, and money estimated on U.S. data, we compare the relative performance of monetary targeting and inflation targeting. The results show monetary targeting to be quite inefficient, yielding both higher inflation and output variability. This is true even with a nonstochastic money demand formulation. Our results are also robust to using a P∗ model of inflation. Therefore, in these popular frameworks, there is no support for the prominent role given to money growth in the Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy.     

Time-varying money demand and real balance effects

This paper presents an analysis of the stimulants and consequences of money demand dynamics. By assuming that household's money holdings and consumption preferences are not separable, we demonstrate that the interest-elasticity of demand for money is a function of the household's preference to hold real balances, the extent to which these preferences are not separable in consumption and real balances, and trend inflation. An empirical study of U.S. data revealed that there was a gradual fall in the interest elasticity of money demand of approximately one-third during the 1970s due to high trend inflation. A further decline in the interest-elasticity of the demand for money was observed in the 1980s due to the changing household preferences that emerged in response to financial innovation. These developments led to a reduction in the welfare cost of inflation that subsequently explains the rise in monetary neutrality observed in the data.     

Labour markets, liquidity, and monetary policy regimes

Abstract.  We develop an equilibrium model of the monetary policy transmission mechanism that highlights information frictions in the market for money and search frictions in the labour market. The information friction increases the persistence in the response of interest rates following monetary policy regime shifts. This occurs because agents have incomplete information about the nature of the shifts and optimally update their inflation forecasts using an 'adaptive' expectations rule. The search friction transmits the interest rate movements to the labour market by affecting job creation activities; together, the two frictions imply that unemployment reacts very gradually to monetary policy shocks. JEL Classification: E4, E5     

Monetary policy and efficiency in over‐the‐counter financial trade

We develop a monetary model that incorporates over‐the‐counter (OTC) asset trade. After agents have made their money holding decisions, they receive an idiosyncratic shock that affects their valuation for consumption and, hence, for the unique liquid asset, namely money. Subsequently, agents can choose whether they want to enter the OTC market in order to sell assets and thus boost their liquidity or to buy assets and thus provide liquidity to other agents. In our model, inflation affects not only the money holding decisions of agents, as is standard in monetary theory, but also the entry decision of these agents in the financial market. We use our framework to study the effect of inflation on welfare, asset prices and OTC trade volume. In contrast to most monetary models, which predict a negative relationship between inflation and welfare, we find that inflation can be welfare improving within a certain range, because it mitigates a search externality that agents impose on one another when they make their OTC market entry decision. Also, an increase in the holding cost of money will lead to a decrease in asset prices, a regularity that is well documented in the data and often considered anomalous.     

Credit and inflation under borrower?s lack of commitment

In this paper we study the effects of monetary policy on privately supplied credit in model economies where money is needed for transaction purposes and agents who default on their loans cannot participate in the credit market but are allowed to accumulate money. In our deterministic benchmark economy where agents alternate in productivity, credit has the role of smoothing consumption. We show that deflation crowds out credit completely. The reason is that deflation increases the value of being excluded from the credit market and eliminates the incentive to repay loans. When inflation is positive but low, credit, consumption smoothing and welfare increase with inflation, until inflation reaches a threshold at which the allocation is efficient and money becomes superneutral.     

Liquidity risk, economic development, and the effects of monetary policy

Empirical evidence indicates that monetary policy is not super-neutral in many countries. In particular, in high inflation economies, inflation is negatively related to economic activity. By comparison, inflation may be positively correlated with output in low inflation countries. We present a neoclassical growth model with money in which the incidence of liquidity risk is inversely related to aggregate capital formation. Interestingly, there may be multiple monetary steady-states where the effects of monetary policy vary. In poor economies, the financial system is highly distorted and higher rates of money growth are associated with less capital formation. In contrast, in advanced economies, a Tobin effect is observed. Since inflation exacerbates distortions from a coordination failure in the low-capital steady-state, individuals become much more exposed to liquidity risk. Consequently, optimal monetary policy depends on the level of development.     

Capital market imperfections in a monetary growth model

Summary. We consider a monetary growth model essentially identical to that of Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985), except that we explicitly model credit markets, a credit market friction, and an allocative function for financial intermediaries. These changes yield substantially different results than those obtained in more standard models. In particular, if any monetary steady state equilibria exist, there are generally two of them; one of these has a low capital stock and output level, and it is necessarily a saddle. The other steady state has a high capital stock and output level; either it is necessarily a sink, or its stability properties depend on the rate of money creation. It follows that monetary equilibria can be indeterminate, and nonconvergence phenomena can be observed. Increases in the rate of money creation reduce the capital stock in the high-capital-stock steady state. If the high-capital-stock steady state is not a sink for all rates of money growth, then increases in the rate of money growth can induce a Hopf bifurcation. Hence dynamical equilibria can display damped oscillation as a steady state equilibrium is approached, and limit cycles can be observed as well. In addition, in the latter case, high enough rates of inflation induce the kinds of “crises” noted by Bruno and Easterly (1995): when inflation is too high there are no equilibrium paths approaching the high-activity steady state. Received: November 18, 1995; revised version: March 26, 1996     

The information content of money in forecasting euro area inflation

This article contributes to the debate on the role of money in monetary policy by analysing the information content of money in forecasting euro-area inflation. We compare the predictive performance within and among various classes of structural and empirical models in a consistent framework using Bayesian and other estimation techniques. We find that money contains relevant information for inflation in some model classes. Money-based New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models and Vector Autoregressions (VARs) incorporating money perform better than their cashless counterparts. But there are also indications that the contribution of money has its limits. The marginal contribution of money to forecasting accuracy is often small, money adds little to dynamic factor models, and it worsens forecasting accuracy of partial equilibrium models. Finally, nonmonetary models dominate monetary models in an all-out horserace.     

Central bank design with heterogeneous agents

We study alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, where monetary policy has redistributive effects. Inflation is determined by a policy board using either simple-majority voting, supermajority voting, or bargaining. We compare the equilibrium inflation rates to the first-best allocation.     

Private information, money, and growth: Indeterminacy, fluctuations, and the Mundell-Tobin effect

We introduce an informational asymmetry into an otherwise standard monetary growth model and examine its implications for the determinacy of equilibrium, for endogenous economic volatility, and for the relationship between steady-state output and the rate of money growth. Some empirical evidence suggests that, for economies with low initial inflation rates, permanent increases in the money growth rate raise long-run output levels. This relationship is reversed for economies with high initial inflation rates. Our model predicts this pattern. Moreover, in economies with high enough rates of inflation, credit rationing emerges, monetary equilibria become indeterminate, and endogenous economic volatility arises.     

Money,liquidity and welfare

This paper develops an analytically tractable Bewley model of money demand to shed light on some important questions in monetary theory, such as the welfare cost of inflation. It is shown that when money is a vital form of liquidity to meet uncertain consumption needs, the welfare costs of inflation can be extremely large. With log utility and parameter values that best match both the aggregate money demand curve suggested by Lucas (2000) and the variance of household consumption, agents in our model are willing to reduce consumption by 3–4% to avoid 10% annual inflation. The astonishingly large welfare costs of inflation arise because inflation increases consumption risk by eroding the buffer-stock-insurance value of money, thus hindering consumption smoothing at the household level. Such an inflation-induced increase in consumption risk at the micro level cannot be captured by representative-agent models or the Bailey triangle. Although the development of financial intermediation can mitigate the problem, with realistic credit limits the welfare loss of moderate inflation still remains several times larger than estimations based on the Bailey triangle. Our findings provide a strong justification for adopting a low inflation target by central banks, especially in developing countries where money is the major form of household financial wealth.     

Time consistent monetary policy with endogenous price rigidity

I characterize time consistent equilibrium in an economy with price rigidity and an optimizing monetary authority operating under discretion. Firms have the option to increase their frequency of price change, at a cost, in response to higher inflation. Previous studies, which assume a constant degree of price rigidity across inflation regimes, find two time consistent equilibria—one with low inflation, the other with high inflation. In contrast, when price rigidity is endogenous, the high inflation equilibrium ceases to exist. Hence, time consistent equilibrium is unique. This result depends on two features of the analysis: (1) a plausible quantitative specification of the fixed cost of price change, and (2) the presence of an arbitrarily small cost of inflation that is independent of price rigidity.     

Welfare cost of inflation in a stochastic balanced growth model

There is a large and growing literature on the welfare cost of inflation. However, work in this area tend to find moderate estimates of welfare gains. In this paper we reexamine welfare costs of inflation within a stochastic general equilibrium balanced growth model paying a particular attention to recursive utility, portfolio balance effects, and monetary volatility and monetary policy uncertainty. Our numerical analysis shows that a monetary policy that brings down inflation to the optimum level can have substantial welfare effects. Portfolio adjustment effects seem to be the dominant factor behind the welfare gains.     

Fiscal and Monetary Policies in a Transactions‐Based Endogenous Growth Model with Imperfect Competition

This paper's model is capable of explaining the empirical evidence on the mixed growth‐rate effects of fiscal and monetary policies and a nonlinear inflation–growth relation. When monopoly power in the product market is strong/weak, an increase in the money growth rate or the income tax rate promotes/reduces the output growth rate through lowering/raising the equilibrium gross markup and increasing/reducing the net rate of return on capital. The fact that money can generate a positive growth rate effect allows for the appearance of a nonlinear inflation–growth relation. Such a nonlinear relation cannot be caused by changes in the income tax rate.     

Liquidity Preference and Financial Intermediation

We examine the characteristics of optimal monetary policies in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. Markets are incomplete because of uninsured preference uncertainty, and because productive capital is traded infrequently. Rational individuals are willing to hold a liquid asset—"money"—at a premium. Monetary policy interacts with existing financial institutions to determine this premium, as well as the level of precautionary holdings. We show that inflation is expansionary, and that the optimal inflation rate is positive if there is no operative banking system (the Tobin effect). Otherwise, efficiency requires that money be undominated in its rate of return (the Friedman Rule).