Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game

The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence,each of which wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybody?s hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an error cascade, which we measure by evaluating the (heterogeneous) Quantal Response Equilibrium which better suits our data. We also check the robustness of our findings when we allow for belief heterogeneity by applying Kübler and Weizsäcker?s (2004) cognitive frame of limited depth of reasoning.     

Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence

We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.     

Evaluating the carbon-macroeconomy relationship: Evidence from threshold vector error-correction and Markov-switching VAR models

This paper studies the nonlinear adjustment between industrial production and carbon prices – coined as ‘the carbon-macroeconomy relationship’ – in the EU 27. We model carbon price returns and industrial production as nonlinear and state-dependent, with dynamics depending on the sign and magnitude of past realization of returns and the growth of industrial production. Our findings show that (i) macroeconomic activity is likely to affect carbon prices with a lag, due to the specific institutional constraints of this environmental market; (ii) the joint dynamics of industrial production and carbon prices seem adequately captured by two-regime threshold vector error-correction and two-regime Markov-switching VAR models compared to linear models as main competitors. The regime-switching models proposed are profoundly checked for their economic content and statistical congruency, and are found to provide a sound statistical framework for a comprehensive analysis of the carbon-macroeconomy relationship.     

Misery loves company: Social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty

Extensive field evidence shows individuals? decisions in settings involving uncertainty depend on their peers? decisions. One hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects: an individual?s utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action. We employ a series of controlled laboratory experiments to study the causes of peer effects in choice under uncertainty. We find strong peer group effects in the laboratory. Our design allows us to rule out social learning, social norms, group affiliation, and complementarities as possible causes for the observed peer group effects, leaving social interaction effects as the likely cause. We use a combination of theory and empirical analysis to show that preferences including “social regret” are more consistent with the data than preferences including a taste for conformity. We observe spillover effects, as observing another?s choice of one risky gamble makes all risky gambles more likely to be chosen.     

Stochastic evolutionary selection in finite populations

We primarily focus on a wide range of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics between two strategies which are characterized by a condition we call monotonicity: the sign of the difference between the probabilities of increasing and decreasing an A-individual completely depends on the difference of payoffs based on different strategies. When mutations are excluded, we provide sufficient conditions for selection to favor one strategy over the other and necessary conditions for selection to favor or oppose change, respectively. Moreover, we discuss which strategy will be favored in case of rare mutations and give a simple rule to determine evolutionary selection of strategies for large populations under some specific stochastic mutation–selection dynamics.     

The robustness of robust implementation

We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement ε-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of ε-optimal outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.     

Choosing and sharing

Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal, which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic. In practice, revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements. We address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to select the efficient site (the host with the lowest cost) while simultaneously allowing for the implementation of any individually rational division of the whole hosting cost. The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of our simple mechanism are efficient, budget-balanced and individually rational. Moreover, the truthful equilibrium is immune to coalitional deviations.     

Aggregation of multiple prior opinions

Experts are asked to provide their advice in a situation of uncertainty. They adopt the decision maker?s utility function, but each has a potentially different set of prior probabilities, and so does the decision maker. The decision maker and the experts maximize the minimal expected utility with respect to their sets of priors. We show that a natural Pareto condition is equivalent to the existence of a set Λ of probability vectors over the experts, interpreted as possible allocations of weights to the experts, such that (i) the decision maker?s set of priors is precisely all the weighted-averages of priors, where an expert?s prior is taken from her set and the weight vector is taken from Λ; (ii) the decision maker?s valuation of an act is the minimal weighted valuation, over all weight vectors in Λ, of the experts? valuations.     

The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment

This paper uses a large panel of OECD data on stocks of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) to evaluate the impact of bilateral investment treaties. For several variants of the knowledge capital model of multinationals, we demonstrate that investment treaties exert a significant positive effect on outward FDI, if they actually are implemented. Moreover, even signing a treaty has a positive, although lower and in most specifications insignificant, effect on FDI. Journal of Comparative Economics 32 (4) (2004) 788–804.     

Labor market distortions and China's WTO accession package:: an applied general equilibrium assessment

The economic implications of China's accession to the World Trade Organization have been analyzed using applied general equilibrium techniques. We explore the consequences of trade reform in the presence of labor market distortions. A formal model of imperfect labor mobility is incorporated into a large-scale, stochastic applied general equilibrium framework with which the consequences of China's trade reform for net welfare are considered. The simulations suggest that distortions in China's labor market, including imperfect labor mobility, rural-urban migration, dual urban markets and surplus rural labor, have significant effects on trade liberalization outcomes and in some cases produce unexpected second-best results. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 774–794.     

Forecasting the volatility of S&P depositary receipts using GARCH-type models under intraday range-based and return-based proxy measures

We employ four various GARCH-type models, incorporating the skewed generalized t (SGT) errors into those returns innovations exhibiting fat-tails, leptokurtosis and skewness to forecast both volatility and value-at-risk (VaR) for Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts (SPDRs) from 2002 to 2008. Empirical results indicate that the asymmetric EGARCH model is the most preferable according to purely statistical loss functions. However, the mean mixed error criterion suggests that the EGARCH model facilitates option buyers for improving their trading position performance, while option sellers tend to favor the IGARCH/EGARCH model at shorter/longer trading horizon. For VaR calculations, although these GARCH-type models are likely to over-predict SPDRs' volatility, they are, nevertheless, capable of providing adequate VaR forecasts. Thus, a GARCH genre of model with SGT errors remains a useful technique for measuring and managing potential losses on SPDRs under a turbulent market scenario.     

Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game

We study a “reverse” ultimatum game, in which proposers have multiple chances to offer responders a division of some fixed pie. The game ends if the responder accepts an offer, or if, following a rejection, the proposer decides not to make a better offer. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium gives the proposer the minimum possible payoff. Nevertheless, the experimental results are not too different from those of the standard ultimatum game, although proposers generally receive slightly less than half of the surplus.We use the reverse ultimatum game to study deadlines experimentally. With a deadline, the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is that the proposer gets the entire surplus.Deadlines are used strategically to influence the outcome, and agreements are reached near the deadline. Strategic considerations are evident in the differences in observed behavior between the deadline and no deadline conditions, even though agreements are substantially less extreme than predicted by perfect equilibrium.     

Spillovers through backward linkages from multinationals: Measurement matters!

We argue that the measures of backward linkages used in recent papers on spillovers from multinational companies are potentially problematic, as they depend on a number of restrictive assumptions, namely that (i) multinationals use domestically produced inputs in the same proportion as imported inputs, (ii) multinationals have the same input sourcing behaviour as domestic firms, irrespective of their country of origin, and (iii) the demand for locally produced inputs by multinationals is proportional to their share of locally produced output. We discuss why these assumptions are likely to be violated in practice, and provide alternative measures that overcome these drawbacks. Our results, using plant level data for Ireland, clearly show that the choice of backward linkage measure and thus, the assumptions behind it, matters greatly in order to draw possible conclusions regarding the existence of foreign direct investment (FDI)-related spillovers. Using the standard measure employed in the literature we fail to find robust evidence for spillovers through backward linkages. However, when we use alternative measures of backward linkages that relax assumptions (i)–(iii), we find robust evidence for positive FDI backward spillover effects.     

On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors

Proving the folk theorem in a game with three or more players usually requires imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the stage-game payoffs. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) assume full dimensionality of payoffs, while Abreu et al. (1994) assume the weaker NEU condition (“nonequivalent utilities”). In this note, we consider a class of n-player games where each player receives the same stage-game payoff, either zero or one. The stage-game payoffs therefore constitute a one-dimensional set, violating NEU. We show that if all players have different discount factors, then for discount factors sufficiently close to one, any strictly individually rational payoff profile can be obtained as the outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium with public correlation.     

Optimal advertising of auctions

We study a symmetric independent private values auction model where the revenue-maximizing seller faces a cost cn of attracting n bidders to the auction. If the distribution of valuations possesses an increasing failure rate (IFR), the seller overinvests in attracting bidders compared to the social optimum. Conversely, if the distribution is DFR, the seller underinvests compared to the social optimum. If the distribution of valuations becomes more dispersed, both, a revenue- and a welfare-maximizing seller, attract more bidders.     

How individuals choose health insurance: An experimental analysis

An individual choosing a health insurance policy faces a complex decision environment where a large set of alternatives differ on a variety of dimensions. There is uncertainty and the choice is repeated at least once a year. We study decisions and decision strategies in a laboratory experiment where we create a controlled environment that closely mirrors this setting. We use an electronic information board that allows to carefully monitor the individual's decision strategy. The number of alternatives, switching costs, and the speed at which health deteriorates are varied across treatments. We find that most subjects' search is based more on attributes than on policies. Moreover, we find that an increase in the number of alternatives increases decision-making time; makes subjects consider a lower fraction of the available information; makes it more likely that subjects will switch; and decreases the quality of their decisions. The introduction of positive costs of switching makes people switch less often but improves the quality of their decisions. Finally, if health deteriorates only gradually, individuals tend to stick to their current policy too long.     

TESTING FOR STATIONARITY IN HETEROGENEOUS PANEL DATA IN THE CASE OF MODEL MISSPECIFICATION

This paper investigates the performance of the tests proposed by Hadri and by Hadri and Larsson for testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data under model misspecification. The panel tests are based on the well known KPSS test (cf. Kwiatkowski et al.) which considers two models: stationarity around a deterministic level and stationarity around a deterministic trend. There is no study, as far as we know, on the statistical properties of the test when the wrong model is used. We also consider the case of the simultaneous presence of the two types of models in a panel. We employ two asymptotics: joint asymptotic, T, N →∞ simultaneously, and T fixed and N allowed to grow indefinitely. We use Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the effects of misspecification in sample sizes usually used in practice. The results indicate that the assumption that T is fixed rather than asymptotic leads to tests that have less size distortions, particularly for relatively small T with large N panels (micro‐panels) than the tests derived under the joint asymptotics. We also find that choosing a deterministic trend when a deterministic level is true does not significantly affect the properties of the test. But, choosing a deterministic level when a deterministic trend is true leads to extreme over‐rejections. Therefore, when unsure about which model has generated the data, it is suggested to use the model with a trend. We also propose a new statistic for testing for stationarity in mixed panel data where the mixture is known. The performance of this new test is very good for both cases of T asymptotic and T fixed. The statistic for T asymptotic is slightly undersized when T is very small (≤10).     

Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome

It is well known that in a duopoly model of product choice with quadratic transportation cost, the firms locate at the extreme endpoints of the market. Jehiel (1992, Int. J. Ind. Organ, 10, 633–641) has examined this model in an infinite horizon setting where in the initial period the firms choose location and in subsequent periods charge the Nash bargaining solution prices. Then, in the unique equilibrium both firms locate at the center of the market. This paper examines the case when the firms instead charge the prices determined by either the egalitarian bargaining solution or the Kalai–Smorodinski bargaining solution. It is shown that central agglomeration is an equilibrium. Furthermore, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria in addition where the firms locate apart from each other. So the products are not necessarily minimally differentiated. Thus different bargaining solutions provide quite different outcomes.     

Inequality and network structure

We explore the manner in which the structure of a social network constrains the level of inequality that can be sustained among its members, based on the following considerations: (i) any distribution of value must be stable with respect to coalitional deviations, and (ii) the network structure itself determines the coalitions that may form. We show that if players can jointly deviate only if they form a clique in the network, then the degree of inequality that can be sustained depends on the cardinality of the maximum independent set. For bipartite networks, the size of the maximum independent set fully characterizes the degree of inequality that can be sustained. This result extends partially to general networks and to the case in which a group of players can deviate jointly if they are all sufficiently close to each other in the network.