How loan portfolio diversification affects risk, efficiency and capitalization: A managerial behavior model for Austrian banks

The aim of this paper is to analyze how diversification of banks across size and industry affects risk, cost and profit efficiency, and bank capitalization for large Austrian commercial banks over the years 1997–2003. Employing a unique dataset, provided by the Austrian Central Bank, we test for several different types of managerial hypotheses, formalized according to a modified version of the Berger and DeYoung model [Berger, A.N., DeYoung, R., 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks. Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 849–870]. We find that, although diversification negatively affects cost efficiency, it increases profit efficiency and reduces banks’ realized risk. Finally, diversification seems to have a positive impact on banks’ capitalization.     

Monetary policy and financial (in)stability: An integrated micro–macro approach

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.     

Bank concentration and financial constraints on firm-level investment in Europe

This study examines the effect of bank concentration on financing constraints of non-financial firms in 14 European countries between 1992 and 2005. Using firm-level data we analyze financial constraints with the Euler equation derived from the dynamic investment model. We find that with a highly concentrated banking sector firms are less financially constrained. This result is robust to consideration of firm opacity, firm size, and business cycle. Relaxation of financial constraint while greater for firms in less opaque industries also accrues for firms in more opaque industries. Greater bank concentration is associated with less tight financial constraint during both expansions and recessions. Results overall are consistent with an information-based hypothesis that more market power increases banks’ incentives to produce information on potential borrowers. Findings are robust to consideration of country specific institutional factors.     

Credit derivatives and loan pricing

This paper examines the relation between the new markets for credit default swaps (CDS) and banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to US corporates. We find that changes in CDS spreads have a significantly positive coefficient and explain about 25% of subsequent monthly changes in aggregate loan spreads during 2000–2005. Moreover, when compared to traditional explanatory factors, they turn out to be the dominant determinant of loan spreads. In particular, they explain loan rates much better than same rated bonds. This suggests that CDS prices contain, beyond general credit risk, to a substantial extent information relevant for bank lending. We also find that, over time, new information from CDS markets is faster incorporated into loans, but information from other markets is not. Overall, our results indicate that the markets for CDS have gained an important role for banks.     

Openness, profit opportunities and foreign banking

Using new data from the World Bank and OCC surveys, we show correlations across a wide range of countries between foreign banking and domestic economic, financial and bank regulatory conditions. Foreign banking tended to be more prevalent in countries that were more open to foreign ownership of their banks, more open to banks’ engaging in a wider range of financial activities and more open to international trade. Restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic banks that were in place in the late 1970s reduced the current extent of foreign banking. Foreign banking was negatively correlated with current restrictions on banks’ securities, insurance and real estate activities. Countries that had more international trade tended to have more foreign banking. Foreign banking was more pervasive in countries where banking was more profitable and where the domestically-owned banking sector was smaller relative to GDP.     

Joint size and ownership specialization in bank lending

During the period 1996–2003 consolidation reduces the size diversity of Spanish banks but diversity in ownership forms increases as savings banks and cooperatives gain market share. This paper examines the implications of these structural changes in Spanish credit markets in terms of banks’ specialization (large or small borrowers, relational or transactional lending) and consequent credit availability for small and opaque firms. We find that size-of-the-borrower/size-of-the-bank specialization follows a different pattern in savings banks than in commercial banks, suggesting lower organizational diseconomies of size in the former than in the latter, which helps to explain the increase in ownership diversity over time. We also find that savings banks and cooperatives specialize relatively more in relational lending than commercial banks so ownership diversity assures funding for small firms even if bank consolidation continues.     

Do weak supervisory systems encourage bank risk-taking?

Weak bank supervision could give banks the ability to shift risk from themselves to supervisors. We use cross-border bank mergers as a natural experiment to test changes in risk and the impact of supervision. We examine cross-border bank mergers and find that the supervisory structures of the partners’ countries influence changes in post-merger total risk. An acquirer from a country with strong supervision lowers total risk after a cross-border merger. However, total risk increases when the target bank is located in a country with relatively strong supervision. This result is consistent with strong host regulators limiting the risky activities of their local banks. Foreign-owned competitors could then engage in the risky projects, especially if the foreign banks’ supervisors are not strong. An acquirer entering a country with strong supervision appears to shift risk back to its home country. The results suggest that bank supervisors can reduce total banking risk in their countries by being strong.     

The cost of being late? The case of credit card penalty fees

This paper is the first in the literature to examine the determinants of US credit card penalty fees. Many critics of credit card fees – including a number of US Senators – have argued that credit card penalty fees reflect banks’ market share. Using a unique data set we find that fees are increasing in customer risk which supports the position of defenders of penalty fees, such as banks. However, our finding that fees are increasing in a bank's market share is consistent with the concerns expressed by politicians and regulators. We also find card penalty fees are direct substitutes for card interest rates.     

The transparency of the banking system and the efficiency of information-based bank runs

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system. We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw. An improvement in the transparency of a bank may reduce depositor welfare by increasing the chance of an inefficient contagious run on other banks. A deposit insurance system in which some depositors are fully insured and the others are partially insured can ameliorate this inefficiency. Under such a system, bank runs can serve as an efficient mechanism for disciplining banks. We also consider bank managers' control over the timing of information disclosure, and find that bank managers may use their influence to eliminate both inefficient and efficient bank runs.     

On the importance of retail banking relationships

We use proprietary data to analyze the importance of retail banking relationships to commercial banks and their depositors when banks underwrite securities. We find lead underwriters’ retail customers benefit as they demand and end up with significantly more of the highly underpriced issues. We find it is actual underpricing beyond that predicted by grey markets that drive the differential demand from the lead bank retail clientele, suggesting that banks pass on information about underpriced initial public offerings to their retail depositors. We analyze banks’ incentives for such behavior and find evidence of banks benefiting through retail cross-selling—both brokerage accounts and consumer loans increase significantly.     

The impact of competition on the operations of foreign banks in Australia in the post-deregulation period

In 1985, Australia removed its long-standing embargo on the entry of foreign banks. The Australian market therefore provides an opportunity to study the factors influencing multinational bank expansion in a new host country. This paper tests a model of the size of multinational banking operations in Australia in the post-embargo period. One major finding is that a push for market share in a highly competitive environment led to risky lending practices in the global boom-bust economic climate of the late 1980s, which adversely affected the foreign banks’ performance. Another is that competition from home country banks had a significantly negative effect on foreign banks’ asset volumes.     

Does the stock market value bank diversification?

This paper investigates whether or not functionally diversified banks have a comparative advantage in terms of long-term performance/risk profile compared to their specialized competitors. To that end, this study uses market-based measures of return potential and bank risk. We calculate the franchise value over time of European banks as a measure of their long-run performance potential. In addition, we measure risk as both the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk components derived from a bank stock return model. Finally, we analyze the return/risk trade-off implied in different functional diversification strategies using a panel data analysis over the period 1989–2004. A higher share of non-interest income in total income affects banks’ franchise values positively. Diversification of revenue streams from distinct financial activities increases the systematic risk of banks while the effect on the idiosyncratic risk component is non-linear and predominantly downward-sloping. These findings have conflicting implications for different stakeholders, such as investors, bank shareholders, bank managers and bank supervisors.     

Accounting for distress in bank mergers

Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.     

Bondholders’ wealth effects in domestic and cross-border bank mergers

The recent credit crisis and the increased internationalization of the European banks have given the debate about the role of national regulators a renewed urgency. We therefore investigate the determinants of bondholders’ abnormal returns for both domestic and cross-border bank merger announcements that involve European acquirers for the period 1998–2002. We find that bondholders’ abnormal returns are higher for Domestic Mergers than cross-border mergers, in direct contrast to evidence from equity prices where no difference is found. Further investigations in which we control for the changes in market power for example suggest this result may be indicative of investors perceiving Domestic Mergers as increasing the probability of a government bailout in case of distress. Banks’ bondholders also experience higher abnormal returns when the country of the partner bank has stricter rules in relation to forbearance of prudential regulations than the own country, and when functional diversification between lending and fee/trading activities increases.     

Strategic loan defaults and coordination: An experimental analysis

This paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank’s expected strength is low, although loan repayment is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers’ expected repayment capacity is low, regardless of banks’ fundamentals. We show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers’ coordination problem, and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults. For the individual borrower, loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment, suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress.     

Market discipline in international banking regulation: Keeping the playing field level

The focus of this article is the debt market as a powerful disciplinarian source for large and complex banking organizations around the world. We empirically study the interactions between reinforcing banks’ market discipline and preserving a level playing field in international banking. Our approach consists of conducting cross-country comparisons of the secondary market prices sensitivity to market measures of bank risk (traditional and financial strength ratings). The results are generally consistent with the market discipline paradigm. However, much progress still needs to be made (especially in Japan and certain European countries) in order to make the level playing field principle compatible with the reinforcement of market discipline on an international level.     

Towards a measure of financial fragility

The paper proposes a measure of financial fragility that is based on economic welfare in a general equilibrium model calibrated against UK data. The model comprises a household sector, three active heterogeneous banks, a central bank/regulator, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors and how the response of the economy to shocks relates to our measure of financial fragility. Finally we use panel VAR techniques to investigate the relationships between the factors that characterise financial fragility in our model, i.e. banks’ probabilities of default and banks’ profits – to a proxy of welfare.      

The Lender of Last Resort Reconsidered

The Central Bank's lender of last resort role was developed by a series of authors in the very late eighteenth and through the nineteenth centuries. It was tested in practice in a number of countries and was found to be effective in providing monetary stability in the face of adverse shocks. There have recently been attempts to broaden the role—to make the central bank responsible for the stability of asset markets, or for protecting individual banks—and there have recently also been claims that an international lender of last resort is necessary. This article considers and rejects these proposed extensions to the classic lender of last resort role.     

Bank lending opportunities and credit standards

This article empirically tests the hypothesis that credit-screening standards can be first increasing and then decreasing in the quality of the bank's pool of potential borrowers, which in turn may vary through the business cycle or across different segments of the lending markets. A key implication is that banks with lending opportunities toward the middle of the quality spectrum can have loan portfolios that perform better than do the portfolios of banks with loan-origination opportunities that are either too weak or too strong. Using banks’ volume of secondary-market loan sales as a proxy for the richness of lending opportunities, I find an inverse U-shaped relation between the performance of banks’ loan portfolios and their activity in the loan sales market. The pattern deserves scrutiny for its policy implications, as many regulators hold the view that countercyclical variation in credit standards may have a destabilizing effect on business cycles.     

On the independence of assets and liabilities: Evidence from U.S. commercial banks, 1990–2005

Traditional asset–liability management techniques limit banks’ abilities to structure their balance sheets—but more recently, financial innovations have allowed banks the chance to manage interest rate risk without constraining their asset–liability choices. Using canonical correlation analysis, we examine how the relationships between asset and liability accounts at U.S. commercial banks changed between 1990 and 2005. Importantly, we show that asset–liability linkages are weaker for banks that are intensive users of risk-mitigation strategies such as interest rate swaps and adjustable loans. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that asset–liability linkages are stronger at large banks than at small banks, although these size-based differences have diminished over time, both because of increased asset–liability linkages at small banks and decreased linkages at large banks.