Optimal tax treatment of the family: Married couples

This paper examines the appropriate tax treatment of the family in a series of analytical models and numerical examples. For a population of taxpaying couples which differ in earning capacity, we drive the optimal tax rates for each potential earner. These rates depend crucially upon own and cross labor supply elasticities and the joint distribution of wage rates. Our results suggest that the current system of income splitting in the United States, under which husbands and wives face equal marginal tax rates, is nonoptimal. Using results from recent econometric studies, and allowing for a sensitivity analysis, the optimal tax rates on secondary workers in the family are much lower than those on primary earners. Indeed, our best estimate is that the secondary earner would face tax rates only one-half as high as primary earners.     

Identifying Laffer Bounds: A Sufficient‐Statistics Approach with an Application to Germany

We derive a simple sufficient‐statistics test for whether a nonlinear tax‐transfer system is second‐best Pareto efficient. If it is not, then it is beyond the top of the Laffer curve and there exists a tax cut that is self‐financing. The test depends on the income distribution, extensive and intensive labor supply elasticities, and income effect parameters. A tax‐transfer system is likely to be inefficient if marginal tax rates are quickly falling in income. We apply this test to the German tax‐transfer system, and we find that the structure of effective marginal tax rates is likely to be inefficient in the region where transfers are phased out.     

New estimates of labour supply elasticities for married women in Canada 1996–2005

In this article, we estimate income and substitution labour supply and participation elasticities for Canadian married women using data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics 1996–2005. We use the Canadian Tax and Credit Simulator (CTaCS) and detailed information on the structure of income at the household level to compute the marginal tax rates faced by each individual. We then use these marginal tax rates to compute net own-wage, spouse-wage, and nonlabour income. We show how the magnitude of the estimated elasticities varies depending on whether net or gross wages and income are used in the estimation procedure, and quantify biases caused by using average tax rates instead of marginal tax rates. Finally, because marginal tax rates vary significantly over the sample, we use quantile regressions to compare elasticities at different points of the hours distribution. Overall, our results show that public policies now have, on average, less scope for influencing hours of work than 10 years ago. However, the quantile results show that wives working fewer hours per week are more sensitive to changes in their own or spouses’ wages.     

The Anatomy of the Extensive Margin Labor Supply Response*

We estimate how labor force participation among married women in Sweden responded to changing work incentives implied by a reform in the tax and transfer system in 1997. Using rich, population‐wide, administrative data, we estimate an average participation elasticity of 0.13, thereby adding to the scarce literature estimating participation elasticities using quasi‐experimental methods. We also highlight that estimated extensive margin responses necessarily are local to the observed equilibrium. Among low‐income earners, elasticities are twice as large in the group with the lowest employment level, compared with the group with the highest employment level.     

Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates

This paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates. A simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution. In the general non-linear income tax problem, this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of Mirrlees. The optimal non-linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution. These formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters.     

Lifetime versus Annual Tax‐and‐Transfer Progressivity: Sweden, 1968–2009

In this paper, we analyze the evolution of tax‐and‐transfer progressivity in Sweden over both annual and lifetime horizons. Using a rich micro panel covering the period 1968–2009, we calculate tax rates over a cohort's entire working life cycle. Our main finding is that taxes are considerably less progressive over the lifetime than in any single year. Social insurance transfers to transitory low‐income earners account for most of this result. We offer a number of robustness checks of the measurement of lifetime incomes and progressivity, but none of them changes our overall findings.     

Does labour supply respond to a flat tax?

We exploit the exogenous change in marginal tax rates created by the Russian flat tax reform of 2001 to identify the effect of taxes on the labour supply of men and women. We apply a weighted difference‐in‐difference regression approach and instrumental variables to estimate labour supply functions using a panel dataset. The mean regression results indicate that the tax reform led to a statistically significant increase in hours of work for men but had no effect on work hours for women. However, we find a positive response to tax changes in both tails of the female work hour distribution. We also find that the reform increased the probability of finding a job among both men and women. Despite significant variation in individual responses, the aggregate labour supply elasticities are trivial. This suggests that reform‐induced changes in labour supply are an unlikely explanation for the amplified personal income tax revenues that followed the reform.     

The incidence of income taxes on high earners in Canada

This article explores the “brain drain” explanation for the concentration of incomes in Canada during the past 30 years, namely, that high-skilled Canadians make use of high salaries on offer in the United States to extract higher salaries at home. If this is the case, then for a given level of US salaries, the threat to accept outside offers should be more credible when the Canadian dollar is depreciating against the US dollar, and weaker when the Canadian dollar is appreciating. The data are broadly consistent with this claim: income concentration worsened during the depreciations of the 1980s and 1990s, and eased when the Canadian dollar began to appreciate in value. The article develops a simple two-parameter model based on the propositions that high earners in Canada can use US salaries to bargain for higher salaries, and that Canadian high earners can shelter part of their income from personal income taxes. It also offers some preliminary evidence about the parameter values consistent with available data. The results suggest that higher top marginal personal income tax rates may potentially accentuate top-end after-tax income inequality. If high earners are able to use their bargaining power to extract pay increases to offset higher tax rates, then the burden of increased personal income taxes will be deflected elsewhere, and may even have the perverse effect of making the after-tax income distribution more unequal than it was before.     

Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada

We study corporate income taxation when firms operating in multiple jurisdictions can shift income using tax planning strategies. Because income of corporate groups is not consolidated for tax purposes in Canada, firms may use financial techniques, such as lending among affiliates, to reduce subnational corporate taxes. A simple theoretical model shows how income shifting affects real investment, government revenues, and tax base elasticities, depending on whether firms must allocate income to provinces or not. We then analyze data from administrative tax records to compare the behavior of corporate subsidiaries that may engage in income shifting to comparable firms that must use the statutory allocation formula to determine their taxable income in each province. The evidence suggests that income shifting has pronounced effects on provincial tax bases. According to our preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates for “income shifting” firms is 4.9, compared with 2.3 for other, comparable firms.     

Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners

We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes changes the optimal nonlinear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad, net of migration costs — utilities and costs both depending on productivity. A simple formula, that complements Saez's formula obtained in closed economy, is derived for the marginal tax rates faced by top-income earners. It depends on the labour elasticity, the tax rate abroad and the migration costs expressed as a fraction of the utility obtained abroad. The Rawlsian marginal tax rates, obtained for the whole population, illustrate a curse of the middle-skilled. Simulations are provided for the French economy.     

THE BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY OF INCOME AND CONSUMPTION TAXES IN NEW ZEALAND

This paper provides estimates of individual and aggregate revenue elasticities of income and consumption taxes in New Zealand, based on the 2001 tax structure and expenditure patterns. Using analytical expressions for revenue elasticities at the individual and aggregate levels, together with a simulated income distribution, values for New Zealand were obtained. Results using equi-proportional income changes suggest that the aggregate income and consumption tax revenue elasticities are both fairly constant as mean income increases, at around 1.3 and 0.95 respectively. This latter estimate assumes that increases in disposable income are accompanied by approximately proportional increases in total expenditure. If there is a tendency for the savings proportion to increase as disposable income increases, a somewhat lower total consumption tax revenue elasticity, of around 0.9, is obtained for 2001 income levels. However, non-equiproportional income changes are more realistic. Allowing for regression towards the geometric mean income reduces these elasticities, giving an elasticity for income and consumption taxes combined that is only slightly above unity. Examination of the tax-share weighted expenditure elasticities for various goods also revealed that, despite the adoption of a broad based GST at a uniform rate in New Zealand, the persistence of various excises has an important effect on the overall consumption tax revenue elasticity, especially for individuals at relatively low income levels.     

Does work pay in France? Monetary incentives, hours constraints, and the guaranteed minimum income

This paper uses a representative sample of individuals on France's main welfare program (the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, or RMI) to estimate monetary incentives for employment among welfare recipients. Based on the estimated joint distribution of wages and hours potentially offered to each individual, we compute potential gains from working in a very detailed manner. Relating these gains to observed employment, we then estimate a simple structural labor supply model. We find that potential gains are almost always positive but very small on average, especially for single mothers, because of the high implicit marginal tax rates embedded in the system. Employment rates are sensitive to incentives with extensive margin elasticities for both men and women usually below one. Conditional on these elasticities, simulations indicate that existing policies devoted to reducing marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution, such as the intéressement earnings top-up program, have little impact in this population due to their very limited scope. The negative income tax (Prime pour l'emploi), seems to be an exception.     

The optimal taxation of risky capital income: An elasticity rule

Should risky capital income be taxed like safe income or should tax rates be differentiated? The question is analyzed in a 2-assets model of portfolio choice. Flat tax rates are chosen in order to maximize the investor's expected utility from terminal wealth subject to an expected tax revenue constraint. If lump-sum taxes are not available, optimal tax rates are characterized by an elasticity rule: The relative change in the risk remuneration should be equal to the inverse of the product of two elasticities. One is the output elasticity of capital. The other is the demand elasticity for risky investments with respect to a revenue preserving tax variation.     

Reported gross income and marginal tax rates: estimation of the behavioural reactions of Spanish taxpayers

This article estimates, for the Spanish personal income tax, the elasticity of reported gross income to marginal tax rates. The identification of this elasticity has been performed using the reform approved by Law 35/2006, which came into force in January 2007. The elasticities obtained suggest the existence of important efficiency costs, with significant regional differences. The average elasticity estimated for Spain as a whole is 0.676. However, this elasticity is highly dispersed throughout the Spanish administrative regions, which indicates the unequal power of distortion of the tax. Thus, households whose principal source of income is salary display an elasticity of 0.337, compared to 0.682 for households whose main income source comes from business or savings. Lastly, a positive correlation is also detected between elasticity and income level: an elasticity of 3.6 is reached for taxpayers with an annual gross income exceeding 100 000€.     

Progressive Taxation and Wage Setting: Some Evidence for Denmark

The proposition that a progressive tax system contributes to wage moderation is studied using Danish earnings data disaggregated by occupation, gender and earnings level. Our main conclusions are that income-tax progression affects wage setting, but whether it moderates or exaggerates wage pressure is income dependent. An increase in progressivity reduces the pre-tax earnings of middle-income workers (manual male workers and moderate income earners among both male and female non-manual workers). The reverse is found for high-income earners (non-manual male workers), in that an increase in progressivity tends to raise pre-tax earnings. Finally, there is no significant effect of tax progressivity on the wages of low-income earners.
JEL classification : H 3; J 3; J 5; J 6     

The Laffer curve in schedular multi-rate income taxes with non-genuine allowances: An application to Spain

This paper models the connection between tax revenue and marginal tax rates in modern personal income taxes. In so doing, new analytical expressions for the elasticity of tax revenue to tax rates are derived taking into account global and schedular income taxes in the presence of non-standard allowances. Based on these new analytical elasticities the implicit Laffer curve is characterised and explored in detail. Calculations are performed for the individual taxpayer and the aggregate population. When applied to microdata, the model permits us to locate individually the position of every taxpayer on the entire range of the Laffer curve as well as to characterise the “representative” aggregate Laffer curve. The utility of the model to forecast revenue is illustrated by applying it to Spanish personal income tax. The model confirms that the Laffer curve is essentially an intrinsic individual matter although a virtual aggregate Laffer curve for the whole population can be inferred.     

Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records

We show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms. We develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs. We present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using Danish tax records. First, larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities. Second, kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities. Third, the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers' aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium. Our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods.     

Estimating a Dynamic Model of Household Choices in the Presence of Income Taxation

The purpose of the article is to study the incentive and distributional consequences of income taxation. The article analyzes tax changes in a dynamic setting. The framework is estimated under a set of different identifying assumptions using parametric, nonparametric, and semiparametric techniques. The empirical results focus on tax reforms in Germany in the 1980s. The article shows that these reforms did not significantly lower effective tax rates. The findings also suggest that estimated elasticities for male labor supply are small, ranging between 0.02 and 0.2.     

Australian Family Tax Reform and the Targeting Fallacy

Over recent decades, Australia's highly progressive, individual‐based taxation of families has been replaced by a system that tends towards joint taxation with an inverted U‐shaped rate scale. The reform has been implemented by introducing family‐income‐targeted child payments (now Family Tax Benefit Part A) and by lowering tax rates on higher incomes. The new system has shifted the burden of taxation to two‐earner families on low and average wages and, in particular, to working married mothers as second earners. For reasons of fairness and efficiency, we propose returning to more progressive individual taxation and universal family payments.     

Cigarette demand and tax policy for race groups in South Africa

This paper calculates cigarette demand for race groups in South Africa. Elasticities are the most important information a tax policy analyst can have. Elasticities determine how the tax base will change with a change in the tax rate and thus how government revenues will respond to the tax. Elasticities also determine the excess burden that consumers will bear as a result of the tax. As such, own price, crossprice, and expenditure elasticities are calculated along with government revenue maximizing tax rates, and total and excess burdens. Parametric and semiparametric estimation techniques are used and compared. Results show that a tax on cigarettes will discourage nonsmokers from starting to smoke and mainly raise revenue from current smokers. Furthermore, it is found that consumption behaviours between groups are different implying different government revenue maximizing tax rates for each group affecting the distribution of income.