Market power in Austrian food retailing: the case of milk products

An increasing market concentration in food retailing has generated concerns about the market power of retailers towards consumers and input suppliers. This is especially true for countries such as Austria, which has a CR-3 in food retailing greater than 75%. Based on a New Empirical Industrial Organization model we estimate the market power of food retailers towards consumers and input suppliers with respect to three groups of dairy products (drinking milk, cheese, butter including others). Our empirical results suggest that market power of retailing exists towards consumers (in particular in the case of drinking milk) and towards input suppliers (in particular in the case of butter and other milk products). Market power is more significant (in statistical terms) downstream than upstream. However, the impact of oligopsony power on input prices is stronger than the impact of oligopoly power on consumer prices.     

跨国零售企业:高控制要求及其多元实现路径——基于企业性质与资源特征的分析

本文基于跨国零售企业性质与资源特征视角,分别运用逻辑推理方法、统计分析方法,分析了跨国零售企业与生产企业相比所具有的多重特殊性、海外市场各种进入模式的内在特性,认为,跨国零售企业母公司对子公司的高控制度追求,有其逻辑上的必然性;而具有高控制特征的独资模式是与零售企业性质与资源特征的最佳匹配.但由于其海外进入模式的具体选择是一个多目标的复杂决策,从而决定其高控制要求实现路径的多元性与特殊性.因此,文章进一步分析了高控制要求的多元实现路径,归纳得出了关于跨国零售企业规模扩张的一般性结论以及需要进一步研究的理论与实践问题.     

Mergers in the food retailing sector: An empirical investigation

We address the problem of merger evaluation, for competition policy purposes, in the retailing sector. The likely effects of a possible merger are analysed ex ante. The novelty of the paper lies in the inclusion of downstream and upstream market power effects on the retailers. Also, it provides an empirical application to the Portuguese food retailing market. The effects of additional concentration on prices are estimated, as well as the price reduction insiders are likely to obtain via an improved bargaining position. The final effect on prices depends on how these cost reductions are reflected in insiders’ prices, i.e., on the pass-through rate. For realistic values of this rate we find that the merger in question will most likely increase consumer prices and, therefore, should not be allowed on an antitrust legislation basis.     

Manufacturers and retailers in the global economy

We develop a model with multi‐product retailers acting as intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers. We show that the rise in retailer product assortment, the rise of up‐front payments in many retail markets and the observed shift in employment from manufacturing to retailing may be the consequence of the global integration of product markets. We also identify a novel benefit from market integration consisting of efficiency gains in the vertical distribution chain.     

零售企业核心竞争力研究——兼析中外零售企业的竞争力

文章在总结国内外学者诸观点的基础上,归纳出企业核心竞争力一般理论应包括的三个基本内容,提出了零售企业的具体核心竞争力理论必须既要继承性地反映企业核心竞争力一般理论的基本内容,又要反映零售企业的具体竞争特点的观点,得出了零售企业核心竞争能力应具备的五项内容.若内资零售企业能将零售企业的具体核心竞争力理论运用于实践,普遍提高内资企业的核心竞争能力,外资零售企业很难全面掌控我国零售市场,但外资零售企业利用所具备的核心竞争能力,有可能在我国某些地区、某些城市、某些经营领域局部掌握主导权.     

零售企业顾客投诉问题研究——基于数据挖掘技术

随着零售业的飞速发展,国外大型零售企业大举进入中国市场.国内零售业竞争日趋激烈,消费者的行为模式和购物心理也随之发生巨大的变化.如何更好地满足顾客的需求,与顾客建立密切的联系,增强顾客满意、顾客忠诚,减少关键客户的流失已经成为零售企业生死存亡的关键.作为现代营销管理理念与信息技术相结合的产物,客户关系管理建设对企业有效了解、满足客户的需求,给客户更多的让渡价值,从而使客户满意、提升忠诚度,增加企业的客户价值有重要的作用.本文应用Clementine作为数据挖掘软件,对零售企业投诉数据进行数据挖掘.通过对各类商品投诉原因、投诉处理方法、投诉处理后再次满意度等的分析,来实现对其投诉数据内在结构特征的理解和预测,同时提高零售业管理人员的工作效率和管理水平.     

零售商业市场定位与地理定位

本文从微观角度出发,以零售商业为研究主体,探讨在零售商业企业发展战略中市场定位与地理定位的重要性及两者的关系。依据定性和定量相结合的原则,给出了零售商业进行市场定位与地理定位的思路     

中国零售服务业发展的国际比较

2005年中国零售服务市场对WTO成员方全面开放,中国零售服务业面临着更大的机遇与挑战。与实力雄厚的跨国零售大企业相比,中国零售企业存在着企业整体规模小,业态结构不尽合理,管理和技术落后等问题。应进一步加快城市商业规划,加快国内零售业重组,增强内资零售企业竞争力,以促进中国零售服务业健康有序发展。     

Effects of horizontal consolidation under bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers

This article considers bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers to estimate the trade off between market power and cost efficiency. The model is based on pricing rules from a firm's profit maximization and nests both oligopoly and oligopsony models. An empirical analysis for US beef processors and retailers suggests that processors tend to exercise oligopsony market power in procuring cattle, but they are unlikely to exercise market power on retailers. When retailers and processors are considered as one integrated sector, efficiency effects from the increased concentration in the US beef packing industry are slightly larger than market power effects. When processors’ market power is considered separately from retailers’ market power, the difference between cost saving and market power effects becomes greater. The cost elasticity estimate, 0.99, indicates that a further merger would result in little economies of scale in the future. Therefore, although we find that efficiency effects are currently larger than market power effects, a further increase in concentration in the US beef processing industry could narrow the gap between the two effects.     

Modelling upstream and downstream market power in bilateral oligopoly

This article develops a general model that estimates market power exertion in a bilateral market relationship for processors and retailers where each may also have market power in their primary input market and output markets, respectively. Monte Carlo experiments are used to generate industry data for market structures such as perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, bilateral imperfect competition with an integrated processor/retailer, bilateral imperfect competition with separate processor and retailer, and bilateral imperfect competition with four adjacent upstream and downstream markets. Then, new empirical industrial organization models are estimated using the data with models that match the market structure under which the data were generated (true) and with models that reflect alternative market structures (alternative). The general model is derived using the production function approach without imposing the fixed proportion assumption. Monte Carlo simulation results indicate that the general model is preferred to alternative models that presume competitive behaviour by processors in primary input procurement and by retailers in the output market. Results indicate that less flexible models lead to biased market power estimates in the presence of market power in the corresponding input and output markets.     

Trade Policy and Access to Retail Distribution

The paper develops a model in which foreign and domestic manufacturers producing differentiated goods sell through spatially differentiated retailers. There is free entry into retailing but access to the retail distribution network (by manufacturers) may be controlled. The author considers a domestic vertical control mechanism in which domestic retailers carry only domestic brands (termed “domestic dealing”) and compares the use of tariffs on imports and the enforcement of domestic dealing restrictions as means of increasing domestic welfare. It is shown that domestic dealing will always be prohibited when tariffs can be used. When trade policy is not available, however, domestic dealing may be desirable.     

Local monopsony and free riders

In an industry with upstream economies of scale in the distribution of differentiated products to retailers which have monopoly power within separate local market areas, the retailers have an incentive to exert monopsony power due to the divergence between average and marginal costs in the distribution of those inputs. The retailers increase their ability to exert monopsony power by forming coalitions (that is, chains) across local markets. Sufficiently large retail chains may force input price below the seller's average cost, thus ‘free riding’ on the level of product variety supported by other retailers. Vertical integration, cartels, or other cooperative behavior, however, can be means to control the level of product variety, and may increase both industry profits and economic welfare. Policy applications to the cable television, motion picture, and pharmaceutical industries are discussed.     

Productivity and efficiency impacts of human resources practices in food retailing

Data from an annual survey of US supermarkets including detailed information on store characteristics, operations, and performance are used to develop an index of Human Resource (HR) practices for food retailers. A stochastic frontier analysis demonstrates that HR policies have a positive impact on value added in food retailing establishments while efficiency is not adversely influenced by HR practices. Managerial implications of the model link technical inefficiency estimates for retailers to slight declines in store level gross margins. Evaluated on the basis of technical efficiency, retailers choosing a portfolio of HR practices that score high on the HR index are able to match the performance of competitors pursuing an alternative low HR strategy.     

基于制造商投资和讨价还价模型的零售通道费形成机理研究*

通道费的形成机理以及对其的规制政策一直是个未解的难题。本文在上游制造商之间的努力存在外部性的条件下考虑上游的投资决策,基于纳什不对称讨价还价模型考察了努力外部性、努力成本、相对谈判势力等因素对通道费的影响,以及通道费收取对生产投资的影响和福利效应。研究表明,通道费的形成不仅取决于制造商的相对谈判势力,而且取决于制造商投资努力的成本以及外部性的大小。即便制造商完全没有谈判势力,零售商也会选择向制造商支付特许经营费的方式激励制造商提供努力。此外,通道费在一定条件下可能会损害消费者福利,因而把通道费纳入滥用市场支配地位的行为范围,对其根据合理推断原则进行判别具有一定的必要性。     

零售商买方势力一定会导致通道费吗？--基于纵向市场结构的合作博弈分析

关于通道费的研究,有一种观点认为通道费是零售商买方势力的体现。但是现实经济中有些具有买方势力的零售商收取通道费,而另一些却不收取通道费,买方势力的观点不能对这一现象作出解释。针对此,构建双边双寡头的纵向市场结构模型,并在模型中引入零售商的价格竞争和服务竞争,在合作博弈的框架下分析研究了零售商买方势力与通道费之间的关系。研究发现买方势力并不是出现通道费的充分条件,而只是必要条件,通道费的出现与否除了与零售商买方势力有关外,还与其他的市场环境因素有关。最后,通过线性需求函数的特例对这一结论进行了验证,并在此基础之上提出了相应的规制政策建议。     

The market for bushmeat: Colobus Satanas on Bioko Island

Species conservation is an important issue worldwide. The market for monkeys consumed as food on Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea, is modeled as a bargaining game. The bargaining set-up leads to the conclusion that black colobus are being over-hunted. Using daily data an empirical density is fit to the price-quantity pairs resulting from exchange between buyers and retailers. The density provides support for the bargaining model. Quantile regressions are also fit to the data. The median quantile indicates buyers have greater bargaining power than retailers. Knowing who has bargaining power aids in the design of policy to reduce bushmeat hunting. Strategic elasticities are constructed from the quantiles. Given the harvest rate of monkeys and the elasticity estimates, the monkeys of Bioko Island are under considerable pressure.     

大中型零售业在中国中西部中等城市的发展潜力分析--以山西省临汾市为例

大中型零售业在我国大城市中发展迅速,竞争激烈,尤其是外资的大中型零售企业更是给内资的零售企业带来了巨大的压力和冲击。反观在中等城市,尤其是中国中西部地区的中等城市,大中型零售商业的发展较为迟缓,然而零售业在中等城市却蕴藏广阔的市场和商机。文章选择了山西省临汾市的零售市场和企业进行了实证分析,指出当地的经济发展水平和一定规模的人口密度是大中型零售业进入中等城市的基本条件,而区位因素、距离因子、消费者行为等方面成为影响大中型零售企业经营成败的关键。     

Supermarket Choice and Supermarket Competition in Market Equilibrium

Multi-store firms are common in the retailing industry. Theory suggests that cross-elasticities between stores of the same firm enhance market power. To evaluate the importance of this effect in the U.K. supermarket industry, we estimate a model of consumer choice and expenditure using three data sources: profit margins for each chain, a survey of consumer choices and a data-set of store characteristics. To permit plausible substitution patterns, the utility model interacts consumer and store characteristics. We measure market power by calculating the effect of merger and demerger on Nash equilibrium prices. Demerger reduces the prices of the largest firms by between 2 and  3.8%  depending on local concentration; mergers between the largest firms lead to price increases up to  7.4%  .     

国内市场运行效率的互联网驱动* ——计量模型与案例调研的双重验证

本文从宏观和中观两个层面考察互联网对国内市场运行的影响，围绕市场整合和行业运行两个效率评判维度进行机制分析，并综合运用面板数据模型和多案例分析方法加以考察验证。研究结果表明：互联网因素对于国内市场运行的影响存在着不同范畴的结构差异，互联网发展倾向于增进流通业效率而可能妨碍统一市场，未来应理性认识互联网对于国内市场运行的真实驱动，着重利用互联网技术优化商流运行和提高流通业效率，同时也要重视线下交易制度和实体型交易关系对于推进国内统一市场的实质性作用，避免因忽视实体流通业发展和混淆互联网驱动而加剧国内市场分割。     

Transmission Constraints and Imperfect Markets for Power

This article argues that, while most of the economic gains from the restructuring of the power industry will be achieved in electricity generation, trading and retailing, the transmission grid holds the keys to an important share of the economic value created by the process. Using a simple three-node network, this article shows that an increase in transmission capacity has two effects: (1) cheaper power can be used, and (2) competition among generators is increased. This carries three policy implications: first, policy makers can and should use transmission expansion to increase competition in generation. Second, generators will not necessarily finance nor advocate optimal transmission expansion: they may prefer to keep the rents derived from local market power, rather than gain better access to markets, even if they receive transmission payments corresponding to their investment, as suggested in parts of the United States. Finally, this work provides support for the vertical separation between generation and transmission, beyond the traditional foreclosure argument.