Income diversification and risk: Does ownership matter? An empirical examination of Indian banks

We examine the impact of ownership on income diversification and risk for Indian banks over the period 2001–2009. We investigate both the determinants of non-interest income and the impact of diversification on various profitability and insolvency risk measures for public sector, private domestic, and foreign banks. We document that ownership does matter in the pursuit of non-interest income. Relative to private domestic banks, public sector banks earn significantly less fee-income, while foreign banks report higher fee income. Public sector banks with higher levels of governmental ownership are significantly less likely to pursue non-interest income sources. Fee-based income significantly reduces risk, measured by profitability variables, for public sector banks. Default risk is also reduced for these banks. From a regulatory perspective, it appears that diversification benefits India’s public sector banks. Our research has implications for the changes in the risk profile for banks in emerging banking markets pursuing non-interest revenue sources.     

Loan loss provisions and income smoothing – Do shareholders matter?

In this paper, we aim to analyse the role of shareholders in the creation of discretionary loan loss provisions (LLP) and the use of LLP in income smoothing. Using a sample of over 200 Central European banks, we demonstrate that LLP and income smoothing of foreign-owned banks and state-owned banks differ from those of domestic private banks. Foreign and state banks create higher discretionary LLP than private domestic banks. Foreign banks use these LLP to perform discretionary income smoothing, while state banks, in general, do not smooth income. Higher LLP of foreign banks are observed in banks with low asset quality and high profitability. Foreign banks with low profitability that operate in volatile economic environments do not create higher discretionary LLP than domestic private banks. This implies that their risk is not lower than that of locally owned banks, at least on the credit side. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, both foreign and state banks have become more prudent than domestic private banks, and their discretionary LLP are higher. Overall, we provide evidence that foreign and government ownership affect LLP policy in banks. This complements existing results on the differences in loan cyclicality and default risk between foreign, state and domestic private banks.     

Loan growth and riskiness of banks

We investigate whether loan growth affects the riskiness of individual banks in 16 major countries. Using Bankscope data from more than 16,000 individual banks during 1997–2007, we test three hypotheses on the relation between abnormal loan growth and asset risk, bank profitability, and bank solvency. We find that loan growth leads to an increase in loan loss provisions during the subsequent three years, to a decrease in relative interest income, and to lower capital ratios. Further analyses show that loan growth also has a negative impact on the risk-adjusted interest income. These results suggest that loan growth represents an important driver of the riskiness of banks.     

Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks

Using detailed ownership data for a sample of European commercial banks, we analyze the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned and publicly held banks. We consider five categories of shareholders that are specific to our dataset. We find that ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but mainly for privately owned banks. A higher equity stake of either individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. In addition, institutional investors and non-financial companies impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership structure do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of publicly held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in explaining risk differences. However, higher stakes of banking institutions in publicly held banks are associated with lower credit and default risk.     

Governance and bank characteristics in the credit and sovereign debt crises – the impact of CEO power

The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. A common question is whether the recent experience with the credit crisis has helped in dealing with the sovereign debt crisis. We study more specifically whether banks with powerful CEOs perform better or worse than other banks, and if there is any difference in this relationship between the two crises. Using unique hand-collected data for 378 large global banks, we find that CEO power has a significant positive relation to bank profitability and asset quality, but also to insolvency risk, during the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, strong CEOs do not appear to be detrimental to bank performance. Our results also support the idea that deposit insurance may have contributed to the credit crisis.     

Bank income structure and risk: An empirical analysis of European banks

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank risk and product diversification in the changing structure of the European banking industry. Based on a broad set of European banks for the period 1996–2002, our study first shows that banks expanding into non-interest income activities present higher risk and higher insolvency risk than banks which mainly supply loans. However, considering size effects and splitting non-interest activities into both trading activities and commission and fee activities we show that the positive link with risk is mostly accurate for small banks and essentially driven by commission and fee activities. A higher share of trading activities is never associated with higher risk and for small banks it implies, in some cases, lower asset and default risks.     

Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative

We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices.     

Bank ownership and performance. Does politics matter?

This paper uses a new dataset to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and bank performance, providing separate estimations for developing and industrial countries. It finds that state-owned banks located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts, and that the opposite is true for foreign-owned banks. The paper finds no strong correlation between ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries. Next, in order to test whether the differential in performance between public and private banks is driven by political considerations, the paper checks whether this differential widens during election years; it finds strong support for this hypothesis.     

Bank ownership reform and bank performance in China

Using a panel of Chinese banks over the 1997–2004 period, we assess the effect of bank ownership on performance. Specifically, we conduct a joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of (domestic) private, foreign and state ownership. We find that the “Big Four” state-owned commercial banks are less profitable, are less efficient, and have worse asset quality than other types of banks except the “policy” banks (static effect). Further, the banks undergoing a foreign acquisition or public listing record better pre-event performance (selection effect); however, we find little performance change in either the short or the long term.     

Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model,efficiency and stability

How different are Islamic banks from conventional banks? Does the recent crisis justify a closer look at the Sharia-compliant business model for banking? When comparing conventional and Islamic banks, controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, we find few significant differences in business orientation. There is evidence however, that Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized. We also find large cross-country variation in the differences between conventional and Islamic banks as well as across Islamic banks of different sizes. Furthermore, we find that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. The better stock performance of listed Islamic banks during the recent crisis is also due to their higher capitalization and better asset quality.     

Financial fragility of banks,ownership structure and income diversification: Empirical evidence from the GCC region

This paper investigates the role that ownership structure and diversification of income plays in the financial stability of banks from the GCC region. We find evidence that suggests that higher concentration of ownership in any type of shareholding is associated with higher insolvency risk. However, this higher insolvency risk is not associated with any specific type of shareholders. Higher financial fragility is also associated with the size and whether the bank is an Islamic bank. Banks engaged in substantial fee-based activities are more financially stable as compared with banks that predominantly generate their incomes from traditional intermediation activities.     

Concentrated control,institutions, and banking sector: An international study

Using a broad sample of listed commercial banks in East Asia and Western Europe, this paper investigates the relations among concentrated control, a set of bank operating characteristics, and legal and regulatory regimes. We find that banks with concentrated control exhibit poorer performance, lower cost efficiency, greater return volatility, and higher insolvency risk, relative to widely held ones. We also document that legal institutions and private monitoring effectively reduce the detrimental effects of concentrated control and that official disciplinary power plays a weak governance role, whereas government intervention exacerbates the adverse effects. Further evidence shows that the relations between control concentration and bank operating characteristics are curvilinear and vary according to the types of controlling owners. Overall, our findings support the contention that country-level institutions play important roles in constraining insider expropriation, and that private monitoring mechanisms are more effective than are public rules and supervision in governing banks.     

Structural effects of asset-backed securitization

This paper analyses the potential changes in the operational structure of deposit-taking financial institutions that securitize assets. Findings indicate that banks can create an asset securitization pipeline structure that enables them to increase their return on capital. In other words, through securitization banks can expand their loan provision business without increasing their liabilities or their capital levels. Using a contingent claims model, four factors that impact on the bank's decision to securitize are highlighted and analysed: (i) the level of deposit insurance; (ii) capital adequacy requirements; (iii) insolvency risk; and, (iv) the risk of credit enhancements. Furthermore, we identify key accounting and regulatory challenges that emerge for banks from the process of asset backed securitization.     

The effects of loan portfolio concentration on Brazilian banks’ return and risk

This paper tests whether diversification of the credit portfolio at the bank level leads to better performance and lower risk. We employ a new high frequency (monthly) panel data for the Brazilian banking system with information at the bank level for loans by economic sector. We find that loan portfolio concentration increases returns and also reduces default risk; the impact of concentration on bank’s return is decreasing on bank’s risk; there are significant size effects; foreign and state-owned banks seem to be less affected by the degree of diversification. An important additional finding is that there is an increasing concentration trend after the breakout of the recent international financial crisis, specially after the failure of Lehman Brothers.     

Securities class actions in the US banking sector: Between investor protection and bank stability

This paper investigates whether securities class actions (SCAs) can play a role in banking supervision, both as a warning signal of insolvency and as an instrument of market discipline to encourage bank managers to carefully evaluate risk. Two groups of US banks are compared over the 2000–2008 period. One includes banks that have faced at least one SCA, while the other is composed of non-targeted banks (control group). Results indicate that collective private litigation procedures are more frequently directed at financially fragile intermediaries exhibiting inadequate governance standards. Furthermore, banks which have been subjected to SCAs are likely to reduce their excessive risk positions. This supports the idea that SCAs could be efficiently employed as a complement to public supervisory activity in the banking sector.     

The effect of bank ownership and deposit insurance on monetary policy transmission

In this paper we develop a theoretical model with a representative bank whose ownership is shared between state and private sector. The bank faces a risk of failure and provides private and public explicit deposit insurance. Banks owned to a larger extent by the government are more able to counteract a restrictive monetary policy because of their capacity to raise additional volume of deposits. Therefore, the greater the state’s share in the bank ownership, the less the impact of a monetary tightening on the level of loan supply.     

Islamic versus conventional banks in the GCC countries: A comparative study using classification techniques

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on Islamic finance by investigating the feature of Islamic and conventional banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period 2003–2010. We use parametric and non-parametric classification models (Linear discriminant analysis, Logistic regression, Tree of classification and Neural network) to examine whether financial ratios can be used to distinguish between Islamic and conventional banks. Univariate results show that Islamic banks are, on average, more profitable, more liquid, better capitalized, and have lower credit risk than conventional banks. We also find that Islamic banks are, on average, less involved in off-balance sheet activities and have more operating leverage than their conventional peers. Results from classification models show that the two types of banks may be differentiated in terms of credit and insolvency risk, operating leverage and off-balance sheet activities, but not in terms of profitability and liquidity. More interestingly, we find that the recent global financial crisis has a negative impact on the profitability for both Islamic and conventional banks, but time shifted. Finally, results show that Logit regression obtained slightly higher classification accuracies than other models.     

The Dependency of the Banks' Assets and Liabilities: Evidence from Germany

Two decades of developments in risk‐transfer instruments may have fundamentally changed the extent to which banks practice on‐balance sheet term and liquidity transformation. These changes should be deliberated in on‐balance sheet asset‐liability dependencies. By using correlation analyses, we investigate asset‐liability dependency for all three sectors of German universal banks from 1994 to 2007 and find that it declined over our sample period. We also investigate whether asset‐liability dependency varies systematically with a bank's affinity for using risk‐transfer instruments, regulatory capital, and profitability and document several differences between the three sectors of German universal banks.     

What Happens During the Private Period?: Evidence from Public‐to‐Private Reverse LBOs

This study provides new evidence on the restructuring activities undertaken by public‐to‐private reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) while owned by private equity firms. The authors' comprehensive sample of public‐to‐private LBOs that return to public ownership through IPOs enables them to observe changes in profitability, valuation, financial structure, operating structure, and cost structure from the time the firms go private through (and after) their emergence through (re‐) IPOs. With their exclusive focus on reverse LBOs involving public‐to‐private deals, the authors reach findings that contradict previous conclusions about RLBOs. At the time of the LBO, the target firms in reverse LBOs are more levered than their peers, pay higher dividends, and are more profitable than their peers. At the same time, however, they appear to have lower market valuations before the buyouts. During the private period, the target firms of reverse LBOs achieve significant increases in employee productivity, asset restructuring, and improved gross margins, while operating with substantially higher levels of debt financing, lower levels of cash and working capital, and greater concentration of equity ownership. After the companies return to public ownership through IPOs, such companies continue to operate with higher leverage and ownership concentration than their publicly traded peers while producing further increases in profitability, resulting in substantial increases in both enterprise and equity valuation. The authors' analysis also shows that higher debt levels from the buyout play an important role in increased enterprise values. The evidence suggests that possible undervaluation as well as expected efficiency gains from restructuring actions are the primary motives for such reverse LBOs.     

Ability of accounting and audit quality variables to predict bank failure during the financial crisis

We examine the ability of selected accounting and audit quality variables measured in a period prior to the financial crisis (i.e., the four quarters of 2006), to predict banks that subsequently failed during the financial crisis. We employ two sets of samples from the US: a troubled banks sample that includes banks that failed in or after 2007 as well as banks classified as being troubled based on profitability, loan quality, and balance sheet position in 2007, and a full sample that includes all banks with available required data. Using the troubled banks sample, we identify six reliable predictors of bank failure: auditor type, auditor industry specialization, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, growth in loans, and loan mix. For the larger full sample of banks, we identify the following ten predictors of bank failure: auditor type, Tier 1 capital ratio, proportion of securitized loans, nonperforming loans, loan loss provisions, growth in commercial loans, growth in real estate loans, growth in overall loans, loan mix, and whether the bank is a public bank.