The two sides of CEO option grants at the IPO

This paper examines the impact of CEO IPO option grants on IPO underpricing. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between the two, this paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venture capitalists (VCs) are taken into account. The results are threefold. First, powerful CEOs are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options, to the detriment of the shareholders. Second, young, powerful VCs use IPO option grants to bribe the CEO to agree to an early IPO which will leave more of the existing shareholders' money on the table. Finally, IPO options only work as a value-enhancing incentive in the presence of strong boards.     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.     

The risk appetite of private equity sponsors

Using a unique proprietary data set of 460 realized buyouts completed between 1990 and 2005, we examine the risk appetite of private equity (PE) sponsors in different states of the PE market and analyze key determinants of deal-level equity risk. We develop a new approach to mathematically model PE investment equity risk based on the Black-Cox default model. We find higher equity volatilities during boom periods. Further, deals conducted by more reputed PE sponsors have lower equity volatilities as they are unwilling to imperil their reputation by taking excessive risks. In addition, we find that PE sponsors' risk appetite is negatively related to the ownership stake in the buyout target company.     

Cycles in the IPO market

We develop a model in which time-varying real investment opportunities lead to time-varying adverse selection in the market for IPOs. The model is consistent with several stylized facts known about the IPO market: economic expansions are associated with a dramatic increase in the number of firms going public, which is in turn positively correlated with underpricing. Adverse selection is procyclical in the sense that dispersion in unobservable quality across firms should be more pronounced during booms. Taking the premise that uncertainty is resolved (and thus private information revealed) over time, we test this hypothesis by looking at long-run abnormal returns and delisting rates. Consistent with the model, we find (a) greater cross-sectional return variance, and (b) higher incidence of delisting for hot-market IPOs.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

Local ownership as private information: Evidence on the monitoring-liquidity trade-off

We investigate how ownership patterns affect the way the firm is monitored, the liquidity of its shares, and its stock price. We show that informed ownership improves governance and induces value-enhancing decisions (less over-investment and fewer but better acquisitions). At the same time, it increases the adverse selection discount required by less informed investors to trade, reducing the firm's liquidity. Both effects are impounded in the stock price. This explains why ownership seems to be unrelated to performance. Informed investors affect prices in opposite directions: monitoring would raise prices, but the lower liquidity induced by their presence would reduce them.     

IPO underwriting and subsequent lending

This study investigates the relation between IPO underwriting and subsequent lending. We find that when a bank underwrites a firm’s IPO, the bank is more likely to provide the issuer with future loans at a lower cost, compared to banks without an IPO underwriting relationship. The evidence also suggests that the underwriting banks share information surplus with the IPO firms in the post-IPO loans, supporting the cost-saving hypothesis. Overall, the evidence for the relation between prior IPO underwriting and subsequent lending supports the notion that firms can derive value from investment bank relationships.     

Uncertain Demand,Heterogeneous Expectations,and Unintentional IPO Underpricing

Distinguishing between intentional and unintentional incentives to underprice initial public offerings (IPOs), I develop sufficient conditions for the winners' curse postulated by Miller (1977) and implications for intertemporal changes in the magnitude of underpricing. Specifically, I show that unintentional underpricing (and occasional overpricing) of IPOs is a consequence of investors' heterogeneous expectations of the uncertain value of a stock when the supply is constrained and the underwriter's price discovery process only partially identifies aggregate demand. Moreover, an IPO that is oversubscribed in the premarket sale almost certainly will experience a short‐term price increase in the secondary market.     

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.     

Do today's trades affect tomorrow's IPO allocations?

Underwriters using bookbuilding can allocate shares of initial public offerings (IPOs) on the basis of, among other things, commissions paid by investors. In testing the hypothesis that investors trade liquid stocks in order to affect their IPO allocations, we find that money left on the table by IPOs is related to the trading volume of the 50 most liquid stocks near the offer date. For an IPO that leaves $1 billion on the table, there is abnormal volume of 2.7% to 4.1% in the 50 most liquid stocks over the six days ending on the day that trading commences in that IPO, although only during the internet bubble period is this volume increase statistically significant.     

Pre-IPO ownership structure and its impact on the IPO process

We investigate the impact of pre-issue ownership structure on the key decisions surrounding an IPO. We find that managerial ownership is significantly related to (1) the proportion of shares offered, (2) share allocation, and (3) direct issue-related expenses. This suggests that pre-IPO ownership by managers influences their incentive to maintain control and to lower the cost of going public. In comparison, large pre-IPO non-managerial shareholders are more concerned about exiting, and their presence tends to increase issue size and costs. Our findings indicate that differences in pre-IPO owners’ incentives and bargaining power as implied by their pre-IPO shareholdings can significantly influence the IPO process.     

Model specification and IPO performance: New insights from Asia

This study examines the post-issue stock price performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) from advanced and emerging Asian markets from 1991 to 2004. We provide a comparative assessment on the short- and long-term stock performance of Asian IPOs with comprehensive international evidence. We use several different methods to examine the robustness of IPO performance. Our results reveal that whilst there is initial underpricing in Asian IPOs, the existence of long-run underperformance for the Asian IPOs depends resoundingly on the methodology used for assessment.     

Founder CEO management and the long-run investment performance of IPO firms

This study provides a comparative analysis of the long-run investment performance of founder and non-founder CEO led IPO firms in high and low technology environments. We find weak evidence of superior long-run investment performance on the part of founder CEO led IPO firms, since the significance of the results are sensitive to choice of benchmark, portfolio weighting method, and factor regression model. However, in the context of high technology IPO firms, we find consistent evidence to indicate that founder CEO led firms provide significantly higher long-run returns relative to non-founder CEO led firms. Our results suggest that the unique nature of founder CEO leadership is particularly beneficial to IPO firms in high technology environments.     

The underpricing of private targets

We examine acquisitions of private firms with valuation histories and find a positive relation between acquirer announcement returns and target valuation revisions. Similar to other studies, acquirer announcement returns are positive, on average. However, positive acquirer announcement returns are mainly driven by targets that are acquired for more than their prior valuation. This relation is consistent with pricing effects associated with target valuation uncertainty and behavioral biases in negotiation outcomes.     

Why are IPO investors net buyers through lead underwriters?

In Nasdaq initial public offerings (IPOs) issued between 1997 and 2002, purchases of lead underwriter clients exceed sales by an amount equal to 8.79% of the total issue. We find that lead underwriter clients do not buy to build larger long-term positions, capitalize on superior execution quality, or because of clientele effects. However, characteristics of net buying that are at odds with these explanations and other behaviors (like institutional purchases of cold IPOs) are all consistent with lead underwriters engaging in quid pro quo arrangements with clients. Price contribution analysis shows that such client buying activity contributes significantly to first-day price increases.     

Investor interest, trading volume, and the choice of IPO mechanism in France

This paper investigates the relationship between underpricing and investor interest level prior to and after the IPO date. Empirical tests show a significant 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal return of 19.15%. It is positively related to the share demand-to-offer ratio in the pre-market period and to trading volume in the aftermarket. Despite a high initial underpricing for some book-built issues, the book-building procedure allows for more effective pricing and a lower divergence of opinion among investors in the aftermarket than the auction-like procedure.     

IPO first-day returns,offer price revisions,volatility, and form S-1 language

Form S-1 is the first SEC filing in the initial public offering (IPO) process. The tone of the S-1, in terms of its definitiveness in characterizing the firm’s business strategy and operations, should affect investors’ ability to value the IPO. We find that IPOs with high levels of uncertain text have higher first-day returns, absolute offer price revisions, and subsequent volatility. Our findings provide empirical evidence for the theoretical models of uncertainty, bookbuilding, and prospect theory.     

Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism

This paper extends the literature on analyst optimism. Our analysis of a large sample of recommendations issued from 1995 through 2006 indicates that sell-side analysts are likely to assign frequent and favorable ratings to a stock after the analysts’ affiliated mutual funds invest in that stock. Controlling for a number of variables, including the ties between analysts and investment banks, we find that the greater the portfolio weight of a stock in the fund family, the more optimistic the stock ratings from affiliated analysts become. Since 2002, analysts’ optimism on stocks held by affiliated mutual funds has declined. However, an analyst's decision of upgrading a stock to a “strong buy” rating is still significantly associated with the portfolio weight of that stock in the fund family.     

Limited partner performance and the maturing of the private equity industry

We evaluate the performance of limited partners? (LPs?) private equity investments over time. Using a sample of 14,380 investments by 1,852 LPs in 1,250 buyout and venture capital funds started between 1991 and 2006, we find that the superior performance of endowment investors in the 1991–1998 period, documented by prior literature, is mostly due to their greater access to the top-performing venture capital partnerships. In the subsequent 1999–2006 period, endowments no longer outperform, no longer have greater access to funds that are likely to restrict access, and do not make better investment selections than other types of institutional investors. Nevertheless, all investor types? private equity investments continue to outperform public markets on average. We discuss how these results are consistent with the general maturing of the industry, as private equity has transitioned from a niche, poorly understood area to a ubiquitous part of institutional investors? portfolios.     

Drivers of holding period firm-level returns in private equity-backed buyouts

We extend the research on the drivers of holding period firm-level returns in private equity (PE)-backed buyouts by examining deal-, industry-, and macroeconomic-level drivers and their interaction. To conduct our study, we use a comprehensive and hand-collected dataset covering exited buyouts in the UK between 1995–2004, and we control for sample selection and investment risk. Our study shows that governance variables generally have a limited role in driving value creation but that use of a ratchet is positively related to both equity and enterprise value returns; we also find that leverage has a positive impact on median and top-quartile equity returns. Moreover, returns are driven by the size of the buyout and the acquisitions made during the holding period. With respect to macroeconomic and industry level factors, industry growth particularly drives buyout returns. However, the effect of industry growth is not uniform; its influence is particularly strong in insider-driven and divisional buyouts, in addition to top-quartile transactions.