Analysis of free gift card program effectiveness

Retailers use various promotions, such as gift cards, to increase profits. When retailers give gift cards “free” to consumers who spend above specified thresholds in a single purchase, some consumers may buy more goods. We develop a model to derive the optimal purchase amount thresholds and gift card values. The model is developed for consumers without and then with a spending constraint. We find that the retailer's profit margin, the degree of forward buying and stockpiling, and use of gift cards in future purchases that would have been made with cash, are the most important factors in determining the profitability of gift cards. Gift cards may be very profitable for high-margin retailers who can limit the degree of forward buying and stockpiling, particularly when consumers use gift cards to buy goods they would not have bought from the retailer without gift cards. If this is how consumers use the gift cards, then consumers spending above the cards’ value at redemption can significantly increase their profitability. Without a consumer spending constraint, it is best for the retailer to offer at most one gift card at a large purchase amount. With a consumer spending constraint, it may be profitable to give gift cards at multiple purchase amount thresholds. We also show that the commonly observed policy of giving gift cards at equally spaced purchase amounts may be profitable when forward buying and stockpiling can be controlled. Moreover, we show that gift cards become more profitable when consumers are inconsistent, that is, they overestimate their probability of redeeming the gift card at purchase time. Finally, gift cards may have only a slight profit advantage over discounts if consumers are consistent. Consumer inconsistency and spending above the cards’ value increase this advantage.     

The current and future sales impact of a retail frequency reward program

This research presents an empirical study of the impact of a retail frequency reward program on store sales. We examine both the “points pressure,” or short-term impact, and the “rewarded behavior,” or long-term impact. The points-pressure impact is due to forward-looking customers increasing their purchase levels in order to earn the reward. The rewarded-behavior impact is evidenced as purchases above baseline levels after an individual has received a reward and could result from either behavioral learning reinforcement or positive affect resulting from the reward. We investigate a turkey reward program that awarded free turkeys to shoppers who accumulated the required sales levels during an 8-week period. We find both a points-pressure and rewarded-behavior impact. These effects are statistically significant and managerially relevant in that the program is apparently profitable. The points-pressure impact is especially strong among customers who do not place value on frequent shopper programs that in general deliver immediate price discounts. The key implications are that frequency reward programs of the form, “buy x, then receive xx” can be profitable, are segmentation strategies, and can complement a store's overall frequent shopper program.     

Cross-reward effects in a coalition loyalty program: The impact of a point currency devaluation

While single-brand reward programs encourage customers to remain loyal to that one brand, coalition programs encourage customers to be “promiscuous” by offering points redeemable across partner stores. Despite the benefits of this “open relationship” with customers, store managers face uncertainty as to how rewards offered by partners influence transactions at their own stores. We use a model of multi-store purchase incidence and spend to show how the value of points shared among partner stores can explain patterns in customer-level purchases across them. We also allow reward spillovers to be moderated by three measures of store affinity that characterize a coalition’s portfolio: the relative popularity, geographic distance, and overlap in product categories between each pair of stores.For the coalition studied, popularity affinity was the main determinant of the valence of cross-reward effects, both before and after the devaluation. In contrast, category and geographic affinity had a smaller and more heterogenous impact. Through the use of an event where the loyalty program uniformly devalued the entire coalition’s value of reward points, we show that cross-reward effects changed (lessened), leading to larger financial losses for the most popular stores. While we do not observe changes to the composition of the coalition’s portfolio, our results also suggest that the value of a shared reward currency may be driven by the inclusion of smaller partners.     

Exploring the influence of three types of grocery retailer loyalty programs on customer affective loyalty

Loyalty programs have become a key tool in retailer marketing strategies. In order to manage client heterogeneity adequately, companies have implemented different types of programs: reward programs (RP), loyalty cards (LC) and VIP programs. This paper explores the effects of these three types of programs and provides a comparative analysis of the influence that these three types of programs have on the affective loyalty towards the retailer of customers participating in them. Results show that VIP programs are the most effective in achieving customer affective loyalty, whilst people taking part in reward programs and loyalty card schemes evidence no differences in their affective loyalty towards the store. It can thus be concluded that clients who are loyalty card holders do not value the intangible rewards (preferential treatment) they receive from the store.     

Bonus gift card programs: a methodology to measure the impact on revenue and profit

Many retailers are now offering bonus gift cards to entice customers to buy more regular gift cards. The most common offers are a $5 bonus card with $25 worth of gift card purchases or a $10 bonus card with $50 worth of purchases. Unlike regular gift cards, bonus gift cards are not paid for by other customers. Bonus cards provide $5 or $10 of free credit to a customer at the firm’s expense. Most retailers do not understand the potential for cannibalization of revenue and profit when gift card redeemers use a bonus card for a purchase they would have made without it. Nor do they know what proportion of redeemers represent these cannibalized sales versus the proportion of redeemers that represent incremental purchases. We use an in-market study with a large national restaurant chain to demonstrate a methodology and model to properly evaluate the effect of bonus gift card programs on revenue and profit. We found that although bonus gift cards provide incremental revenue, they can significantly reduce profit particularly in certain retail segments. For those who wish to implement a bonus card program, we provide suggestions to maximize the potential for success.     

Why would a big retailer refuse to collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs?

Big retailers that carry a large assortment of products rely on knowledgeable salespeople to provide purchase advice to customers and match customers with suitable products. Interestingly, big retailers vary in their policies regarding whether to allow their salespeople to receive manufacturer SPIFF (Sales Person Incentive Funding Formula) payments, which motivate salespeople advising at no cost of the retailer. In this study, we investigate a big retailer’s incentive to block manufacturer SPIFF programs, which has the consequence of demotivating salespeople from advising customers, from the perspective of vertical channel interactions. We scrutinize a big retailer’s decision to maximize its profit through managing its channel interactions with upstream manufacturers offering horizontally differentiated products, customers uncertain about true fits with competing products, and its salesperson who can match customers with suitable products through offering purchase advice. Our analysis shows that motivating the salesperson to advise customers is profitable for the retailer only if the such advising has moderate effectiveness in matching consumers and suitable products, and only in this case would the retailer collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs. Otherwise, salesperson advising hurts retailer profit and the big retailer benefits from blocking manufacturer SPIFF programs. Our study reveals the interesting theoretical insight that the incentives of a big retailer and upstream manufacturers to motivate sales advising reside in their incentives to battle for a more favorable channel status.     

The Impact of Frequent Shopper Programs in Grocery Retailing

Frequent shopper programs are becoming ubiquitous in retailing. Retailers seem unsure however about whether these programs are leading to higher loyalty, or to higher profits. In this paper we analyze data from a U.S. supermarket chain that has used a number of frequent shopper rewards to improve sales and profitability. We find that while these programs are profitable, this is only because substantial incremental sales to casual shoppers (cherry pickers) offset subsidies to already loyal customers. In this way our findings are inconsistent with existing theories about how frequent shopper programs are supposed to work. We construct our own Hotelling-like model that explicitly models cherry picking behavior and show that its predictions match the data quite closely. We further test the predictions of our model by characterizing the impact of such programs on trip frequency and basket size. We then use the model to examine more complex scenarios. For example, our analysis suggests that frequent shopper programs may be unprofitable if they eliminate all cherry picking. This may explain why some retailers seem dissatisfied with their programs. We end by proposing a solution that retains the benefits of the frequent shopper programs and yet continues to let supermarkets benefit from price discrimination.     

Drivers of customer likelihood to join grocery retail loyalty programs. An analysis of reward programs and loyalty cards

This paper aims to identify which personal features of customers may determine their likelihood to join a grocery retail loyalty program. We consider five aspects: price sensitivity, search for variety, shopping enjoyment, attitude toward loyalty schemes, and one personality trait: privacy concerns. Some of these variables have already been explored in the literature. Where our research breaks new ground is in establishing the difference between profiles of customers attracted by two of the most common types of loyalty programs currently used by grocery retail firms: a reward program and a loyalty card. The two kinds of program evidence differences in how they are managed, and we posit that the drivers of likelihood to take part in each are different. The study was carried out using logistic regression with a sample of 600 clients of a Spanish supermarket chain. Findings show that one particular type of customer is more likely to take part in these schemes: those displaying little shopping enjoyment, who are greatly concerned with privacy, and who show a favorable attitude toward loyalty programs in general. Furthermore, as expected, differences were observed between drivers of participation likelihood in reward programs and loyalty cards.     

The impact of customer-specific marketing expenses on customer retention and customer profitability

We study the effects of customer-specific marketing expenses on customer retention and customer profitability in a business-to-business setting. Using data from a company providing hygiene services, we look at the impact of a hitherto unstudied type of expense targeted at individual customer relationships: the offering of free equipment to customers. The data allow tracking the activities performed in more than 4,500 customer relationships over a period of 4 years. Retention rates are higher for customers targeted with free equipment, but this effect results from an interaction with customer size. First-order dynamic panel data analyses show that the impact of targeted marketing expenses on customer dollar profit is positive for large customers, but there is no effect for smaller customers. Thus, targeted marketing expenses seem to be a tool for relationship maintenance rather than customer development: they help in retaining large customers that generate more profit, but they do not seem to work in developing new customers into larger, more profitable ones.     

Customer-based execution strategy in a global digital economy

Multinational corporations (MNCs) are continuing to invest more in expanding into new markets around the world. These firms are faced with determining the optimal go-to-market strategy in these heterogeneous new markets to attract and retain profitable customers. This paper provides an organizing framework to help firms develop profitable customer-level strategies across countries in the digital environment. We start by providing a summary of the marketing literature on a customer-based execution strategy. Next, we discuss how the evolving digital landscape is affecting firms’ relationships with customers and describe some of the current digital product and process innovations in the marketplace. We discuss boundary conditions for how these digital product and process innovations might affect profitable customer strategies in a global context. In addition, we discuss implementation challenges that MNCs will likely face in deploying these customer-level strategies and other stakeholders (outside of customers) that will likely play a role in the execution of these customer-level strategies. Finally, we summarize set of research questions to guide future research on customer-level strategies in a global digital context.     

Strategic Use of Analytical CRM in a Market with Network Effects and Switching Costs: Terminating Unprofitable Customer Relationships

Analytical customer relationship management (CRM) systems make firms more informed than ever about their customers. This further gives firms the ability to serve customers selectively in a way that ensures retaining profitable customers and eliminating unprofitable ones. However, when firms of products/services with network effects decide to eliminate unprofitable customers, they may face the risk associated with firing them, which is user-based shrinkage. This risk incurred as a result of network effects has been widely neglected in CRM literature. In this study, considering this risk, we investigate when firms can eliminate unprofitable customers in the competitive market with network effects and consumer switching costs, which often co-exist with network effects, using a game-theoretic model of a duopoly. Our results show that it is not desirable for firms to fire unprofitable customers in the presence of strong network effects or sufficiently low consumer-switching costs. Otherwise, firms can fire unprofitable customers and benefit from the ability to eliminate them. An interesting point is that competing firms can be better off when both have the ability to eliminate unprofitable customers in the presence of moderate switching costs and small network effects.     

The Relationship Rhombus: A Quadratic Relationship

Affinity marketing is highly focused cause related marketing which bridges the divide between commercial companies and organizations, places, or groups which have supporters and /or members and followers, rather than shareholders and customers. Consumers purchase from an organization, which they currently have no relationship with through the strength of their affinity towards a group to which they are linked. In affinity marketing a ready-made relationship is taken by one party and adapted for 'own use' and this raises the issue of who takes and adapts and for what purpose? This paper introduces the concept of affinity marketing, using the example of the affinity credit card to explain the complications of affinity relationships. Having explained the triadic nature of the affinity credit card relationship it then takes this one step further to discuss the development of a further quadratic, rhomboidal relationship.     

Customer Responses to Channel Migration Strategies Toward the E-channel

Many firms stimulate customers to use the E-channel for services, which provokes various consumer responses to such limits on their freedom of choice. In a study on bank customers, we examine the extent of customer reactance in response to various E-channel migration strategies, the potential of incentive programs in mitigating customer reactance, as well as the moderating role of attitudinal loyalty. Finally, we address the mediating role of customer forgiveness. Our study documents that rewarding the use of the firm-preferred E-channel is more effective than punishing the retention of the incumbent channel, and that a punishment-based E-channel migration strategy causes similar reactance levels as forced migration does. Importantly, the mere act of forcing also creates reactance among those customers who have already been using the firm-preferred E-channel. In addition, our results reveal that highly loyal customers exhibit lower reactance than less loyal customers. By including customer forgiveness as a process measure we show that this partially occurs because highly loyal customers tend to be more forgiving toward the firm than less loyal customers.     

Customer Selection and Prioritization

Abstract

That a firm benefits most when customers stick around for the long haul is a central premise of relationship marketing. This conviction has manifested itself over the past decade in the form of numerous formal loyalty programs that aim to seek and foster customer relationships. Scant evidence for the success of such programs has accrued since. This has lead firms to re-evaluate their investments in customer relationship management. Optimal resource allocation models address issues of relative investments in customer acquisition versus retention, and on managing relationships with profitable customers so that the value of a firm's customer base is maximized.     

Acquisition mode and credit card overspending behavior: An empirical analysis of the credit card industry

Although credit card overspending behavior has become a critical societal concern with severe negative impacts on consumer welfare and economic stability, research on credit card overspending behavior remains fragmented and understudied. This study investigates new types of antecedents of credit card overspending behavior that are overlooked in the prior literature—the acquisition mode of credit card companies. Based on data set from a large commercial bank in China, this study measures credit card overspending behavior using consumption amount, cash withdrawal amount and overdueness, and suggests that gift acquisition has a positive effect on cash withdrawal amount and overdue probability as well as a negative effect on consumption amount. Furthermore, we find that this relationship could be weakened for female customers and for customers with higher education levels. This study provides theoretical implications for both the credit card overspending literature and customer acquisition literature. It also has important implications for consumer welfare and public policymaking.     

Targeting and salesforce compensation: When sales spill over to unprofitable customers

Quantitative Marketing and Economics - Targeting selling efforts towards profitable customers is widely known to increase sales and allow firms to charge higher prices. In this paper, we show that...     

Make me special: Gender differences in consumers’ responses to loyalty programs

Current literature on loyalty programs emphasizes the importance of psychological rewards and special treatment. However, it is not clear if male and female customers respond to these incentives in a similar way. We explore the differential effect for female versus male consumers of two psychological rewards that are provided through a loyalty program (a) high status (e.g., Gold membership), and (b) personalization, at different levels of visibility to other consumers. Across three experiments and a field study, we find a coherent pattern of gender differences in the way customers respond to different types of psychological rewards in the context of loyalty programs. The results show that men respond more positively than women to loyalty programs that emphasize status, but only when their higher status is highly visible to others. In contrast, women respond more positively than men to loyalty programs that emphasize personalization, but only for personalization in private settings. We discuss managerial implications for the design of loyalty programs.     

What else can your payment card do? Multifunctionality of payment modes can reduce payment transparency

Payment modes (e.g., cash vs. credit card) vary in the transparency of the outflow of money. Smartcards (multifunctional cards), which bundle payment with non-payment functions (e.g., loyalty programs, identification, and other information functions), have become an increasingly popular payment mode. This shift toward multifunctionality in payment modes is assumed to reduce payment transparency and consequently to decrease consumers’ recall accuracy of past expenditures. We employ a field study to examine recall accuracy for recent purchases with cash, a single-function card, and a multifunctional card. We find that recall accuracy is lower when using a single- or a multifunction card than cash. We also find that it is not the multifunctionality of the card that results in a higher recall error but the individual usage patterns: A higher usage frequency of the non-payment functions results in a higher recall error.     

Competing with loyalty: How to design successful customer loyalty reward programs

For industries with low switching costs, customer loyalty programs (LPs) have potential to drive differentiation and sustain a competitive advantage. However, incentives provided through LPs also have a potential to escalate into costly price wars. In this article, we discuss how to design successful customer loyalty reward programs that bring value to participants and that cannot be emulated by competitors easily. We focus on three distinct aspects of improvement: personalization, reward types, and additional services. Through personalization, companies can leverage the knowledge they already have on their customers to tailor offers that they find relevant and appealing. For the reward structure, we argue in favor of a certain degree of opacity. We also encourage loyalty programs to consider giveaways that are unique and difficult to imitate and to use all the information they have available to provide rewards that fit with each customers’ idiosyncratic situation or preference. Finally, competitive LPs should look beyond offers and rewards. In addition to purchases, LPs can reward participants for other desirable behaviors; they can also provide additional services that impose minimal costs on firms, but bring value to customers.     

Why offer lower prices to past customers? Inducing favorable social price comparisons to enhance customer retention

Price discrimination policies vary widely across companies. Some firms offer new customers the lowest price; others give preferential prices to their past customers. We contribute to the literature on price discrimination in behavior-based pricing by exploring how customers’ social price comparisons, i.e., comparing one’s price to that received by similar peers, impact the optimal structure of price discrimination. Social price comparisons have a negative (positive) impact on customers’ transaction utility if the price charged to past customers is higher (lower) than a new customer’s price. Using an analytical model with vertically differentiated firms, we show that a firm with relatively large market share will reward its past customers with relatively low prices when social price comparisons have a sufficiently large impact on utility. Furthermore, we find that social price comparisons lead to a relaxation of the price competition for new customers. Thus, both firms can earn higher profits when such comparisons are made than when they are absent. We also examine how other factors, such as horizontal competition and strategic customers, interact with social price comparison concerns to impact pricing strategies. Finally, we show how pricing behavior differs when price comparisons are based on historic reference prices rather than on peers’ prices.