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1.
Florence Naegelen 《Review of Economic Design》2002,7(2):135-153
In this paper, we consider the implementation of the optimal procurement auction outcome when there is a trade-off between
price and quality for the buyer. The quality proposals of the competing firms are assumed to be exogenous and common knowledge.
After defining the optimal auction, we characterize the discriminatory first score auction and the modified second score auction
implementing it when the buyer is assumed to have the same information as the firms. Then we consider an auction which requires
no specific information from the buyer and show that a second score auction followed by a negotiation stage can implement
the optimal auction outcome under this more realistic assumption.
Received: 30 March 2001 / Accepted: 14 December 2001
I am grateful to the anonymous referees for comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
2.
RJVs in product innovation and cartel stability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Abstract. We characterise the interplay between firms' decision in product development undertaken through a research joint venture
(RJV), and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. Participant firms in an RJV face a trade-off between saving the costs
of product innovation by developing similar products to one another, e.g., by sharing most of the basic components of their
products, and investing higher initial efforts in product innovation in order to develop more distinct products. We prove
that the more the firms' products are distinct and thus less substitutable, the easier their collusion is to sustain in the
marketing supergame, either in prices (Bertrand) or in quantities (Cournot). This gives rise to a non-monotone dependence
of firms' product portfolio upon their intertemporal preferences.
Received: 1 October 1998 / Accepted: 14 December 2002
We thank the seminar audience at Centre for Industrial Economics, University of Copenhagen, where all three authors were affiliated
at the time we presented the first draft of this paper, and also the two anonymous referees for Review of Economic Design for their detailed comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献
3.
Hans Gersbach 《Review of Economic Design》2002,7(1):45-56
Abstract. Many governmental programs are effective only if firms make costly investments. The inability of authorities to precommit
to a regulatory scheme creates incentives for firms not to invest and to hold-up the regulator. This paper describes a simple
subsidy/tax scheme embedded in a four-stage mechanism that solves the hold-up problem. We design a self-financing subsidy/tax
scheme which benefits a complying firm at the expense of a non-complying firm. In order to be credible, the subsidy
and tax rates must maximize social welfare for any combination of investment decisions. We show that there exists a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium in which all firms invest and no actual implementation with subsidies and taxes is required. We
discuss in which cases the mechanism can work under incomplete information.
Received: 30 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 October 2001 相似文献
4.
Auctions with endogenous participation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their
values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction
since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first-
and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium
where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions
generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature,
the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that
it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions
with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse.
Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct
revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal
to the participation cost.
Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999 相似文献
5.
The paper examines the influence of altruism on voluntary transfers and government redistribution in a simple model: two
jobs of different productivity are assigned by chance to two individuals. Ex ante the individuals are identical, ex post they
have different incomes. The first part of the paper examines voluntary transfers determined ex post or agreed upon ex ante
in the absence of altruism. In the second part, the influence of altruism is examined. Altruism is modelled as a pure public
good: the minimum consumption (or income, since there is only one consumption good). Both individuals can contribute to its
provision, one person by earning wage income, the other by voluntary transfers. The ex ante solutions generally lead to higher
expected welfare but create several incentive problems. Only lump-sum transfers are considered.
Received: 28 February 1997 / Accepted: 31 January 2000 相似文献
6.
Michael Peters 《Review of Economic Design》1999,4(3):273-292
A competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have private information
about their own private use value for the commodity being traded. In addition the commodity has a common value to all buyers,
perhaps represented by the future resale value of the commodity. A competitive equilibrium in mechanisms is described. In
every such equilibrium it is shown that sellers must offer mechanisms that are allocationally equivalent to English ascending
price auctions. The reservation prices that sellers set are shown to be below their ex post cost of trading the commodity.
Received: 24 April 1998 / Accepted: 8 March 1999 相似文献
7.
This paper analyses the effects of taxation and subsidies in an economy with private provision of a public good. It is shown
that in a situation where all individuals contribute, taxation affects the equilibrium allocation if and only if at least
one individual's voluntary contribution to the public good has an impact on the aggregate tax payments of the others. We then
consider linear nonneutral tax-subsidy schemes and analyse efficiency and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibria. We
show that an efficient Nash equilibrium, where all individuals contribute, will in general not be unique, and establish a
non-uniformity property which a tax-subsidy scheme must fulfil in order to induce a unique interior equilibrium that is efficient.
Throughout the paper it is assumed that individuals fully understand and take into account the government's budget constraint.
Received: 3 November 1997 / Accepted: 23 March 1999 相似文献
8.
Sandro Brusco 《Review of Economic Design》1998,3(3):271-300
In this paper we consider the problem of a principal with many agents who desires to implement a given action profile. Agents observe the actions taken by their colleagues, and this information can be exploited by the principal. Sufficient conditions for implementation under various informational structures are provided. Received: 6 April 1996 / Accepted: 19 April 1998 相似文献
9.
This paper analyzes the formation of cartels of buyers and sellers in a simple model of trade inspired by Rubinstein and
Wolinsky's (1990) bargaining model. When cartels are formed only on one side of the market, there is at most one stable cartel
size. When cartels are formed sequentially on the two sides of the market, there is also at most one stable cartel configuration.
Under bilateral collusion, buyers and sellers form cartels of equal sizes, and the cartels formed are smaller than under unilateral
collusion. Both the buyers' and sellers' cartels choose to exclude only one trader from the market. This result suggests that
there are limits to bilateral collusion, and that the threat of collusion on one side of the market does not lead to increased
collusion on the other side. 相似文献
10.
We show that recent developments in hedonic pricing theory allow modeling of the equilibrium pricing function as the marginal cost of an additional housing unit plus a markup that varies inversely with the elasticity of demand. Useful information about demand elasticity at a given point on the envelope function can be recovered from the hedonic regression and limited information on marginal costs. In particular, the elasticity of the envelope with respect to any characteristic such as interior area provides information on the elasticity of demand. Relative price elasticities (i.e., elasticities that vary from a base value in a known way with interior area, unit type or neighborhood characteristics) can be computed from the elasticity of the hedonic envelope. Like Yinger (2010), our method is based on a single hedonic equation.We test our method using sales of new high rise condominiums in two districts within Shenzhen, China: Futian and Longgang. The results strongly confirm the main hypothesis of this paper: price elasticity with respect to size is increasing for more complex types of units. Together with estimates of marginal costs of production, these results imply that relative demand elasticity is declining for larger, more complex units. 相似文献
11.
We propose a simple liability rule when several agents are jointly responsible for monitoring a risky economic activity or
certifying its security. Examples are safety controls for drugs or technical systems, environmental liability, or air safety
accidents. The agents have private knowledge of their monitoring or avoidance costs. We adopt a mechanism design approach
to ensure optimal monitoring incentives. Our innovation is to focus on information that is available or can be proxied when
harm has occurred and when typically regulators and/or courts deliberate over fines and damages. By contrast, earlier proposals
require more estimations of hypothetical accident scenarios and their ex ante probabilities. We argue that our rule promises
substantial savings in information costs for courts and regulators and excludes likely sources of errors.
Received: 11 October 2000 / Accepted: 14 September 2001
We are grateful to Doug Bernheim, Lewis Kornhauser, Kai-Uwe Kühn and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and discussions,
and to an associate editor in particular for very valuable suggestions. Financial support from the European Commission (TMR
Grant ERBFMBICT 972827) and from Thyssen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
12.
Gopal Das Varma 《Review of Economic Design》2002,7(2):155-171
This paper examines whether the seller of an object should reveal the identities of the participating bidders before bids
become due. It is shown that when bidders experience identity dependent externalities and auction participation is exogenous,
then for a large class of standard auction mechanisms, a policy of revelation serves to realize a higher surplus because it
improves the accuracy of each bidder's estimate of her ex-post willingness-to-pay, and therefore changes the auction allocation
in a more ex-post efficient manner. Furthermore, it is shown that the policy of revelation increases both the expected seller
revenues as well as ex-ante expected bidder payoffs.
Received: 4 February 2000 / Accepted: 15 November 2000
An earlier version of this paper had the title 'Disclosure of Bidder Identities'. I thank an anonymous referee and an Associate
Editor for suggestions that improved the paper. I also acknowledge comments made by participants of the Auctions session during
the North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society 2001 held in New Orleans. I remain solely responsible for any
errors. 相似文献
13.
This paper analyses multi-period regulation or procurement policies under asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated firms. As well known in the literature, some degree of separation is always optimal under any form of commitment. In contrast, we show that full pooling is optimal under noncommitment when the discount factor is sufficiently high. We also discuss the meaning of full pooling under double randomization. Finally, we provide a graphical analysis of the second-best policy in terms of the regulator's commitment capacity. Received: 4 December 1996 / 7 October 1999 相似文献
14.
Domenico Menicucci 《Review of Economic Design》2000,5(1):59-70
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that if one seller and one buyer have independent private valuations for an indivisible object then no individually rational and incentive compatible trading mechanism can guarantee ex post efficiency when gains from trade are uncertain. Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) show that this is not the case when there are at least two buyers. In the latter context, if the highest possible seller's valuation is not too large, we provide an ex post efficient mechanism in which the mechanism designer and the agents are not required to know the probability distribution for the seller's valuation. Received: February 18, 1998 / Accepted: September 10, 1999 相似文献
15.
Antoni Calvó-Armengol 《Review of Economic Design》2003,7(4):411-428
Abstract. We examine a bargaining game among players connected by a network, where successively potential partners negotiate over terms
of a project. For any network structure and ordering of selection of bargaining partners, there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome which coincides with the standard Rubinstein split. Based on this, we derive expected payoffs for players
as a function of the network. We the characterize the pairwise stable and efficient bargaining networks. These two sets do
not always coincide and in many situations pairwise stable networks are over-connected.
Received: 10 April 2001 / Accepted: 17 January 2002
I am indebted to Matthew Jackson for suggesting this paper. I also thank Bernard Caillaud, Sanjeev Goyal, and the seminar
participants at Universidad de Alicante, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, CEMFI (Madrid), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,
Erasmus University of Rotterdam, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) and CERAS (Paris) for helpful comments. This paper was
written while at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CERAS. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through research
grant DGESIC PB96-0302, and from the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Paris is gratefully acknowledged. All errors
are of course mine. 相似文献
16.
Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory? 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
There has been much discussion of the relative merits of selling government bonds using a uniform-price auction rather than
the traditional discriminatory-price auction. Arguments in favor of the former have won the day in respect of the newly instituted
auctions of index-linked bonds in the USA and UK. This short paper assesses the evidence and concludes that the advantages
of uniform-price auctions have been oversold.
Received: 28 May 1999 / Accepted: 27 September 1999 相似文献
17.
Ryuichi Yamamoto 《Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control》2011,35(11):1938-1963
Recent empirical research has documented that the state of the limit order book influences stock investors' strategies. Investors place more aggressive orders when the same side of the order book is thicker, and less aggressive orders when it is thinner. We conjecture and demonstrate that this behavior is related to long memories of trading volume, volatility, and order signs in stock markets. We investigate our conjecture in two types of artificial stock markets: a transparent market, in which agents observe all limit orders on both sides of the book and order volumes at those prices before they trade; and a less transparent market, in which agents observe only the best five bid and ask quotes with the depth available at these limit prices. The first market structure resembles certain actual stock exchanges in the level of pre-trade transparency, such as the Australian Stock Exchange, NYSE OpenBook, and the London Stock Exchange, whereas the second market structure is consistent with stock exchanges such as Euronext Paris, the Toronto Stock Exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing. We demonstrate that our long memory results are robust with different levels of pre-trade transparency, implying that the strategy constructed by the state of the order book is key for explaining long memories in many actual stock exchanges. 相似文献
18.
In situations of imperfect testing and communication, as suggested by Sah and Stiglitz (AER, 1986), organizational forms
can be identified with different rules of aggregating evaluations of individual screening units. In this paper, we discuss
the relative merits of polyarchical organizations versus hierarchical organizations in evaluating cost-reducing R&D projects
when individual units' decision thresholds are fully endogenous. Contrary to the results of Sah and Stiglitz, we find that
the relative merit of an organizational form depends on the curvature of the screening functions of the individual evaluation
units. We find that for certain parameters organizations would want to implement asymmetric decision rules across screening
units. This allows us to derive sufficient conditions for a polyarchy to dominate a hierarchy. We also find conditions for
which the cost curves associated with the two organizational forms cross each other. In this case the optimal organizational
form will depend on product market conditions and on the “lumpiness” of cost-reducing R&D. 相似文献
19.
Profit centers in a firm in multidivisional form agree in the ex ante stage upon a plan about their joint production and profit imputation. The plan is executed in the subsequent two periods of the interim stage: the setup period and the manufacturing period. In the setup period, each center has its private information, but a part of its information is revealed to the other centers through its action. Based on the information endogenously pooled this way, the centers take another round of actions in the manufacturing period. A core plan is defined as a Bayesian incentive-compatible plan of the grand coalition of profit centers, upon which no coalition can improve using its Bayesian incentive-compatible plan. A core plan is called full-information revealing if each center fully reveals its private information in the setup period. Three existence theorems for a full-information revealing core plan are established. The first two theorems impose alternative conditions on returns to scale: (1) the neoclassical convex technology, and (2) increasing returns to scale. In case (2), a stronger condition than Scarf's distributiveness is imposed on the total production set. The third theorem is based on a specific supplier-customer relationship among the divisions. Received: 13 October 1997 / Accepted: 26 July 1999 相似文献
20.
The focus of this paper is to characterize regulatory mechanisms for natural monopolies to provide for optimal technical progress when information is asymmetric. We model a Bayesian-Nash game where the monopolist has private knowledge of the cost-reducing effects of R&D investment to generate process innovations. In the first case, a price-regulated, profit-maximizing firm whose R&D level is unobservable sets its R&D level efficiently to maximize profits at the output level chosen by the firm. However, the level of technical progress achieved by the firm in this case is too high from the regulator's point of view since, in the second-best regulated solution of interest, the regulator has to provide for the R&D expenditures, assumed sunk, as well as for information rents transferred to the firm. In a second case, it can be shown that if the regulator can observe and set limits on the firm's investment in R&D, social welfare is improved, even though the regulated investment level is no longer efficient at the output level chosen by the firm. The reason for the welfare improvement is that losses in consumer surplus due to a decrease in output and an increase in the price are offset by a decrease in information rents and R&D costs transferred, causing the social costs of public funds to fall. Received: 31 July 1994 / Accepted: 15 January 1999 相似文献