Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts, Earnings Uncertainty, and Stock Returns

In this study we examine the association among confirming management forecasts, stock prices, and analyst expectations. Confirming management forecasts are voluntary disclosures by management that corroborate existing market expectations about future earnings. This study provides evidence that these voluntary disclosures affect stock prices and the dispersion of analyst expectations. Specifically, we find that the market's reaction to confirming forecasts is significantly positive, indicating that benefits accrue to firms that disclose such forecasts. In addition, although we find no significant change in the mean consensus forecasts (a proxy for earnings expectations) around the confirming forecast date, evidence indicates a significant reduction in the mean and median consensus analyst dispersion (a proxy for earnings uncertainty). Finally, we document a positive association between the reduction of dispersion of analysts' forecasts and the magnitude of the stock market response. Overall, the evidence suggests that confirming forecasts reduce uncertainty about future earnings and that investors price this reduction of uncertainty.     

Do higher value firms voluntarily disclose more information? Evidence from China

This paper examines the effect of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure of information about new investment projects in China's institutional setting. We find a negative relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure for firms that rely heavily on guanxi in their value creation (e.g. non-high-tech firms, and firms located in regions with underdeveloped institutions). By contrast, for firms that rely less heavily on guanxi and more on other sources of core competencies (e.g. high-tech firms, and firms in high-marketisation regions), we find a positive relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure. The moderating role of guanxi on the relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure is explained by firms conscientiously balancing the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure relative to guanxi. Specifically, high guanxi-dependence firms refrain from detailed voluntary disclosures for fear of revealing sensitive information that may harm their guanxi. In contrast, low guanxi-dependence firms rely more heavily on voluntary disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and financing cost, with such incentives being particularly strong for high value firms. Our evidence has implications for research on motives for disclosure and regulation of financial reporting.     

Voluntary disclosures and information production by analysts

We analyze the voluntary disclosure decision of a manager when analysts scrutinize the quality of disclosure. We derive an equilibrium in which managers voluntarily disclose unfavorable information only if sufficiently precise, but disclose favorable news with lower levels of accuracy. We show that analysts cover good news disclosures with higher scrutiny. To the extent analysts rely on mandatory financial reports to interpret voluntary disclosures, we show that more precise financial reports may lead to more precise but less frequent voluntary disclosures. Moreover, a slant toward conservatism in financial reports can lead to less precise yet more frequent voluntary disclosures.     

Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform

In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission enacted the Securities Offering Reform (Reform), which relaxes “gun‐jumping” restrictions, thereby allowing firms to more freely disclose information before equity offerings. We examine the effect of the Reform on voluntary disclosure behavior before equity offerings and the associated economic consequences. We find that firms provide significantly more preoffering disclosures after the Reform. Further, we find that these preoffering disclosures are associated with a decrease in information asymmetry and a reduction in the cost of raising equity capital. Our findings not only inform the debate on the market effect of the Reform, but also speak to the literature on the relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry by examining the effect of quasi‐exogenous changes in voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry, and thus a firm's cost of capital.     

Downlistings in European exchange-regulated markets: The role of enforcement

This paper investigates the potential role of enforcement action in shaping firms’ decisions to opt out of highly regulated stock market regimes. Our analyses are set in the German environment, where firms may choose to “downlist” from an EU-regulated to an exchange-regulated stock market, thereby circumvent mandatory preparation of IFRS financial statements and enforcement oversight. We find that downlisting firms are more likely to have been censured by enforcement bodies for erroneous accounting, compared to a sample of control firms, and that this association is more pronounced for severe or controversial errors. This finding is consistent with enforcement actions creating costs for firms and managers. Event study analyses show that market price reactions to firms’ downlisting announcements are negative in about one out of two cases. This suggests that in quite a few cases, managers, by downlisting, may be protecting private benefits rather than the interests of equity holders. Additional analyses reveals that about half of our sample firms continued to prepare IFRS financial statements on a voluntary basis after the downlisting. Taken together, our results contribute to the literature on the economic consequences of the EU’s IAS and enforcement regulation by suggesting that some firms adopt avoidance strategies to opt out of enforcement supervision.     

Proprietary Costs and the Disclosure of Information About Customers

In deciding how much information about their firms’ customers to disclose, managers face a trade off between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry with capital market participants and the costs of aiding competitors by revealing proprietary information. This paper investigates the determinants of managers’ choices to disclose information about their firms’ customers using a comprehensive data set of customer‐information disclosures over the period 1976–2006. We find robust evidence in support of the hypothesis that proprietary costs are an important factor in firms’ disclosure choices regarding information about large customers.     

Unionization,product market competition,and strategic disclosure

We examine the disclosure policies of non-unionized firms operating in unionized industries. We test the hypothesis that non-unionized firms have an incentive to disclose more information when their unionized rivals are engaged in labor renegotiations; that is, to weaken them. We find that non-unionized firms disclose more information and more good news when renegotiations are ongoing. This behavior is stronger for larger firms, firms with fewer peers in the industry, and firms more similar to their renegotiating rivals. We also find some evidence that unionized firms are harmed by this behavior and that non-unionized firms benefit from their increased disclosures.     

Voluntary disclosures of intangibles information by U.S.-listed Asian companies

This paper provides evidence on the voluntary disclosure of intangibles information for U.S.-listed Asian companies. The paper examines the following issues: (1) the effect of firm size, ownership concentration, proportion of foreign revenue, and leverage on voluntary disclosures of intangibles information by U.S.-listed Asian companies; and (2) the use of international standards, and the effect of domestic and global culture on those disclosures. Results indicate that larger firms, firms with greater ownership dispersion, and firms with lower leverage provide more voluntary disclosure of intangibles information. The paper also documents that companies from countries that are more individualistic provide more voluntary disclosure of intangibles information than companies from countries that are collectivist. Therefore, it appears that domestic culture does affect the voluntary disclosure of intangibles information in the U.S. This paper uses the index developed for Portuguese companies by Oliveira, Rodrigues, and Craig (2006), to measure voluntary disclosures of intangibles information thereby providing external validity to their instrument.     

Management earnings forecasts and other forward-looking statements

We identify forward-looking statements (FLS) in firms’ disclosures to distinguish between “forecast-like” (quantitative statements about earnings) and “other”, or non-forecast-like, FLS.  We show that, like earnings forecasts, other FLS generate significant investor and analyst responses. Unlike earnings forecasts, other FLS are issued more frequently when uncertainty is higher. We then show that earnings-related FLS are more sensitive to uncertainty than quantitative statements, suggesting that managers are more likely to alter the content than the form of FLS when uncertainty is higher.  Our study indicates that incorporating other FLS into empirical measures provides a more comprehensive proxy for firms’ voluntary disclosures.     

The usefulness of firm risk disclosures under different firm riskiness,investor-interest,and market conditions: New evidence from Finland

To date, there is only meager research evidence on the usefulness of mandatory annual report risk disclosures to investors. Although it has been argued that corporate disclosure decreases information asymmetry between management and shareholders, we do not know whether investors benefit from high-quality risk reporting in a highly regulated risk disclosure environment. In this paper, we performed association tests to examine whether the quality of firms' mandatory risk disclosures relate to information asymmetry in the Finnish stock markets. In addition, we analyzed whether the usefulness of risk disclosures depends on contingency factors such as firm riskiness, investor interest, and market condition. We demonstrate that the quality of risk disclosure has a direct negative influence on information asymmetry. We also document that risk disclosures are more useful if they are provided by small firms, high tech firms, and firms with low analyst coverage. We also found that momentum in stock markets affects the relevance of firms' risk reports.     

The effect of stock-based incentives and governance mechanisms on voluntary disclosure of intangibles

The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of stock-based incentives in encouraging more voluntary disclosures about firm-specific intangibles. I also examine whether corporate governance, previously found to be related to voluntary disclosures, is a complement to or substitute for stock-based incentives. Using content analysis of annual reports of a sample of high-tech firms, I find that stock-based incentives are positively associated with firms' voluntary disclosures about intangibles. With regard to the effect of governance mechanisms, I find that corporate governance does not have a relationship with disclosures when stock-based incentives are low. On the other hand, better governance will strengthen the positive effect of stock-based incentives on disclosures, suggesting that governance and incentives mechanisms are complements instead of substitutes. The results also show that this complementary effect primarily results from the internal monitoring provided by the board of directors.     

The effect of conference calls on equity incentives: An empirical investigation

Conference calls have become increasingly common in recent years, yet there is little empirical evidence regarding the effect of conference calls on executive compensation. In this study, we examine the effect of voluntary disclosures on equity incentives. We hypothesize that voluntary disclosures, as measured by conference calls, affect executive compensation contracts. Using a dataset of 6263 firm-year observations from both conference call and non-conference call firms, our results are consistent with the argument that the board of directors substitutes voluntary disclosures for more costly corporate governance mechanisms. Alternatively, in firms where CEOs have less equity incentives, the owners demand more voluntary disclosures. The results of this study should be of great importance to executives and capital market participants internationally, such as investors and analysts, since we provide evidence that conference calls affect incentive based compensation contracts, which were shown in prior studies to be value relevant.     

Voluntary disclosure practices by foreign firms cross-listed in the United States

This is one of the first large-scale studies to examine the voluntary disclosure practices of foreign firms cross-listed in the United States. We proxy for voluntary disclosure using three attributes of firms’ management earnings guidance: (1) the likelihood of issuance; (2) the frequency of earnings guidance; and (3) a guidance quality measure. After first establishing that market participants view these firms’ disclosures as credible and economically important (i.e., the disclosures are negatively related to analyst forecast errors and the implied cost of equity capital), we compare cross-listed firms’ disclosure practices with comparable US firms and explore variations in disclosure practices among cross-listed firms. We find that cross-listed firms issue less frequent and lower quality management earnings guidance than comparable US firms. We further show that the gap between US and cross-listed firms widened after passage of Regulation FD, a regulation which induced greater public disclosure of firm-specific information. Focusing on the sample of cross-listing firms, we show that firms from common-law countries disclose more than firms from code-law countries. Finally, our results indicate that cross-listed firms that do not list on an organized US exchange provide more frequent and higher quality disclosure than those that do list on organized exchanges.     

The impact of country institutional factors on firm disclosure: Cybersecurity disclosures in Chinese cross-listed firms

This paper explores differences in qualitative disclosures between Chinese firms that cross-list in the US and their US domestic counterparts that reflect firm-level cybersecurity awareness. Consistent with the strong regulatory framework in China externalizing cybersecurity and thus reducing the need to disclose individual company cybersecurity awareness, we find that relative to their US domestic counterparts, Chinese cross-listed firms in the US provide less cybersecurity disclosure. However, market valuation of these cybersecurity disclosures is higher for Chinese cross-listed firms, suggesting that the market more favorably views Chinese firm disclosures that communicate a greater level of internalized cybersecurity awareness. We also explore the effect of institutional setting on market valuation of cybersecurity awareness through an event study surrounding the arrest of Huawei’s CFO. This event highlighted cybersecurity weaknesses at Huawei, potentially more generally challenging the effectiveness of Chinese cybersecurity policies. We find a negative stock market reaction to the event, but only for our Chinese sample. These results provide evidence that the market’s view of company cybersecurity awareness is sensitive to changes in perceptions of companies’ institutional setting.     

Peer R&D disclosure and corporate innovation: Evidence from American depositary receipt firms

In this paper, we examine the effect of peer research and development (R&D) disclosures on corporate innovation. R&D disclosures can generate externalities for related firms, enabling those firms to better infer a project's likely payoffs and thus prioritize projects with higher net present values. We use a sample of foreign firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges to investigate whether U.S. peer firms experience externalities from the cross-listing firm's R&D disclosures. We find that R&D disclosures by cross-listing firms are associated with greater innovation for industry peers in the U.S. market, especially when product market competition is high. The effect also varies with the home country's legal protection systems, disclosure environments, and accounting reporting rules. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that the externalities are more pronounced in industries or firms that rely more on external financing and firms subject to higher financial constraints; disclosures of higher quality appear to promote innovation by ameliorating financing frictions. Overall, this study provides evidence of R&D disclosure as an industry-wide determinant of innovation, thereby contributing to literature on the real effects of peer disclosures.     

Voluntary fair value disclosures beyond SFAS 157’s three-level estimates

Some firms voluntarily make disclosures about the controls and processes in place to ensure the reliability of fair value estimates. Consistent with these disclosures being driven by investors’ concerns about the reliability of their SFAS 157 estimates, we find that firms with more opaque estimates are more likely to provide such disclosures. We then examine whether these disclosures improve investors’ perception about the reliability of fair value estimates. We find that they are associated with higher market pricing and lower information risk for Level 3 estimates. Further analyses of the disclosures reveal that the following types of information are particularly important to investors: discussion of the external and independent pricing of fair value estimates and their proper classification according to the SFAS 157 hierarchy. Overall, our results suggest that the voluntary reliability disclosures that firms provide beyond SFAS 157’s three-level estimates help reduce investors’ uncertainty toward the more opaque fair value estimates.     

Do Economic Incentives of Controlling Shareholders Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure? A Natural Experiment

We evaluate whether voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is influenced by the economic incentives of controlling shareholders. To examine this research question, we apply the natural experiment setting based on the Split Share Structure Reform in China. Following this Reform, Chinese state shareholders are allowed to trade their shares in the stock market, which increases their incentives to maximize the market value of the firms that they control. We present empirical evidence of increased CSR disclosure among listed state-owned enterprises after this Reform. This evidence suggests that the economic incentives of key stakeholders are associated with voluntary CSR disclosures.     

Risk reporting quality: implications of academic research for financial reporting policy

In this paper, I survey empirical research on the relevance of firms’ financial report information for the evaluation of their risk. I recommend that financial reporting policymakers require or encourage firms to enhance their risk reporting quality in four ways. First, firms should report comprehensive income statements that: (1) use fair value or a similarly information-rich accounting measurement attribute and (2) separate the components of comprehensive income that are primarily driven by variation in cash flows from those that are primarily driven by variation in costs of capital. Such comprehensive income statements would provide users of financial reports with the flexibility to calculate alternative summary accounting numbers and to perform different types of risk assessment analyses. Second, firms should conduct and disclose the results of back-tests of prior significant accrual estimates, indicating any identified trends in and drivers of revisions to those estimates, and describing the effects of those revisions on current or future summary accounting numbers. Third, firms should aggregate and present risk disclosures in tabular or other well-structured formats that promote the usability of the information. Identifying existing best disclosure practices and encouraging new best practices are the most natural way to do this. Fourth, for model-dependent risk disclosures, firms should disclose the primary historical and forward-looking attributes of the models and their implementation in practice, sensitivity of the model outputs, and benchmarking of the models to standard portfolios of exposures.     

Global warming, commitment to the Kyoto protocol, and accounting disclosures by the largest global public firms from polluting industries

This study evaluates disclosures on pollution and greenhouse gases by firms domiciled in countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol compared to others. The study is based on disclosures made in the annual reports, environmental reports, and websites of 120 of the largest (in terms of revenues) public firms from the chemical, oil and gas, energy, and motor vehicles and casualty insurance industries. The study uses content analysis to construct weighted and unweighted disclosure indices.The results show that firms from countries that ratified the Protocol have higher disclosure indexes as compared to firms in other countries. Additionally, larger firms disclose more detailed pollution information. Multinational firms that operate in countries that ratified the Protocol but have their home offices in countries that did not are associated with lower disclosures. This lack of consistency in disclosure is not likely to be helpful in informing shareholders about the social responsibility of their investments.