EVA, ACCOUNTING PROFITS, AND CEO TURNOVER: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION, 1985–1994

A growing number of companies use EVA or related measures of economic profits as metrics for corporate planning and executive compensation. Unlike traditional accounting measures of performance, EVA attempts to measure the value that firms create or destroy by subtracting a capital charge from the cash returns they generate on invested capital. For this reason, EVA is seen by its proponents as providing the most reliable year-to-year indicator of a market based performance measure known as market value added, or MVA. Although EVA and MVA have received considerable attention in recent years, there has been little empirical study of these performance measures—and what studies have been produced have provided mixed results. This study joins the debate over EVA vs. conventional accounting measures by asking a different question: Which performance measures do the best job of explaining not only stock returns, but the probability that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance? Using a sample of 452 firms during the period 1985–1994, the authors report that EVA has a somewhat stronger correlation with stock price performance than conventional accounting measures such as ROE and ROA. But, of greater import, EVA appears to be a considerably more reliable indicator of CEO turnover than conventional accounting measures.     

HOW TO FIX ACCOUNTING—MEASURE AND REPORT ECONOMIC PROFIT

Bending accounting rules has become so ingrained in our corporate culture that even ethical business leaders succumb to the temptation to “manage” their earnings in order to meet analysts' demands for smoothly rising results. The author of this article argues that such behavior reflects not a general decline in ethical standards so much as executives' growing sense that accounting itself has become “unhinged from value.” For example, clearly valuable expenditures on R&D, customer acquisition, and employee training are generally expensed immediately against earnings. And reported corporate income is often further reduced by provisions for losses that most companies never expect to incur, by “book” taxes they never expect to pay, and by depreciation charges on assets that are actually increasing in value. At the same time, the opportunity costs associated with employee stock options and the corporate use of equity capital are not reflected in the accountant's measure of profit. To improve the quality of corporate governance and revitalize the public's faith in reported earnings, the author proposes a complete overhaul of GAAP accounting to measure and report economic profit, or EVA. Stated in brief, the author's concept of economic profit begins with an older, but now seldom used, definition of accounting income known as “residual income,” and then proposes a series of additional adjustments to GAAP accounting that are designed to produce a reliable measure of a company's annual, sustainable cash‐generating capacity. Besides expensing the cost of equity capital as well as stock options, the author recommends bringing off‐balance‐sheet items such as pension assets and liabilities back onto the balance sheet, eliminating reserve accounting, capitalizing R&D and other expenditures on intangible assets, and recording economic rather than accounting depreciation. Such changes, by replacing the accountants' current flawed definition of earnings with a comprehensive new statement of value added, could restore investor confidence in financial statements. Even more important, managers would be less likely to pursue their now common practice of boosting earnings by making value‐reducing operating and investment decisions and more likely to use financial reporting not to mislead the market but as an opportunity to communicate relevant, forward‐looking information.     

GOLBALIZATION, CORPORATE FINANCE, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL

International financial markets are progressively becoming one huge, integrated, global capital market—a development that is contributing to higher stock prices in developed as well as developing economies. For companies that are large and visible enough to attract global investors, having a global shareholder base means having a lower cost of capital and hence a greater equity value for two main reasons: First, because the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks, equity market risk premiums should fall for all companies in countries with access to global markets. Although the largest reductions in cost of capital resulting from globalization will be experienced by companies in liberalizing economies that are gaining access to the global markets for the first time, risk premiums can also be expected to fall for firms in long-integrated markets as well. Second, when firms in countries with less-developed capital markets raise capital in the public markets of countries (like the U.S.) with highly developed markets, they get more than lower-cost capital; they also import at least aspects of the corporate governance systems that prevail in those markets. For companies accustomed to less-developed markets, raising capital overseas is likely to mean that more sophisticated investors, armed with more advanced technologies, will participate in monitoring their performance and management. And, in a virtuous cycle, more effective monitoring increases investor confidence in the future performance of those companies and so improves the terms on which they raise capital. Besides reducing market risk premiums and improving corporate governance, globalization also affects the systematic risk, or “beta,” of individual companies. In global markets, the beta of a firm's equity depends on how the stock contributes to the volatility not of the home market portfolio, but of the world market portfolio. For companies with access to global capital markets whose profitability is tied more closely to the local than to the global economy, use of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will overstate the cost of capital because risks that are not diversifiable within a national economy can be diversified by holding a global portfolio. Thus, to reflect the new reality of a globally determined cost of capital, all companies with access to global markets should consider using a global CAPM that views a company as part of the global portfolio of stocks. In making this argument, the article reviews the growing body of academic studies that provide evidence of the predictive power of the global CAPM as well as the reduction in world risk premiums.     

Legal Institutions,Ownership Concentration,and Stock Repurchases Around the World: Signal Mimicking?

One of the central puzzles of signaling theory is how to assess signal quality, in particular the potential for signal mimicking. Our study provides evidence of signal mimicking in the context of stock repurchases. Employing an ex-ante proxy for the likelihood of mimicking stock repurchases and data on open market stock repurchases from 30 countries, we find that long-term operating and market performance following stock repurchases improve less for suspected mimicking firms. This finding contradicts the conventional characterization that managers use stock repurchases to signal undervaluation and enhanced future performance. We find that mimicking firms have smaller capital investments, need greater external financing, buy back fewer shares, and issue more new shares (and/or resell more treasury shares) in the year of the repurchase. Our analysis further shows that mimicking is more likely in countries with weak investor protections and in firms with higher ownership concentration. Further, mimicking associated with concentrated ownership is mitigated in countries with stronger investor protections and by the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Altogether, our findings provide evidence of signal mimicking in stock repurchases in international data that is influenced by market, ownership, legal, and financial reporting characteristics of countries.     

Individual investors’ attitudes towards listing requirements for foreign entities on U.S. stock exchanges and the promulgation of international accounting standards

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) currently requires foreign issuers of securities listed on U.S. securities exchanges to either employ U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP) or include a statement of reconciliation to U.S. GAAP if they use their home country's accounting standards. With some exceptions, they are also required to comply with the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA). John Thain, CEO of the New York Stock Exchange, states that these requirements hamper U.S. investments, economic growth, and employment opportunities. The Chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), Sir David Tweedie, echoed Thain's comments. An important stakeholder who is affected significantly by the U.S. listing requirements is the U.S. individual investor. Accordingly this study examines their attitudes involving the extant rules for foreign listings on U.S. exchanges and other aspects of the issue. The study also examines their perceptions regarding accounting standard promulgation authority and the use of a global set of accounting principles. The results indicate that although U.S. investors are very much in favor of the listing of foreign companies on U.S. exchanges, they also endorse the current rule requiring either employment of U.S. GAAP or reconciliation to it as well as mandatory adherence to the SOA. In the area of accounting standards, although a large majority believed that the U.S. should control the accounting standards for U.S. listings, a smaller majority also believed that there should be a universal set of accounting principles for all stock exchanges.     

PERHAPS EVA DOES BEAT EARNINGS—REVISITING PREVIOUS EVIDENCE

In two articles, the first published in 1997 in the Journal of Accounting and Economics and the second in 1999 in this journal, Gary Biddle, Robert Bowen, and James Wallace presented evidence that reported earnings are more closely related than EVA to marketadjusted stock returns– in other words, that earnings are more “value relevant” than EVA. These papers, which are among the most widely cited in finance and accounting, fundamentally affected perceptions about the importance of EVA as a measure of corporate performance. The current article addresses a simple question: Do the Biddle, Bowen, and Wallace results continue to hold for a different set of companies, a different time period, and a different market? The authors first examined updated EVA information for different companies in the same time period examined in the Biddle, Bowen, and Wallace study. They then looked at a more recent time period (1995–1999) and a different market (the Canadian stock market), and found in all cases that “EVA has greater power than earnings in explaining marketadjusted stock returns.” Their findings validate the widespread corporate acceptance of EVA as a management tool.     

IAS Versus U.S. GAAP: Assessing the Quality of Financial Reporting in South Africa,the United Kingdom,and the United States

In this study, we investigate whether financial reporting, using International Accounting Standards (IAS) results in quality disclosures, given differences in institutional and market forces across legal jurisdictions. This study contributes to the global accounting debate by utilizing U.S.-based companies complying with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) as a benchmark for measuring the quality of IAS as applied by South Africa (S.A.) and United Kingdom (U.K.) companies. Although South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States are common law countries with strong investor protection, South Africa's institutional factors and market forces vary from that of the U.K. and the U.S. South Africa's financial market is less developed than that of the U.K. and the U.S. We compare the discretionary accruals of firms complying with U.S. GAAP to the discretionary accruals of U.K. and S.A. firms complying with IAS. This allows a comparison between companies (S.A. and U.K.) operating under different institutional factors and market forces that have adopted IAS versus U.S. companies that report under U.S. GAAP. Our sample, consisting of U.S., S.A., and U.K. listed firms, contains 3,166 firm-year observations relating to the period 1999–2001. The results of our study indicate that S.A firms utilizing IAS report absolute values of discretionary accruals that are significantly greater than absolute values of discretionary accruals of U.S. firms utilizing U.S. GAAP. In contrast, U.K. firms utilizing IAS report discretionary accruals that are significantly less than the discretionary accruals of companies in the United States reporting under U.S. GAAP. This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the quality of financial information prepared under IAS and its dependency on the institutional factors and market forces of a country.     

管理者短视偏差对企业投资行为影响研究——一个基于股东短期利益压力视角的实证

基于股东短期利益压力的视角,以沪深两市2003～2009年间的A股上市公司为对象,采用多元回归分析就管理者短视偏差与企业短期投资间的关系及其对企业未来盈利能力、业绩水平和财务困境的影响进行研究。实证结果表明,管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资水平越高;管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资对企业未来盈利能力和业绩水平的削弱作用越强,意味着管理者短视偏差企业进行的短期投资降低了企业未来盈利能力和业绩水平;管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资对企业当期陷入财务困境可能性的削弱作用越弱,说明管理者短视偏差企业进行的短期投资虽然增大了企业风险,但是并不会加大企业当期陷入财务困境的可能性。     

Industry policy,investor sentiment,and cross-industry capital flow: Evidence from Chinese listed companies’ cross-industry M&As

This study investigates how the government’s industry policies affect investor sentiment, and whether the influenced investor sentiment guides corporate capital flow in the real economy. By examining a sample of cross-industry mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of Chinese listed companies, we find that industry policies promulgated by the government have a significant asymmetric influence on investor sentiment. Furthermore, investor sentiment under the exogenous shock of industry policies has a significant real effect on companies’ cross-industry M&A behavior, generating cross-industry capital flow. Additional analyses reveal that this effect arises because the acquirer depends on equity financing and has incentive to cater to investor sentiment. Our findings help clarify the effect of public policies on the stock market, theoretically, from the company’s micro-level perspective, as well as the mechanism by which stock market volatility transmits to the real economy.     

Investor Protection,Investment Efficiency and Value: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

We examine the impact of improved investor protection due to cross‐listing on foreign firms’ investment decisions and firm value. While we find that cross‐listing increases firms’ capital expenditures and mergers and acquisitions activities, cross‐listed firms also invest more in research and development, make better acquisition decisions, and have higher profitability compared to non‐cross‐listed firms. Moreover, cross‐listing is associated with better cash utilization by foreign firms for investments. These improvements in investments and cash utilization are more pronounced for firms cross‐listed on US exchanges and for firms from countries with weak investor protection laws.     

EVA,not EBITDA: A New Financial Paradigm for Private Equity Firms

Private equity firms have boomed on the back of EBITDA. Most PE firms use it as their primary measure of value, and ask the managers of their portfolio companies to increase it. Many public companies have decided to emulate the PE firms by using EBITDA to review performance with investors, and even as a basis for determining incentive pay. But is the emphasis on EBITDA warranted? In this article, the co‐founder of Stern Stewart & Co. argues that EVA offers a better way. He discusses blind spots and distortions that make EBITDA highly unreliable and misleading as a measure of normalized, ongoing profitability. By comparing EBITDA with EVA, or Economic Value Added, a measure of economic profit net of a full cost‐of‐capital charge, Stewart demonstrates EVA's ability to provide managers and investors with much more clarity into the levers that are driving corporate performance and determining intrinsic market value. And in support of his demonstration, Stewart reports the finding of his analysis of Russell 3000 public companies that EVA explains almost 20% more than EBITDA of their changes in value, while at the same time providing far more insight into how to improve those values.     

Aktienanlage für Lebensversicherer unter Solvency II

Life insurance companies are among the largest institutional investors. As part of their investment policy they are subject to special legal requirements. In particular the calculation of the solvency capital that has to be deposited for the market risk has changed under Solvency II. A widely spread thesis on this topic is that investments in equity have become unprofitable for life insurers due to solvency capital requirements – compared to previous periods of high equity ratios of temporally over 25%. Therefore insurers might have dropped their average stock quotas to below 5%.The intention of the present study is to analyze whether the capital requirements for the equity investments under Solvency II are a hurdle to achieve a reasonable profitability or – opposite to that – whether the equity investments are a suitable investment to provide an acceptable return on assets. For this purpose the solvency capital requirements of the equity investment under Solvency I considering the BaFin stress test are compared with the new solvency capital requirements under Solvency II including the symmetric adjustment factor (SA). Furthermore the diversification effects are taken into account; they are analyzed on the basis of the SFCR reports of the life insurance companies first published in 2017. As a result the risk capital requirements for equity investments under Solvency II have been reduced to more than 50% compared to prior solvency requirements and depending on the observed scenarios. Whilst Solvency I required an underlying risk capital of 31% at the end of 2017, Solvency II requires only 13.56% following the standard model and after aggregating the risk-mitigating effects in the group scenario. This effect results in a surplus of 7.2%, considering industry-standard capital costs for the underlying solvency capital and an average stock market return of 8% per annum. Consequently the equity investment is suitable to increase the profitability of the investments of German life insurance companies especially in the environment of low interest rates in the capital market for fixed income titles.     

Accounting for investments and the relevance of losses to firm value

Recent research has documented investment in research and development as a key driver of the market value of currently unprofitable firms (hereafter loss firms) in a knowledge-based economy. We broaden this argument to consider the influence of accounting for investments in general on the relation between current profitability and firm value for loss firms. Specifically, in the context of a resource-based economy, we find that exploration costs, cash flow measures of investment, and research and development costs help to explain the value of loss firms and reduce the negative relation between current profitability and firm value.     

Intangible Assets and Corporate Signaling

Research and development (R&D) and advertising expenditures often result in patents, technologies and brand names which are difficult to accurately value. Under current generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) these intangible assets are generally not recognized in the financial statements, but instead are expensed in the period that they occur. Prior studies note that the market-to-book ratios of firms with significant levels of R&D and advertising expenditures suggest that investors, at least partially, value these assets. Researchers and practitioners argue that current GAAP, by not recognizing these intangible assets, reduces the usefulness and relevance of accounting reports.We investigate whether companies with significant levels of intangible assets are more likely to emphasize dividend increases and stock repurchases (which are generally perceived as signaling favorable investment opportunities), instead of traditional accounting disclosures, as a means of overcoming adverse selection. Because these assets are difficult to measure, cash distributions may be viewed as a more credible means of signaling firm value to investors. Using analysts' ratings of firms' accounting disclosures, we find that companies with higher levels of R&D and advertising expenditures are less likely to provide extensive accounting disclosures and instead tend to employ dividend and stock repurchase signals. We obtain these results even after controlling for other firm attributes, such as size, stock returns performance, leverage, liquidity and investors' expectations of growth opportunities. We also find that the market reaction to dividend increase and stock repurchase announcements is greater for firms with higher levels of R&D and advertising expenditures, indicating that these announcements are more informative for such firms.     

The association between legal regime and the value-relevance of accounting information: a Japan-U.K. comparison

Prior research has shown that there is an association between the legal regime of a firm’s country of domicile and the value-relevance of its accounting information. However, it is still unclear whether it is the difference in the properties of accounting information (“the supply effect”), or alternatively, if it is the difference in the way the investors in certain jurisdictions interpret and apply that information (“the demand effect”) that is mainly driving this phenomenon. Since the observed pattern in value-relevance is less likely to be observed in a particular capital market that belongs to a single legal regime (where the demand effect is assumed to be constant) in case the demand effect is mainly driving the association, I test for a marginal impact of the supply effect in a single capital market setting. Using U.S. stock price data, I find that the accounting numbers of U.K. firms, prepared under U.K. GAAP, are more value-relevant than those of Japanese firms, reported under Japanese GAAP. This result lends support to the supply hypothesis and suggests that the legal regime does have a marginal impact on the value-relevance of the accounting information.     

Contracts valuation assessment noise and cross-border listing of equities on U.S. and U.K. stock markets

This study develops and tests the hypothesis that firms in the home country have capital market incentives to cross-border list on foreign stock exchanges that have similar financial reporting with local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Non-U.S. firms' contracts and the underlying GAAP are based on the home-country culture and institutional climates. This connection with culture and institution makes the local GAAP's assessment of the contracts less spurious relative to foreign GAAP. Ball et al. [J. Account. Econ. 29 (2000) 1] note that contracting with stakeholders in the home markets is based on local GAAP's numbers, while cross-border listing provides settings in which the value relevance of local GAAP-based contracts is assessed based on foreign GAAP. Therefore, foreign investors' assessment of the contracts using foreign stock exchange GAAP or mindset of foreign GAAP is likely to result in an assessment noise, which is value irrelevant. The level of assessment noise depends on the differences between foreign and local GAAP. Because of the valuation implications of the assessment noise, we expect cross-border listing to diminish as the likelihood of assessment noise increases.As predicted, we find that assessment noise undermines cross-border listing on U.S. stock exchanges. Because U.S. and local GAAPs are based on different cultural and institutional environments, assessment noise arises if U.S. investors use the mindset of U.S. GAAP financial reports to assess local GAAP-based contracts of cross-border firms. The results are robust in the London Stock Exchange in which assessment noise is induced by interpreting local GAAP contracts as if they were based on U.K. GAAP. As expected, the influences of assessment noise on cross-border listings are more robust in the United States than in the United Kingdom. Our results suggest that harmonization of financial reporting is critical in attenuating the influences of assessment noise on global capital market developments.     

Proportional consolidation versus the equity method: A risk measurement perspective on reporting interests in joint ventures

Under Canadian generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), firms are required to proportionally consolidate joint venture investments, as opposed to the United States where the equity method is used. Using a sample of Canadian firms, this study investigates the relative information content of equity method and proportionally consolidated financial statement amounts for explaining market risk. This is possible for Canadian firms where detailed footnote disclosures permit the calculation of pro forma equity method amounts. The findings are surprising in that whereas proportionally consolidated financial statements are more risk relevant than equity method statements for explaining price volatility, equity method statements are more risk relevant than proportionally consolidated ones for explaining bond ratings. The findings suggest that different market participants use financial statement information differently. The study also finds that failure to disclose disaggregated joint venture accounting amounts, as is the case under US GAAP, masks information that could help market participants assess risk.     

Legality and venture capital exits

This paper introduces an analysis of the impact of Legality on the exiting of venture capital investments. We consider a sample of 468 venture-backed companies from 12 Asia-Pacific countries, and these countries' venture capitalists' investments in US-based entrepreneurial firms. The data indicate IPOs are more likely in countries with a higher Legality index. This core result is robust to controls for country-specific stock market capitalization, MSCI market conditions, venture capitalist fund manager skill and fund characteristics, and entrepreneurial firm and transaction characteristics. Although Black and Gilson (1998) [Black, B.S., Gilson, R.J., 1998. Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 243–77] speculate on a central connection between active stock markets and active venture capital markets, our data in fact indicate the quality of a country's legal system is much more directly connected to facilitating VC-backed IPO exits than the size of a country's stock market. The data indicate Legality is a central mechanism which mitigates agency problems between outside shareholders and entrepreneurs, thereby fostering the mutual development of IPO markets and venture capital markets.     

A Better Way to Measure Operating Performance (or Why the EVA Math Really Matters)

Most companies rely heavily on earnings to measure operating performance, but earnings growth has at least two important weaknesses as a proxy for investor wealth. Current earnings can come at the expense of future earnings through, for example, short‐sighted cutbacks in investment, including spending on R&D. But growth in EPS can also be achieved by investing more capital with projected rates of return that, although well below the cost of capital, are higher than the after‐tax cost of debt. Stock compensation has been the conventional solution to the first problem because it's a discounted cash flow value that is assumed to discourage actions that sacrifice future earnings. Economic profit—in its most popular manifestation, EVA—has been the conventional solution to the second problem with earnings because it includes a capital charge that penalizes low‐return investment. But neither of these conventional solutions appears to work very well in practice. Stock compensation isn't tied to business unit performance—and often fails to provide the intended incentives for the (many) corporate managers who believe that meeting current consensus earnings is more important than investing to maintain future earnings. EVA doesn't work well when new investments take time to become profitable because the higher capital charge comes before the related income. In this article, the author presents two new operating performance measures that are likely to work better than either earnings or EVA because they reflect the value that can be lost either through corporate underinvestment or overinvestment designed to increase current earnings. Both of these new measures are based on the math that ties EVA to discounted cash flow value, particularly its division of current corporate market values into two components: “current operations value” and “future growth value.” The key to the effectiveness of the new measures in explaining changes in company stock prices and market values is a statistical model of changes in future growth value that captures the expected effects of significant increases in current investment in R&D and advertising on future profits and value.     

Accounting Choice, Home Bias, and U.S. Investment in Non-U.S. Firms

This paper examines the relation between accounting choice and U.S. institutional investor ownership in non‐U.S. firms. We predict that U.S. investors exhibit home bias in their preference for accounting methods conforming to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) because such methods are more familiar, reduce information processing costs, and are perceived as higher quality. We find that firms exhibiting higher levels (changes) of U.S. GAAP conformity have greater levels (changes) of U.S. institutional ownership. Lead‐lag regressions suggest that increases in U.S. GAAP conformity precede increases in U.S. investment, but changes in U.S. institutional holdings do not precede changes in accounting methods. We also find that the positive relation between U.S. GAAP conformity and U.S. investment holds regardless of a firm's visibility to U.S. investors (e.g., American Depositary Receipt listing, stock index membership, analyst following, firm size). However, we find that U.S. GAAP conformity has a significantly greater impact among firms already visible to U.S. investors.