银行危机与货币危机共生性关系的实证研究

1 997— 1 998年的亚洲金融风暴中 ,银行危机与货币危机的同时爆发 ,即共生性危机的发生引发国际社会与学术界对这种现象的重新思考 :这种共生性现象是否确实具有普遍性 ?从理论的角度来看 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着一定的联系 ,但到目前为止 ,很少有研究从实证的角度来证明这种联系的确存在。正是基于此 ,本文从实证的角度出发 ,旨在揭示出银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着相互影响 ,换言之 ,共生性危机的发生是具有显著性的。具体来说 ,本文以 1 975— 2 0 0 0年期间 53个国家危机的发生情况为研究对象 ,分别运用频率分布、信号法 ,以及概率回归模型来分析两种危机的共生性 ,并得到非常一致的结论 :在新兴市场国家中 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着明显的相互关系 ,同时银行危机更趋向于作为货币危机即将发生的同步或预警指标 ,而反之则不然。     

The illusive quest: Do international capital controls contribute to currency stability?

We investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in insulating economies from currency crises, focusing in particular on both direct and indirect effects of capital controls and how these relationships may have changed over time in response to global financial liberalization and the greater mobility of international capital. We predict the likelihood of currency crises using standard macroeconomic variables and a probit equation estimation methodology with random effects. We employ a comprehensive panel data set comprised of 69 emerging market and developing economies over 1975–2004. Both standard and duration-adjusted measures of capital control intensity (allowing controls to “depreciate” over time) suggest that capital controls have not effectively insulated economies from currency crises at any time during our sample period. Maintaining real GDP growth and limiting real overvaluation are critical factors preventing currency crises, not capital controls. However, the presence of capital controls greatly increases the sensitivity of currency crises to changes in real GDP growth and real exchange rate overvaluation, making countries more vulnerable to changes in fundamentals. Our model suggests that emerging markets weathered the 2007–2008 crisis relatively well because of strong output growth and exchange rate flexibility that limited overvaluation of their currencies.     

Stability periods between financial crises: The role of macroeconomic fundamentals and crises management policies

This study aims to identify which factors explain why some countries enjoy long durations of stability, while others experience crises in shorter intervals. We analyze the duration of stability periods between currency, debt, and banking crises by employing an innovative econometric strategy, the Finite Mixture Model (FMM). Real and financial variables show high predictive power for stability spells between currency crises. Regarding debt crises, the real interest rate is observed to be the best predictor. The time between systemic financial crises appears to be prolonged through government interventions and through IMF program participation, while bank recapitalization has a negative impact.     

Withstanding financial crises: would trade partners help or hurt?

This article provides new empirical evidence on the losses of real activity caused by various financial shocks. Spillover effects due to foreign trade linkages deserve special attention. To this end, we estimate a modify auto-regressive process and a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations estimator is used to account for the dependency of one’s country growth on its trade-weighted partners growth. We run estimations on a set of currency collapses, banking crises and sovereign defaults in 49 advanced and developing countries from 1978 to 2011. The trade-weighted foreign demand effect mitigated the economic downturn following a banking or a sovereign debt crisis in all countries, while only the advanced ones benefited from it after a currency collapse. Trade-based spillover effects make banking crises more costly in the developing countries, in those that liberalize their financial account. It contrasts with what is observed during currency or sovereign debt crises.     

International Financial Contagion: Why are Eastern Europe's banks not failing when everybody else's are?

While the Asian financial crisis spread to Russia and Brazil, the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) are largely unaffected by international financial contagion. This is the more surprising considering that most economies have experienced severe banking sector problems in the past, that large bad loan ratios are still prevalent, that banking regulation and supervision are only slowly improving, and that stabilizing policies have slowly been eliminated. What insulated the CEECs from the recent wave of financial instability? To consider the counterfactual, we first provide a framework that links banking crises to financial deregulation. We then focus on a number of macro- and microeconomic factors, using data compiled from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, from the World Bank's World Debt Tables, and from the BIS's Consolidated International Banking Statistics. We first compare past experiences in CEECs with those in other emerging economies as a cross-sectional reference point. We then consider whether the situation in CEECs has changed since the last banking sector problems, in order to establish a reference point across time. Our results indicate that the factors leading up to past banking crises are generally different in CEECs from those in other emerging economies. However, in recent years, the characteristics of CEECs have become more similar to those of other emerging economies.     

Early Warning for Currency Crises: What Is the Role of Financial Openness?

The paper explores whether financial openness—capital account openness and gross capital inflows—makes countries vulnerable to currency crises. A quarterly dataset on 46 advanced and emerging market economies (AEs and EMEs) during 1975Q1–2011Q4 is used, with the period after Q2 2007 used for out‐of‐sample testing. The key findings are: (1) capital account openness is associated with lower probability of currency crises, but less so for EMEs; (2) surges in gross capital flows are associated with increased risk of currency crises; and (3) the model performs well out‐of‐sample, confirming that early warning models are helpful in judging relative vulnerability.     

Keynes at the periphery: Currency hierarchy and challenges for economic policy in emerging economies

While the post Keynesian literature offers a rather clear concept for growth-oriented policies, it is necessary to adapt them for peripheral emerging economies. We base our analysis of an appropriate Keynesian policy mix for these countries on the concept of currency hierarchy, where the currencies of peripheral emerging economies have a lower liquidity premium than the currencies of advanced economies. The international asymmetry related to the currency hierarchy, amplified by financial globalization, imposes major constraints to the adoption of Keynesian policies for these economies. Under these conditions, we argue that domestic economic policy coordination should lay a major focus on a low policy rate and, especially, a competitive exchange rate for obtaining, at least, a balanced current account, in order to prevent capital flows boom-bust-cycles with subsequent financial crises. We conclude that it is a rather ambitious and long-term goal to climb up the currency hierarchy, especially under the current condition of financial globalization.     

Twin Crises in Emerging Markets: The Role of Liability Dollarization and Imperfect Competition in Banking

Currency crises in emerging markets have been accompanied by banking crises, with concentration in the market for bank credit increasing after large devaluations. This paper examines how the presence of imperfect competition and liability dollarization in banking shapes the real effects of the just mentioned twin crises. An important gap in the theoretical literature is filled, by being the first paper to provide a model of twin crises in the presence of imperfect competition in banking, and the changes in market structure that occur in the aftermath of crises. Doing so, the analysis is able to reveal that currency devaluations generate more severe twin crises in economies with less competitive banking sectors. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence on the concentration‐fragility view, and it unveils the importance of prudential regulation that focuses on the market structure in banking.     

Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows,financial market structure,and banking crises

An emerging consensus among scholars and policy‐makers identifies foreign capital inflows as one of the primary determinants of banking crises in developed countries. We challenge this view by arguing that external imbalances are destabilizing only when banks face substantial competition from securities markets in the process of financial intermediation. We assemble a dataset of banking crises covering the advanced industrialized countries from 1976 to 2011 and find evidence of a conditional relationship between capital inflows, a well‐developed securities market, and the incidence of banking crises. We further explore the impact of capital inflows on banks’ actual risk taking as indicated by their capital adequacy levels and measures of insolvency risk. Our results demonstrate that prudential capital cushions tend to decline with the combination of capital inflows and prominent securities markets. We highlight the political decisions—often made during the early days of a country's financial development—that determine the relative prominence of banks vs. non‐bank financial institutions and conclude with policy recommendations.     

The real effect of financial crises in the European transition economies1

The aim of this work is to assess the impact of financial crises on output for 11 European transition economies (CEECs). The results suggest that financial crises have a significant and permanent effect, lowering long‐term output by about 12–17 percent. The effect is larger in smaller countries in which the banking sector presented more important financial disequilibria. We also found that fiscal policy has been the most efficient tool in dealing with the crises, whereas the effect of monetary policy has been rather modest. Flexible exchange rates are found to attenuate the impact of the crises in the short and medium term, but to amplify the effect in the long run. International Monetary Fund support is found to moderate the effect in the long run. Finally, the effect in the CEECs is considerably larger than in the EU advanced economies.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

Optimal versus adequate level of international reserves: evidence for Turkey

The determination of international reserve balance for emerging economies is part of the efforts to strengthen the immunity of these economies to crises. However, there is still evidence on crises even for the countries with large foreign reserves. It has usually been experienced that the countries with greatest need for reserves economize more than others on their holdings since they might underestimate the cost of crisis. In this study, the official international reserves of Turkey are tested against optimality and adequacy. During 1988–2002, the actual reserves fell short of both the optimal and the adequate levels. They are only optimal when the expected cumulative contraction is about 5.2% of real GDP under crisis. However, early evidence from emerging economies and Turkey show that crises hit more heavily. Hence, it is found that the current financial structure in Turkey such as the absence of capital controls and a highly dollarized banking system necessitates more foreign reserves for preventing any future economic and/or financial shocks.     

Sudden stops, banking crises and investment collapses in emerging markets

We evaluate whether financial openness leaves emerging market economies vulnerable to the adverse effects of capital reversals (“sudden stops”) on domestic investment. We investigate this claim in a broad sample of emerging markets during the period 1976–2002. If the banking sector does not experience a systemic crisis, sudden stop events fail to have a significant impact on investment. Bank crises, on the other hand, have a significant negative effect on investment even in the absence of a contemporaneous sudden stop crisis. We also find that openness to capital flows worsens the adverse impact of banking crises on investment. Our results provide statistical support for the policy view that a strong banking sector which can withstand the negative fallout of capital flight is essential for countries that open their economies to international financial flows.     

Sudden Stops and Currency Crashes

This paper investigates which factors determine whether sudden stops in international capital flows are followed by a currency crash using data for 85 economies in the period 1980–2012. An event study approach is used for an 11‐year window around the crises for nine potential explanatory variables. In addition, the paper estimates discrete‐choice panel models. The results suggest that low trade openness, shallow financial markets, and current account imbalances increase the likelihood that a sudden stop will be followed by a currency crash. Moreover, it is established that the impact of these factors differs across different exchange rate regimes.     

International aid and financial crises in donor countries

The recent global financial crisis placed new economic and fiscal pressures on donor countries that may have long-term effects on their ability and willingness to provide aid. Not only did donor-country incomes fall, but the cause of the drop — the banking and financial-sector crisis — may exacerbate the long-term effect on aid flows. This paper estimates how donor-country banking crises have affected aid flows in the past, using panel data from 24 donor countries between 1977 and 2010. We find that banking crises in donor countries are associated with a substantial additional fall in aid flows, beyond any income-related effects, at least in part because of the high fiscal costs of crisis and the debt hangover in the post-crisis periods. Aid flows from crisis-affected countries are estimated to fall by 28% or more (relative to the counterfactual) and to bottom out only about a decade after the banking crisis hits. In addition, our results confirm that donor-country incomes are robustly related to per-capita aid flows, with an elasticity of about 3. Findings are robust to estimation using either static or dynamic panel data methods to account for possible biases. Because many donor countries, which together provide two-thirds of aid, were hit hard by the global recession, this historical evidence indicates that aggregate aid could fall by a significant amount (again, relative to counterfactual) in the coming years. We also explore how crises affect different types of aid, such as social-sector and humanitarian aid, as well as whether strategic interaction among donors is likely to deepen or mitigate the fall in aid.     

Currency crises and the stock market: empirical evidence for another type of twin crisis

We explore the dependency between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies. Our focus is two-fold. First, the risk of a currency crisis rises as the foreign stake in the domestic stock market increases. Successful economies with high capital flows into their booming stock markets especially are prone to stock market-induced currency crises. Second, we apply the dividend growth model to show that stock markets crash in the run-up to a currency crisis. This new type of twin crisis is empirically tested by employing a logit framework using quarterly data for 33 emerging economies for 1994Q1–2007Q4.     

Global banking,global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises

We examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries׳ risk of suffering financial turmoil. We construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks׳ balance-sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets. This allows us investigating the effect of (foreign) bank balance-sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011. Our proxies of shocks towards bank balance-sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries. Confirming these results, bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks׳ assets are hit by negative shocks, as measured by credit rating downgrades from third-party countries. Short-term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll-over and funding risks, thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders’ balance-sheets. Domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities, such as illiquid assets and a low deposit-asset ratio, are found to increase crisis contagion risk. In contrast, a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks׳ assets to debtor countries.     

基于信息的双重危机模型及其在东亚危机中的应用

由于近来在新兴市场国家发生的一系列货币危机都同时伴随着银行危机的发生,要全面地理解这些货币危机,我们需要将具有微观基础的银行部门明确地纳入到货币危机的分析模型中去.该文通过应用基于信息的银行挤兑模型,建立了一个双重危机模型,并对诸如经济基本面的脆弱如何导致双重危机,以及银行危机和货币危机如何相互作用等问题,做出了内生化的解释.模型抓住了最近新兴市场货币危机的本质特征,并与最近东亚危机的经验事实非常符合.     

A Simple Model of an International Lender of Last Resort

This paper develops a simple model of an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). The world economy consists of many open economies, each with its own banking system and its own central bank which uses its reserves to manage a pegged exchange rate. The fragility of the banking system and the limited ability of a domestic central bank to provide international liquidity together can cause currency and banking crises. An international interbank market can help an economy with the needed international liquidity, but this risk-sharing also comes with potential costs of international financial contagion. Such contagious risk is much higher when there is an international interbank market than otherwise. An ILOLR can play a useful role in providing international liquidity and reducing international contagion.     

Sustainable and Excessive Current Account Deficits

Both the Mexican crisis of 1994–95 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 have been preceded by large current account deficits run by the affected economies. External deficits are often assumed to play an important role in the propagation of financial crises in emerging markets. Policymakers are faced with a new challenge: that of resisting or accepting the large current account deficits that may result from heavy private capital inflows. This paper aims at providing some guidance:First, the Lawson Doctrine – according to which current account deficits that result from a shift in private-sector behaviour should not be a public policy concern – has been discredited by recent currency crises in Latin America and Asia. Second, define the size of current account deficits that should be sustainable in the long run. Third, the intertemporal approach to the current account does not provide a reliable benchmark to define when deficits become excessive. Fourth, large external deficits should be resisted if unsustainable currency appreciation, excessive risk-taking in the banking system and a sharp private spending boom are seen to coincide.