Taxation, Public Policy, and Dynamics of Unemployment

This paper provides an overview of the key issues relating to taxation, public policy and the dynamics of unemployment.It takes issue with the widely held view that generous social insurance schemes and the associated highpayroll taxes have been the major cause of the high unemployment rates which have persisted in Europe over thepast 15 years. It puts forward a framework for a theory of adjustment, based on the portfolio theory of the riskaverse firm and the efficiency wage theory of labor markets. This is used to explain why in the onset of a downturn,the hiring rate may lag the layoff rate, thus giving rise to rising unemployment rates. It is also shown to provideguidance as to policies which enhance the ability of firms to bear risks and which reduce costs of hiring and firing.The paper argues that while policies which increase severance or layoff costs may be well intended they mayactually serve to exacerbate the magnitude of employment fluctuations. Similarly, unemployment compensation,which is designed to ease the burden on those who are unemployed, may lead to higher levels of equilibriumunemployment. These programs can be restructured in ways which simultaneously ease the short-run burden ofthose thrown into unemployment, while reducing the adverse impact of these programs on the unemployment rate.     

我国外商直接投资税收敏感性分析

采用现状分析、理论论证和实证分析等经济分析方法,对税收政策对外商投资的影响作用进行分析,可得出以下结论:税收优惠对吸引外商直接投资有促进作用,但其影响作用并不显著。我国应正确对待税收优惠的作用地位,并全面考虑影响优惠政策的因素,采用更为有效的税收优惠工具,有的放矢地运用税收优惠政策。     

Neutral Property Taxation Under Uncertainty

In a framework where no uncertainty arises, Arnott (J Publ Econ Theor 7:27–50, 2005) investigates a neutral property taxation policy that will not affect a landowner’s choices of capital intensity and timing of development. We investigate the same issue, but allow rents on structures to be stochastic over time. We assume that a regulator implements taxation on capital, vacant land, and post-development property so as to expropriate a certain ratio of pre-tax site value as well as to achieve neutrality. We find that the optimal taxation policy is to tax capital and subsidize properties before and after development. We also investigate how this optimal policy changes in response to changes in several exogenous forces related to demand and supply conditions of the real estate market.

Exemption vs. Credit Method in International Double Taxation Treaties

This paper examines the choice of international double taxation relief methods by two small countries that mutually exchange foreign direct investment. At the first stage, each country chooses between the exemption and the credit method (as prescribed by the OECD model treaty) and at the second stage, each country sets nationally optimal non-discriminatory capital tax rates. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium both countries choose the exemption method. Mutual application of the exemption method is also shown to yield the highest welfare for each country. While the tax export effect generally induces both countries to choose inefficiently high tax rates, this effect is weakest when both countries exempt foreign earned profits from domestic taxation.     

Capital Mobility and Source-Based Taxation of Capital Income in Small Open Economies

This paper examines the taxation of capital income in a small open economy that faces a highly elastic supply of internationally mobile capital and increasing tax competition. The analysis considers a wide variety of additional factors that affect the determination of capital income taxation policy, including the desire to tax economic rents earned by foreign and domestic firms, the desire to take advantage of any treasury transfer effects, the role played by transfer pricing and other financial accounting manipulations by foreign multinationals, the need for a backstop to the personal income tax and various political concerns. The paper evaluates several potential income and consumption-based tax reforms in this context. JEL Code: H21, H25, H87     

企业集团合并纳税：比较及启示

我国的合并纳税制度目前只针对特批企业,这不利于企业集团之间公平竞争。对企业集团合并纳税范围及不同国家合并纳税模式的比较与分析表明:我国应进一步完善所得税法等法律法规,保证税收公平,积极建设我国的"集团纳税制度"。     

宪政税收——一个从宪法视角分析税收的框架

宪政税收是宪法上对税收核心规则或最高原则的创设与运用之政法过程的制度性规范,这一过程要求税收的每一个核心要素都受制于宪政税收。理论上,一个符合中国现实的宪政税收模型是人民代表的一致同意。因为国家和人民的基本关系其实是税收关系,所以必须在宪法上界定国家与人民的权力与权利、责任与义务并使其基本关系宪法化。实践上,应以宪政税收为基本出发点,修改宪法的涉税条款,不必出台税收基本法,并以宪法理念或精神指导税收法律体系或制度的构建。     

内蒙古文化产业发展中的税收政策分析

文化产业的发展壮大离不开完善优惠的配套政策体系的扶持,本文就税收政策如何能更好地服务于内蒙古文化产业,从而推动内蒙古经济社会健康有序发展进行了深入的调查研究,并提出一些相应的意见和建议。     

Optimal Income Taxation and the Ability Distribution: Implications for Migration Equilibria

As recently argued by Diamond (1998), one of the key factors explaining the progressivity of an optimal non-linear income tax is the distribution of productivity among workers. Migration is one source of changes in the productivity distribution. How changes in the populations ability distribution affect optimal income tax schedules has received little attention. Changing the distribution generally affects both the objective function and the government budget constraint. We first consider the comparative statics of the fraction of highly-skilled workers with maximin and maximax welfare functions (so that only the second effect is present) and a quasi-linear utility function. We also present some results for a utilitarian social welfare function.We then study the interaction between mobility and redistributive taxation. We consider mobility by either the skilled or unskilled population under majority voting where governments take the population as fixed. If individuals choose to relocate independently, having identical ability distributions is always a stable equilibrium when the unskilled are the mobile group. However, this is not always the case when the skilled are mobile. If groups of individuals can choose where to locate, having identical ability distributions across regions is only an equilibrium when the mobile type has an overall majority.     

A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation

This paper generalizes the standard model of how taxes affect the labor-leisure choice by allowing individuals to change both their labor supply and avoidance effort in response to tax changes. Doing so reveals that the income and substitution effect of taxes depend on both preferences and the avoidance technology. Econometric analysis will not in general allow one to separately identify the two influences, unless one can specify observable determinants of the cost of avoidance. The effective marginal tax rate on working must be modified by the addition of an avoidance-facilitating effect, which measures how the cost of avoidance changes with higher income. This model provides a conceptual structure for evaluating to what extent, and in what situations, the opportunities for tax avoidance mitigate the real substitution response to taxation.     

Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level

Due to the use of distortionary taxation, many believe that real-world economies should attain a lower level of public expenditures than in a situation where lump-sum taxes are available. The present paper examines this hypothesis by means of the two-type self-selection model of income taxation. Based on the findings of Boadway and Keen (1993), I provide sufficient conditions for both a lower and a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best. In particular, it is shown that the separability assumption of Christiansen (1981) leads to under-provision of the public good in the income tax optimum.     

International interest withholding taxation: Prospects for a common European policy

In 1989 the European Union member states rejected a proposal to introduce a minimum interest withholding tax of 15 percent. Some Union member states, however, remain keenly interested in bringing about some minimum level of international taxation of interest income. This suggests that member states will be asked to reconsider the issue in the near future. This paper first examines the effects of interest withholding taxes on financial markets. It then reviews some of the main aspects of potential tax reform in this area. A major challenge for any future proposal will be to satisfactorily integrate the banking system into a common interest withholding scheme.     

最优所得税理论与我国个人所得税的实践

最优所得税理论一诞生,就受到了广泛关注。一些学者用不同模型阐述了最优所得税理论。虽毋须严格按照这些模型来设计我国的个人所得税制度,但其模型所体现的税制设计理念或思想对现阶段我国个人所得税制度的设计具有一定的参考价值。     

论我国林业税费制度改革——以内蒙古自治区根河市的调研为基础

我国现行林业税费呈现出"轻税重费"特征,带来的问题包括:有悖于公共财政的原则;催生乱收费;资金使用易出现漏洞;林区地方财政困难。这不利于林业经济的持续发展、生态环境的有效保护和我国公共财政体制的构建。其解决措施在于:将林业税费制度纳入公共财政体系;规范林业税费制度;改革育林基金;建立森林生态环境利益补偿机制。     

Optimal International Taxation and Growth Rate Convergence: Tax Competition vs. Coordination

Optimal international taxation and its implications for convergence in long run income growth rates are analyzed in the context of an endogenously growing world economy with perfect capital mobility. Under tax competition (i) the residence principle will maximize national welfare; (ii) the optimal long run tax rate on capital incomes from various sources will be zero in all countries; and (iii) long term per capita income growth rates will be equalized across countries. Under tax coordination, (i) becomes irrelevant while (ii) and (iii) will continue to hold. In other words, optimal tax policies are growth-equalizing with and without international policy coordination. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

From Destination- to Origin-Based Consumption Taxation: A Dynamic CGE Analysis

A switch from the current destination-based value-added taxation to an origin-based consumption tax will not be neutral in a world economy with international capital mobility and overlapping generations. This paper evaluates the macroeconomic and welfare effects of such a multilateral reform in a two-region, intertemporal general equilibrium model. The analysis isolates and quantifies income effects due to changes in generations' tax burdens, factor price repercussions and initial asset price adjustments, as well as efficiency effects that arise from endogenous labor supply and short run savings responses in a numerical simulation exercise.     

The Property Tax as a Tax on Value: Deadweight Loss

Consider an atomistic developer who decides when and at what density to develop his land, under a property value tax system characterized by three time-invariant tax rates: τ_V, the tax rate on pre-development land value; τ_S, the tax rate on post-development residual site value; and τ_K, the tax rate on structure value. Arnott (2005) identified the subset of property value tax systems that are neutral. This paper investigates the relative efficiency of four idealized, non-neutral property value tax systems [(i) “Canadian' property tax system: τ_V = 0, τ _S = τ_K; (ii) simple property tax system: τ_V = τ _S = τ_K; (iii) residual site value tax system: τ_K = 0,τ _V = τ_S; (iv) two-rate property tax system: τ_V = τ _S > τ_K > 0] under the assumption of a constant rental growth rate. JEL Code: H2     

The Valuation of Deferred Taxation: Evidence from the UK Partial Provision Approach

The UK provides a virtually unique environment in which to examine the information content of the partial provision approach to deferred tax accounting. In addition this issue is of particular interest to UK accounting standard setters in the light of trends towards international accounting standard harmonisation. Taking the total amount of deferred taxation to be equal to the partial balance sheet provision plus the potential portion appearing in the notes, this study tests the relationship between these various deferred tax components and market value. It also examines the economic rationale for the potential portion. The study is based on 1,512 company/years from the period 1989–1991. It finds that, while the full amount of deferred taxation is not valued by the market as a liability, there is evidence of the partial balance sheet provision being so valued. There is also evidence that the potential portion is positively related to market value, consistent with its proxying for information about future growth. This result is supported by the positive relation between the potential portion and measures of future capital spending, indicative of an underlying economic rationale for this deferred taxation component. From a regulatory perspective, the study concludes that the main benefit of the partial provision approach is that the balance sheet amount constitutes a reasonably reliable measure of the portion likely to crystallise as a liability, information that would be lost were only the full amount to be disclosed.     

Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer

The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a—probably ‘the’—central issue on the international tax policy agenda. Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation—away from parametric tax coordination and towards strengthening information exchange—has gone largely unnoticed in the public finance literature. This paper gives an overview of this increasingly important area of international taxation, reviewing the key economic, legal, and practical concepts and issues bearing on the analysis and implementation of information exchange, and providing an account of recent policy initiatives and emerging theoretical insights. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

Redistributive Taxation in the Era of Globalization

This paper analyzes the impact globalization has on voting for redistributive policies in an increasingly integrated world. It explains why tax competition has so far not led to a significant decline in redistributive taxation. The voting process is considered for the two alternatives of direct democracy and representative democracy. In both regimes, globalization pushes down the scope for redistribution, but this effect is mitigated with political representation, since the electorate votes strategically for a slightly more left-wing politician with stronger preferences for redistribution. Moreover, voting polarizes twice, with respect to governments' preferences for redistribution and to equilibrium tax rates.