Level of economic development and political democracy revisited

This article reassesses a democracy-economic development linkage for the period 1972 to 1990. The results show that economic development has a significant effect on democratic performance in the semiperiphery and periphery, yet in an opposite direction. For the core, there is no linkage from economic development to political performance. Moreover, the finding also suggests that democracy enhances economic development only in the core and semiperiphery. This finding thus contradicts Barro's [1996] contention that more democracy enhances economic growth at low levels of political freedom, but it depresses economic growth when a moderate level of freedom has already been attained.     

Human capital,age structure and growth fluctuations

This article assesses the empirical relationship between per capita income growth fluctuations and the age-structured human capital variations across four groups of geographically clustered developed and developing countries from spatial perspective. We estimate a spatial Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model of income dynamics where the distance between countries is defined on relational space based on their similarity in appropriation tendency of human capital in the production processes. These distances are computed using a newly developed human capital data set which fully characterizes the demographic structure of human capital, and thus underlines the joint relevance of demography and human capital in economic growth. Spatial effects on growth interdependence and complementarity are then explored with respect to the proposed distance metrics. Our results imply that significant cross-country growth interdependence based on human capital distances exists among defined country groups suggesting the need for a cooperative policy programme among them. We also find that the relationship between economic growth and human capital is highly nonlinear as a function of the proposed human capital distance.     

基于三维距离的省域创新绩效空间溢出效应研究

运用空间计量模型对2010-2019年28个省份面板数据实证分析,研究省际创新绩效溢出效应空间格局,分析三维距离对省域创新绩效空间溢出影响,探索通过区域创新能力构建促进创新强省创新绩效正向空间溢出效应。研究发现：省域创新绩效由低向高增长阶段对邻近省域产生回流效应;在高位增长阶段,对空间邻接和地理距离邻近、经济水平差距大的省域具有回流效应;对空间邻接、地理距离邻近和经济距离邻近省域产生正向空间溢出效应。经济发展水平越接近,原始创新力对区域创新绩效溢出效应的促进越明显,且呈倒U型曲线趋势;经济水平差距是技术创新力直接效应与间接效应差距的关键因素;空间邻接和地理距离邻近是成果转化力空间正向溢出的关键因素。     

Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence

The paper examines how democracy affects long-run growth by influencing the quality of governance. Empirical evidence is first presented showing that measures of the quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries. A general-equilibrium, endogenous growth model is then built to show how a governance-improving democracy raises growth. In this model, stronger democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt officials. Reducing corruption, in turn, stimulates technological change and spurs economic growth. Empirical evidence is presented showing that democracy is in fact a significant determinant of total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 1960 and 1990 in a cross-section of countries. But this contribution occurs only insofar as stronger democratic institutions are associated with greater quality of governance.     

Do the Effects of Corruption upon Growth Differ Between Democracies and Autocracies?

Many studies examining whether corruption lowers economic growth do not consider if the effects of corruption differ across countries. Whether corruption produces the same effects everywhere or whether its effects are conditional on some country characteristics are important questions. We investigate the association between corruption and growth, where the marginal impact of corruption is allowed to differ across democratic and nondemocratic regimes. Using cross‐country, annual data from 1984 to 2007, we regress growth on corruption, democracy and their interaction. We find that decreases in corruption raise growth but more so in authoritarian regimes. Possible reasons are that in autocracies corruption causes more uncertainty, is of a more pernicious nature, or is less substitutable with other forms of rent seeking.     

Oil,Growth, and Health: What Does the Cross‐Country Evidence Really Show?*

We show that previous results from the body of literature on the resource curse have primarily been driven by the collapse in oil prices during the mid‐1980s. By exploiting cross‐country variations in the size of initial oil endowments and the timing of oil discoveries, we find that there is a stable positive relationship between oil abundance and long‐run economic growth. Using dynamic panel data methods, we also find that there is no evidence that higher oil rents hinder growth. However, to focus on material gain means that the welfare gain from oil is understated, because oil‐rich countries benefit more by the reduction in infant mortality and the gain in longevity. Interestingly, such oil‐led health improvements are more pronounced in non‐democratic countries, where initial heath conditions were poor and oil wealth is concentrated among the ruling elites.     

Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence

It has been shown that both formal existence and actual use of direct democratic institutions have effects on a number of variables such as fiscal policies, quality of governance but also economic growth. Further, it has been argued that direct democratic institutions would not only have an impact on policy outcomes but influence citizen participation and attitudes toward politics. For the first time, these conjectures are tested in a large cross-country sample here. Overall, we do not find strong effects and some of the significant correlations are rather small substantially. In contrast to previous studies, voter turnout is not higher when direct democracy is available or used. Further, and also in contrast to previous studies, citizens do not express a greater interest in politics in countries with direct democracy institutions. Finally, they display lower trust in government and parties but not in parliament. These results shed some doubt on the hope that direct democracy would make for better citizens.     

Does democratization spur growth?

Many studies have considered how democratization affects economic growth. We expand this work by allowing short‐ and long‐run effects of democracy upon growth to differ since effects during political transitions need not coincide with those under established democracies. We also allow these short‐ and long‐run effects to differ across world regions since history, demography and geography vary across regions. Using annual, cross‐county data from 1960 to 2010, we find that democratizations increased growth rates in sub‐Saharan Africa both in the short run and in the long run but lowered them in Europe. Effects in other regions appear less strong. Our results suggest that democracy could be most beneficial for growth in poorer, less stable regions. We also do not find any evidence of a transitional cost. Stronger evidence arises that these effects come from rising productivity rather than through greater investment. Finally, some support though mixed suggests that democracy's ability to mitigate the effects of ethnic heterogeneity provides a partial explanation for the cross‐regional heterogeneity.     

Making Economic Policy in a Democratic Indonesia: The First Two Decades

After three decades of rapid economic growth during the authoritarian Soeharto era, followed by the deep but relatively short‐lived Asian financial crisis, Indonesia transitioned rapidly to democratic and decentralized governance. We examine policy‐making processes and economic outcomes during the first two decades of this new era, leading up to the 2019 national elections where it was widely conjectured that Indonesia might follow the global trends of authoritarian rule and illiberalism. We conclude that, thus far, Indonesia has navigated the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule quite successfully. Compared to the Soeharto era, growth has been somewhat slower, inequality has risen, and policy reform is slower and generally incremental. But living standards continue to rise and all major political players have elected to operate within the new democratic parameters. Macroeconomic management has continued to be effective. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for complacency: there is a large outstanding reform agenda, and the economy is not providing enough economic opportunities for the better‐educated senior secondary and tertiary graduates entering the workforce.     

Democracy and Education in twentieth‐century Latin America

Do democratic electoral systems strengthen a country's outcomes in education? Does the degree of inclusiveness of a democratic system matter? This article offers evidence that political competition and the inclusion of marginalized populations in electoral systems transformed education over an 80‐year period in Latin America. It finds that democracy has a positive effect on education enrollment and illustrates how current work on democracy and development has overlooked important democratic subcomponents, specifically, who votes and how. Our results deepen current work on democracy, operationalizing the impact of electoral expansion in comparative analysis and showing how democracies respond to specific education demands.     

Does democracy cause growth? A meta-analysis (of 2000 regressions)

The relationship between democracy and economic growth has been widely debated in the social sciences with contrasting results. We apply a meta-analytical framework surveying 188 studies (2047 models) covering 36 years of research in the field. We also compare the effect of democracy on growth with the effect of human capital on growth in a sub-sample of 111 studies (875 models). Our findings suggest that democracy has a positive and direct effect on economic growth beyond the reach of publication bias, albeit weaker (about one third) of that of human capital. Further, the growth effect of democracy appears to be stronger in more recent papers not surveyed in Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008). Finally, we show that the heterogeneity in the reported results is mainly driven by spatial and temporal differences in the samples, indicating that the democracy and growth nexus is not homogeneous across world regions and decades.     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Democracy vs. dictatorship

A democratic society is often regarded as a prerequisite for economic growth and development. Yet, most empirical studies are not capable of identifying a positive link between GDP growth and democracy indexes. In addition, it is a stylized empirical fact that: (i) most developing countries are dictatorships; and (ii) many poor dictatorships have experienced high growth performances and emerged from poverty such as South Korea, China and Egypt. Against this background, it is of interest to analyse in which ways the growth performance between autocratic and democratic economies may differ, in particular among low-income countries. To answer this question, we compare the endogenous growth paths of two economies that differ only in their political regimes in the context of an overlapping generations model. The key features of the model are: (i) a positive bequest motive in the form of investments in education or productive public capital (infrastructure); (ii) a higher marginal (inter-temporal) utility of consumption today versus consumption tomorrow in low-income countries (for example, subsistence level of consumption); and (iii) a dictator that cares about her income or the income of her dynasty tomorrow. In this framework, we demonstrate that poor but large and stable dictatorships exhibit a higher equilibrium growth rate than comparable (equally poor) democracies. Moreover, there exists a particular threshold value in income such that the growth-reducing impact of dictatorial consumption (corruption) outweighs the higher (initial) public investments. Above this, the growth rate under democracy dominates the one in dictatorship.     

Is democracy good for growth? — Development at political transition time matters

Is democracy a better political regime for economic prosperity than autocracy? This paper shows that the answer depends on the initial economic development level during the democratic transition when the foundation of institutions was laid. Democracy facilitates growth only in countries that already have adequate development at transition time. These countries are more likely to create and sustain growth-enhancing institutions than others. Without appropriate development, democracy does not improve growth; this applies to about 40% of the third-wave democratized countries. These results are based on a sample of 153 countries in 1960–2010 and robust to various specifications and endogeneity issues.     

法学与政治：内生民主化

作者指出，经济发展增加了一国发生民主化转变的可能性。他们的这一结论与Przeworski及其合作者的观点相抵触，后者认为，发展只能起到维持既存民主的作用，而无法促成民主化转变的发生。通过全面地处理样本选择及模型规范方面的问题，作者发现，经济增长的确导致了非民主国家向民主化方向转变的发生。他们指出，在十九世纪中叶到二战前这百余年时间里，经济增长对于民主化转变发生可能性的影响十分明显，甚至比它在维持民主稳定方面的作用更加显著。同时，他们指出，在未来的几十年里，一些取得了一定程度的经济发展但仍由独裁政权统治的国家，发生民主化的几率会随着它们的经济发展水平的提高而提高。例如，当一国人均收入达12000美元时，该国有望最快在三年之内实现民主化。     

Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches

This article focuses on two previously unexamined aspects of the relationship between economic growth and democracy. First, the growth experiences of countries that experience significant changes in democracy are examined directly. Countries that democratize are found to grow faster than a priori similar countries, while countries that become less democratic grow more slowly than comparable countries. These differences do not seem to be due to differences in education or investment levels. Second, regression tree analysis suggests that democracy, along with initial income and literacy, contributes to the identification of regimes of countries facing similar aggregate production functions.     

DOES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS AFFECT FIRM PERFORMANCE OF CONSUMER CO‐OPERATIVES? THE CASE OF ICOOP KOREA

Consumer co‐operatives in Korea have been growing rapidly since they launched their own shops. If co‐operatives would be too much oriented to enlargement or economic growth, they might easily pay no attention to members’ participation which is one of the priorities in co‐operatives. It could lead to losing the value of co‐operatives. So it is important to adjust the balance between members’ participation and economic growth. This paper focuses on the role of board of directors in doing that. It aims to examine how effectiveness of the board influences members’ participation and the participation has effect on performance of co‐operatives in the case of iCOOP Korea. The variables such as communication with members and usage of management skills and knowledge are employed as measures of the effectiveness of the board in decision‐making process. The data are collected by survey the respondents of which are 222 directors of 30 primary co‐operatives. It is analyzed by Structural Equation Model. The findings of the research are as follows. Firstly, communication of the board with members increases the members’ democratic participation, and the increased participation contributes to improving the financial performance. Secondly, management skills and knowledge of the board does not have significant relations with the level of members’ participation, even though members’ economic participation has significantly positive relation with the financial performance. The findings imply that members’ voluntary participation will be increased when boards of co‐operatives try to reflect members’ needs in the decision making processes, and it can help the co‐operatives improve their financial performance. It suggests a clue for the trade‐off between the value of co‐operatives and growth of business which many co‐operatives are trying to resolve.     

Democracy and climate change policies: Is history important?

This paper argues that it is countries' historical experience with democracy, the democratic capital stock, rather than current levels of democracy that determines current climate change policies. Empirical evidence using data starting as far back as year 1800 for 87 countries, which together are responsible for 93.7% of global carbon emissions, suggests that the democratic capital stock has an important and robust effect on climate change policies. A history of executive constraints is particularly important. The current level of democracy does not play a role once democratic capital has been accounted for.     

Does Democracy Lead to a Better Environment? Deforestation and the Democratic Transition Peak

The relationship between democracy and environment is subject to controversy. Some scientists find that democracy has a positive impact in reducing environmental disruption. Other scholars claim that democracy tends to accelerate environmental degradation. By using deforestation rates as a proxy for environmental disruption, we suggest that both sides might be right. Our quantitative analysis has three important outcomes. First, there is evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between deforestation and democracy. Second, countries in democratic transition experience the highest deforestation rates, compared to non-democracies and mature democracies. Third, in explaining deforestation rates democracy has larger explanatory power than income. This last result implies that in reducing deforestation rates the emphasis should not only be on economic development but even more on democratization.     

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM, FISCAL POLICY, AND GROWTH NEXUS: SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR FIJI

This article presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between political and civil liberty, economic freedom, and growth for Fiji. Fiji's experience of two military coups in 1987, the delay to resolve the agricultural land lease issues, and the implementation of the 1990 Constitution have been major setbacks in terms of Fiji's nondemocratic political environment and uncertain economic policies, a decline in the private investment and exports, and an exodus of skilled labor. This experience severely damaged the growth prospects whereby unstable sociopolitical institutions undermined the importance of economic freedom and civil liberties of its citizens and foreign investors. Empirical results presented here support the view that democratic values and economic freedom are significant for growth. A statistical test for the endogeneity of democracy variable rejects the null, thus the reverse causality, so democratic environment and economic freedom lead to higher economic growth.