Social polarization, fiscal instability and growth

We present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization (of preferences) plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse. In a highly polarized society, a deficit occurs endogenously, fiscal spending path becomes more volatile, output collapses, and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output. One novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit, the magnitude of fiscal volatility, and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization. This is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers (or socio-economic groups) to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting (polarization effect). Thereby, we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth, which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth. Moreover, we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short-term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization. Polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting.     

Inflation and Exchange Rate Targeting Challenges Under Fiscal Dominance

Countries have significantly increased their public-sector borrowing since the Global Financial Crisis. As a consequence, monetary authorities may face pressure to deviate from their policy targets in ways designed to ease the debt burden. In view of this consideration, we test for greater fiscal dominance over 2000-2017 under Inflation Targeting (IT) and non-IT regimes. We find that evidence of fiscal dominance varies across countries and debt configurations. Higher ratios of public debt-to-GDP may appear associated with lower policy interest rates in advanced economies. However, a declining natural rate of interest largely explains the pattern of lower rates and higher debt in these countries. The most robust evidence of fiscal dominance lies among emerging markets under non-IT regimes, composed mostly of exchange rate targeters. For these countries, policy interest rates are non-linearly associated with public debt levels, depending on both the level of hard-currency public debt-to-GDP and the currency composition of public debt. We also show that emerging market economies with greater exchange rate volatility, inflation volatility, and underlying commodity exposure exhibit stronger associations between public debt and policy interest rates.     

Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries

Many believe and argue that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling. To analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation, we present a career-concerns model with political parties. This allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto-separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt accumulation (at least by reducing an electoral cycle in deficits), that right-wing governments (at least for strategic reasons) tend to have higher deficits than left-wing governments, and that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation. To test the predictions of the model, we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency on 19-country OECD data. Simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and deficits, independent of controls for explanatory variables from other approaches.     

Mandatory spending,political polarization,and macroeconomic volatility

This paper studies the impact of political polarization on macroeconomic volatility in a political economy model of optimal fiscal policy. I introduce the distinction between mandatory and discretionary public spending in a model where consumers disagree on the size of the public sector. In the presence of political turnover and political polarization, public policies that affect individual decision-making lead to macroeconomic volatility. I show that the legislative requirements behind the changes in mandatory public spending can reduce macroeconomic volatility caused by political polarization and political turnover. The numerical simulations of the model suggest that in the presence of a binding constraint on the changes in mandatory spending, an increase in the political polarization is associated with an increase in the share of mandatory spending and a decrease in the macroeconomic volatility, consistent with the U.S. data.     

Fiscal Convergence, Business Cycle Volatility, and Growth

This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal convergence on business cycle volatility and growth. Using a panel of 11 EMU and 21 OECD countries and 40 years of data, we find that countries with similar government budget positions tend to have smoother business cycles. That is, fiscal convergence (in the form of persistently similar ratios of government surplus/deficit to GDP) is systematically associated with smoother business cycles. We also find evidence that reduced business cycle volatility through higher fiscal convergence stimulates growth. Our empirical results are economically and statistically significant, and robust.     

Fiscal institutions and public spending volatility in Europe

This work provides empirical evidence for a sizeable, statistically significant negative impact of the quality of fiscal institutions on public spending volatility for a panel of 23 EU countries over the 1980–2007 period. The dependent variable is the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy, which does not represent reactions to changes in economic conditions. Our baseline results thus give support to the strengthening of institutions to deal with excessive levels of discretion volatility, as more checks and balances make it harder for governments to change fiscal policy for reasons unrelated to the current state of the economy. Our results also show that bigger countries and bigger governments have less public spending volatility. In contrast to previous studies, the political factors do not seem to play a role, with the exception of the Herfindahl index, which suggests that a high concentration of parliamentary seats in a few parties would increase public spending volatility.     

Political and Fiscal Risk Determinants of Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Markets

Using a panel of 46 emerging market economies from 1997 to 2008, this paper investigates the key determinants of country risk premiums as measured by sovereign bond spreads. Unlike previous studies, the results indicate that both political and fiscal factors matter for credit risk in emerging markets. Lower levels of political risk are associated with tighter spreads, particularly during financial turmoil. Efforts at fiscal consolidation narrow credit spreads, especially in countries with high initial public debt levels. The composition of fiscal policy also matters as higher public investment lowers spreads as long as the fiscal position remains sustainable and the fiscal deficit does not worsen.     

Political frictions and public policy outcomes

We study the role of political frictions in public policy outcomes. We propose a simple model of fiscal policy that combines a lack of commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction that can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking. We show that political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking leads to higher public spending. We evaluate the importance of different political frictions for fiscal policy outcomes using a sample of twenty developed countries. We find that the data on political instability combined with the data on public rent-seeking explain 25% of the variation in public debt levels.     

Rent-seeking distortions and fiscal procyclicality

Recent research has demonstrated that while government expenditures are countercyclical in most industrialized countries, they tend to be procyclical in developing countries. We develop a dynamic political-economy model to explain this phenomenon. In the model, public expenditures provide insurance to uninsured households, and optimal fiscal policy is countercyclical. The introduction of a political friction, in which successive governments disagree on the desired distribution of public spending, can lead to procyclical fiscal policies. Numerical simulations of the model allow us to compare quantitatively the relative role of common explanations for fiscal procyclicality. We conclude that political distortions in the fiscal process can explain fiscal procyclicality better than other common explanations, such as borrowing constraints and macroeconomic volatility.     

Political Leaders' Socioeconomic Background and Public Budget Deficits: Evidence from OECD Countries

This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between political leaders' socioeconomic backgrounds and public budget deficits utilizing panel data on 21 OECD countries from 1980 to 2008. Building on sociological, as well as economic research, we argue that the socioeconomic status of political decision‐makers, i.e., presidents or prime ministers, is an important determinant of fiscal budget decisions. Our theory‐consistent findings show that the tenures of lower‐class leaders – i.e., leaders of low socioeconomic status – are associated with a deficit‐to‐GDP ratio which is 1.6 percentage points higher than that during tenures of upper‐class leaders.     

Growth, income distribution, and fiscal policy volatility

The relationship between income distribution and economic growth has long been an important economic research subject. Despite substantial evidence on the negative impact on long-term growth of inequality in the literature, however, there is not much consensus on the specific channels through which inequality affects growth. The empirical validity of two most prominent political economy channels - redistributive fiscal spending and taxes, and sociopolitical instability - has recently been challenged. We advance a new political economy channel for the negative link between inequality and growth, a fiscal policy volatility channel, and present strong supporting econometric evidence in a large sample of countries over the period of 1960-2000. Our finding also sheds light on another commonly observed negative relation between macroeconomic volatility and growth. We carefully address the robustness of the results in terms of data, estimation methods, outlier problem, and endogeneity problem that often plague the standard OLS (ordinary least squares) regression.     

相机抉择政策、经济增长与地区产出波动

本文旨在研究地方政府的相机抉择政策对经济增长和产出波动的实际影响。本文首先从预算软约束和晋升激励的角度分析这一政策的作用方式，然后用模型测度出相机抉择政策，并以2000—2013年的省际面板数据进行实证检验。研究表明，相机抉择的确刺激了地方经济增长，但却带来了明显的产出波动。不过相机抉择政策具有明显的时滞，其真实效果集中凸显在政策实施的两年后。因此，我国应加强公共财政制度的建设，使相机抉择政策在规则的框架下更为合理地使用。     

International Reserves and Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries

This paper investigates empirically the relationship between the pattern of fiscal policy and the demand for international reserves in developing countries, and how this relationship is associated with political risk and conditional access to global capital markets. It finds evidence that for developing countries with low political risk, countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policies are associated with higher (lower) international reserve holdings in economic downturns. The relationship is stronger when the countries with low political risk rely heavily on external financing. For developing countries with high political risk, the link between reserves holdings and fiscal policy pattern is not clear-cut.     

Investing Volatile Resource Revenues in Capital‐Scarce Economies

Natural resource revenues are an important financing source for public investment in many developing economies. Investing volatile resource revenues, however, may subject an economy to macroeconomic instability. This paper studies fiscal approaches to investing resource revenues, using Angola as an example. With spend‐as‐you‐go, resource revenues are spent as received, resulting in little external saving; public investment can be interrupted, driving up the capital depreciation rate and undermining stability. Gradual scaling‐up, instead, allows countries to build up external saving to shield investment from revenue volatility. The framework adopted here can be used as a planning tool to define a medium‐term fiscal strategy.     

Global capital markets,housing prices,and partisan fiscal policies

In recent years, global imbalances have channeled the excess savings of surplus countries toward the real estate markets of deficit countries. By consequence, the deficit countries that attracted lots of foreign capital experienced large run‐ups in house prices, whereas most surplus countries that exported capital exhibited flat or slow house price growth. We first use new house price data and a novel instrumental variable design to show the causal relationship between housing prices and capital inflows, particularly through debt bonanzas. We then argue that international capital flows affect the fiscal policy preferences of both voters and political parties by way of their impact on housing prices. Where capital inflows are large and housing prices are rising, we expect voters to respond by demanding both lower taxes and less publicly‐provided social insurance because rising house prices allow homeowners to self‐insure against income loss. In contrast, declining house prices produce greater demands for social insurance, particularly among those most exposed to housing market risk. We present evidence from two cross‐national surveys that supports these claims, as well as a “before and after” analysis of the housing crash in Eastern Europe. We also show that the connection between house prices and social policy also manifests itself in government spending outcomes, mediated by partisan control.     

Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies

In this paper we reconsider the trade-off between rules and discretion in fiscal policy in the presence of politically motivated fiscal deficits. We present a model of political bias in the budget process appropriately developed to allow for tax-smoothing-motivated deficits as well as for the consideration of deficit biases in open economies. We find that endowing politically-biased governments with the ability to respond to economic shocks with deficit finance will not exacerbate the existing biases. In an open economy, the ability to borrow abroad will significantly increase the deficit. However, restrictions to public foreign borrowing will not reduce the political bias as long as the private sector has access to international capital markets at the same terms as the government.     

Natural Resource Exports,Fiscal Policy Volatility and Growth

The combination of poor institutions and erratic macroeconomic policy, as measured by the volatility of fiscal policy, is associated with slower growth. We show that macroeconomic policy is more erratic in countries that are rich in natural resources, especially minerals and fuels, and in those that receive large aid inflows. Poor institutions also play a role. Although Africa is a major receiver of aid and exporter of natural resources, this is not purely an African phenomenon. Output volatility is not associated with slower growth after controlling for institutions and the volatility of fiscal policy.     

Inequality and public debt: A positive analysis

This study extends the multi‐country, politico‐economic model of fiscal policy to incorporate wage inequality within each country. In this extended framework, we present conflict over fiscal policy within and across generations and show that a low‐inequality country realizes tight fiscal policy with low public debt accumulation, whereas a high‐inequality country experiences loose fiscal policy with high public debt. This model prediction is consistent with empirical evidence from OECD countries for the years 1980 to 2010.     

Growth Effects of Fiscal Policy and Debt Sustainability in the EU

In this paper we study the relationship of fiscal policy and economicperformance of some core countries in the EU. Our aim is to find outwhether public deficit and public debt have consequences for real variables in the economies we consider. The background of our empirical study is a growth model that provides us with some predictions on the relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth. In a first step we then use Granger causality tests to analyze empirically whether some of the implications of our model arecompatible with the data. In a second step, we investigate whether the fiscalpolicies of the member states have been sustainable. Given this information,we then pursue the question of whether differences in the fiscal positions ofcountries have consequences as concerns the outcome of our empirical testsof step one. Finally, we study whether the impact of the public deficit ratiodepends on the magnitude of the debt ratio.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.