Does Inequality Foster Corruption?

In this paper, we investigate how inequality affects corruption in the presence of an imperfect credit market. We favor an explanation based on a multimarket framework where corruption in one market (or sector) arises because of imperfections exacerbated by inequality in related markets. We demonstrate that even when an individual's ability to pay bribes and benefit from engaging in corruption are not affected by wealth level, greater (wealth) inequality will lead to an increase in corruption.     

Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth

This paper uses an encompassing framework developed by Murphy et al. (1991, 1993) to study corruption and how it affects income distribution and growth. We find that (1) corruption affects income distribution in an inverted U-shaped way, (2) corruption alone also explains a large proportion of the Gini differential across developing and industrial countries, and (3) after correcting for measurement errors, corruption seems to retard economic growth. But the effect is far less pronounced than the one found in Mauro (1995). Moreover, corruption alone explains little of the continental growth differentials. In countries where the asset distribution is less equal, corruption is associated with a smaller increase in income inequality and a larger drop in growth rates.     

Corruption and legislature size: Evidence from Brazil

This paper studies whether and how legislatures affect political corruption. Using a regression discontinuity design in the context of Brazilian municipalities, we find a positive causal impact of council size on corruption levels, as detected by random federal audits. This indicates that an extra councilor represents an additional political actor potentially interested in diverting public resources, which we define as a rent extraction effect. However, we find further evidence that, in some contexts, larger councils enhance the representation of opposition parties and effectively increase monitoring over the executive, attenuating the rent extraction effect. Namely, in municipalities where opposition parties are typically underrepresented, the additional seat in the council is absorbed by the opposition and corruption outcomes do not worsen. In addition, only in such context, mayors are more commonly sentenced for misconduct in office by judicial authorities, whose investigations anecdotally often originates from councilors denouncing mayors to local courts. Overall, our findings show that legislature size is detrimental to corruption outcomes but less so where the representation of opposition parties improves with the enlargement of the legislature.     

Debt financing,soft budget constraints,and government ownershipEvidence from China1

Debt financing is expected to improve the quality of corporate governance, but we find, using a large sample of public listed companies (PLCs) from China, that an increase in bank loans increases the size of managerial perks and free cash flows and decreases corporate efficiency. We find that bank lending facilitates managerial exploitation of corporate wealth in government‐controlled firms, but constrains managerial agency costs in firms controlled by private owners. We argue that the failure of corporate governance may derive from the shared government ownership of lenders and borrowers, which nurtures soft budget constraints.     

Corruption,product complexity and African exporters

Several studies have shown that African manufacturers perform poorly, especially in comparison to their counterparts from other developing countries. We build on these studies by (a) examining the decision to stop exporting among African manufacturers and (b) investigating whether these decisions can be linked to institutional dimensions (such as corruption). Consistent with previous studies, we observe that a significant fraction of African firms stop exporting every year. Using product complexity as a measure of an industry’s ‘sensitivity’ to corruption, we find that firms in more ‘corruption-sensitive’ industries are more likely to stop exporting if there is an increase in overall corruption in the exporting country. Firm characteristics (such as size and productivity) also seem to influence the decision to stop exporting. Our finding about the relationship between corruption and the decision to stop exporting supports the conventional wisdom that corruption is detrimental to economic performance.     

The effect of corruption on microfinance loan portfolio: A semiparametric analysis

In this paper, we examine the extent to which corruption affects the loan portfolio of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We employ robust econometric estimation on a sample of 507 MFIs across 63 countries from 2005 to 2018. Our results show that corruption is negatively associated with the loan portfolio. However, in semiparametric analysis, we find that lower-level corruption is beneficial to increase the loan portfolio while higher-level corruption is detrimental. The results imply that it is not just corruption that matters as far as its effect on MFIs' loan portfolio is concerned; what matters is the degree of corruption. In further analyses, we find that corruption reduces both the number of active borrowers and average loan per borrower indicating that corruption reduces both coverage and amount of credit extension. The results suggest that the effect of corruption on the loan portfolio is gender-sensitive. Corruption facilitates an increase in loans to female borrowers. Our results are robust to alternative variable measurements and different identification strategies, including two-stage least square.     

Corruption,workforce selection and mismatch in the public sector

We examine the impact of corruption on workforce selection and personnel allocation in the public sector. Using Italian data, we find that the selection of public employees in terms of human capital worsens in comparison to that of their private sector counterparts in areas with higher levels of corruption. Moreover, corruption is associated with educational mismatch in the allocation of human resources and, in particular, with an increase in the rate of under-qualification. These results are robust to several alternative indicators and specifications, including IV estimation using past dependence on public spending and the historical relevance of foreign domination as exogenous sources of variation for current corruption.     

Emissions Trading, Wealth Transfers and the Wounded Bull Scenario in Power Generation

Electricity generators accept that emissions trading is fundamental to meeting CO₂ reduction targets. But unless a percentage of permits are allocated, existing generators will face non-trivial wealth transfers. Seldom contemplated in academic works are the adverse economic consequences of an all-auction approach to emissions trading. Using Victoria to illustrate, we find that once CO₂ prices exceed $17.50/t, the marginal coal generator facing large wealth transfers will withhold generating capacity to raise prices and recoup stranded investments, thus becoming a 'wounded bull' in the market place. This has material welfare implications with modelling results indicate an intermediate-run 300 per cent increase in wholesale power prices.     

Do the poor benefit from globalization regardless of institutional quality?

Despite significant progress towards the Millennium goals, more than one billion people live on less than 1.25 US dollars per day. Previous research suggests that globalization stimulates poverty reduction, but does not investigate what role institutions play in this relationship. Theoretically, globalization could act as either a complement or a substitute to institutional quality in reducing poverty. We find that the poverty-reducing effect of globalization is stronger when institutions are weak. In particular, increasing social globalization reduces poverty more when corruption is high and democratic accountability is low. Thus, globalization has the power to reduce poverty even in countries with low institutional quality.     

Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption

We present a model where agents can inflate the cost of goods needed to start an investment project and inflation variability increases monitoring costs. We show that inflation variability can lead to higher corruption and lower investment. We document a positive relationship between corruption and inflation variability in a sample of 75 countries. The effect is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, other controls, and 2SLS estimation. The results are economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in inflation variance from the median increases corruption by 12 percent of a standard deviation and reduces growth by 0.33 percentage points. Our paper highlights a new channel through which inflation reduces investment and growth, thus bridging the perception gap over the costs of inflation between economists and the public. We also find evidence that political competition reduces corruption and that corruption is pro-cyclical.     

The effect of informal employment and corruption on income levels in Brazil

This paper exploits a unique dataset on corruption and informal sector employment in 476 Brazilian municipalities to estimate whether corruption impacts GDP or income levels once variation in informal economic activity is taken into account. Overall, I find that higher levels of corruption and a large informal economy are generally associated with poor economic outcomes. However, only the size of the informal economy has a statistically significant effect. This effect is robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls and fixed effects, as well as an instrumental variable analysis. Further, these effects are large in magnitude. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the share of total employees that are informally employed explains a decrease in GDP per-capita of about 18%.     

CORRUPTION AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES

In this study we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality. Our analysis advances the existing literature in three ways. First, instead of using one of the corruption indices assembled by various investment risk services, we use an objective measure of corruption: the number of public officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. Second, we minimize the problems which are likely to arise because of data incomparability by examining the differences in income inequality across the United States. Finally, we exploit both time series and cross‐sectional variation in the data. We find robust evidence that an increase in corruption increases income inequality. (JEL D31, D73, I32)     

Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.     

Public policy,dynamic status preferences,and wealth inequality

This paper studies the effect of productive government spending (taxation) on aggregate savings behavior and its consequences for the dynamics of wealth inequality, taking into consideration key behavioral changes that occur during the process of economic development. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that during this process agents' preferences toward status (positional consumption) evolves according to the average wealth of the society. The sources of wealth include private capital and productive public capital, the latter financed by a distortionary income tax. This dynamic status effect impacts peoples' responses to tax policy in ways which contrast with those of the standard neoclassical model. Specifically, we find that in response to an increase in the income tax, in economies with a strong (weak) enough dynamic status effect, savings and inequality increase (decrease). Incorporating the behavioral changes to fiscal policy expands the set of mechanisms available to explain the observed variations of savings and wealth distribution dynamics that cannot be attributed to technological or other structural factors.     

INCREASES IN WEALTH AMONG THE ELDERLY IN THE EARLY 1990s: HOW MUCH IS DUE TO SURVEY DESIGN?

The Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) study shows a large increase in reported total wealth between 1993 and 1995. Such an increase is not found in other U.S. household surveys around that period. This paper examines one source of this difference. We find that in AHEAD 1993 ownership rates of stocks, CDs, bonds, and checking and saving accounts were under-reported, resulting in under-measurement of wealth in 1993 and a substantial increase in wealth from 1993 to 1995. The explanation for the under-reporting is a combination of question sequence and wording in the AHEAD survey instrument.     

The Impact of Inheritance on the Distribution of Wealth: Evidence from Great Britain

Using the British Household Panel Survey, we investigate the role of inheritance in shaping the distribution of household wealth in Great Britain during 1995–2005a period characterized by a substantial increase in wealth and an equally important decrease in wealth inequality. Abstracting from behavioral effects, we find that inheritances received during this period accounted for 30 percent of the increase in wealth of inheritors. Regression estimates of the effect of inheritance on wealth accumulation suggest that households spend 30 percent of their inheritances on average, and that there is substantial heterogeneity in household responses. Households that accumulated more wealth saved a larger share of their inheritances, as did middle aged households and those with lower initial wealth. Although inheritances are highly unequal they had a small impact on overall wealth inequality. This mainly reflected the fact that their size relative to other sources of wealth was very small.     

Taxation,corruption, and growth

We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.     

政府规模、市场化与地区腐败

Using a panel data at the provincial level during the period of 1989–2004, this paper examines the effects of social and economic factors such as government scale, privatization, openness, and education on regional corruption. Applying a fixed-effect model and IV estimation, we find that government size positively affects the incidence rate of corruption, and the effect becomes larger with the increase in the size of the core department of the government. 1% increase in the core department of the government leads to a 0.68%–1% increase in the number of corruption cases. While the proportion of FDI is positively associated with the corruption of regional officials, the ratio of the import and export trade to GDP is negatively associated with corruption. The impact of privatization on corruption is ambiguous. We also identify the significant impacts of the size and structure of the government expenditure on corruption. __________ Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2008, (11): 16–26     

Country governance,corruption, and the likelihood of firms’ innovation

Using a sample of firms from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for the period 2006–2016 in emerging and developing countries, we find that corruption has a negative impact on the likelihood of innovations, thus supporting the “sanding-the-wheels” hypothesis. Our empirical results also show that corruption at the firm level, in the manufacturing industry, and in regions with the worst governance or that are more corrupt has a significant negative effect on innovation. In addition, country governance plays a particularly important role in innovative activity for corrupt firms. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption in order to improve firms’ innovation within an environment of corruption.     

Anticorruption reforms,tax evasion,and the role of harassment

We examine the impact of anticorruption reforms on tax evasion when corruption and potentially harassment are endemic among tax auditors. We find that the threat of harassment may counterintuitively boost the impact of such anticorruption reforms on tax evasion and also eliminate corruption. Specifically, a moderate anticorruption policy can discontinuously reduce tax evasion to a level even below that under no corruption. Further strengthening of such policy can nonetheless prove counterproductive and increase tax evasion. On the contrary, in the absence of harassment, a moderate anticorruption reform induces higher tax evasion and sustenance of bribery. In this case, only a large reform can reduce tax evasion and eliminate corruption.