Variety-skill complementarity: a simple resolution of the trade-wage inequality anomaly

The Stolper–Samuelson theorem predicts that the relative wage of high-skilled to low-skilled labor will increase in the high-skill abundant US but decrease in low-skill abundant Mexico after trade liberalization, while it actually began to rise in both countries in the late 1980s. We present a simple resolution of this “trade-wage inequality anomaly” in a model of variety trade. Variety trade increases the variety of intermediate goods used by the final good. If the varieties and high-skilled labor are complements, the skill premium rises in both countries. This linking of imports of new foreign varieties—the extensive margin—to wage inequality is compatible with evidence. Our numerical examples illustrate that small amounts of variety trade can produce a significant increase in relative wage.     

Cross-Country Externalities of Trade and FDI Liberalization

We develop a three-country heterogeneous-firm model and show that FDI liberalization in one foreign country (F1) results in the following: (i) some firms from the home country switch from export to FDI in F1; (ii) skilled labor’s wage rate drops in the home country; (iii) wage inequality between the skilled and unskilled labor decreases; and (iv) some firms from the home country switch from FDI to export to another foreign country (F2). The effects from trade liberalization are just the opposite, but the effects from education improvement are qualitatively the same as FDI liberalization. The cross-country externalities work through the domestic labor market.     

Domestic Unionization and the Political Economy of Strategic Export Policy

This paper examines the effect of lobbying by a labor union and its parent firm on the argument for strategic export policy in a third market-unionized duopoly. The lobbying-induced export policy frequently deteriorates domestic welfare as compared with free trade. It is true that the politically-determined export policy can improve domestic welfare if the union's bargaining power is strong and the domestic government's responsiveness to political contributions is weak. However, even if the conditions are met, implementing the lobbying-induced export policy will not enhance domestic welfare more than improving labor–management relations. Moreover, the improvement of their relations will be hampered by the opportunity of their lobbying. These results indicate that strategic export policy toward a unionized duopoly should be restrained in light of political economy.     

Wage bargaining,trade and growth

We construct a North-South product-cycle model of trade with fully-endogenous growth and union wage bargaining. Economic growth is driven by Northern entrepreneurs who conduct R&D to innovate higher quality products. Northern production technologies can leak to the South upon successful imitation. The North has two sectors: a tradable industrial goods sector (manufacturing) where wages are determined via a bargaining process and a non-tradable sector (services) where wages are flexible. The South has only a tradable industrial goods sector where wages are flexible.We find that unilateral Northern trade liberalization, in the form of lower Northern tariffs on industrial goods, increases the rate of innovation but decreases both the bargained wage in the industrial sector and the flexible wage in the service sector. The wage effects are relative to the Southern wage rate. We also consider a variant of the model with Northern unemployment, driven by a binding minimum wage in the non-tradable service sector. In this case, Northern tariff cuts decrease the innovation rate and the bargained wage rate. In addition, the Northern unemployment rate increases. The model thus highlights the role of labor market institutions in determining the growth and labor market effects of tariff reductions. We also study the effects of unilateral Southern trade liberalization.     

A North–South model of outsourcing and growth

In this paper, I formulate a simple North–South R&D‐based growth model where final goods firms in the North endogenously determine the range of international outsourcing of intermediate goods to the South. I show that a fall in the trade cost (through trade liberalization) of intermediate goods in the North: (i) reduces the wage of the North relative to that of the South; (ii) increases the outsourced variety of intermediate goods in the North; and (iii) stimulates Northern R&D activity and economic growth in both countries. By conducting welfare analysis, I also show that a decline in the trade cost of intermediate goods in the North improves welfare in the South more than in the North.     

Trade liberalization in environmental goods

Trade negotiations have started to pay attention to liberalization in environmental goods (EGs), whose production may require dirty intermediate goods. We construct a two-country trade model to explore the effects of trade liberalization in EGs on the local pollution, the global environment and welfare in the presence of such an environmental conundrum. We find that countries do not necessarily benefit from trade liberalization in EGs in the absence of an environmental policy. With the assistance of an upstream pollution tax, trade liberalization in EGs improves each country's welfare. This result holds independent of whether the upstream market is competitive or not, or whether we have upstream trade across countries. For asymmetric countries, trade liberalization in EGs improves the world welfare and the welfare for the country if it has a smaller demand for EGs; or experiences less damage from the production of dirty inputs; or values environment improvement more.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

Globalization and inter‐industry wage differentials in China

This paper explores the relationship between globalization and inter‐industry wage differentials in China by using a two‐stage estimation approach. Taking advantage of a rich household survey dataset, this paper estimates the wage premium for each industry in the first stage conditional on individual worker and firm characteristics. Alternative measures of globalization are considered in the second stage: trade openness and capital openness. A disaggregation of trade into trade in final and intermediate goods shows that increases in import (export) shares of final goods reduce (increase) the wage premia significantly, whereas imports or exports of intermediate goods do not explain differences in industry wage premia. This finding is supported by stronger effects for final goods trade in coastal than noncoastal regions. Our results also show a positive relationship between capital openness and industrial wage premia, though this finding is less robust when potential endogeneity issues are allowed for.     

产业内贸易对中国技能 工资差距的影响

本文试图考察产业内贸易对技能工资差距的影响,理论分析表明：它随劳动力条件的变化而变化,在劳动力无限供给条件下它取决于技术劳动力的绝对需求,由于产业内贸易必能刺激技术劳动力的绝对需求,因此必然会扩大工资差距。但在劳动力条件转向有限供给后,它又取决于技术劳动力的相对需求,而产业内贸易未必使之扩大,特别是对两类劳动力替代弹性较大的部门来说,可能会使技术劳动力的相对需求下降,并使技能工资差距收缩。本文基于中国33个产业的5年面板数据验证了上述假说。     

International Trade and Unemployment—the Worker‐selection Effect

This paper investigates the labor market effects of trade liberalization. We incorporate trade unions and heterogeneous workers into the Melitz framework. Workers differ with respect to their abilities. Our main findings are: (i) trade liberalization harms low‐ability workers, they lose their job and switch to long‐term unemployment (worker‐selection effect); (ii) high‐ability workers are better off in terms of both higher wages and higher employment; (iii) if a country is endowed with a large fraction of low‐ability workers, trade liberalization leads to a rise in aggregate unemployment—in this case, trade liberalization may harm a country's welfare; (iv) the overall employment and welfare effect crucially hinges on the characteristics of the wage bargain.     

A Schumpeterian North–South Growth Model of Trade and Wage Inequality*

The paper presents a dynamic general‐equilibrium model of interindustry North–South trade that is used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the Northern wage distribution. Both countries have a low‐tech sector where consumer goods of constant quality are produced by use of unskilled labor. The North also has a high‐tech sector that employs skilled labor and features a quality‐ladder model structure with endogenous growth. Both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. In a balanced trade equilibrium, it is found that Southern‐originated (Northern‐originated) trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in Northern wage inequality both between skilled and unskilled workers and within the group of skilled workers. The endogenous change in the Southern terms of trade determines the direction of change in unskilled wages in both the North and the South.     

Wage indexation,migration, and unemployment

This article sets up a two-goods model with wage indexation and migrants. A dual labor market is introduced where the domestic workers receive an indexed wage while migrants receive a market-determined wage. The traded sector may be assumed to be unionized while the non-traded goods sector is non-unionized giving rise to flexible wages. This provides an example of segmentation and wage indexation. The wage indexation creates unemployment in the traded sector and the segmentation allows this unemployment to persist. The main results obtained are: sector-specific migration of labor may raise domestic welfare, while with capital accumulation such migration necessarily raises the relative price of the non-traded goods, leading to structural adjustment.     

Trade liberalization and Firms’ export performance in China: Theory and evidence

The focus of the literature surrounding trade liberalization has recently shifted from trade liberalization in imported final goods to studying the effects of trade liberalization in imported intermediate inputs. This emphasis fits very well the trade liberalization experience of China following its accession to the WTO in 2001. In this paper, we build a multi-sector heterogenous-firm model with trade in both intermediate goods and final goods, and we ask: How do final-goods producers respond to trade liberalization in imported inputs? Do they respond differently across sectors? How do firms respond differently to trade liberalization in imported-outputs instead? We separate the total effect of trade liberalization into those caused by inter-sectoral resource allocation (IRA) and by within-sector selection of firms according to productivity (which we call Melitz selection effect). It is the IRA effect that gives rise to differential impacts of trade liberalization in different sectors. These impacts include changes in the probability of entry into the export market, the fraction of firms that export and the share of export revenue. To test our hypotheses, we carry out both quantitative analysis and empirical analysis by using Chinese firm-level data. The results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.     

Import Competition and Worker Productivity in Unionized Firms

This paper analyzes the effects of trade and labor market liberalization on wages and worker productivity/effort in a domestic unionized firm with firm-union bargaining over wages and effort. It is shown that both types of liberalization will induce a 'cold shower effect' (a rise in effort) if the union's objective function is more heavily weighted towards employment. However, the welfare effects of the two policies can differ markedly. The paper also identifies a separate productivity cost of protection associated with the distortionary effect of protection on worker effort.     

The codetermined firm in a Cournot duopoly: A stability analysis

This paper aims to study the stability issue in a Cournot duopoly with codetermined firms. We show that when both firms codetermine employment together with decentralised employees' representatives, a rise in wages acts as an economic (de)stabiliser when the wage is fairly (high) low, while under profit maximisation a rise in wages always acts as a stabilising device because the parametric stability region monotonically increases with the wage in such a case. Moreover, a rise in the union's bargaining power has a de-stabilising effect, except when the wage is low and the firm power is already high. Therefore, under codetermination a change either in the wage or firm power in the Nash bargaining plays an ambiguous role on stability. We also show with numerical simulations that complex dynamics can also occur.     

Welfare Effects of Reducing Home Bias in Government Procurements: A Dynamic Contest Model

This paper models an international contest for government procurement as a dynamic game between a domestic firm and a foreign firm. We show that trade liberalization, in the form of a reduction in bias against the foreign firm, improves both domestic and global welfare if (i) either the foreign firm's profit is sufficiently large or (ii) the initial degree of home bias is sufficiently small. If the initial home bias is large, a small reduction in the bias may reduce welfare.     

Goods market responses to trade shocks and trade and wages decompositions

Abstract.  Trade and wages literature asks whether trade or technology has been the major factor behind increases in wage inequality in OECD countries since the 1980s. In this literature, little attention has been paid to how goods market responses to trade shocks affect conclusions. Using an Armington heterogeneous goods trade model we capture demand side effects, and show how trade shocks affecting the price of unskilled‐intensive importable goods can be absorbed on the demand side of goods markets, with little or no impact on relative wage rates. No wage impact occurs if the elasticity of substitution in preferences between imports and import substitutes is one. As this elasticity increases, trade plays an ever larger role in explaining wage inequality changes, and as the elasticity goes below one the sign of the effect changes. We present some results of general equilibrium decompositions of total wage change into trade and technology components using UK data. We suggest that since many import demand elasticity estimates are in the neighbourhood of one, there is a prima facie case that goods market considerations further lower the significance of trade as an explanation of recent trends in OECD wage inequality beyond that claimed in the literature.     

Trade in goods and services: Two sides of the same coin?

This study analyzes the interrelationship between goods and services in production and trade using the most recent input–output tables for all OECD countries. It first describes the role of services in production and trade in goods. Next, it proposes two models for analyzing the impact of services trade liberalization on industrial structure. The first captures the role of trade in tasks when countries have different technology i) in production of services; and ii) in organizing production. The latter has to the author's knowledge not been analyzed in the trade literature before. Countries with superior organizational technology (e.g. Japan) will strengthen their comparative advantage in manufacturing following trade liberalization in services. The second model explores the interrelationship between intermediate goods and services i) when they are substitutes; and ii) when they are complements. In both models the gains from trade liberalization is non-linear in trade costs. Going the last mile of liberalization has a much larger impact than taking the first steps.     

Time zones,shift working and international outsourcing

We build a trade model with two identical countries located in different time zones and one sector with intermediate differentiated goods produced in two successive stages. We introduce shift working disutility that raises night wage and firms that “virtually” outsource foreign labor. We found that firms only outsource if outsourcing costs are relatively low and shift disutility is high. When outsourcing occurs, it generates the highest level of welfare among production modes. Intermediate values of shift working disutility generate the lowest level of welfare. Outsourcing and domestic labor are substitutes at the firm level and complements at the economy level.     

China's Regional Trade and Domestic Market Integrations

The global economic crisis in 2007 forced China to move from export‐led growth to promoting domestic demand. The move is significant, but the success of this new growth strategy depends critically on the level of domestic market integrations. In this paper, we use the methodology proposed by Anderson and Wincoop to examine China's domestic market integrations. We find evidence of border effects at both national and regional levels with significant regional differences, but they are smaller than some earlier studies suggest. Income growth, lower transportation costs, and higher intra‐industry trade all have positive effects on China's regional trade. Among the factors affecting regional trade, a better business environment has the largest positive impact on lifting China's domestic trade between regions, especially in intermediate goods, suggesting that improving business environment should be the priority of government at all levels in China.