Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment

To construct their Equilibrium Binding Agreements, Ray and Vohra (J. Econ. Theory, 73 (1997) 30-78) define a concept of an equilibrium between coalitions and prove its existence for any coalition structure. We show that this result crucially depends on the quasi-concavity of the utility functions, which in turn depends on the type of mixed strategies used by the coalitions. When coalitions use uncorrelated mixed strategies utility functions may not be quasi-concave and an equilibrium may not exist. However, if coalitions use correlated strategies, an equilibrium always exist.     

Aggregative games and best-reply potentials

This paper introduces quasi-aggregative games and establishes conditions under which such games admit a best-reply potential. This implies existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium without any convexity or quasi-concavity assumptions. It also implies convergence of best-reply dynamics under some additional assumptions. Most of the existing literature’s aggregation concepts are special cases of quasi-aggregative games, and many new situations are allowed for. An example is payoff functions that depend on own strategies as well as a linear combination of the mean and the variance of players’ strategies.     

On inferior inputs and marginal returns

An input is inferior if and only if an increase in its price raises all marginal productivities. A sufficient condition for input inferiority under quasi-concavity of the production function is then that there are increasing marginal returns with respect to the other input and a non-positive marginal productivity cross derivative. Thus, contrary to widespread opinion, input “competitiveness” is not needed. We discuss these facts and illustrate them by introducing a class of simple production function functional forms. Our results suggest that the existence of inferior inputs is naturally associated with increasing returns, and possibly strengthen the case for inferiority considerably.     

The Austrian theory of the marginal use and of ordinal marginal utility

Conclusion The Austrian theory of the marginal use raises almost as many problems as it has solved. We list here a few of these unsolved problems.Complementarity and rivalness do lead to the ALEP criterion in the examples we worked out above, but we have made no attempt to formalize this rule into a general theorem. Intuitively, the ALEP condition must appear when the complementary or rival relationships are somehow active in the inner or outer marginal uses, but it is not clear exactly what the circumstances are under which this holds.Although the theory leads to quasi-concavity of commodity preferences over goods in the particular cases we worked out, even when rival or complementary interactions are present, it has only been proven that this must be generally true when there are two goods, and then only in the case when the two goods are independent. Perhaps preferences do not really have to be quasi-concave after all.And finally, it must be resolved whether the possibility of intrinsically ordinal preferences nullifies the von Neumann-Morgenstern axiom system, or if instead the validity of those axioms rules out intrinsically ordinal preferences.After over a century, the Austrian theory is still in its youth. Perhaps the day has come for Felix Kaufmann's youngGrenznutzler to return from the netherworld of economic doctrine: There I will quietly lie in wait, Amid my neglected writings, Until I hear the trumpet call of Complementary Goods. Then through the sky will gallop Böhm-Bawerk, Polemics will thunder and flash! Then armed with a quill I'll rise up from the grave, To fight for theGrenznutzen school!²⁷ The author is Scherman Research Fellow at NBER-West and Assistant Professor at Boston College. He is grateful for helpful suggestions made by J. R. Meginniss and by various participants in seminars at Boston College, at the Universities of Hartford and Chicago, at Stanford University, and at NBER-West.     

试论强势品牌的经营优势

强势品牌能够给企业创造更大的边际收益,给企业带来更多的忠诚顾客,使企业拥有更稳定的品牌资产。强势品牌是企业经营的高级目标,是企业完成营销使命的重要载体。建立强势品牌必须通过准确的品牌定位,导入具有传播力的CI系统,在形成品牌知名度的基础上建立品牌美誉度、忠诚度,并保持品牌建设稳定性等策略得以实现。     

关于强互惠及政府型强互惠理论的研究

美国Santa Fe研究所的经济学家的研究表明,群体中自发的强互惠的出现,保证了合作在群体内的延续,从而使得群体成功演化.在此基础上,进一步认为 ,强互惠者的职业化以及政府型强互惠能更有效地对不合作者实施制裁,于是合作在强制下使得社会成为可能.     

EFFICIENT POLICY IN A PREDATORY ECONOMY: TO HIM WHO HATH SHALL BE GIVEN?*

Trade subject to predation generates externalities within and between markets. Efficient tax, infrastructure, and enforcement policies internalize the net externality—more trade implies fewer predators but drawn to trade at rising cost. The balance is positive (negative) as enforcement is weak (strong). Dual economies pair weak Periphery and strong Core enforcement markets. Efficient taxation and infrastructure promote the Core at the expense of the Periphery. Efficient enforcement promotes both. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is efficient when Core enforcement is weak (strong). Tolerance of informal market Mafias that provide enforcement and infrastructure is efficient when Core enforcement is strong.     

三维视角下中国特色知识产权强国理论体系建构研究

随着知识产权强国战略的深入实施,知识产权强国逐渐成为我国知识产权学界的研究热点,但相关理论体系尚未形成。从我国知识产权事业发展实际出发,基于本体论、价值论、实践论三维视角的马克思主义哲学思维范式,中国特色知识产权强国理论体系构建具有重要的理论意义和实践指导价值。知识产权强国本体论从静态分析和动态进程两个角度,考察知识产权强国的基本内涵,并以知识产权理论与实务、强国建设实践领域与组织结构为要素构建其基本结构,以知识产权能力、绩效及环境为切入点提炼出其主要表征。我国知识产权综合实力提升、知识产权事业发展是知识产权强国的元价值,由此体现出建设中国特色知识产权强国的内部价值和外部价值。按照发展本土化——意识大众化——角色定位明晰化——行动协同化、联动化4个步骤,从知识产权创造运用、管理、保护、人才培养及海外事务5大实施领域,建设具有中国特色、世界水平的知识产权强国。     

绿色经济强省建设的核心问题是绿色营销

如何抓住国家西部大开发的历史机遇发展云南经济，云南省委省政府将建设绿色经济强省作为重要战略目标之一。本文以、99世界园艺博览会的成功举办了范例，分析了建设经济强省思想形成的经济社会基础，论述了绿色营销与绿色经济强省建设的相互关系，强调了绿色经济强省建设的核心问题是绿色营销。     

ANALYSIS OF POLICY CHANGES IN THE SEAFOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY IN VIETNAM

Abstract. This paper examines firms’ competitiveness in the seafood processing industry in Vietnam and policy changes for global integration. We find that trade liberalization is a very important policy change that has generally positive impacts and generates strong reactions in the seafood processing industry. Exchange rate depreciation is also an important factor and receives strong responsiveness as most of firms’ intermediate inputs are tradable and seafood products are also tradable. Increasing electricity charges that reduce profitability also generate strong reactions. Oil and petrol comprise a small portion of intermediate inputs, hence increasing the oil price does not significantly hinder the industry and does not stimulate very strong reactions. The US anti‐dumping tariff strongly hurts firms’ profitability, not only seafood exporting firms but also non‐exporters.     

海外科研人才网络关系强度变化对其创造力的影响

基于1990-2015年我国引进的海外高端科研人才论文合著数据，研究海外高端科研人才网络特征动态变化对其创造力的影响机理。假设提出在动态网络关系下，以往强关系数量所占比例与当前强关系数量所占比例呈正相关关系，并且以往强关系数量所占比例会抑制新关系的产生，也会对创造力产生抑制作用；结构洞对以往强关系所占比例和创造力具有负向调节作用。利用负二项回归模型分析以往强关系数量所占比例、当前强关系数量所占比例、新关系所占比例及其交互作用对创造力的作用机理。以3年为数据窗口样本，回归分析结果显著支持所有假设。研究结论有利于深化对高端海外科研人才创造力的认识，为相关机构制定人才引进与使用政策提供建议。     

社会网络强弱关系对创新性机会识别的影响

创新性创业活动起源于创业者对创新性机会的识别。运用问卷调查法,分析创业者社会网络关系与创业机会创新性之间的逻辑联系,并探索了创业者创新性认知风格对该过程的影响。结果表明：弱关系相较于强关系对创业者所识别的创业机会的创新性有显著正向影响,混合利用强、弱关系相较于单一利用强关系/弱关系对创业机会的创新性有显著正向影响;创新性认知风格对创业机会的创新性有显著正向影响;创新性认知风格在混合利用强弱关系和创业机会创新性之间的作用关系中起正向调节作用。     

Income inequality and crime in the United States

This paper investigates the relationship between income inequality and crime. Results show that there is a strong and robust effect of relative income inequality on burglary. Effect on robbery is also strong and robust in most cases.     

Strong price of anarchy

A strong equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) to be the ratio of the worst strong equilibrium to the social optimum. Differently from the Price of Anarchy (defined as the ratio of the worst Nash Equilibrium to the social optimum), it quantifies the loss incurred from the lack of a central designer in settings that allow for coordination.We study the SPoA in two settings, namely job scheduling and network creation. In the job scheduling game we show that for unrelated machines the SPoA can be bounded as a function of the number of machines and the size of the coalition. For the network creation game we show that the SPoA is at most 2. In both cases we show that a strong equilibrium always exists, except for a well defined subset of network creation games.     

基于政府型强互惠的共享意义制度化的均衡与内卷

政府型强互惠将那些共享意义的习惯、习俗以具体的形式固定下来,实现制度化。当制度演化收敛于某一均衡点时,群体成员对于现行的规范体系不再有异动的要求,于是制度在均衡状态下表现为被简单的遗传复制,从而强互惠的政府就无须再对这些制度的强互惠投入成本,制度演化也自发地达成了均衡状态。在自发式内卷和强互惠式内卷两种力量共同作用下,制度会呈现长期低效率的锁定状态。     

Strong–weak collaborative management in coping supply chain disruption risk transmission based on scale-free networks

Supply chain disruption causes tremendous loss to supply chains and global businesses. Organizational structure and operational features of supply chain networks, therefore, constitute a major portion of research for coping with supply chain disruption risk. This article first discusses the theoretical foundation, analyses the strength theory of strong and weak ties and the collaborative theory of strong and weak ties. Also, research methods are explicated; the scale-free networks and the theory of strong ties are integrated; the features of supply chain networks are considered from single statistical parameters and comprehensive analyses. Next, we provide numeric simulation of the properties of supply chain networks, verifying the accuracy of parameter analyses of single statistics and comprehensive analyses. Ultimately, when coping with supply chain disruption risk, each node enterprise of supply chain network is supposed to deploy the characteristics of scale-free networks to systematically manage existing weak ties, weak ties newly introduced, existing strong ties and strong ties newly introduced. This study is conducive to node enterprises of supply chains to recognize and apply the scale-free networks and the strength theory of ties to analyze the properties of supply chain networks, and to improve the capacity to cope with disruption risk.     

Screening,ability, and the productivity of education in Malaysia

The test of the strong version of the screening hypothesis proposed by Psacharopoulos is applied to the case of a LDC with further extensions to allow for interaction terms and differences in ability. The results do not support the strong version of the screening hypothesis.     

LIBERALIZATION OF EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: SECTORAL DYNAMICS AND STRUCTURAL MUTATIONS

ABSTRACT ** :  This contribution intends to draw up an assessment of structural changes in the telecommunications sector impelled by the European policy of liberalization. Deep transformations with contrasted results have occurred. A strong differentiation in offer of services and a considerable fall in cost appears. After a strong growth, however, investment sharply decreased with the financial crisis. Employment has become a variable of adjustment for companies subjected to strong risks due to the economic situation. Lastly, the assertion of the universal service of telecommunications is accompanied by an important reduction of public service missions.     

关于对建设绿色经济强省的再认识

本文对云南建设绿色经济强省的主要内容,内涵是实现产业发展与生态建设的统一及其模式与重点,战略目标,支撑和保障体系等作了详细的阐述和意见,以求加快建设的步伐。     

Bargaining and inequity aversion: On the efficiency of the double auction

In a bargaining setting with asymmetrically informed, inequity-averse parties, a fully efficient mechanism (i.e., the double auction) exists if and only if compassion is strong. Less compassionate parties do not trade in the double auction in the limit of strong envy.