丝网印刷在包装组合印刷中的功能

随着经济发展、物质生活日益丰富，人们对精神文化的需求越来越高。包装印刷品因具有艺术性、装饰性和美化生活的特点，也日益受到生产商和销售商的重视。尤其是印刷企业要想在激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地，树立起质量竞争的观念十分必要。以烟酒包装为例，如今的产品包装较之以往更加华丽精美，工艺日益成熟，以一种印刷方式就能满足要求的日子已经一去不复返了。     

DOES COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENCOURAGE PIRACY?*

When copyright enforcement is targeted at high‐value buyers such as corporate and government users, the copyright holder charges super‐monopoly prices, thereby encouraging low‐value buyers to switch to inferior pirated copies. We show that enlarging the copyright holder's captive market through more extensive copyright enforcement reduces prices toward the monopoly level, increases sales of legitimate copies and can increase consumer surplus. Therefore, in contrast with the case of more intensive copyright enforcement, more extensive copyright enforcement over some range can increase the incentive to generate intellectual property while also reducing the loss to consumers from monopoly power.     

屏幕文化

2012年,我们的生活将越来越被普及化、个性化、互动化、科幻化的屏幕展现出来。就不说智能手机、平板电脑、游戏机和电子书这些随处可见的设备了,也不说证交所、车站、楼宇内外的指示屏和广告屏了。看看下面被屏幕全覆盖的建筑、汽车、衣物抑或是可代表个人的机器人吧。当然,伴随屏幕文化演进的,还有背后的商业模式。     

THE EFFECTS OF CAPACITY ON SALES UNDER ALTERNATIVE VERTICAL CONTRACTS*

Retailer capacity decisions can impact sales for products by affecting, for example, availability and visibility. Using data from the U.S. video rental industry, we report estimates of the effect of capacity on sales under alternative vertical contracts. New monitoring technologies facilitated new supply contracts in this industry, reducing upfront costs of capacity but requiring minimum capacity purchases, strongly impacting stocking decisions. We find that larger capacity (more tapes) for a given title can substantially increase rentals of that title; and that alternative vertical contractual forms for distributing tapes from studios to retailers strongly impacts the relationship between capacity and rentals.     

THE EFFECT OF SERVICE QUALITY AND EXPECTATIONS ON CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS*

Customer complaints measure consumers' dissatisfaction with the quality of a product or service. If product quality is unobservable ex ante, customer complaints may be driven by expectations as well as by the actually experienced quality level. I test whether the level of quality that could be expected prior to consumption affects the number of customer complaints after controlling for–ex post observable–actual quality, using data from the U.S. airline industry. I find that there are fewer complaints when actual quality is higher. Controlling for actual quality, a higher level of expected quality leads to more complaints.     

THE EFFECT OF MOST‐FAVORED CUSTOMER CLAUSES ON PRICES*

We study the effects of introducing a Most‐Favored Customer (MFC) clause on price competition among major consumer electronics retailers. Our data spans the periods before and after the introduction of an MFC clause by Best Buy, which occurred between April 1, 2003 and March 31, 2004. After controlling for various factors (including product life‐cycle and seasonality effects), we find that, on average, Best Buy lowered its prices by 1.6% after introducing the MFC clause. Its competitors responded by cutting prices further: Buy.com by 3.5%, Circuit City by 2.2%, CompUSA by 3.2%, and Sears by 0.4%. We conclude that Best Buy's MFC adoption reduced prices.     

THE IMPACT OF INITIAL FINANCIAL STATE ON FIRM DURATION ACROSS ENTRY COHORTS*

Recent theories of industry dynamics emphasize the role of financial frictions in determining post entry performance of firms. Testing these theories has been difficult because of the lack of financial data on small, young and private firms. Using a unique data set, T2LEAP, this paper considers the survival of new firms in Canadian manufacturing from a financial perspective. Duration analysis quantifies the effects of firm, industry and aggregate factors. Findings show that nonlinear effects are found with firm leverage. Finally, likelihood decompositions offer insights into the contributing factors to firm hazard for nine entry cohorts during the period 1985–1997.     

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: ON THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS*

The impact on vertical contracting of a type‐dependent reservation utility is investigated within a sequential monopolies environment with asymmetric information. The welfare and private properties of contracts controlling both the retail price and the sales level are compared with those restricting only sales. When firms choose contracts non‐cooperatively, retail price restrictions are desirable for the upstream supplier although detrimental to consumers, whenever the retailer reservation utility has a relevant impact on optimal contracts. If this impact is relatively weak and contracts are chosen cooperatively, vertical price control fails to maximize firms' joint‐profit although it would be beneficial to consumers.     

ON THE VALUE OF A LARGE CUSTOMER BASE IN MARKETS WITH SWITCHING COSTS*

It is usually acknowledged that firms benefit from a large customer base in markets with switching costs. However, Klemperer [1995] argues that this may not be true if an increase in the size of a firm's customer base induces fierce price competition, making the firm worse off. This paper shows that such an outcome can be obtained under standard assumptions, such as homogeneous goods and uniformly distributed switching costs. In the model, firms have very limited incentives to fight for market shares, and the notion that switching costs make markets less competitive is stronger than previously shown.     

ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING WHEN ENTRY BY MERGER IS POSSIBLE*

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive dealing can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit the buyer's acceptance of exclusivity. Third, despite allowing the more efficient technology to find its way into the industry, exclusive dealing reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas independent entry would be socially optimal and (ii) it may deter entry altogether.     

THE EFFECT OF GROUP SIZE AND ASYMMETRIES ON THE INCENTIVE TO REVEAL GROUP‐SPECIFIC INFORMATION*

In this paper, I examine how firms' incentives to differentiate their products through the revelation of truthful information about product attributes varies with the distribution of consumer preferences for those attributes. I show that information will tend to be provided for large groups, even absent scale economies in producing that information. In addition, the relative sizes of the groups whose estimates of product quality change positively vs. negatively (i.e., the degree of asymmetry) by the information is likewise an important determinant of its profitability.     

THE FAILING FIRM DEFENSE*

This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm defense (FFD) in the EU and U.S. merger laws. To this end, I combine an oligopoly model with an ‘endogenous valuations’ auction model. The FFD is shown to work reasonably well for consumers unless small firms are too small. The FFD may, however, lead to total surplus losses, due to a ‘least danger to competition’ (LDC) condition which favors small, and thus possibly inefficient, firms. It is also shown that, in a multi‐firm setting, the FFD increases the incentive for predation only when the assets are industry‐specific.     

THE IMPACT OF ACADEMIC PATENTING ON THE RATE,QUALITY AND DIRECTION OF (PUBLIC) RESEARCH OUTPUT*

We examine the influence of faculty patenting on the rate, quality, and content of public research outputs in a panel dataset of 3,862 academic life scientists. Using inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW) to account for self‐selection into patenting, we find that patenting has a positive effect on the rate of publications and a weak positive effect on the quality of these publications. We also find that patenters may be shifting their research focus to questions of commercial interest. We conclude that the often voiced concern that patenting in academe has a nefarious effect on public research output is misplaced.