Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation

What criteria do venture capitalists use to make venture investment decisions? The criteria venture capitalists use to make their venture investment decisions are of interest for several reasons. First, venture capitalists are conspicuously successful in their investment decisions. The success rate of venture capital-backed ventures is significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Dorsey 1979: Davis and Stetson 1984). A better understanding of the criteria used could lead to a better understanding of the reasons for this success.Second, a better understanding of the criteria for successful new ventures could lead to an improvement in the success rate of new ventures. Although there is no clear agreement on the precise rate, the failure rate among new ventures is generally viewed as significantly higher than the average failure rate (Dun and Bradstreet 1984; Van de Ven 1980; Shapero 1981).Finally, venture capitalists' investment criteria are of enormous import to entrepreneurs seeking venture funding. Such entrepreneurs require a significant infusion of capital in order to grow their businesses, and knowledge of the criteria sought by venture capitalists can aid entrepreneurs in gaining the necessary financing.This study attempts to uncover the criteria used by venture capitalists through semistructured interviews and verbal protocol analysis of venture capitalists' evaluations of actual venture proposals. Sixteen verbal protocols—in which the participants “think aloud” as they review business proposals— were made of venture capitalists' venture evaluation decisions.The findings of this study suggest that venture capitalists screen and assess business proposals very rapidly: the subjects in this study reached a GO/NO-GO decision in an average of less than six minutes on initial screening and less than 21 minutes on proposal assessment. In venture capitalists' initial proposal screening, key criteria identified include fit with the venture firm's lending guidelines and the long-term growth and profitability of the industry in which the proposed business will operate. In the second stage of proposal assessment, the source of the business proposal also played a major role in the venture capitalists' interest in the plan, with proposals previously reviewed by persons known and trusted by the venture capitalist receiving a high level of interest.In addition to the specific criteria identified and how they were used in reaching GO/NO-GO decisions, the findings of this study also were surprising for the lack of importance venture capitalists attached to the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and the strategy of the proposed venture during these early stages of the venture evaluation process.     

Angel group members' decision process and rejection criteria: A longitudinal analysis

This paper investigates business angel group members' decision-making from project submission to the final decision. Using a Canadian group's archival data on 636 proposals, we provide a detailed longitudinal analysis of the decision process. The rejection reasons generally refer to market and execution risk; this finding holds for every step of the process for proposals that pass the pre-screen. Angel group members focus more on market and execution risk than agency risk, similar to venture capitalists. Inexperienced entrepreneurs are rejected for market and product reasons. Decision-making by the studied angel group members differs from that generally described for independent angels.     

Venture capitalists and serial entrepreneurs

Habitual entrepreneurship is receiving growing attention, much of which has focused on entrepreneurs who have started more than one venture. This paper examines the importance of habitual entrepreneurs to the venture capital industry, with particular emphasis on those who have exited from an initial investment in the venture capitalist's portfolio, termed serial entrepreneurs. As venture capital markets mature, increasing numbers of entrepreneurs are likely to exit from their initial enterprises, creating a pool of entrepreneurs with the potential for embarking on subsequent ventures. Venture capitalists making investments may invest both in entrepreneurs starting new ventures and those who purchase a venture through a management buy-out or buy-in. On this wider basis, the paper develops a classification of types of serial venture. A number of issues are raised for venture capitalists, notably the relative attractiveness of reinvesting in exited entrepreneurs and the policy they adopt in tracking and assessing such individuals.The paper addresses venture capitalists' perspectives on investing in serial entrepreneurs based on a representative sample of 55 UK venture capitalists (a response rate of 48.7%, and a follow-up survey of those who had more extensive experience of serial entrepreneurs (23 respondents). The results of the survey show that despite a strong preference for using an entrepreneur who had played a major role in a previous venture, the extent to which exiting entrepreneurs are funded from their own portfolio again is limited, though there is more extensive use of such individuals in a consultancy capacity. In screening entrepreneurs exiting from previous ventures for subsequent investments, venture capitalists scored attributes relating to commercial awareness, experience in a particular sector, and personal ambition of the entrepreneur most highly.Venture capitalists do make extensive use of serial entrepreneurs who have exited from other venture capitalists' portfolios, primarily to lead management buy-ins. Indications from the survey are that venture capitalists rarely assess entrepreneurs formally at the time of exit and that it is unusual to maintain formal links with entrepreneurs after they have exited. These apparent shortcomings suggest that perhaps investment opportunities are being missed. Those venture capitalists preferring serial entrepreneurs generally had a larger volume of funds under investment and were rather older than those venture capitalists who do not prefer to use serial entrepreneurs, reflecting the possibility that longer established venture capitalists have had more opportunity and experience in relation to second-time entrepreneurs.Investment appraisal factors were subject to a principal components analysis to identify underlying dimensions/relationships between them. With respect to the general investment appraisal factors, five factors were identified. Two factors were related to track record; one of these reflected ownership experience, while the other represented management experience. The third factor was related to personal attributes such as age, knowledge, and family background. The fourth factor represented links to the funding institution, and the final factor (a single variable factor) concerned financial commitment. The principal components analysis for screening factors on management buy-ins produced a single factor comprising all variables. These factors were then subject to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with preference for use of a serial entrepreneur as the independent variable. The results suggest that there are significant differences between venture capitalists who prefer serial entrepreneurs and those who do not in respect to their business ownership experience, the length of their entrepreneurial careers, and the number of their previous ventures.The results of the study have implications for practitioners. First, the findings emphasize the importance of not considering previous venture experience in isolation but in the context of other key investment criteria. Second, the lack of strongly greater performance from serial, versus novice, entrepreneurs further emphasizes the care to be taken in assessing experienced entrepreneurs. Third, the relatively low degree of formal and rigorous post-exit assessment and monitoring by venture capitalists suggests that important opportunities to invest in experienced entrepreneurs may be missed.     

Wealth Distribution,Elasticity of Substitution and Piketty: An ‘Anti‐Dual’ Pasinetti Economy

This paper studies the dynamics of wealth distribution between workers and capitalists in a neoclassical growth model with differential saving rates. It shows that if capitalists are thriftier than workers and the factors elasticity of substitution is high enough to ensure endogenous growth, capitalists’ share of total wealth asymptotically tends to one. It is also proved that a tax on capital income shifts the long run distribution of wealth in workers’ favor, and that the capitalists’ share of total wealth is a decreasing function of the tax rate. The results of the paper are compared to Piketty's ‘fundamental laws’ of capitalism.     

Classical and Neoclassical Indeterminacy in One‐shot Versus Ongoing Equilibria

I analyze two connections between neoclassical and classical economics. First, I consider the indeterminacy that arises for both schools: in the neoclassical theories of overlapping generations and of factor pricing and in Sraffa's price theory. Neoclassical indeterminacy occurs only in environments where relative prices can change through time; otherwise, determinacy obtains. Although these results challenge the Sraffian position on indeterminacy, the classical principle that current economic activity is embedded in the past proves to be a powerful insight: it establishes the robustness of factor‐price indeterminacy and casts doubt on the importance of overlapping‐generations indeterminacy. Second, I argue that recent claims that capital‐theoretic paradoxes arise in intertemporal general equilibrium modes, not just in aggregative theory, cannot be validated.     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.     

THE EFFECT OF THE TRANSFER IN A TWO-CLASS MODEL

Hamada showed that the income transfer from capitalists to workers does not increase the income of workers in the long run. His result is based on the nonlinearity of the saving functions. If the saving function of capitalists is concave (or convex), the maximum of workers' income is attained by the positive (or the negative) transfer. There exists a case where the after-tax income of capitalists increases by a positive transfer. The global maximum of capitalists' income is attained when workers' income is all transferred to capitalists, while the global maximum of workers' is attained when capitalists enjoy positive income.     

From Cocoa to CSR: Finding sustainability in a cup of hot chocolate

Sustainability definitely has become a hot topic in recent years. Clearly, it is a subject that is not going away and whose importance in the corporate world is gaining currency. The notion of “doing well by doing good” is moving incrementally into mainstream business practice. In what might be considered a sea change, some very important customers now want to talk to supplier company CEOs and managers about their sustainability efforts, as do a growing number of consumers. And while it's hard to tell whether consumers are leading or following when it comes to the importance of sustainability, it's definitely on their radar. Business success increasingly is going to depend upon conducting operations today with a clear view to their impact on future generations. For this, and other valid reasons, we, as business leaders, need to arrive at a practical, workable model of sustainability. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Specialization versus diversification as a venture capital investment strategy

Much important work has informed us of rates of return earned by venture capitalists, the importance of venture capitalists to the “going public” process, and the criteria venture capitalists use to evaluate deals. This paper seeks to add to the literature by testing hypotheses, based upon both the finance and strategic management literature, regarding certain venture capitalist investment practices.Venture capitalists seek to control or manage risk (Driscoll 1974; MacMillan, Siegel, and SubbaNarasimha 1985). Financing structure and investment strategy provide several means for venture capitalists to do this. Tools available to the venture capitalist include portfolio diversification to spread risk across different industries, firms, or hot/cold IPO markets to minimize unsystematic or investment-specific risk. Information sharing, networking, and specialization can also be used to control unsystematic risk.Several hypotheses are developed from these conflicting perspectives. Data used to test the hypotheses are derived from responses to a survey of venture capitalists. Three hundred surveys were mailed to venture capitalists; 98, or 32.7%,returned usable responses.Portfolio diversification is a well-known means to control risk exposure by reducing unsystematic or specific risks. However, Bygrave (1987, 1988), as well as financial intermediation theorists, argues that maintaining a high degree of specialization is useful for controlling risk as well as for gaining access to networks, information, and deal flow from other venture investors. The analyses of this paper build upon Bygrave's work. We construct more rigorous tests to resolve the conflict between the diversification and information-sharing hypotheses. Our hypothesis tests were usually resolved in favor of the information-sharing view. For example, venture capitalists in the sample that were heavily involved in seed round financing were diversified across fewer numbers of firms and industries.Further evidence in favor of information sharing is seen in investment patterns across different financing stages. Diversification would imply maintaining a portfolio of investments across the different investment stages. The information sharing/specialization view would argue that it is best to stay focused on a single stage or several “connected” stages. The empirical evidence from the sample once again favors the specialization perspective.This research provides information of use to venture capitalists, as they seek information on how best to control risk; to entrepreneurs, as they learn of the factors venture capitalists consider in determining their investment strategy; and to academicians, as such studies provide insight to general industry practice and thus help to form the basis of classroom discussion and future research endeavors.     

AXING WICKSELL'S DURABILITY RESULT

In the course of discussing Åkerman's problem, Wicksell maintained that, when capitalists can choose the length of life of a fixed capital good, the chosen lifetime will be positively related to the real wage. It is shown that this conclusion collapses once we drop Wicksell's extreme assumption that the capital good is made by unassisted labour.     

Technological Gap and Uneven Accumulation in a Classical Production Model

Two regions are distinguished by their technological capabilities. In autarky, the advanced region accumulates more rapidly. Trade augments both regions' growth rates, but can initially worsen the uneven accumulation. The advanced region's faster growth turns the terms of trade against itself. The growth gap narrows. Yet, trade can never close that gap completely. Further decline in the advanced region's growth rate is arrested by its investment in, and technology transfer to, the backward region to augment the latter's export. Whether uneven accumulation persists depends on how successfully the backward region's indigenous capitalists adopt the more efficient `foreign' technology.     

Optimal seller strategy in overlapping auctions

Little research has been conducted on a common phenomenon in today's online environment: the concurrent selling of identical products in online auctions. To fill this gap, the current research proposes a game-theoretical model to analyze the seller's optimal strategy for selling two identical items in overlapping auctions. The overlap is modeled endogenously (as the seller's decision), trading off multiple influences including the positive effect on the overlap from bidders' forward-looking behavior and the seller's time discounting, versus the negative impact from bidders' learning and varied demand (i.e., bidder entry). The combined impact of these factors governs the conditions for which a simultaneous, sequential, or partially overlapping strategy is optimal. When the effect of bidders' forward-looking behavior and/or the seller's time discounting dominates, running simultaneous auctions is optimal; when bidders' learning (and bidder entry) dominates, running sequential auctions is optimal. Partially overlapping auctions are optimal when neither effect dominates and the opposing effects are offsetting.     

Criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate new venture proposals

A questionnaire was administered to one hundred venture capitalists to determine the most important criteria that they use to decide on funding new ventures. Perhaps the most important finding from the study is direct confirmation of the frequently iterated position taken by the venture capital community that above all it is the quality of the entrepreneur that ultimately determines the funding decision. Five of the top ten most important criteria had to do with the entrepreneur's experience or personality. There is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all.The question is if this is the case, then why is so much emphasis placed on the business plan? In a business plan there is generally little to indicate the characteristics of the entrepreneur—it is generally devoted to a detailed discussion of the product/service, the market, and the competition. To us, the implications are obvious—such content is necessary, but not sufficient. The business plan should also show as clearly as possible that the “jockey is fit to ride” —namely, indicate by whatever feasible and credible means possible that the entrepreneur has staying power, has a track record, can react to risk well, and has familiarity with the target market. Failing this, he or she needs to be able to pull together a team that has such characteristics and show that he or she is capable of leading that team.Factor analysis of the results indicate that venture capitalists appear to assess ventures systematically in terms of six categories of risk to be managed. These are: risk of losing the entire investment: risk of being unable to bail out if necessary; risk of failure to implement the venture idea; competitive risk; risk of management failure; and risk of leadership failure.Finally, three clusters of venture capitalists were identified: those who carefully assess the competitive and implementation risks: those who seek easy bail out; and those who deliberately keep as many options open as possible.     

The Optimal Structure for Public Debt

We study risk‐sharing through public debt in a two‐generations‐overlapping model. If bonds and wage‐indexed social security service a given initial obligation, there exists a set of Pareto‐efficient debt structures. This set is characterized by conflicting interests of current and yet unborn cohorts over the factor‐price risk allocation. If both size and composition of the debt are choice variables, these conflicting interests can be reconciled. Changes in the debt's composition reallocate factor‐price risks, while changes in its size reallocate resources. This separation of risk‐sharing and crowding‐out narrows the set of efficient debt structures until only one remains.     

Venture capital investing for corporate development objectives

There is a significant new player emerging in the venture capital world whose participation is changing the way that the venture business is done. Domestic and foreign corporations have discovered that investing in venture capital adds a new dimension to their corporate development strategies and can also make an outstanding return on investment.Armed with serious amounts of cash, aware of the value of an association with their name and frequently possessing marketing power that a small company covets, corporations are competing with venture capitalists for the best deals. Obtaining a “corporate partner” is now an accepted part of a small company's financing strategy.For the corporate development executive, this activity provides a useful tool to widen the spectrum of participation in new technologies while retaining the entrepreneurial drive and reducing the cost and exposure of new ventures. However, it is not a panacea for growth and caution should be exercised to avoid creating unrealistic expectations.Both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists welcome this source of later-stage capital, providing it minimizes equity dilution and assists in product development, marketing and liquidity for their investment. However, it is a competitor for the venture capitalists in sourcing deals and a potential adversary for the entrepreneur when objectives clash. Additionally, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists often are suspicious of the corporation in the small company's boardroom.The objective of most corporations is the strategic benefits that can result from venture capital investing, such as acquisitions, technology licenses, product marketing rights, international opportunities and a window on technology. However, this objective is frequently mixed with a financial return objective and can lead to a confused strategy.Participation by corporations can take many different forms but usually begins with investments in several venture capital funds as a limited partner and evolves into direct investments in venture companies. Formation of a venture development subsidiary by the corporation is a demonstrated way to maximize the strategic rewards. If financial return is the only objective, then a stand-alone venture fund is the best vehicle.The most important factors for the strategic success of a corporate program are the creation of a high-quality deal stream and the use of outstanding people to interface between the corporation and the venture capital world. In addition, there has to be a long-term commitment, active involvement and a carefully devised internal communications strategy to promote and protect the program.Creation of a formal venture development subsidiary is probably the best way to maximize the strategic objectives. Lubrizol Enterprises operates as such a subsidiary of The Lubrizol Corporation and utilizes venture capital investing, acquisitions, partnerships, and contract research to develop strategic business units based on leading-edge technologies.     

What Might Globalisation's Critics Believe?

Critics of globalisation object to many things, some of which can be easily understood within standard economic models, but others of which seem to reflect a view of the world that economists generally do not share. This paper attempts to identify several alternative frameworks for analysis within which some of their criticisms may be understood, with the ultimate aim of extracting testable implications that differ from standard models. Three such alternative models are suggested, all of which focus mainly on the behaviour of owners and managers of corporate capital: an anti‐labour model, in which capitalists are willing to sacrifice some of their own profits for the chance to make labour worse off; a labour‐monopsony model in which capitalists co‐operate globally to increase profits by depressing wages; and an international political economy model in which capitalists use their resources to influence the political process for more than just obtaining import protection. This third framework, which is not spelled out in any detail here, has capitalists seeking policies such as export subsidies and other means of promoting market access, and it also has them influencing the international negotiations that set the rules of international agreements and organisations, such as the NAFTA and WTO. Examples of the latter sort of influence are discussed.     

Consumer recycling goals and their effect on decisions to recycle: A means-end chain analysis

Means-end chain theory and the laddering methodology were used to derive the goals relevant to consumers for recycling, as well as the interrelations among goals. The importance of the goals and their hierarchical structure were also tested, and their effects on attitudes, subjective norms, and past behavior determined. Data were collected on 133 consumers in a moderate-size metropolitan community by use of a random digit dialing procedure. The overall framework emerging from the analyses is one where concrete goals lead to more abstract goals, and attitudes and past behavior intervene between goals and intentions in decision making. Nineteen total goals were uncovered, with 15 ultimately found to be salient. The topmost goals in the hierarchy were “promote health/avoid sickness,” “achieve life-sustaining ends,” and “provide for future generations.” The key lower-order goals—“avoid filling up landfills,” “reduce waste,” “reuse materials,” and “save the environment”—work through such intermediary goals as “reduce messy trash,” “curtail pollution,” “save resources,” and “save the planet.” Two important terminal goals that were also at intermediate levels in the hierarchy were “save/earn money” and “it's the right thing to do.” © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.     

Income shares,secular stagnation and the long-run distribution of wealth

Four alarming stylized facts have recently emerged in the United States: (a) a decline in the labor share of income; (b) a decline in labor productivity; (c) an increase in the top 1% wealth share and (d) an increase in the capital-income ratio. In Capital in the XXI Century, Thomas Piketty's argument is that the r > g inequality determines an increase in the capital-income ratio; if the elasticity of substitution in production is above one, the profit share rises. We provide a contrasting explanation that draws from the Post Keynesian approach to differential saving propensities between classes and the Classical-Marxian theory of induced technical change. In a simple model of “capitalists” and “workers,” we show that institutional changes that lower the labor share—declining unionization, increasing monopsony power in the labor market, the global ‘race to the bottom' in unit labor costs or the exhaustion of path-breaking scientific discoveries—can reduce labor productivity growth because of the lessened incentives to innovate to save on labor costs. A falling labor share reduces workers' total savings, and wealth concentrates in the capitalists' hands. A higher profit share and wealth share both put pressure on accumulation: but the long-run growth rate, which is anchored to labor productivity growth, has fallen. To restore balanced growth, the capital-income ratio must rise, independent of the elasticity of substitution. These tendencies are not inevitable: taxation can be used to implement any wealth distribution targeted by policymakers, while worker-crushing institutional arrangements can also in principle be reversed through policy. Neither change appears likely given the current institutional and global policy climate.