Allocating Shareholder Capital to Pension Plans

This article discusses the corporate challenge of providing retirement income to employees while limiting the costs and risks of pension plans to the companies themselves by addressing five main questions:

• ? What are the major issues and challenges surrounding pensions? Although the pension shortfalls have been the focus of attention, the author argues that the more serious concern is the risk stemming from the mismatch between pension assets and pension liabilities— that is, the funding of debt‐like liabilities with equity‐heavy asset portfolios.
• ? To what extent do the equity market and equity prices reflect the shortfall in value and the mismatch in risk? While the author describes some evidence of the market's ability to capture pension risk, analysts' P/E multiples and management's assessments of cost of capital may still be distorted by failure to take full account of the risks associated with pension assets.
• ? How should management analyze and formulate strategic solutions? Without offering specific solutions, the author presents a framework for analyzing the problem from a strategic perspective that can be used in formulating a company's pension policy. In particular, the article recommends that companies take an integrated perspective that views pension assets and liabilities as parts of the corporate balance sheet, and the pension asset allocation decision as a critical aspect of a corporate‐wide enterprise risk management program.
• ? If a company chooses to make a major change in its pension policy, such as a partial or complete immunization accomplished by substituting bonds for stocks, how would you communicate the new policy to the rating agencies and investors?
• ? What are the major issues to be thinking about when contemplating a change from a DB plan to a defined contribution, or DC, plan? The author argues that DC plans without some corporate oversight or responsibility for results are not a long‐term solution.

     

“Author’s Reply: Critique of Mexico’s New Social Security Act”, Octavio Maupomé-Carvantes,July, 1999

Abstract

This paper considers the pension plan as part of the capital structure of the sponsoring employer. This enables lessons from financial theory concerning capital structure to be used to answer the question, “What assets should a pension fund hold?” The standard Modigliani-Miller framework is expanded on to consider the implications of corporate tax. This leads to the conclusion that bond investment for pension plans has tangible advantages over holding risky assets (e.g., equities). The paper considers a case study of the pension plan of the Boots Company, a U.K. pharmacy retailer with a pension fund of around £2.3 billion ($3.5 billion), where these ideas were put into practice. Finally, the paper discusses the value released to shareholders and the extra security members of the pension fund have derived from putting theory into practice.     

Public Pensions and U.S. Infrastructure Investment: The Perfect Partnership?

Public pension funds have been passive investors in U.S. infrastructure projects for years, serving primarily as limited partners in designated infrastructure funds. However, the continued maturation of U.S. public‐private partnerships, combined with pension funds' need for yield to match future liabilities, has prompted the funds to take a more active role in infrastructure investment. In recent years, many pension funds have built internal teams to make direct (as opposed to indirect and for the most part passive) investments in infrastructure projects. Governments in particular should pay close attention to the emergence of pension funds as direct infrastructure investors. With OECD pension assets totaling $10.6 trillion at the end of 2010, the world's pension funds offer governments a strong value proposition. Given the fixed nature of their pension liabilities, pension funds emphasize yield and long‐term appreciation, and are likely to accept rate of returns in the neighborhood of CPI + 5%. Infrastructure investments, which generate highly stable cashflow and enjoy high barriers to entry, are ideally suited to meet these criteria. Also of particular significance to governments, pension funds have two bottom lines. First is expected yield and returns; second is their desire to invest in projects that meet a mission of social responsibility. Pension investors prefer, when possible, to invest in projects that promote government objectives such as reduced congestion and clean air. Taking account of pension funds' double mission can help governments capture opportunities to develop infrastructure through meaningful partnerships with like‐minded investors.     

“On the Merger of Two Companies,” Hans Gerber and Elias S. W. Shiu,July 2006

Abstract

Bankruptcy risk falls to pension plan participants if a plan sponsor fails when a defined benefit (DB) pension plan is underfunded. This article examines the incidence of that risk and how it changes when public policy provides a guarantee fund. Although government-based guarantee funds are in a unique position to provide pension protection, primarily because of the extent to which the risk of sponsor default is systematic in nature, a looming question is the extent to which such guarantees are exposed to moral hazard. The article focuses on that question using data from four Canadian provinces, including one (Ontario) that operates a guarantee fund for pensions. The findings show that plan assets per DB-plan participant increase with the earnings of workers and decrease with higher unemployment, and that level of assets also is moderated by the influence of taxes, with higher plan assets observed when and where tax rates are higher. Plans in Ontario had on average $20,035 less in asset value per participant, and Ontario plans covered by the guarantee fund had an average of $16,497 less per participant than other Canadian DB plans not backed by a guarantee fund. A separate model finds the presence of a guarantee fund to be one of a very small number of variables significant in explaining variability in the plans’ funded ratios. These empirical results are consistent with the existence of moral hazard.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

Deterministic Modeling of Defined-Contribution Pension Funds

Abstract

Formulas are derived to model the response of a money purchase, defined-contribution pension fund to the following types of investment shock: (1) an instantaneous fall in the value of the fund assets and (2) a permanent, uniform reduction in the rate of earned interest. An alternative defined-contribution fund, incorporating a variable defined-benefit scale, is then proposed, and its responses to the same investment shocks are compared with those of the money purchase fund. The comparison shows that the variable defined-benefit approach offers a useful alternative to the money purchase principle for defined-contribution pension funds.     

An analysis of risk-taking behavior for public defined benefit pension plans

This paper presents the first comprehensive study on the determinants of public pension fund investment risk and reports several new important findings. Unlike private pension plans, public funds undertake more risk if they are underfunded and have lower investment returns in the previous years, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Furthermore, pension funds in states facing fiscal constraints allocate more assets to equity and have higher betas. There also appears to be a herding effect in that CalPERS equity allocation or beta is mimicked by other pension funds. Finally, our results suggest that government accounting standards strongly affect pension fund risk, as higher return assumptions (used to discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher equity allocation and portfolio beta.     

The Shift to Defined Contribution Pension Plans

Abstract

There has been a strong shift away from defined benefit (DB) pension plans toward defined contribution (DC) pension plans in the United States over the last 20 years. A variety of reasons for this shift have been proposed. In another paper in this issue, Krzysztof Ostaszewski presents a new hypothesis to explain the shift to DC plans in the United States. He argues that the decline in importance of DB plans is due to a shift in the way relative returns to macroeconomic factors of production, that is, capital and labor, are being rewarded in the national economy.

This paper attempts to test the Ostaszewski hypothesis using Canadian data. In Canada there has been only a slight decrease in DB plan coverage. It is shown that the Ostaszewski theory does not fit the Canadian experience well. Instead, it is argued that pension regulation and tax legislation play a crucial role in pension design and reform. It is also argued that the difference in pension regulation and taxation in Canada versus the United States has directly influenced plan sponsors in considering their pension objectives, costs, and risks. Differences in the proportion of the workforce that is unionized may also be important. The paper concludes that pension regulation and taxation are more important variables than are macroeconomic reward systems in the use of DB versus DC pension plans.     

Scale economies in pension fund investments: A dissection of investment costs across asset classes

Using a unique dataset of 225 Dutch occupational pension funds with a total of 928 billion euro of assets under management, we provide a comprehensive cross-sectional analysis of the relation between investment costs and pension fund size. Our dataset is free from self-reporting biases and decomposes investment costs for 6 asset classes in management costs and performance fees. We find that a pension fund that has 10 times more assets under management on average reports 7.67 basis points lower annual investment costs. Economies of scale differ per asset class. We find significant economies of scale in fixed income, equity and commodity portfolios, but not in real estate investments, private equity and hedge funds. We also find that large pension funds pay significantly higher performance fees for equity, private equity and hedge fund investments.     

Financing Gaps of Public Pension Schemes and Market Potential for the Private Retirement Market

Abstract

Increasing longevity, declining birth rates, and high unemployment severely threaten the financial basis of many public pension plans. These problems are most pronounced in continental Europe, where public pension plans tend to be relatively generous and are usually funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. Given the demographic development, future pension payments exceed the expected contribution payments. The resulting financing gaps can be seen as implicit public debts (net pension liabilities), which often exceed the value of GDP figures and are in many cases higher than the explicit public debt figures. If people would decide to cover these financing gaps via life insurance, life insurance premiums would triple in Germany, more than double in Italy, and double in Canada and France. The increase would be only moderate in the U.S. and particularly small in the U.K.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

Projections of pension fund solvency under alternative valuation regimes

This paper examines the impact of three alternative valuation regimes on perceived pension fund solvency. Deterministic valuation assumes smoothed valuation of assets and liabilities. National valuation is based on market valuation of assets and on smoothed valuation of liabilities. International valuation marks assets and liabilities to market values. Using closed-form methods based on the funding ratio return, we exemplify the dramatic effect that the choice of valuation approach has on long-horizon solvency projections.     

Pension Funding Regulations and Actuarial Gains and Losses

With pervasive pension funding deficits, Korean firms have been under pressure to improve their funding levels. We examine whether firms have incentives to set obligation‐decreasing pension assumptions when they have large pension deficits (pension obligations in excess of plan assets) and when they make insufficient contributions to external pension funds. We find that firms report larger actuarial gains (or smaller actuarial losses) associated with the remeasurement of pension liabilities when their pension funding ratio (the ratio of the fair value of plan assets to defined benefit obligations) is lower and when contributions to plan assets relative to pension service costs are smaller. Next, upon the introduction of a minimum pension funding guideline, we find that the effect of the funding ratio and contributions to pension funds on actuarial gains and losses is more pronounced for firms whose funding ratios are slightly below the minimum funding ratio than it is for firms whose funding ratios exceed or fall short of the minimum by a large margin. Our results indicate that firms opportunistically exercise discretion regarding corporate pension accounting under International Financial Reporting Standards to comply with pension funding regulations, thereby reducing perceived pension deficits.     

Managing Pension Risks: A Corporate Finance Perspective

Defined benefit (DB) pension plans of both U.S. and European companies are significantly underfunded because of the low interest rate environment and prior decisions to invest heavily in equities. Additional contributions and the recovery of stock markets since the end of the crisis have helped a bit but pension underfunding remains significant. Pension underfunding has substantial corporate finance implications. The authors show that companies with large pension deficits have historically delivered weaker share price performance than their peers and also trade at lower valuation multiples. Large deficits also reduce financial flexibility, increase financial risk, particularly in downside economic scenarios, and contribute to greater stock price volatility and a higher cost of capital. The authors argue that the optimal approach to managing DB pension risks relates to the risk tolerance of specific companies and their short and long‐term strategic and financial priorities. Financial executives should consider the follow pension strategies:

• Voluntary Pension Contributions: Funding the pension gap by issuing new debt or equity can provide valuation and capital structure benefits—and in many cases is both NPV‐positive and EPS‐accretive. The authors show that investors have reacted favorably to both debt‐ and equity‐financed contributions.
• Plan de‐risking: Shifting the pension plan's assets from equity to fixed income has become an increasingly popular approach. The primary purpose of pension assets is to fund pension liabilities while limiting risk to the operating company. The pension plan should not be viewed or run as a profit center.
• Plan Restructuring: Companies should also consider alternatives such as terminating and freezing plans, paying lump sums, and changing accounting reporting.

     

Modeling a Dynamic Portfolio for Pension Plans in Emerging Markets With Myopic and Nonmyopic Behavior

ABSTRACT

We introduce a dynamic formulation for the problem of portfolio selection of pension funds in the absence of a risk-free asset. In emerging markets, a risk-free asset might be unavailable, and the approaches commonly used may no longer be suitable. We use a parametric approach to combine dynamic programming and Monte Carlo simulation to gain additional flexibility. This approach is general in the sense that optimal asset allocation is tractable for all HARA utility functions in the absence of a risk-free asset. The traditional case composed of several risky assets and one risk-free asset is compared to a case in which the risk-free asset is unavailable.     

Performance Reporting under Fair Value Accounting

Abstract

This paper compares performance measurement under fair value accounting vs. U.S. GAAP accounting. As illustrated in the paper, the main difference between fair value accounting and U.S. GAAP accounting lies in the treatment of gains and losses on both assets and liabilities. Fair value accounting would report all gains and losses on both assets and liabilities in the period in which they arise. U.S. GAAP on the other hand, recognizes gains and losses over the life of the block of business (or at the time of a transaction). When net gains and losses on assets and liabilities are immaterial, the pattern of earnings under both systems can be quite similar. However, If a company is generating significant gains or losses on its net book of business (such as in the case of an asset/liability mismatch), fair value accounting will reveal this much sooner than U.S. GAAP. When the full impact of its actions (including gains and losses) is reported in the current period, management is in a better position to understand how the value of the company is changing and adjust its decisions accordingly. This is one of the main reasons for moving to a fair value system and is expected to be a major benefit if fair value accounting is ultimately adopted.     

CREATING VALUE IN PENSION PLANS (OR, GENTLEMEN PREFER BONDS)

Pension funds are typically one-half to two-thirds invested in equities because equities are expected to outperform other financial assets over the long term, and the long-term nature of pension fund liabilities seems well suited to absorbing any short-term return volatility. What's more, U.S. GAAP currently makes it possible to take credit in advance for the higher anticipated earnings on equity investments without acknowledging their inherent risk. But by allowing the higher expected returns from stocks to reduce a company's current pension expenses, the accounting treatment conflicts with some very basic principles of finance (in particular, the idea that investors must earn higher returns on riskier investments just to "break even"), conceals systematic biases in the actuarial analysis, and gives managers considerable latitude to manipulate the bottom line.
The authors suggest a startlingly different approach. They argue that pension assets should be invested entirely in duration-matched debt instruments for two reasons: (1) to capture the full tax benefits of pre-funding their pension obligations and (2) to improve overall corporate risk profiles by converting general stock market risk into firm-specific operating risk, where corporate managers should have a comparative advantage and can generate real value. Investing exclusively in bonds would take better advantage of the tax-exempt status of pension plans and greatly reduce fund management costs, while at the same time helping o shore up fund quality and sharpening corporate executives' focus on their real operating assets.     

Valuation of Contingent Pension Liabilities and Guarantees Under Sponsor Default Risk

This article analyzes the relationship between a pension fund with contingently indexed defined benefit liabilities and its sponsor, using contingent claims analysis. As pension funds generally choose to run a mismatch risk, future surpluses and deficits will occur. Surpluses are divided between beneficiaries and sponsor through contingent indexation of the benefits and refunding. Covering a deficit at the pension fund level is a function of the sponsor's financial ability to do so. This article suggests that this system creates an asymmetric allocation of the residual risk between sponsor and beneficiaries. The optimal investment policy for the pension fund in this context can be found by reverse engineering option valuation formulas. The main conclusion is that sponsor default risk negatively impacts the optimum risk profile and thereby the market value of contingent pension liabilities.     

Would emerging market pension funds benefit from international diversification: investigating wealth accumulations for pension participants

In recent years, investment portfolio selection is growing in importance for many emerging market pension funds, as pension reforms replace traditional pay-as-you-go systems with advanced funding systems. Various investment regulations are applied to the funded pensions, particularly in the form of portfolio limits for equities and international assets. With a bootstrap simulation approach, this paper attempts to quantify the impacts on retirement benefits of restricting international assets from the investment portfolios of emerging market pension funds. We find that, on average, over half of the pension portfolios of emerging market countries should be in international assets in order to maximize the expected utility of moderate and conservative pension fund participants. More generally, international assets can play a significant role in the investment portfolios for workers with risk aversion varying from aggressive to conservative. With few exceptions, the entire probability distribution of wealth accumulations at retirement could be shifted higher with the inclusion of international assets.     

The Poisson Log-Bilinear Lee-Carter Model

Abstract

Life insurance companies deal with two fundamental types of risks when issuing annuity contracts: financial risk and demographic risk. Recent work on the latter has focused on modeling the trend in mortality as a stochastic process. A popular method for modeling death rates is the Lee-Carter model. This methodology has become widely used, and various extensions and modifications have been proposed to obtain a broader interpretation and to capture the main features of the dynamics of mortality rates. In order to improve the measurement of uncertainty in survival probability estimates, in particular for older ages, the paper proposes an extension based on simulation procedures and on the bootstrap methodology. It aims to obtain more reliable and accurate mortality projections, based on the idea of obtaining an acceptable accuracy of the estimate by means of variance reducing techniques. In this way the forecasting procedure becomes more efficient. The longevity question constitutes a critical element in the solvency appraisal of pension annuities. The demographic models used for the cash flow distributions in a portfolio impact on the mathematical reserve and surplus calculations and affect the risk management choices for a pension plan. The paper extends the investigation of the impact of survival uncertainty for life annuity portfolios and for a guaranteed annuity option in the case where interest rates are stochastic. In a framework in which insurance companies need to use internal models for risk management purposes and for determining their solvency capital requirement, the authors consider the surplus value, calculated as the ratio between the market value of the projected assets to that of the liabilities, as a meaningful measure of the company’s financial position, expressing the degree to which the liabilities are covered by the assets.