An application of dynamic specifications of factor demand equations to interfuel substitution in US industrial energy demand

In a recent paper, Jones (1995) [A dynamic analysis of the interfuel substitution in US industrial energy demand. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 13 (4), 459–465] presents a dynamic analysis of interfuel substitution in US industry energy demand. The author concludes that a dynamic linear logit model is ‘superior' to a comparable dynamic translog model. The latter in fact violates concavity conditions whilst the logit formulation does not. This paper shows first of all that the dynamic formulation of the translog used in Jones (1995) is mis-specified. In fact, a parsimonious error-correction model (ECM) ‘dominates' alternative dynamic formulations, amongst which the partial adjustment mechanism used by the author. The ECM is able to generate optimal estimates of long-run and short-run elasticities, and it satisfies the concavity conditions of the cost function. Further, the theoretical framework used in this paper is the one recently proposed by Urga (1996) [On the identification problem in testing dynamic specification of factor demand equations. Econ. Lett. 52, 205–210] and Allen and Urga (1998) [Derivation and estimation of interrelated factor demands from dynamic cost function. Forthcoming in Economica]. It allows one to identify all coefficients (long-run and short-run) of the dynamic formulation via the joint estimation of the ‘effective' (short-run) cost function and the set of factor demand equations. This strategy solves, amongst other things, the parameter identification problem within the set of demand equations themselves, an issue which was originally noted by Anderson and Blundell (1982) [Estimation and hypothesis testing in dynamic singular equation systems. Econometrica, 1559–1571], re-addressed by Friesen (1992) [Testing dynamic specification of factor demand equations for US manufacturing. Rev. Econ. Stat. LXXIV (2), 240–250] and, more recently, by Urga (1996) and Allen and Urga (1998).     

Rapid evolution under inertia

This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m×m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing states that allow Ellison's [Ellison, G., 2000. Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67, 17–45] “step-by-step” evolution to occur.     

Income inequality, democracy and growth reconsidered

Persson and Tabellini (Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992a. Growth, distribution and politics. Eur. Econ. Rev. 36, 593–602; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1992b. Growth, distribution and politics. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 3–22; Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 1994. Is inequality harmful for growth? Am. Econ. Rev. 84, 600–621) as well as Alesina and Rodrik (Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1992. Distribution, political conflict, and economic growth. In: Cukierman, A., Hercowitz, Z., Leiderman, L. (Eds.), Political Economy, Growth, and Business Cycles. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 23–50; Alesina, A., Rodrik, D., 1994. Distributive politics and economic growth, Q. J. Econ. 109, 465–490) have argued that income inequality reduces economic growth rates among democracies because it promotes distributional struggles. In this paper I question the supportive evidence for a number of reasons. Measures of income distribution and democracy are unreliable and permit only very tentative conclusions. Changes in data sources or recoding of some influential cases affect results. It is questionable whether equality effects on growth apply only within democracies, as a median voter interpretation of this relationship should make one expect. The general idea that distributional struggle hurts the growth prospects of nations, however, receives some empirical support.     

Graphical causal models and VARs: an empirical assessment of the real business cycles hypothesis

This paper assesses the empirical plausibility of the real business cycle view that shocks to real variables are the dominant sources of economic fluctuations and that monetary policy shocks play an insignificant role in determining the behavior of real variables. I reconsider the vector autoregressive model of King et al. (Am Econ Rev 81:819–840, 1991), but propose an alternative identification method, based on graphical causal models. This method selects the contemporaneous causal structure using the information incorporated in the partial correlations among the residuals. The residuals orthogonalization which follows and the study of the impulse response functions confirm the results of King et al. (Am Econ Rev 81:819–840, 1991): permanent productivity shocks are not the dominant sources of aggregate fluctuations in US economy. I would like to thank Peter Spirtes, Marco Lippi, and Clark Glymour for helpful comments on early versions of the paper. I am also grateful to Valentina Corradi for providing me with an updated version of the King et al. (1991) data set. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Capital–skill complementarity and inequality: A sensitivity analysis

Krusell et al. in [Krusell, P., Ohanian, L., Ríos-Rull, J.V., Violante, G.L., 2000. Capital–skill complementarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis. Econometrica 68 (5), 1029–1053] analyzed the capital–skill complementarity hypothesis as an explanation for the behavior of the US skill premium. We refit Krusell et al.'s [Krusell, P., Ohanian, L., Ríos-Rull, J.V., Violante, G.L., 2000. Capital–skill complementarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis. Econometrica 68 (5), 1029–1053] model with two alternative capital equipment price series: One proposed by Greenwood et al. [Greenwood, J., Hercowitz, Z., Krusell, P., 1997. Long-run implications of investment-specific technological change. Amer. Econ. Rev. 87 (3), 342–362] and the official, revised National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data. We find that capital–skill complementarity is preserved, but other results were sensitive to the data used. Specifically, the fit of the model was similar to Krusell et al.'s [Krusell, P., Ohanian, L., Ríos-Rull, J.V., Violante, G.L., 2000. Capital–skill complementarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis. Econometrica 68 (5), 1029–1053] using the NIPA data, but not the Greenwood et al. [Greenwood, J., Hercowitz, Z., Krusell, P., 1997. Long-run implications of investment-specific technological change. Amer. Econ. Rev. 87 (3), 342–362] data. Also, both series produce estimates of the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and equipment that are substantially larger than Krusell et al.'s [Krusell, P., Ohanian, L., Ríos-Rull, J.V., Violante, G.L., 2000. Capital–skill complementarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis. Econometrica 68 (5), 1029–1053] estimates.     

The link between economic growth and growth volatility

This paper investigates the relationship between economic growth and growth volatility through simultaneous equations system. By employing the identification through heteroskedasticity method of Rigobon (Rev Econ Stat 85:777–792, 2003) and using a panel of 158 countries over the period 1960–2010, we find that output volatility is detrimental to economic growth, suggesting that stabilization policies to mitigate short-run economic fluctuations contribute to long-run economic growth. And economic growth accelerates output variability, supporting the feedback effects from growth to the volatility. The evidence is robust to a number of sensitivity tests.     

When is reputation bad?

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad.” We allow a broad set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the “Stackelberg type” used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.     

Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games with non-ordered preferences

In the usual framework of continuum games with externalities, we substantially generalize Cournot–Nash existence results [Balder, A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Int. J.Game Theory 24 (1995) 79–94; On the existence of Cournot–Nash equilibria in continuum games, J. Math. Econ. 32 (1999) 207–223; A unifying pair of Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence results, J. Econ. Theory 102 (2002) 437–470] to games with possibly non-ordered preferences, providing a continuum analogue of the seminal existence results by Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem without complete or transitive preferences, J. Math. Econ. 1 (1974) 237–246], Gale and Mas-Colell [An equilibrium existence theorem for a general model without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 9–15], Shafer and Sonnenschein [Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences, J. Math. Econ. 2 (1975) 345–348], Borglin and Keiding [Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium: a note on the “new” existence theorems, J. Math. Econ. 3 (1976) 313–316] and Yannelis and Prabhakar [Existence of maximal elements and equilibria in linear topological spaces, J. Math. Econ. 12 (1983) 233–245].     

Renewable resources,property-rights regimes and endogenous growth

We extend Brander and Taylor's [Brander, J.A., Taylor, M.S., 1998. The simple economics of Easter Island: a Ricardo-Malthus model of renewable resource use. Am. Econ. Rev. 88, 119–138.] model of feast and famine cycles on Easter Island using Galor and Weil's [Gailor, O., Weil, D.N., 2000. Population, technology and growth: from Malthusian stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond, Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 806–28] model of endogenous technological advance, where technological change is related to the population. We note that different property-rights regimes will influence the relative direction of technological advance—whether that advance is in harvesting technologies or in technologies that influence the growth rate of some renewable biological resource. Property-rights regimes that favor biological growth rates over harvest rates tend to dampen feast–famine cycles, while those that favor harvest efficiency worsen such cycles.     

Specialization and concentration: a note on theory and evidence

We study the prediction of the theory in Rossi-Hansberg [Rossi-Hansberg E (2005) Am Econ Rev 95(5):1464–1491] that, under quite general circumstances, lower transport costs increase specialization of regions or countries and decrease (regional) concentration of industries. This prediction contradicts the contention of other models and many empirical papers that specialization and concentration should move in parallel. We use two data sets on manufacturing industries across US States and EU member countries to show specialization and concentration do not develop in parallel. The empirical data replicates some of the features of the divergence predicted in the model.     

Averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias

We study the behavior of experimental subjects who have to make a sequence of risky investment decisions in the presence of network externalities. Subjects follow a simple heuristic—investing after positive experiences and reducing their propensity to invest after a failure. This result contrasts with the theoretical findings of Jeitschko and Taylor [Jeitschko, T.D., Taylor, C., 2001. Local discouragement and global collapse: A theory of coordination avalanches. Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (1), 208–224] in which even agents who have only good experiences eventually stop investing because they account for the fact that others with worse experiences will quit. This can trigger sudden economic collapse—a coordination avalanche—even in the most efficient Bayesian equilibrium. In the experiment, subjects follow their own experiences and disregard the possible bad experiences of others—thus exhibiting behavior that we term “solipsism bias.” Solipsism results in sustained investment activity and thus averts complete collapse.     

Two further aspects of some new tests for structural stability

This paper presents two extensions to Hall and Sen’s [Hall, A.R. and Sen, A. 1999. Structural stability testing in models estimated via generalized method of moments. J. Bus. Econ. Stat., 17, 335–348.] analysis of their structural stability tests. First, we approximate the p-values for the non-standard asymptotic null distribution for the structural stability test statistics proposed by Hall and Sen (1999). The p-value response surfaces are approximated by a parametric function using the methodology proposed by Hansen [Hansen, B.E., 1997. Approximate asymptotic P-values for structural change tests. J. Bus. Econ. Stat, 15, 60–67.] Second, we show how Hall and Sen’s (1999) testing methodology can be used to diagnose the source of instability in Euler equation models. To illustrate this issue, we examine the stability of the dividend capital asset pricing model proposed by Hagiwara and Herce [Hagiwara, M. and Herce M.A., 1997. Risk aversion and stock price sensitivity to dividends. Am. Econ. Rev. 87, 738–745]. Hagiwara and Herce (1997) estimate the model using annual data from 1889–1994 and find the model is not rejected using the over-identifying restrictions test. Using the same data, we find some evidence of structural instability in the model. Interestingly, the tests reveal that the model appears to be correctly specified for the period up until 1942 but incorrectly specified in the post 1942 part of the sample.     

Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations

We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any finite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the aspiration-and-imitation process of Binmore and Samuelson [Muddling through: noisy equilibrium selection, J. Econ. Theory 74 (1997) 235–265] and the related processes proposed by Benaı¨m and Weibull [Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games, Econometrica 71 (2003) 873–903] and Traulsen et al. [Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 (2005) 238701], as well as the frequency-dependent Moran process studied by Fudenberg et al. [Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation, Theoretical Population Biol. 70 (2006) 352–363]. We illustrate our results by considering the effect of the number of periods of repetition on the selected equilibrium in repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma when players are restricted to a small set of simple strategies.     

Government policies and graft in an economy with endogenous labor supply

This paper is an extension of Marcouiller and Young's [Am. Econ. Rev. 85 (1995) 630] paper which shows that in a two-good economy with constant labor supply, the government can always increase graft by squeezing the formal sector out of existence. In this paper, we find that if individuals choose the amount of labor they supply, the government can increase graft by eliminating formal production in relatively rare cases.     

Promoting innovation and competition with patent policy

Recently the role of institutions on growth, and especially the influence of Intellectual Property Rights, has been integrated into the Schumpeterian Growth Framework. In this contribution, we highlight the possibility using one patent’s characteristic, the patent height, as an instrument for promoting innovation and growth. We introduce this possibility into the Segerstrom (Am Econ Rev 80:1290–1310, 1998)/Li (Am Econ Rev 93:1009–1018, 2003) quality ladders model of growth. The Li (Am Econ Rev 93: 1009–1018, 2003) generalized model overturns Segerstrom (Am Econ Rev 80:1290–1310, 1998) policy implication in terms of the size of innovations having to be taxed or subsidized by relaxing a crucial assumption on the value of the elasticity of substitution between goods. In this paper, we point out the fact that the innovation size requirement has to be considered as a policy instrument, so that it appears extremely important to consider the case when the innovation size has been made endogenous. A patent policy using the novelty requirement as an instrument for innovation policy enables implementation of the social optimum. The consequences of this policy for market structure and economic growth are then discussed. When the level of the patent novelty requirement is initially high, a patent policy that weakens the patent height can reinforce competition and promote innovation.     

Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game

This paper investigates the implications of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Games Econ. Behav. 10, 6–38; 1998, Exper. Econ. 1, 9–41] in the ultimatum bargaining game. It is shown that, in a normal-form QRE (NQRE), each bargainer's decision depends critically on the anticipated behavior of the other, and there is a NQRE in which the proposer makes any offer between zero and equal split as a strict best response. The application of NQRE to the experimental data [Slonim and Roth, 1998, Econometrica 66, 569–596] suggests that the history dependence observed in the experiment is a result of the strategic interactions between bargainers.     

A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence

I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of each player is a non-empty compact convex subset of an Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous in joint strategies and continuously differentiable and concave in the player i's strategy. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy sets be polyhedral) are imposed. I demonstrate that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence on this domain is homeomorphic to the space of games. This result generalizes a well-known structure theorem in [Kohlberg, E., Mertens, J.-F., 1986. On the strategic stability of equilibria. Econometrica 54, 1003–1037]. It is supplemented by an extension analogous to the unknottedness theorems in [Demichelis S., Germano, F., 2000. Some consequences of the unknottedness of the Walras correspondence. J. Math. Econ. 34, 537–545; Demichelis S., Germano, F., 2002. On (un)knots and dynamics in games. Games Econ. Behav. 41, 46–60]: the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is ambient isotopic to a trivial copy of the space of games.     

Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations

This paper studies the effects of analogy-based expectations in static two-player games of incomplete information. Players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy: they bundle states into analogy classes and play best-responses to their opponent's average strategy in those analogy classes. We provide general properties of analogy-based expectation equilibria and apply the model to a variety of well known games. We characterize conditions on the analogy partitions for successful coordination in coordination games under incomplete information [Rubinstein, A., 1989. The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under ‘almost common knowledge’. Amer. Econ. Rev. 79, 385–391], we show how analogy grouping of the receiver may facilitate information transmission in Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk games [Crawford, V.P., Sobel, J., 1982. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50, 1431–1451], and we show how analogy grouping may give rise to betting in zero-sum betting games such as those studied to illustrate the no trade theorem.     

A note on the robustness of Card and Krueger (1994) and Neumark and Wascher (2000)

This note adds to the discussion originating from Card and Krueger (Am Econ Rev 84:772–793, 1994) and Neumark and Wascher (Am Econ Rev 90:1362–1396, 2000) by re-evaluating their results using the semiparametric difference-in-differences estimator introduced in Abadie (Rev Econ Stud 72:1–19, 2005). The note addresses the question of whether the differences in the original datasets can explain the differences in their conclusions. Although we observe heterogenous employment effects together with the differences in the distributions, the results show that the original findings on the overall employment effect of a minimum wage are fairly robust and just slightly changed when the differences in the distributions of the observed covariates are taken into account.     

Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities

This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel and Moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria [Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 1995a. Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities. Rev. Econ. Stud. 62, 619–637]. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers.