Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?

This study investigates the interrelationship between bank regulatory capital and bank diversification. We argue that regulatory capital might act as a substitutive mechanism of diversification to alleviate a bank's default risk. As a result, regulatory capital is likely to discourage firms from excessive diversification, which might in turn indirectly improve bank value. Using a sample of listed banks in developed countries from 2011 to 2017, we find that total regulatory capital is inversely associated with bank diversification. Narrower regulatory capital ratios only have a significant association with income-based but not with asset-based diversification. Our results also reveal an indirect effect of regulatory capital on bank value mediated by bank diversification (i.e. indirect-only mediation). Overall, our study provides novel insights into the complementarity of the institutional and strategic domains so as to understand the far-reaching implications of regulation reforms for the strategic behaviour of banking companies.     

Do bank regulation,supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?

The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (,  and ), we contribute to this assessment by examining whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of 4050 banks observations in 72 countries over the period 1999–2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. We also find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency.     

Is bank default risk systematic?

We evaluate the impact of commonly used indicators of bank distress on broad (i.e. sector and country) risks. This issue deserves special attention in the banking industry where there is a strong degree of interconnectedness among institutions and the default of a single bank may cause a cascading failure, which could potentially bankrupt the entire system. Using several measures of individual bank risk our results show that these measures have a direct impact on European banking (i.e. systemic) stock market risk. We also provide strong evidence suggesting that, for listed banks, default risk tends to be systematic (i.e. non-diversifiable).     

The short-term effects of foreign bank entry on domestic bank behaviour: Does economic development matter?

This paper investigates the short-term effects of foreign bank entry on the behaviour of the domestic banking sector. We hypothesise that these effects are dependent on the level of economic development of the host country. Our investigation shows that at lower levels of economic development foreign bank entry is generally associated with higher costs and margins for domestic banks. At higher levels of economic development the effects appear to be less clear: foreign bank entry is either associated with a fall of costs, profits and margins of domestic banks, or is not associated with changes in these domestic bank variables.     

Do time deposits prevent bank runs?

In this paper the Diamond and Dybvig (J. Politic. Econ. 91 (1983) 401) model is extended by small consumption shocks; that is, an agent may encounter either a small shock or a big (full) shock. We show that a bank can issue liquid demand deposits and still avoid panics, if it also issues time deposits, which have a low liquidation value. Each agent splits his endowment between the two deposit types. If an agent later encounters a small, common consumption shock he withdraws demand deposits, whereas a big, rare shock requires that time deposits are also liquidated. Agents who withdraw only demand deposits benefit from liquidity.     

Does bank capital reduce liquidity creation?

This paper investigates the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation against the backdrop of the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Analyzing an unbalanced panel of 11,617 U.S. commercial banks from 1996 to 2016, we find a negative association between regulatory capital and on-balance-sheet liquidity creation, but positive associations for small banks and after the financial crisis. Further, we observe lower liquidity creation among banks that participated in the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The results are largely robust to several alternate variable proxies and model specifications. Our findings suggest that “one-size-fits-all” policy may have some unintended consequences for banks.     

What do premiums paid for bank M&As reflect? The case of the European Union

We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of domestic and cross-border bank takeovers in the European Union between 1997 and 2007. We find that acquiring banks value profitable, high-growth and low risk targets. We also find that the strength of bank regulation and supervision as well as deposit insurance regimes in Europe have measurable effects on takeover pricing. Stricter bank regulatory regimes and stronger deposit insurance schemes lower the takeover premiums paid by acquiring banks. This result, presumably in anticipation of higher compliance costs, is driven by domestic deals. Similar qualitative results are found for both the entire sample and the sample of publicly traded targets.     

Limited liability and bank safety net procedures ∗

A model is presented of bank behaviour which identifies the factors determining a bank's optimal capital/asset ratio, its optimal liquidity ratio, the expected value of non-performing loans and the probability of bank failure. We propose that this last variable can act as an index of bank credit-worthiness. The main factors determining this index are (i) the risk associated with bank asset returns, (ii) the variability of bank deposits, (iii) the costs associated with bank failure and (iv) the implicit or explicit government subsidy involved in depositor protection schemes. The principal general conclusion of the paper is that regulations governing capital requirements, liquidity requirements and depositor protection should be (a) risk related and (b) integrated. Depositor protection can be improved through relatively high capital requirements. However, the optimal strategy is for all bank safety net procedures and incentive mechanisms to be related to the riskiness of individual bank portfolios.     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

The determinants of firm–bank relationships in Italy: bank ownership type,diversification and multiple banking relationships

This paper investigates the main features of the relationships between banks and non-financial firms in Italy. Based on detailed firm-level data, we analyse the role of firm-level characteristics, decision-making factors and local credit market indicators in shaping various aspects of corporate banking choices. Empirical results show that young and small firms have a higher probability of relationships with local banks, confirming the advantage of local credit institutions in dealing with informationally opaque firms. Large and internationally active firms tend to establish relationships with national and foreign banks, as they are able to provide more complex banking services that are crucial to access foreign markets. Moreover, firms that are more dependent on external financing are more likely to use multiple and differentiated banking relationships, as a way to diversify external financing sources and alleviate credit constraints.     

Establishing bank–corporate relationships and building competitive advantages

This article investigates how banks build competitive advantage through relationship banking. Using a grounded theory approach, 29 interviews were conducted with relationship managers and corporate banking directors in 21 case banks from 2004 to 2008. Grounded theory models were developed to illustrate the value creation process in relationship banking. It was found that long-term bank–corporate relationships were established through trust-based personal communications. In the case, banks customer information and knowledge advantages were created. Risk-adjusted returns on assets were used to measure customer relationship performance, and relationship managers were rewarded accordingly. The interviewees thought that bank performance could be improved by managing customer credit risk and identifying cross-selling opportunities. This study starts to open up the ‘black box’ of how banks create shareholder value through relationship banking, provides a picture of relationship banking as a social phenomenon, and supplies some theoretical and managerial implications. The article also links the literature relevant to relationship banking from different disciplines. This is a new way of looking at the relationship banking phenomenon and relevant literature in an integrated manner.     

Basel Faulty Simpler rules for bank regulation,please

The intense scrutiny undergone by the financial sector will reach a hiatus in 2004. Regulators will have learnt that they cannot, by prescribing ever more complex or draconian rules, prevent financial companies from taking disastrous risks, or form exploiting privileged information and diddling their customers. Those two dangers, which have preoccupied bank supervisors since the collapses of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998dan Enron in 2001, are inherent in the financial business and cannot be magicked away.     

Why do contagion effects vary among bank failures?

Many of the previous studies on contagion effects in the banking industry focused on the failure of a large bank to determine whether the adverse effects spread to other banks. Yet, little is known whether other publicized bank failures cause contagion effects, and why the effects may vary among bank failures. Given the changes in the banking environment over time, contagion effects could be conditioned on the characteristics of the failing bank and of the banking environment at that time. We assess 99 publicized bank failures over the 1980–1996 period, and find that contagion effects exist in general for the surviving rivals of the failed bank. The degree of contagion effects varies over time (among bank failures), and is stronger when the failed bank is a multibank holding company, when the failed bank is publicly held, when the failed bank is relatively large, when the rivals are relatively small, and when the rivals have relatively low capital levels. The contagion effects are less pronounced in the period following the passage of FIRREA. Furthermore, the total risk-shifts of surviving rival banks in response to the announcement of a failed bank are inversely related to their capital level, and total risk-shifts of rival banks are less pronounced for failures occurring just after the passage of FIRREA. The results suggest that a bank’s exposure to possible contagion effects due to a bank failure can be partially controlled by a bank’s managerial policies and by regulatory policies.     

Strategy implementation as fantasising – becoming the leading bank

In this empirical case study we explore the fantasy nature of strategy work and propose fantasising as a framework contributing to the nascent literature dealing with the previously overlooked fantasy nature of strategy. More specifically, our interest is on examining how the meaning of official strategy gets constructed as it is being implemented, as well as and how and why the perceptions may evolve during implementation. Our data consists of official strategy documents and interviews from Finland's largest financial services group and its largest unit. The interviews cover all organisational levels, enabling us to reveal the variations of perceptions of strategy as it is being implemented. The data analysis is carried out by means of qualitative interpretation. According to our findings, the main goal of becoming the leading bank, as outlined in the official strategy, had been adopted throughout the organisation hierarchically. However, conceptions of what would constitute ‘a leading bank’ varied, especially horizontally. The plausibility of the official strategy is constructed through rational techniques (e.g. numerical ‘objective’ accounting information) intertwined with storytelling. As a result we propose that strategy implementation may best be understood as fantasising involving two forms: functional (explicit, short-term-oriented) and symbolic (metaphorical, long-term-oriented). We offer fantasising in these two forms as an addition to fantasy-oriented strategy literature for further exploration to better understand the nature of strategy work.     

Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation

This paper analyzes the effects of two regulatory mechanisms, namely a regulation of the structure of bank CEOs incentive pay and sanctions for the CEOs of failed banks, on bank risk shifting. We extend a standard model of CEO compensation by incorporating leverage and an investment decision. To the extent that bank depositors and creditors are even partially protected by public guarantees, we show that it is in the interests of bank shareholders to choose more risky investments than would be socially optimal, and therefore to design a CEO contract with excessive risk taking incentives. Thus, we argue that current corporate governance arrangements in the banking sector are not efficient. In this setting, we show that putting in place one of the aforementioned mechanisms could yield the socially optimal outcome at no cost. We also identify some limitations and potential perverse effects of these mechanisms.     

Do bank regulations affect board independence? A cross-country analysis

Based on the hand-collected board structure data of 277 listed banks across 55 countries, and the bank regulation and supervision database compiled by the World Bank, this paper provides the first cross-country assessment of the impacts of bank regulations on board independence of banks. In line with Beck et al. (2006), we examine the effects of two types of regulation policies, the first involving the empowerment of supervisory agencies to monitor and discipline banks directly, and the second focusing on encouraging private monitoring of banks through requiring disclosure of more accurate and complete information. We find that empowering official supervisory agencies to discipline banks directly reduces board independence, but encouraging private sector monitoring of banks increases it. The findings suggest that the first type of regulations tends to crowd out the internal governance of banks, while the second crowds in it. We also find that the legal system with better investor rights protection and better contracts enforcement not only increases board independence but also enhances the crowding in effect of promoting private monitoring and decreases the crowding out effect of direct official supervision on board independence.     

Did bank distress stifle innovation during the Great Depression?

We find a negative relationship between bank distress and the level, quality and trajectory of firm-level innovation during the Great Depression, particularly for R&D firms operating in capital intensive industries. However, we also show that because a sufficient number of R&D intensive firms were located in counties with lower levels of bank distress, or were operating in less capital intensive industries, the negative effects were mitigated in aggregate. Although Depression era bank distress was associated with the stifling of innovation, our results also help to explain why technological development was still robust following one of the largest shocks in the history of the U.S. banking system.     

What lies beneath—Negative interest rates and bank lending

We study the transmission of negative interest rates to bank lending around an unexpected policy rate cut into deep negative territory by the Swiss National Bank (−0.75%). We exploit a rich data set on transaction-level corporate loans matched with bank balance sheet data. We find that banks more affected by negative interest rates offer looser lending terms and lend more than other banks. This result is consistent with the risk-taking channel, where a lower policy rate spurs bank risk-taking to maintain profits. The result implies that, even in such deep negative territory, the reversal rate has not yet been hit.     

Investment bank monitoring and bonding of security analysts’ research

We assess investment banks’ influence over the agreement between their analysts’ research behavior and their clients’ interests, in the post-reform era. Competing banks discipline their analysts with worse career outcomes for producing biased reports, issuing shirking reports, and for involvement in the earnings guidance game, showing meaningful monitoring of their analysts. Highly reputable banks provide more monitoring discipline of their analysts and bonding of their moral hazard than other banks. The findings agree with the banks taking responsibility for aligning analysts’ behavior with clients’ interests.