晋商经营中的门面文化

商业门面在明清时期的山西社会具有浓厚的文化意味。伴随着晋商的崛起与壮大,门面也日益凸现出无比的丰富性和内在生命力。作为门面文化的重要元素,字号、牌匾、楹联、招幌和装饰都从不同的角度折射出山西商人的经营智慧和文化品位,因此,它们都是晋商文化最忠实的反映。     

晋商商业伦理道德的形成、基本规范与价值

晋商的兴起与商业伦理道德有着密切的关系。晋商商业伦理道德是如何形成和发展的 ,其基本规范与价值如何 ,探讨这些问题既可以使我们更深刻地了解晋商 ,也可以启发我们思考当代山西经济发展中存在的问题     

破解晋商文化之法律密码 探求山西法治经济之发展

为了从晋商文化中吸取法律精华,从而运用到山西法治经济发展中来,通过对晋商古地的实地考察,我们分析整理出晋商成功的并值得借鉴的经营理念、活动原则,结合山西现今法制及经济发展状况,从政策及产业等方面对山西的法治经济进行了系统分析,从中提炼出晋商法制精神,以促进并完善山西法治经济之发展。     

晋商经营中的社会责任

明清时期,晋商通过几代人不懈的开拓,不仅获得了巨大的商业财富,还立足中国传统文化,创造了独具特色的商业文化。其中晋商的经营理念是其商业文化的核心,而晋商承担的社会责任则是其经营理念的一种突出表现。在晋商的发展过程中,其对社会责任的履行集中体现在与国家命运与共的家国一体观和回报社会的舍利取义的价值观。     

晋商商业伦理道德及其现代价值

晋商商业伦理道德的内容包括信誉第一,讲求诚实守信;利以义取,讲求生财有道;修身正己、勤俭自律的敬业精神;群体共赢,讲求互惠互利;倡导良贾、善贾、诚贾的晋商文化。晋商商业伦理道德的价值体现在:晋商商业伦理道德是对中国古代商业伦理道德的继承和发展;晋商商业伦理道德对当代经济发展具有借鉴作用。     

晋商与安化黑茶

晋商,一群明清时期的山西商人,创造了中国史上一个又一个的商业奇迹:票号、钱庄、驼帮、万里茶路……。安化黑茶,中国茶叶发展史上浓墨重彩的一笔,凭借着其独特的做工和口味独树一帜。晋商与安化黑茶的结合更是创造了中国商业史上的一个传奇,给晋商带来的是无数的财富,给安化黑茶带来的是百年不倒的品牌。     

晋商管理思想及其现代启示

晋商是中国明清时期"十大商帮"之首,曾创造了辉煌的业绩。晋商在经营管理中积累了丰富的管理思想,其中商业伦理、用人管理和制度创新方面仍值得现代企业借鉴和学习。     

晋商源头探析

晋商数百年的兴盛与辉煌,同人类早期赖以生存的运城盐湖、盐业、盐商有着天然及密不可分的源渊.盐业做为人类早期商业运作的最初产业,见证了人类繁衍,促进了人类的进化,形成了商业发展的最初形态.而由此形成的政治、经济、文化的繁荣和盐业巨商,奠定了后来晋商的雄厚资金,其"积著之理"等早期商业智慧,成为晋商经营谋略的重要传承.     

明清晋商制度的基本模式与实现方式——自我实施与集体主义惩戒机制

明清晋商的成功与其有效的制度安排是紧密相关的.在当时的外部制度环境和山西特定的地缘文化背景下,晋商选择了一种以地缘乡土社会网络为基础的自我实施与集体主义惩戒机制.该机制内涵于晋商经营管理与商业发展的各个层面,构成了其制度模式的基本内容与主要特征.文章认为面对我国当前经济生活中的诸多违约和信用问题,建立一种多元化的治理机制势在必行.     

基于明清时期晋商的营销策略研究

明清时期,山西商人以其固有的诚信耐劳的淳朴作风,独具特色的商业管理机制,灵活多样的营销手段,在商界独领风骚,创造了驰骋疆海十万里,纵横商界五百年,执中国商业、金融之牛耳的辉煌业绩。然而学者对晋商的关注则更多地倾向于其在金融、管理、用人制度等方面,笔者从晋商的发迹着手,有很大的惊喜:晋商的营销策略早已走在了现代人的前面,这才是晋商成功的"杀手锏"。文章对晋商的营销策略作了粗浅探讨,以求起到抛砖引玉的作用。     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Inflation,money, interest rate,exchange rate,and casuality: the case of Egypt,Morocco, and Tunisia

This study provides further evidence of the inflationary efects of the rates of growth of money supply, gross domestic product, efective exchange rate, and imported inflation for Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia using quarterly data from 1964 to 1990. In addition, it examines the Granger causality between inflation and money supply as well as between inflation and the real exchange rate in the countries under consideration. Most of the results are consistent with extant theory and empirical evidence.     

Country terms of trade: trends,unit roots,over-differencing,endogeneity, time dummies,and heterogeneity

The debate about the Prebisch-Singer thesis has focused on primary commodities with some extensions to manufactures. We analyse trends in country terms-of-trade for goods and services rather than those for commodities according to the World Bank income classification. We find that the natural logarithm of the terms of trade for all groups except for the poorest has common unit roots, but none has individual unit roots. As low-income countries have no unit roots over-differencing is inefficient and biases significance levels in first differences against the fall in the terms of trade. For the low-income countries the terms of trade of goods and services are falling at a rate that is significantly negative without and with endogeneity treatment by system GMM. A comprehensive analysis of the effects of time dummies supports the result of falling terms of trade for low-income countries. When all coefficients are country-specific 50% of all low-income countries have falling terms of trade in a simultaneous equation estimation using the SUR method. Food and financial crisis have no effect on the number of countries with falling terms of trade, but (dis-)improve the terms of trade or the significance of the results for a very small number of countries.     

Quality of judicial institutions,crimes, misdemeanors,and dishonesty

We investigate the extent to which quality of judicial institutions has an impact on individuals’ propensity for criminal and dishonest behavior and on their views regarding the acceptability of dishonesty and law-breaking. We use micro data on residents of 25 European countries and employ alternative measures of judicial quality as perceived by the residents of these countries. As an instrument for judicial quality we employ the procedures with which prosecutors and judges are appointed to their posts in each country. As alternative instruments, we employ an index of de jure institutional quality as well as its components, which provide similar results. The findings show that an increase in the perception of the quality of judicial institutions, such as an improvement in judicial independence or the impartiality of the courts, has a deterrent effect on dishonest and criminal acts. A higher perceived quality of the judicial system also makes individuals less likely to find acceptable a variety of dishonest and illicit behaviors, suggesting that institutions help shape the beliefs of the society. We obtain the same results when we analyze the sample of immigrants, whose cultural attributes should be (more) related to their countries of origin, rather than their countries of residence, and thus should be arguably uncorrelated with the factors that can impact the instrument. We show that people’s beliefs in the importance of the family, in the fairness of others, and the importance of being rich are not impacted by judicial quality, suggesting that judicial quality is not a blanket representation of underlying cultural norms and beliefs in the society.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.