The silent success of customs unions

Globally, 81 countries are now part of a customs union (CU), following the rapid proliferation of this type of trade agreement in past decades. Much of this growth has been driven by countries “upgrading” their links from a free trade agreement (FTA) to CU. At the same time, the rapid formation of new FTAs among countries that had no prior agreement in place has largely overshadowed this growth, making CUs the silent success of regional integration. Using the canonical regionalism model, augmented to allow for political bias towards firm interests, we investigate the endogenous choice of trade agreement. We show it is generally politically viable to move from FTA to CU, because such a move is rent‐creating; but for countries without a trade agreement in place, it may be optimal to form an FTA as a stepping stone to reduce the risk of political derailment. Importantly, forming a CU is consistent with member social welfare maximization: as long as trade with the rest of the world does not cease entirely, a CU leads to higher social welfare than either FTA or no agreement. These gains come at the expense of third‐country welfare. If past trends continue, one can expect more FTAs to be upgraded to CU with associated adverse consequences for outsiders.     

Exchanging market access at the outsiders' expense: the case of customs unions

Abstract.  Under a customs union, countries can exchange preferential market access by coordinating external tariffs to shift profits from excluded countries. I show that the exporting rents resulting from this coordination can offset trade diversion losses produced by the union, even if its members are relatively small in world markets. Such gains come, however, at the expense of excluded countries. I show that small countries can use customs unions also to foster multilateral cooperation, by increasing the incentives of excluded countries to support global free trade.     

Extra-union exports of industrial goods from customs unions among developing countries

Formation of a customs union by developing countries is likely to affect extra-union exports of industrial goods. Two competing hypotheses as to the likely direction of such effects are presented, related to the more conventional concepts of trade creation and trade diversion, and tested. On one hand, increased competition and intra-industry specialization may lead to the emergence of larger, more specialized firms which will be more able to export to the rest of the world. On the other hand, expansion of the protected ‘domestic’ marke may induce firms to sell domestically products that they would otherwise have exported. Evidence from the Central American Common Market (CACM) is consistent with each of the two hypotheses for different goods. In aggregate, CACM extra-union exports of industrial goods did not keep pace with the increase in extra-union imports during 1962–1968.     

Trade in intermediate inputs,customs unions,and global free trade

In a three‐country customs union (CU) formation game, I introduce international trade in intermediate inputs and rules of origin (RoO) restrictions. In the case of symmetric countries, I show that as countries become more involved in global supply chains, global free trade is less likely to be a stable equilibrium outcome. RoO can help solve this problem. In the case of asymmetry, depending on the degree of the globalization, free riding (for high degree) or exclusion motive (for low degree) prevents global free trade. Correspondingly, I show that RoO can have helpful or detrimental effects on attaining global free trade.     

The economic analysis of social customs: the case of pre-marital sex

This paper uses a sample of 18,876 adults aged 16-59 from to estimate logit equations of the determinants of support for the custom of abstaining from pre-marital sex. Three sets of equations are estimated separately for males and females; one set for disapproval of pre-marital sex, one set for disapproval of one night stands and another set for a proxy for involvement in pre-marital sex. These results confirm some expected male-female differences and also show a polarisation amongst the population in their support for, and observance of, customs and practices related to abstaining from sex before marriage.     

The effect of currency unions on business cycle correlations: the EMU case

This paper examines empirically the effects of the introduction of the euro on the output correlation among the member economies. The similarity of shocks affecting the members is an important condition to minimize the costs from the loss of national monetary policy implementation. Eichengreen (Economic Policy 10:118–187; 1990) pointed that this is an important condition to be satisfied before joining a currency union. Frankel and Rose (Economic J 108:1009–1025 1998) state that membership could lead to an ex post rise in output correlations. In the current study, we employ ex post and ex ante data on output for 11 members and 11 non-members of the EMU and we test whether the adoption of the euro increased the output synchronization among members compared to non-members. The main findings of this paper are that there is not robust evidence for a decrease in average correlation among members compared to the co-movement among non-members. Our sensitivity analysis reveals that for a group of countries considered to be the core of the European Union, the effect is statistically insignificant. Any decrease in correlation could be attributed to some extend to the countries of the periphery, and also to some of the countries considered as members of the core, giving credit to Eichengreen (Economic Policy 10:118–187; 1990) and Krugman (1990) arguments about increased specialization giving rise to idiosyncratic shocks.     

The second-best use of social cost estimates

A significant literature has developed to estimate the damages to third parties from new electricity generation technologies. This paper focuses on how such estimates can be profitably used in the present regulatory environment, and in the potential new environment that may result from restructuring in the electricity industry.     

The two-part instrument in a second-best world

Standard Pigovian tax theory has been extended in two directions. First, many polluting activities are difficult to tax because they are not market transactions, and so recent papers have shown that the same effects can be achieved by use of a two-part instrument (2PI): a tax on output or income and a subsidy for clean alternatives to pollution. It is a generalization of a deposit–refund system (DRS). Second, a different literature concerns the second-best pollution tax in the presence of other tax distortions. Here, we combine the two extensions by looking at the second-best 2PI. When government needs revenue, is the deposit larger and the rebate smaller? We find explicit solutions for each tax and subsidy in a general equilibrium model with other tax distortions, and we compare these to the rates in a first-best model. The tax–subsidy combination is explained in terms of a tax effect, an environmental effect and a revenue effect. The model allows for flexible interpretation to show various applications of the 2PI. We also discuss important caveats.     

Sequential equilibria of asymmetric ascending auctions: The case of log-normal distributions

Summary. The sequential equilibrium of an ascending-price auction of a single item is derived explicitly for the case of log-normal distributions and a multiplicative valuation model comprising both common and private factors, and allowing asymmetries. If the prior distribution on the common factors is diffuse, or of the form obtained by Bayesian updating from a diffuse prior distribution, then the equilibrium strategies are log-linear with coefficients obtained by solving a set of linear equations. A similar construction applies to normal distributions and additive terms in the valuation model. An example illustrates the predictions derived from the model. Received: December 11, 1996; revised version: July 15, 1997     

Cournot-Walras and Cournot equilibria in mixed markets: A comparison

Summary In this paper, we show that, in markets with a continuum of traders and atoms, the set of Cournot-Walras equilibria and the set of Cournot equilibria may be disjoint. We show also that, when the preferences of the traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the set of Cournot-Walras equilibria and the set of Cournot equilibria have a nonempty intersection.I would like to thank R. Amir, B. de Meyer, J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Mertens, H. Polemarchakis and L. Ventura for some helpful discussions about the questions examined in the present work.     

The double dividend, second-best worlds, and real-world environmental policy

The recent series of papers by Bovemberg, Goulder, Parry and others argue that the double dividend is unlikely to exist because of second-best problems. They argue that the imposition of environmental tax in an economy already distorted by income taxes will further distort the economy by reducing incentives to supply labor. Our paper argues that this is not likely to be the case because of the restrictive assumptions made by these models, and because of the role of the environment as a factor of production.     

Existence of equilibria in the overlapping generations model: the nontransitive case

Summary This paper investigates the existence of competitive equilibria in dynamic exchange models with countably many periods and countably many agents. At each period the commodity space can be finite or infinite dimensional. The preferences of agents are not assumed to be transitive or complete. A first equilibrium existence theorem is established under the classical assumption that there exists a finite set of non-negligible agents. In the particular case of an overlapping generations model, a second existence theorem allows simultaneously for finite-lived assets and infinite-lived assets and limits the previous assumption to infinite-lived assets. This theorem covers obviously the standard case of an overlapping generations model where the agents have no endowment outside their lifetime.     

Decreasing absolute prudence: Characterization and applications to second-best risk sharing

In this paper, we provide two basic properties of utility functions u which exhibit decreasing absolute prudence i.e. (− u/u″)′ ≤ 0. These properties are used to examine the allocation of risks in an economy when some agents bear non-transferable risks. We show that it is fair Pareto-efficient to let those with a non-transferable risk bear relatively less of the transferable risk in the economy if and only if absolute prudence is decreasing. In another model, there is a complete set of contingent markets, but some agents have no direct access to them. We examine the fair efficient allocation of risk in a pool gathering a trader and a non-trader. Decreasing absolute prudence provides an upper bound to the share of the pool's risk that should be borne by the trader.     

The sensitivity of partially regulated second-best prices to intercommodity cross elasticities of demand

Ramsey prices for multiproduct monopolists with competitive fringe are shown to be sensitive to cross elasticities of demand. The sensitivity increases with size of cross elasticities, and with size of difference between ratios of cross elasticities and of own-price elasticities.     

The nonlinear impact of currency unions on bilateral trade

Most gravity model specifications assume that a currency union varies the level of bilateral trade between members by a constant proportion. We demonstrate that a common currency also alters the slope of the relationship between bilateral trade and member country GDPs.     

Social welfare loss due to second-best pricing: an application to the Portuguese telecommunications

The telecommunications industry is usually characterized by low marginal costs and significant fixed costs which are the conditions for the inefficiency of marginal cost pricing. In such cases theory postulates that optimal pricing is obtained by maximizing welfare subject to a restriction of viability of the firm: the second-best pricing scheme. The possible welfare losses due to second-best pricing varies according to the values of marginal costs, prices and demand elasticities. This paper analyses to what extent the second-best pricing has been achieved in the Portuguese telecommunications firm CTT, over the period 1950#150;1984 as well as the magnitude of the price-cost margins and welfare losses created. We obtained empirical evidence of the presence of economies of scale, a welfare loss estimate of 1% of the telecommunications receipts and a result that price was 40% greater than marginal cost. We concluded that price regulation and public ownership of the firm did not seriously affect social welfare over the sample period (it should be noted that it is the non-digital and fixedwire infrastructure period). Therefore, it is important to study the impact of new digital and non-wire technologies and new services provided in the old regulatory scenery.