Do women borrowers augment financial performance of MFIs?

There is some consensus that depth of outreach and financial performance of Microfinance Institutions (MFI) are positively correlated. A majority of microcredit borrowers are women and since the prevalence of female borrowers is even greater among the very poor, there should be a positive correlation between female borrowers and financial performance. Most of the MFIs target women as preferred borrowers. However, no study to date has investigated the relationship between targeting women and MFI’s sustainability with respect to profitability and yield. Utilizing a panel of 892 MFIs over a period of 10 years, this study shows that increased proportion of women borrowers has a statistically significant positive impact on yield and financial performance of MFIs. Consequently, this article also analyses the implication as to whether female borrowers have better repayment rate than male borrowers.     

INTEREST RATES IN GROUP LENDING: A BEHAVIOURAL INVESTIGATION

Abstract.  Microfinance institutions (MFIs) serve more than 5 million households in developing countries. A crucial variable for MFI schemes is the interest rate to be charged from borrowers. This paper studies the behavioural impacts of the repayment burden on repayment performance. In a laboratory experiment, we vary the amount a borrower group has to repay and study how this affects free-riding behaviour. We can identify two counteracting effects: a higher repayment burden intensifies the incentives to free-ride as shirking saves more money. On the other hand, high-interest loans are less tolerant towards defaulters, which exerts a disciplining effect.     

MEASURING THE EFFICIENCY OF SUB‐SAHARAN AFRICA'S MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS AND ITS DRIVERS

This paper uses a large panel data set covering 70 MFIs in 25 Sub‐Saharan African countries to analyze the efficiency of MFIs. This is important, given that MFIs have to operate efficiently to fulfil its dual mission of serving the poor and being sustainable. The results reveal that MFIs are inefficient in meeting the goals of either providing microfinance related services to their clients or intermediating funds between borrowers and depositors. The MFIs lack ability to reach efficient sizes of their performing loan portfolio at the same time they reach an efficient number of clients served.     

Financing microfinance institutions: subsidies or deposit mobilisation

According to conventional wisdom, dependence on subsidies cannot achieve the double bottom lines of microfinance institutions (MFIs): outreach and financial sustainability. The application of market-based principles to microfinancing, such as deposit mobilisation, has been long suggested as an answer to this problem. This paper documents the following findings regarding this issue. First, deposit mobilisation crowds out subsidies. Second, subsidies and deposit mobilisation reduce microcredit interest rates and allow MFIs to reach poorer borrowers. Third, subsidies and deposit mobilisation worsen financial sustainability. Fourth, subsidies reduce repayment rates, while deposit mobilisation has no impact on repayment. Overall, the results suggest that neither subsidies nor deposit mobilisation solve the traditional problem of trade-off between outreach and financial sustainability.     

Here today,gone tomorrow: Can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible?

This paper presents a model of microfinance lending to individuals that uses dynamic incentives, in the form of access to additional loans, to discourage borrowers from strategic default, or the unwillingness to repay a loan once a positive outcome is realized. We propose an improvement on contracts currently used by microfinance institutions (MFIs) by endogenizing the default penalty, while constraining the MFI to maintain sustainable lending operations. Furthermore, accounting for the risks that the poor face by including a negative economic shock, we show that under certain circumstances, the punishment for default need not be a lifetime without loans.     

Endogenous capital market imperfections, human capital, and intergenerational mobility

In this paper, capital market imperfections are endogenized considering an adverse selection problem between banks and borrowers. We develop a growth model with linear OLG wealth dynamics, where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and ability, which is private information. We show that banks react to this informational asymmetry by granting higher loans to talented borrowers. This, in turn, helps poor and talented agents to become educated and catch up with the rich agents. Furthermore, the credit market friction leads to greater human capital accumulation.     

Endogenous capital market imperfections,human capital,and intergenerational mobility

In this paper, capital market imperfections are endogenized considering an adverse selection problem between banks and borrowers. We develop a growth model with linear OLG wealth dynamics, where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and ability, which is private information. We show that banks react to this informational asymmetry by granting higher loans to talented borrowers. This, in turn, helps poor and talented agents to become educated and catch up with the rich agents. Furthermore, the credit market friction leads to greater human capital accumulation.     

Borrower runs

Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default.     

When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?

Whether a microfinance institution should use a state-contingent repayment or not is very important since a state-contingent loan can provide insurance for borrowers. However, the classic Grameen bank used state non-contingent repayment, which is puzzling since it forces poor borrowers to make their payments even under hard circumstances. This paper provides an explanation to this puzzle. We consider two modes of lending, group and individual lending, and for each mode we characterize the optimal lending and supervisory contracts when a staff member (a supervisor) can embezzle borrowers’ repayments by misrepresenting realized returns. We identify the main trade-off between the insurance gain and the cost of controlling the supervisor's misbehavior. We also find that group lending dominates individual lending either by providing more insurance or by saving audit costs.     

Competition and microfinance

Competition between microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries has increased dramatically in the last decade. We model the behavior of non-profit lenders, and show that their non-standard, client-maximizing objectives cause them to cross-subsidize within their pool of borrowers. Thus when competition eliminates rents on profitable borrowers, it is likely to yield a new equilibrium in which poor borrowers are worse off. As competition exacerbates asymmetric information problems over borrower indebtedness, the most impatient borrowers begin to obtain multiple loans, creating a negative externality that leads to less favorable equilibrium loan contracts for all borrowers.     

Capital requirements and business cycles with credit market imperfections

The business cycle effects of bank capital regulatory regimes are examined in a New Keynesian model with credit market imperfections and a cost channel of monetary policy. Bank capital increases incentives for banks to monitor borrowers, thereby raising the repayment probability, and excess capital generates benefits in terms of reduced regulatory scrutiny. Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined, and the model is calibrated for a middle-income country. Simulations of a supply shock show that, depending on the elasticity that relates the repayment probability to the bank capital–loan ratio, the Basel II regime may be less procyclical than a Basel I regime.     

LES DÉTERMINANTS DE LA PERFORMANCE DE REMBOURSEMENT DES MICROCRÉDITS EN TUNISIE

Our work is part of the quest for sustainability of MFIs. To ensure sustainability, an MFI must be effective. It must, among others, face many risks and in particular the default risk. A question arises: what are the determinants of portfolio quality of MFIs? In other words, what are the determinants that influence delays in payment of MFIs? The interest of this research is twofold. The first is practical: knowing the importance of performance measures of microcredit as a precondition for the efficiency and financial performance of MFIs, this study identified determinants of the reimbursement rate in an MFI of Tunisia. It may even give an evidence for banks to intervene on the market of micro credit. The second is methodological: to find the determinants of reimbursement behaviour in MFIs, a binary logistic regression is used, while differing in explanatory variables between key variables and moderators’ ones, which was not met previously in the literature. The results showed that among the variables related to the characteristics of the loan, the loan amount and the borrower's experience with the MFI affect the rate of reimbursement. The credit increases the likelihood of default. Unlike, when borrower's experience with the MFI increases, the risk of default decreases. A relationship between the industry and the repayment rate has not been verified. For variables related to the characteristics of the borrower, age, educational level and marital status of the borrower appear to affect the relationship between the risk of default and the amount of credit. The effect of the credit amount on the default risk decreases as age and level of education increases. In addition, this effect is more important for married compared to the unmarried. For gender, we found that the effect of maturity on the risk of default is not the same for men or women borrowers. It seems that when the maturity increases, men provide reimbursement rates lower than women.     

Determinants of margin in microfinance institutions

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) lend to the poor. However, microfinance clients suffer from high interest rates, a type of poverty penalty. This article analyses the margin determinants in MFIs. A banking model has been adapted to microfinance. This model has been tested using 9-year panel data. Some factors explaining bank margin also explain MFI margin, with operating costs being the most important factor. Specific microfinance factors are donations and legal status, as regulated MFIs can collect deposits. It has also been found that MFIs operating in countries with a high level of financial inclusion have low margins.     

ARE FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE? A CASE STUDY OF VIETNAMESE MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS

A major debate in microfinance focuses on the existence of a trade‐off between the financial sustainability of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their outreach to poor clients. This paper adds to this debate by analyzing whether financial and social efficiency are mutually exclusive in a context of implicit subsidies by the state and international donors. We use data from a sample of 28 Vietnamese MFIs and apply Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to identify the existence of a trade‐off. Our analysis shows that for Vietnamese MFIs financial and social efficiency are not related. We interpret this as evidence for the fact that there is no support to believe that there is such a trade‐off. Subsidies, based on which most Vietnamese MFIs currently operate, helps them to show high financial efficiency, while at the same time being able to attain their social goals. Nevertheless, this model may not be sustainable in the long‐term.     

Wealth Effects, Incentives, and Productivity

Comparative static effects of varying the wealth level of a risk-averse agent in a moral hazard setting with limited liability constraints are investigated. There are two principal opposing effects of increasing wealth: the incentive effect, which allows stronger punishments for poor performance, thereby encouraging higher effort; and the preference effect, which reduces the agent's effort incentives owing to income effects in the demand for leisure. It is shown that optimal effort levels are initially constant, subsequently increasing and eventually decreasing in wealth. Hence agents with intermediate wealth levels are the most productive.     

Microfinance and child mortality

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) offer targeted opportunities for the poor to generate additional income with a range of financial services including credit, insurance, savings accounts and money transfers. Aside from reducing poverty, microfinance can potentially improve health because it is the poor who are usually more constrained from health investments due to limited budgets. Furthermore, microfinancing specifically targets women, who are more likely to spend additional income on children’s well-being. Finally, several MFIs have also begun to offer health-related services, such as health education, health-care financing, clinical care, training community health workers, health micro-insurance and linkages to public and private health providers. Using a new data set, this article conducts the first multi-country study of the effect of microfinance on child mortality, the health outcome, which is most sensitive to the effects of absolute deprivation. Our findings confirm that an increase in the proportion of MFI clients in a country is significantly associated with lower under-five and infant mortality rates. We conclude that if MFIs’ educational and health services have indeed caused improvements in health outcomes at the community level, then it may be important for governments to complement these activities with similar campaigns, particularly in remote areas where MFI penetration is low.     

Wealth Effects, Distribution, and the Theory of Organization

We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital. Effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid, and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem. Because incentives vary with an agent's wealth, different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances. When borrowing is not costly, firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently. But when the costly state verification problem is sufficiently severe, firm organization will depend on the distribution of wealth: with enough inequality, it will tend to be dictated by incentives of rich agents to earn high returns to wealth, even if the chosen organizational form is not a technically efficient way to provide incentives.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D2, D31, J41, L2.     

Determinants of microcredit repayment in Portugal: analysis of borrowers,loans and business projects

Microcredit programs in Portugal represent a unique case for studying the microcredit repayment determinants in a developed country, as it experienced a financial hardship in 2008–2009, with economic and social consequences that led to unemployment crisis. This research examined the determinants of microcredit loan repayment based on a sample of 752 microcredit loans granted in Portugal by the National Association for the Right to Credit, adopting individual lending mechanisms and granting loans through partnerships with several credit institutions. This is the first study to ascertain the influence that a set of factors – grouped into three categories: borrowers’ individual characteristics; loan characteristics; and characteristics of business projects implemented by borrowers – has on the repayment ability of microcredit programs, in a developed country of the Eurozone. Moreover, this is the first study using an ordered logistic regression (OLR) in estimating the determinants of microcredit loan repayment. Similar to previous studies, married borrowers tend to repay loans faster as they tend to be more responsible than single borrowers. Nationality seems to be an issue as foreigners tends to default the repayment loans. Finally, those involved in manufacturing activities perform better than those involved in service activities in repaying their loans. This clearly indicates that in developed countries special attention needs to be provided to minority groups as well as market/supply conditions, which are not normally considered in less favored economic countries.     

The effect of corruption on microfinance loan portfolio: A semiparametric analysis

In this paper, we examine the extent to which corruption affects the loan portfolio of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We employ robust econometric estimation on a sample of 507 MFIs across 63 countries from 2005 to 2018. Our results show that corruption is negatively associated with the loan portfolio. However, in semiparametric analysis, we find that lower-level corruption is beneficial to increase the loan portfolio while higher-level corruption is detrimental. The results imply that it is not just corruption that matters as far as its effect on MFIs' loan portfolio is concerned; what matters is the degree of corruption. In further analyses, we find that corruption reduces both the number of active borrowers and average loan per borrower indicating that corruption reduces both coverage and amount of credit extension. The results suggest that the effect of corruption on the loan portfolio is gender-sensitive. Corruption facilitates an increase in loans to female borrowers. Our results are robust to alternative variable measurements and different identification strategies, including two-stage least square.     

The impact of ethnic diversity on microenterprise start-ups

Until recently, factors determining the decisions made by microfinance institutions (MFIs) to extend loans to business start-ups had not been explored. Recent evidence shows that MFI performance with regard to funds issued for small business start-ups depends on MFI-level characteristics such as profit orientation. We argue that these decisions do not only depend on MFI-specific practices or characteristics, but also on the role ethnic diversity plays. Using data on microfinance lending activities for business start-ups, we examine the impact of ethnic diversity on microenterprise start-ups. Results show that ethnic diversity negatively affects the provision of financial capital for business start-up. Furthermore, results also suggest a negative association between ethnic diversity and the share of female borrowers recorded by MFIs. We examine social networks and outreach as potential channels through which ethnic diversity affects business start-ups.