Fiscal Forecasting: Lessons from the Literature and Challenges*

While fiscal forecasting and monitoring has its roots in the accountability of governments for the use of public funds in democracies, the Stability and Growth Pact has significantly increased interest in budgetary forecasts in Europe, where they play a key role in EU multilateral budgetary surveillance. In view of the increased prominence and sensitivity of budgetary forecasts, which may lead to them being influenced by strategic and political factors, this paper discusses the main issues and challenges in the field of fiscal forecasting from a practitioner's perspective and places them in the context of the related literature.     

Fiscal Transparency,Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings

Fiscal transparency can provide policymakers with incentives to adopt better policies by enhancing the public debate on the design and sustainability of fiscal policy and establishing accountability for their implementation. Fiscal transparency can also reduce uncertainty about fiscal policy and fiscal outturns by providing more information on the underlying fiscal position and fiscal risks. Both effects suggest that countries should benefit from adopting transparency enhancing policies through better market assessments of their sovereign risk. In this paper, we investigate whether fiscal transparency has an effect on market perceptions of sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign credit ratings, and if so, through which channels. We find that fiscal transparency has a positive and significant effect on ratings – one standard deviation increase in fiscal transparency increases credit ratings by 0.7 and 1 notches (or steps in the credit rating scale) in advanced and developing economies, respectively – but its effect works through different channels in advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies, fiscal transparency is associated with better fiscal outcomes, leading indirectly to higher credit ratings. In developing economies, the direct uncertainty‐reducing effect of fiscal transparency seems to be more important. Indeed, the effect of fiscal transparency on fiscal performance is found to increase with the level of institutional development.     

On the Consequences of Pro‐Cyclical Fiscal Policy

There is widespread evidence that pro‐cyclical fiscal policies have been prevalent in developing countries and often in some industrial nations. It is therefore surprising that, in contrast to the wealth of studies on the sources of pro‐cyclical policy, potential consequences of such seemingly suboptimal policies have been largely ignored in the existing literature. By utilising a comprehensive set of indicators from 114 countries for 1950–2010, we aim to address the following important question: does it matter whether a country adopts a pro‐cyclical fiscal policy stance rather than a counter‐cyclical one? Our results produce a resounding ‘yes’ to this question. We find that fiscally pro‐cyclical countries have lower rates of economic growth, higher rates of output volatility and higher rates of inflation.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from a Fiscal Reform in China

This paper uses a fiscal decentralisation reform in China – namely, the province‐managing‐county (PMC) reform – to examine the effects of fiscal decentralisation on local economic growth. The PMC reform abolished the subordinate fiscal relationship between prefectures and counties and transferred much of the tax and spending authority from the prefecture to the county level. Exploiting a county‐level panel data set over 2001–11, we find that the reform has led to a significant increase in the GDP growth rate. The effect is considerably more pronounced in regions with superior initial institutional quality. We also identify channels: the PMC reform induced county governments to exert lower tax burdens on firms and increase spending on infrastructure construction.     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Empowerment: Evolving Concepts and Alternative Measures*

Decentralisation reforms are among the most common and significant public sector reforms, particularly in developing and transitional countries around the world. Despite the importance of the topic to policy practitioners and academic researchers alike and the extensive empirical research on the topic, there is consensus in the literature that the measures of decentralisation that are currently used are unsatisfactory. In response, we propose an alternative measure of fiscal decentralisation based on the notion that decentralisation is more than simply the inverse of centralisation. Following Bahl (2005), we consider fiscal decentralisation as ‘the empowerment of people by the [fiscal] empowerment of their local governments’. Accordingly, we develop a measure of fiscal empowerment that allows us to quantify fiscal decentralisation as the gain in empowerment due to devolution and we analyse the proposed measures of empowerment and decentralisation for a cross‐section of developing, transitional and industrialised countries.     

Generalized Stability of Monetary Unions Under Regime Switching in Monetary and Fiscal Policies

Earlier studies on the stability of monetary unions show that an inflation‐targeting central bank imposes strict budgetary requirements on fiscal policy to obtain a unique stable equilibrium. Failure of only one fiscal authority to meet these requirements already results in nonexistence of equilibrium. Nevertheless, it might prove useful to temporarily depart from such requirements in order to absorb country‐specific shocks. We show that such departures are feasible if fiscal authorities commit to switch to more sustainable fiscal regimes in the future. Debt devaluation and fiscal bailouts may also broaden the range of policy stances under which monetary unions are stable.     

Public Investment,the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’

The fiscal rules set in the Treaty of Maastricht and in the Stability and Growth Pact have sometimes been criticised as an excessively binding constraint for appropriate counter‐cyclical action. The risk that the rules may permanently reduce the public sector's contribution to capital accumulation has also been pointed out. In this framework, the adoption of a ‘golden rule’ has been suggested. Starting from the recent debate, this paper tackles two questions: (a) the implications of the Pact for public investment and (b) the pros and cons of introducing a golden rule in EMU's fiscal framework, given the objectives of low public debts and adequate margins for a stabilising budgetary policy. The analysis suggests that the rules set in the Treaty and in the Pact may negatively influence public investment spending. However, the golden rule, although intuitively appealing, does not seem to be an appropriate solution to the problem.     

Fiscal Policy Shocks in the Euro Area and the US: An Empirical Assessment*

We analyse the impact of fiscal policy shocks in the euro area as a whole, using a newly‐available quarterly data set of fiscal variables for the period 1981–2007. To allow for comparability with previous results on euro‐area countries and the US, we use a standard structural vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, and study the impact of aggregated and disaggregated government spending and net‐tax shocks. In addition, to frame euro‐area results, we apply the same methodology for the same sample period to US data. We also explore the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of variables aiming to control for underlying financial and fiscal conditions. The main new findings are that: expansionary fiscal shocks have a short‐term positive impact on GDP and private consumption, with government spending shocks entailing, in general, higher effects on economic activity than (net) tax reductions; output multipliers to government expenditure shocks are of similar size in the euro area and in the US; the persistence of a fiscal spending shock is higher in the US than in the euro area, which appears to be related to military spending in the US; and fiscal multipliers have increased over the recent past in both geographical areas.     

Identifying Discretionary Fiscal Policy Reactions with Real‐Time Data

We propose a method of identifying discretionary fiscal policy reactions using real‐time data. Automatic stabilizers should depend on true GDP, while discretionary fiscal policy is contingent on the information that policy makers have in real time. We can compute a real‐time measurement error by comparing the first release of GDP data with later revisions. Discretionary fiscal policy is influenced by this measurement error, whereas automatic fiscal policy is not. We use this identification approach to test the central identifying assumption of Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) seminal structural vector autoregression (VAR). According to this assumption, fiscal policy makers do not react to GDP developments contemporaneously in a discretionary fashion. We find that government expenditure is adjusted upward if GDP growth in real time is lower than true GDP. This suggests that fiscal policy makers use short‐term funds to buy goods and services in response to their perception of GDP dynamics.     

The Cyclical Reaction of Fiscal Policies in the Euro Area: The Role of Modelling Choices and Data Vintages*

We survey the recent empirical literature concerning the cyclical response of fiscal policies in the euro area, finding large differences in results. We show that these differences are heavily influenced by the choices made in modelling fiscal behaviour. We make a case for the use, in assessing policies and in the EMU context, of the standard modelling choice where the discretionary reaction of fiscal policy is directly estimated. Models where the overall reaction to the cycle – which includes the effects of both discretionary actions and automatic stabilisers – is directly estimated tend to suggest either strong pro‐cyclical or strong counter‐cyclical discretionary reactions, depending on how this component is identified. Within the standard model and for the years 1994 to 2008, we show that results are significantly affected by the data vintage (ex post or real‐time). With ex post data, we find an unambiguous indication of a‐cyclicality. Using real‐time data, we find that the output gap matters. However, depending on whether we assess policy intentions or actual policies, euro‐area governments' behaviour radically changes. A plausible interpretation is that in the implementation phase, governments loosen their fiscal stance, giving in to political pressures that are proportional to the scale of the economic difficulties in bad times and the size of the ‘growth dividend’ in good times.     

Fiscal Transfers and Fiscal Sustainability

We examine whether the U.S. and German state governments pursue sustainable fiscal policies taking into account fiscal transfers. Using panel data techniques we investigate whether the debt‐to‐GDP ratio had a positive influence on the primary surplus (Bohn model). We show that including/excluding fiscal transfers changes the results. If fiscal transfers are not included in the primary surplus, the test results do not indicate that the U.S. and German state governments pursued sustainable fiscal policies. Our results also suggest that fiscal transfers were positively related to debt. These findings indicate that intergovernmental transfers have implicitly subsidized debts.     

Fiscal Consolidations and Economic Growth

The aim of this paper is to deepen the understanding of the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal consolidations. In particular, there is evidence in the literature of fiscal consolidation episodes producing (non‐Keynesian) expansionary effects in the short run. We replicate this result for a panel of OECD countries under exogeneity of the fiscal consolidation. However, we provide some evidence that output growth might affect the fiscal tightening process so that fiscal consolidations are not exogenous to economic growth. Once we allow for feedback effects from economic growth to fiscal adjustments, we find that expansionary effects disappear and recover the typical Keynesian effect of fiscal adjustments. This finding points to the need to take these short‐term negative implications into account in the design of fiscal consolidations.     

Mad about Austerity? The Effect of Fiscal Consolidation on Public Opinion

We explore the impact of fiscal austerity on three different dimensions of public opinion in 26 European Union countries (consumer confidence, attitude toward national authorities, and European institutions) on annual data between 1997 and 2017. Our main finding is that the independent effect of a tighter fiscal stance on public opinion is not large and, when present, seems to closely follow the impact of fiscal austerity on economic activity. Our results therefore are inconsistent with the view that fiscal austerity necessarily implies a negative effect on public opinion and a decline in popularity of national and European institutions.     

Macro‐Fiscal Volatility and the Composition of Public Spending*

Earlier empirical literature has examined some long‐ and medium‐term aspects of macro‐fiscal volatility while leaving its short‐term fiscal impact unexplored. To help fill that gap, we examine the impact of macro‐fiscal volatility on the composition of public spending. To that end, we analyse a panel of 10 EU countries during 1991–2007. Our results suggest that increases in the volatility of regularly‐collected and cyclical revenues such as the VAT and income taxes tend to tilt the expenditure composition in favour of public investment. In contrast, increases in the volatility of ad hoc taxes such as capital taxes tend to favour public consumption spending, albeit only a little. We interpret such volatility innovations as conveying news to the fiscal policymaker about the underlying economic conditions, with especially regularly‐collected and cyclical taxes prompting short‐term cyclical fine‐tuning.     

Central Transfer and Fiscal Capacity in China: Evidence from the Tax-Sharing System

In 1994, the Chinese government introduced a new fiscal system. Using the provincial panel data during the following period 1995–2010, we find robust evidence that central transfer (measured as the ratio of net central transfer to budgetary expenditure for each province) has a significant, negative effect on the fiscal capacity of a province (the sum of budgetary and extra-budgetary incomes as a percentage of GDP). Therefore, when the central government favors the poor provinces in central transfers (the common pool problem), the rich provinces expand their extra-budgetary income more to avoid predation by the central government, which helps increase the fiscal capacity and thus the market-preserving behavior of the rich provinces. Our result helps explain China’s success, which has strong policy implications for other transitional economies.     

The Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth Nexus Revisited

This paper addresses two challenges that the fiscal decentralisation and economic growth nexus faces – namely, endogeneity problems and inaccurate measurement of fiscal decentralisation. We introduce novel instrumental variables based on common legal system origin, common federal system, geographical position and relative country size. The positive relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth that we find remains valid when using these instrumental variables. Using fiscal decentralisation measures that better reflect the autonomy of subnational governments changes this relationship. This finding, however, is the result of the accompanying changes in the sample rather than the use of these alternative measures themselves.     

Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union at the Zero Lower Bound

This paper constructs a two‐country core–periphery New Keynesian model of a currency union to address the interaction between the objectives of regionally directed fiscal policy constrained by a single currency and the aggregate use of fiscal policy in face of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on policy interest rates. We identify an optimal path of aggregate and relative fiscal policy responses to a negative region‐specific demand shock. Our results show that (i) in a monetary union, the optimal policy response to an asymmetric reduction in demand concentrated in the periphery always entails a relative shift of fiscal expenditure toward the worse‐affected regions, (ii) though no aggregate fiscal response is required outside the ZLB, and (iii) optimal union‐wide fiscal policy is expansionary at the ZLB. Therefore, optimal policy always entails an expansion in the periphery at the ZLB, but the optimal fiscal response in the core regions can be either expansionary or contractionary depending on the parameters of the model. However, (iv) fiscal expansion in the core is warranted if the periphery cannot implement an expansion due to constraints on public spending.     

两种属性的积极财政政策及其选择

积极的财政政策是一种扩张性的财政政策，但由于政策目标与政策结构的差异，将会形成效率型与稳定型两种属性的积极财政政策，而它们又将从不同的层面影响经济增长与就业增长的关系，进而导致不同的政策效果。1998年以来，我国所实行的效率型积极财政政策在一定程度上加剧了就业的严峻形势。为了扩大就业，促进再就业，保证改革的稳定环境，我国的积极财政政策应由“效率型”转向“稳定为主兼顾效率”的复合型积极财政政策。     

Fiscal Stimulus in Times of High Debt: Reconsidering Multipliers and Twin Deficits

We investigate the impact of fiscal stimuli at different levels of the government debt‐to‐GDP ratio for a sample of 17 European countries from 1970 to 2010. This is implemented in an interacted panel VAR framework in which all coefficient parameters are allowed to change continuously with the debt‐to‐GDP ratio. We find that responses to government spending shocks exhibit strong nonlinear behavior. While the overall cumulative effect of a spending shock on real GDP is positive and significant at moderate debt‐to‐GDP ratios, this effect turns negative as the ratio increases. The total cumulative effect on the trade balance as a share of GDP is negative at first but switches sign at higher levels of debt. Consequently, depending on the degree of public indebtedness, our results accommodate long‐run fiscal multipliers that are greater and smaller than one or even negative as well as twin deficit and twin divergence behavior within one sample and time period. From a policy perspective, these results lend additional support to increased prudence at high public debt ratios because the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli to boost economic activity or resolve external imbalances may not be guaranteed.     

Growth and Welfare Effects of Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model with Public Investment

In this paper we analyze growth and welfare effects of fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model along the balanced growth path. As to the model we assume that sustained per capita growth results from public investment. The government uses its tax revenue for investment in public capital, for investment subsidy and for transfer payments. We then analyze how the balanced growth rate reacts to variations in those policy variables. Further, we study welfare effects of varying the fiscal parameters and demonstrate that, in general, maximizing economic growth is not equivalent to maximizing welfare on the balanced growth path.