Ownership structure and earnings management in emerging markets—An institutionalized agency perspective

Previous earnings management research has largely focused on firm-level governance mechanisms in single countries or on macro-level variables in multiple countries. Building on this research, we incorporate firm ownership predictors along with national institutional dimensions to explore why firm decision makers in emerging markets vary in their earnings management behavior. Our theoretical framework integrates agency and institutional theories proposing that firm-level ownership mechanisms do not function in isolation, but are reinforced or attenuated by elements of the institutional governance environment. The multilevel empirical analysis of 1200 firms in 24 emerging markets indicates that controlling ownership is positively related to earnings management. We find that the level of minority shareholder protection in a country weakens this positive relationship. We also find that regulatory quality strengthens the negative relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management activity. It is hoped that awareness of how firm ownership structures interact with national-level institutions in affecting firm-level behavior will help managers and investors develop skills and practices to better cope with business norms in emerging economies.     

Does Institutional Blockholder Short‐Termism Lead to Managerial Myopia? Evidence from Income Smoothing

We examine institutional blockholders’ influence on income‐smoothing practices in the Korean market, which provides an interesting setting where family‐oriented chaebols dictate the corporate landscape and impede shareholder activism. The empirical results reveal that institutional shareholders with a short‐term (long‐term) investment horizon facilitate (constrain) managerial myopia. This positive (negative) association is most evident among firms with domestic institutional investors. Therefore, we argue that the presence of domestic institutional investors with transient investment goals incentivizes firms’ management to smooth out earnings.     

Ethics and Disclosure: A Study of the Financial Performance of Firms in the Seasoned Equity Offerings Market

In this article, we examine the association between ethics and disclosure and the impact of this association on the long-term, post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We argue that firms with extensive disclosure are less likely to face information problems, and more likely to lead to an active shareholder monitoring, and therefore, engage in fewer unethical activities, such as aggressive earnings manipulation, and have better long-term, post-issue performance. Consistent with these predictions, this study presents evidence that disclosure is negatively related to unethical earnings manipulation and positively associated with long-term, post-issue performance. In particular, we find that long-term, post-issue SEO underperformance is significantly less for firms with extensive disclosure and conservative earnings management than firms with less disclosure and aggressive earnings management. We interpret this evidence to mean that over the long run, the capital market values ethical financial reporting and corporate efforts to incorporate social responsibility into their decision-making processes, for example, by enhancing information transparency through voluntary disclosure.      

The Politics of Shareholder Activism in Nigeria

Shareholder activism has become a force for good in the extant corporate governance literature. In this article, we present a case study of Nigeria to show how shareholder activism, as a corporate governance mechanism, can constitute a space for unhealthy politics and turbulent politicking, which is a reflection of the country’s brand of politics. As a result, we point out some translational challenges, and suggest more caution, in the diffusion of corporate governance practices across different institutional environments. We contribute to the literature on corporate governance in Africa, whilst creating an understanding of the political embeddedness of shareholder activism in different institutional contexts—i.e. a step closer to a political theorising of shareholder activism.     

大股东对盈余指标存在选择偏好吗?

作为转轨经济中公司治理的核心,大股东制衡机制对盈余管理和盈利质量存在重要影响.本文选择每股收益和主营业务利润率作为两类不同盈余指标的代表,以来自中国股市的经验证据研究发现:(1)控股股东持股比例(第一大股东比例)越高,上市公司每股收益越高,而主营业务利润率越低;(2)其他大股东持股比例和对第一大股东(或前两大股东)的制衡度(或联合制衡度)越高,上市公司每股收益越低,而主营业务利润率越高.这表明,不同的大股东对不同类型的盈余指标存在选择偏好:控股股东可能偏好市场和投资者反应程度较为显著,盈余管理空间较大且相对易于操纵的盈余指标;而与之相反,其他大股东持股比例和大股东制衡度(或联合制衡度)越高,越有可能抵制控股股东的盈余管理或利润操纵行为.     

Corporate ownership and control contestability in emerging markets: The case of Colombia

This study examines the structure of voting control and blockholders’ contestability for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms in Colombia during 1996–2004. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and blockholder power, which implies low separation ratios between cash flow rights and voting rights. On average the separation ratios for the largest voting block is 0.95, while that for the fourth largest shareholder is 0.75. Corporate control is privately biased when there is direct monitoring of firm management by controlling owners. Regression results show that a more equal distribution of equity among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. Contestability matters most when firm shares are liquid and actively traded on the stock market. This finding is reinforced when the probability that the largest block can form a winning coalition decreases and performance variables, such as market to sales ratio and return on equity, are included in the estimating equations as substitutes for firm value. In addition, our estimations provide evidence that diversion of rents (tunneling) is limited by blockholders’ contestability.     

机构投资者对企业国际化的影响研究——来自2004～2007年制造业上市公司的证据

本文采用2004～2007年制造业上市公司的数据考察了机构投资者对企业国际化的影响。研究发现,机构投资者的持股对制造业企业的国际化有促进作用;并且不同类型的机构投资者的作用并不相同,其中基金和QFII有显著的促进作用。这些研究结果表明机构投资者积极主义在我国制造业上市公司中有所体现,机构投资者持股有利于我国制造业企业的国际化,实施"走出去"战略。本文基于以上结论,对我国发展不同类型的机构投资者提出了相应的建议。     

Family Control,Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms

We examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family. To do so, we draw upon literature demonstrating that family owners are loss averse with respect to the family’s socioemotional wealth, or the affective endowment derived from firm ownership and control. Our theory and findings suggest that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to non-family firms, and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management. Moreover, the family-firm effect varies with the firm size, the degree of CEO entrenchment, and the firm’s stock structure. We provide important insights regarding differences between family and non-family principals in the use of unethical accounting practices, thereby extending agency theory and advancing an underdeveloped research area.     

Institutional Ownership and Corporate Investment Performance

This paper examines the role of institutional investors in improving firm performance through the channel of corporate investment decisions. We find that the interaction effect between institutional ownership and capital expenditures is significantly related to firm performance. We examine this relationship for different types of institutional investors, and find that investment advisors are most effective monitors in improving firm performance through corporate investment. Moreover, we find that the monitoring role of institutional investors becomes more important when internal governance is weak. Institutional ownership and other forms of corporate governance mechanisms (including CEO incentive compensation and control, shareholder right provisions, and board of director monitoring) operate as substitutes, rather than complements, in improving capital expenditure decisions. Copyright © 2012 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does corporate diversification create value in emerging markets? New evidence from Chile

Using a sample of 85 Chilean firms listed in the Santiago Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013, we analyze the impact of corporate diversification on firm value. We consider voting rights of the main shareholder and institutional investors’ influence on firm value. We report firm‐value destruction for diversified firms. Regarding ownership concentration, we report a negative relation between the largest shareholder ownership and firm value. Separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of this shareholder is negatively related to firm value. While Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) mitigate firm value destruction in diversified firms, other institutional investors do not play an active role in controlling value destruction. Finally, if the largest owner is a family, we report firm‐value creation in diversified firms. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

大股东资金占用与盈余管理

本文以深沪两市2000-2002年所有A股公司作为样本,研究了大股东的资金侵占与上市公司盈余管理的关系。实证结果表明,大股东及其附属公司对上市公司的资金侵占越严重,上市公司进行盈余管理的程度越高,说明大股东的资金占用不仅可能影响上市公司的经营业绩,还会降低上市公司会计信息质量。     

Protect,profit, profess,promote: Establishing legitimacy through logics of diversity in Canadian accounting firm recruitment documents

Prospective accounting recruits are increasingly diverse. Drawing on a theoretical framework that combines legitimacy theory, impression management, and institutional logics, we use content analysis to examine how the eight largest Canadian accounting firms refer to diversity in their recruitment websites. Our analysis reveals accounting firms adopt multiple institutional logics and various impression management strategies to enhance legitimacy in the eyes of prospective diversity‐sensitive employees. We find four “Ps” of diversity‐related institutional logics—protect, profit, profess, and promote—all of which are at play in accounting firms' websites. Further, we find that diversity is far from being an institutionalized concept. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Common Good of the Firm and Humanistic Management: Conscious Capitalism and Economy of Communion

This study examines corporate stakeholder orientation (CSO) across industries and over time prior to the introduction of mandatory CSR. We argue that CSO is a legitimacy signal consciously employed by firms to demonstrate their shareholder and specific non-shareholder orientations in the midst of institutional pressures emerging from country and industry contexts. Using a 7-code index of CSO on CEO–shareholder communications from India, we find that in general large firms in India exhibit a pre-dominant, significant and rising trend of pro-shareholder orientation in the six-year period immediately preceding the CSR law. Yet, we uncover significant industry differences in CSO potentially driven by four key factors: the degree of competitive dynamics, nature of products and services, extent of negative externalities and social activism, and exposure to international markets. Our findings support the view that while some minimum threshold of regulatory intervention is required to balance the interests of business with society, legislation raises questions in relation to the usefulness of a uniform one-size-fits-all CSR across all industries.     

不同成长机会下的上市公司股权结构、资本结构与公司绩效——以A股流通服务业上市公司为例

文章以我国流通服务业上市公司为研究样本,分析了上市公司资本结构和股权结构对公司绩效的影响,以及成长机会在其中的调节作用.研究结果表明流通服务业上市公司第一大股东持股比例、第二到第十大股东持股比例、长期负债资本比对公司绩效存在显著正向影响;国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率对公司绩效存在显著负向影响.随着公司成长机会的增加,第二到第十大股东持股,非国有法人股持股对公司绩效正向影响作用增强;而第一大股东持股比例、国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率与长期负债资本比对公司绩效的影响并不随着公司成长性的变化而变化.文章研究对于流通服务业上市公司股权结构和资本结构优化提供了有益的启示.     

监督机制、企业家创业能力与绩效关系研究

基于制度理论和动态能力观点,建立了一个分析监督机制、企业家创业能力与绩效关系的理论框架,并提出了3条假设。基于195家企业样本的实证分析表明：董事长与总经理两职分离与企业家创业能力发挥正相关,股权集中度与企业家创业能力发挥负相关;企业家创业能力发挥有助于提升企业绩效。     

关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量

Controlling shareholders pursue benefits of control (private benefits and shared benefits) via related party transactions, which result in different levels of earnings quality. Using data from all A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets in the year 2001 and 2002, we found that when the share ratio of controlling shareholder is less than 50%, they prefer pursuing private benefits of control via related party transactions, giving rise to deterioration in earnings quality. By comparison, when the share ratio is more than 50%, controlling shareholders prefer pursing shared benefits of control through related party transactions, which improve earnings quality as a result.      

Ethically Related Judgments by Observers of Earnings Management

Merchant and Rockness (1994, p. 92) characterize earnings management as "probably the most important ethical issue facing the accounting profession" and provide initial evidence of the ethical judgments of various organizational members. The current study extends their work by examining the extent to which an individual's ethically-related judgments in response to earnings management activities are associated with the individual's role.In an experimental study, evening MBA students read three hypothetical scenarios involving a manager engaging in earnings management. The scenarios involved a gain from an operating activity, a gain from an accounting activity, and a loss from an accounting activity. Before reading the cases, however, participants were randomly assigned to one of three roles: a shareholder, another manager from the company who is unfamiliar with the manager in the case, or another manager from the company who is familiar with the manager in the case. Following each case, participants made four ethically related judgments.Participants assuming the role of another manager from the company who is unfamiliar with the manager in the case were expected to reach more unfavorable ethically related judgments than were shareholders or a manager who is familiar with the manager in the case. Generally, the results supported these predictions for accounting based earnings management activities but not for the operating based case.     

The effect of ownership concentration and composition on dividends: Evidence from Latin America

We analyze a unique data set of publicly traded firms based in six Latin American countries to study the joint effect of ownership concentration and composition on dividend policy. We find that when ownership concentration is high and the largest investor is identified as an individual, firms tend to pay fewer dividends consistent with individual investors extracting benefits from minority shareholders. However, if the largest shareholder is based in a common law country, the dividend paid is significantly higher. Finally, greater ownership by the second largest shareholder decreases firm dividends suggesting the monitoring role of a large shareholder.     

第二大股东持股的治理效应——基于上市公司的实证分析

本文以763家上市公司2003年的横截面数据为样本,通过考察公司绩效与第二大股东持股之间的经验关系,考察了第二大股东持股的治理功能。通过结合上市公司数据建立一个多元模型来说明第二大股东是如何监督第一大股东、影响公司价值的。研究发现,第二大股东的存在没有显示出积极的治理激励功能及对第一大股东的监督激励作用;在我国目前的制度背景下,相对控股是一种最佳的平衡状态。     

中小企业治理、治理指数与企业绩效

本文设计了中小企业治理评价指标体系,并对100家县域中小企业的治理状况进行了评价,结果显示中小企业治理指数平均值仅为33.57。实证分析表明,中小企业治理指数不能够显著解释每股收益和净资产收益率;同时也发现,第一大股东持股比例、董事会是否设立、总经理薪酬结构等对企业绩效也没有显著的影响,中小企业治理结构与机制的建立仅仅是形式上所为,最后据此给出提升中小企业治理水平的政策建议。