共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Alexandros Karakostas Axel Sonntag Daniel John Zizzo 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2017,119(4):962-986
We present a simple principal–agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between a revenue‐sharing, a bonus, and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue‐sharing contract. This choice turns out to be not only the most efficient but also, at the same time, fair. Overall, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that, under revenue‐sharing contracts, concerns for fairness can be closely associated with the use of monetary incentives. 相似文献
2.
We present a laboratory investigation of intertemporal choice (i.e., elicited discount rates) allowing for the influence of the endowment effect. Consistent with the previous literature, we hypothesize that the endowment effect in an intertemporal choice setting results in substantially higher discount rates relative to when individuals treat the resources in question as found money. Our results support this hypothesis and our experimental design provides a new protocol for conducting choice experiments wherein the endowment effect is an important determinant of behaviour. 相似文献
3.
Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Self-tuning experience weighted attraction (EWA) is a one-parameter theory of learning in games. It addresses a criticism that an earlier model (EWA) has too many parameters, by fixing some parameters at plausible values and replacing others with functions of experience so that they no longer need to be estimated. Consequently, it is econometrically simpler than the popular weighted fictitious play and reinforcement learning models. The functions of experience which replace free parameters “self-tune” over time, adjusting in a way that selects a sensible learning rule to capture subjects’ choice dynamics. For instance, the self-tuning EWA model can turn from a weighted fictitious play into an averaging reinforcement learning as subjects equilibrate and learn to ignore inferior foregone payoffs. The theory was tested on seven different games, and compared to the earlier parametric EWA model and a one-parameter stochastic equilibrium theory (QRE). Self-tuning EWA does as well as EWA in predicting behavior in new games, even though it has fewer parameters, and fits reliably better than the QRE equilibrium benchmark. 相似文献
4.
We explore an equilibrium model of games where behavior is given by logit response functions, but payoff responsiveness and beliefs about others' responsiveness are heterogeneous. We study two substantively different ways of extending quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to this setting: (1) Heterogeneus QRE, where players share identical correct beliefs about the distribution of payoff responsiveness; and (2) Truncated QRE, where players have downward looking beliefs, systematically underestimating others' responsiveness. We show that the cognitive hierarchy model is a special case of Truncated QRE. We conduct experiments designed to differentiate these approaches. We find significant evidence of payoff responsive stochastic choice, and of heterogeneity and downward looking beliefs in some games. 相似文献
5.
We conducted a laboratory experiment on a dictator game with the option for a “voice” by a third party and compared it with the dictator game with a “voice” by the recipient. Our findings are as follows. The dictators' offers in response to an aggressive voice of the recipients are significantly lower than the dictators' offers in response to the corresponding voice of the third party. The dictators' responses to an aggressive voice differentiate the effects of the recipient's voice from those of the third party's. 相似文献
6.
Abstract. In this paper, we examine the question of whether a collective activity can influence cooperation in a subsequent repeated one‐shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. We conduct two series of experiments. The first consists of control experiments in which 30 periods of a PD game are played, with a random rematching of the pairs in every period. In a second series of experiments, subjects first play a donation game (DG) and then the PD game. In the DG, they collectively discuss the amount of a donation to a given charity, before putting the question to an individual and anonymous vote. Cooperation levels in the PD games preceded by the DG are significantly lower than those observed in the control experiment. 相似文献
7.
Jon Reiersen 《Review of social economy》2017,75(4):434-453
Despite its proposed importance for economic performance, there seems to be little agreement on what trust really is. In economics, trust is generally viewed as a belief regarding the action that is to be expected from others. This contrasts with the view that trust is a way of acting. In his influential book on the nature of explanation in the social sciences, Jon Elster argues that trusting is to act with few precautions. I argue that it is possible to reconcile these seemingly conflicting views about trust. I develop a simple model of trust where both beliefs and precautions play an important role – and where Elster’s understanding of trust can be viewed as a special case. 相似文献
8.
We study behavior in the race game with the aim of assessing whether teams can create synergies. The race game has the advantage that the optimal strategy depends neither on beliefs about other players nor on distributional or efficiency concerns. Our results reveal that teams not only outperform individuals but that they can also beat the “truth-wins” benchmark. In particular, varying the length of the race game we find that the team advantage increases with the complexity of the game. 相似文献
9.
Otwin Becker Johannes Leitner Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger 《The German Economic Review》2008,9(1):96-112
Abstract. Experimental studies of expectation formation of subjects are predominantly limited to the prediction of one single time series despite the practical relevance of expectations in situations with multiple sources of information. In this paper, we report on an experiment in which subjects are given time series (indicators) as additional information for the judgemental forecast of a stationary time series. The quality and the number of these indicators are varied in three versions of a forecasting experiment. We explore the effects on forecasting accuracy and we test the average forecasts of the subjects for consistency with the rational expectations hypothesis. A simple heuristic is presented that explains the average forecasting behavior better than the rational expectations if indicators are presented to the subjects. It is demonstrated by a simulation study that this result is representative for the considered stationary stochastic processes. 相似文献
10.
We show that one of the main results in Chen and Sönmez (2006, 2008) [6] and [7] does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions. No school choice mechanism is significantly superior in terms of efficiency. 相似文献
11.
M. Fernanda Rivas 《Bulletin of economic research》2013,65(1):10-42
A number of papers with field data have found differences in the corrupt activities of males and females; nonetheless they have drawbacks that may be overcome in a laboratory experiment. The aim of this paper is to see experimentally whether women and men, facing the same situation behave in a different way, as suggested in the field‐data studies or, on the contrary, whether they behave in the same way. The results found in the experiment show that women are indeed less corrupt than men. 相似文献
12.
In this paper, we explore the reasons why different generations accumulate different amounts of wealth. We use basic economic theory to propose two indicators of the economic conditions under which households accumulate wealth. The first one represents productivity differences across cohorts: The aggregate level of gross national product per capita around the time the head of the household entered the labor market. The second measure summarizes the changes in Social Security during the head of household's working life. Using panel data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, we show that productivity growth can explain all the cohort effects present in income data, while productivity growth and the generosity of Social Security can explain all the cohort effects present in household net worth. We also find a limited offset of Social Security on wealth holdings. 相似文献
13.
We experimentally study the effect of entry costs on bidding and entry behavior in common value auctions. We find, with entry costs, players bid lower in first price and higher in second price auctions, compared to no entry fee auctions. 相似文献
14.
We study the role of accountability in situations where an agent makes risky decisions for a principal. We observe that in the absence of accountability, agents choose less risk averse investments for the principal than investors who invest for their own account. Accountability mitigates the observed decrease in risk aversion. Differences are observed between situations where agents are accountable for their decision (“ex-ante”) and where they are accountable for the outcome (“ex-post”). 相似文献
15.
Claudia Keser 《European Economic Review》2007,51(6):1514-1533
In a laboratory experiment, we investigate behavior in a principal-agent situation with moral hazard. We evaluate the predictive success of two theories. One is the standard agency theory, which assumes that the agent will accept any contract offer that satisfies his participation constraint, typically requiring zero expected utility. The other is the “fair-offer” theory suggested by Keser and Willinger [2000. Principals’ principles when agents’ actions are hidden. International Journal of Industrial Organization 18 (1), 163-185], which requires that the principal provide full insurance against losses to the agent and leave him a share of at most 50% of the generated surplus. The treatment variable of our experiment is the cost of effort. As effort costs increase, expected net surplus of a contract decreases. We observe that fair-offer theory generally predicts observed contract offers better than standard agency theory. However, the predictive success of the fair-offer theory decreases, while the one of standard agency theory increases with decreasing expected net surplus. 相似文献
16.
Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (Int. J. Game Theory 20 (1992) 393) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which first-order stochastically dominates the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong, and then test bidders’ preference for first- vs. second-price auctions. 相似文献
17.
Marco Casari Davide Dragone 《Economics Letters》2011,111(1):37-39
Survey data show that subjects positively discount both gains and losses but discount gains more heavily than losses. This holds for monetary and non-monetary outcomes. These results do not confirm the findings of two earlier studies about negative time preferences for non-monetary outcomes. 相似文献
18.
Pervasive overbidding represents a well-documented feature of all-pay auctions. Aggregate bids exceed Nash predictions in laboratory experiments, and individuals often submit bids that guarantee negative profits. This paper examines three factors that may reduce pervasive overbidding: (a) repetition (experience), (b) reputation (strangers vs. partners), and (c) active participation. Reputation and repetition reduce aggregate overdissipation, but they eliminate it only in conjunction with active participation. 相似文献
19.
Abstract . We show, in an artefactual field economics decision-making experiment, that the addition of an alternative to a choice set can affect the measurement of farmers' risk preferences in rural Peru. We found that an alternative that would normally be considered irrelevant was chosen in Peru, and that it affected choice between other alternatives. In Montreal, the irrelevant alternative was not chosen, but also affected choices between other alternatives. Comparing choices made in Peru with those made in Montreal, we identify beliefs and cultural characteristics that are likely to lead to these results. 相似文献
20.
We report an experiment in which subjects are not indifferent between real-money lotteries implemented with randomization devices that are equivalent under the Reduction Axiom. Instead, choice behavior is consistent with subjective distortion of conditional probability, and this persists in treatment conditions that control for (i) computational limitations and (ii) possible confounding by ratio bias. 相似文献