Skilled and Unskilled Immigrants and Entrepreneurship in a Developed Country

Evidence from some OECD countries suggests that skilled immigrants are over‐represented in entrepreneurship. We offer an analytical explanation to show that it may be a direct outcome of asymmetric information between immigrants and potential employers in the rich countries. Limiting occupational choices to self‐employment and employment, we show that skilled immigrants vis‐à‐vis natives may be proportionally over‐represented in small businesses. This compensates for the income loss in the labor market. It results from higher critical risk aversion among skilled immigrants compared with natives and subsequently leads to higher average income for all immigrants in the cross‐section. Finally, we show why a lesser number of unskilled immigrants enter self‐employment and discuss the speed of income convergence between all immigrants and natives.     

Risk Preferences and Environmental Uncertainty: Implications for Crop Diversification Decisions in Ethiopia

To the extent that diversifying income portfolio is used as a strategy for shielding against production risk, both individual risk aversion and weather uncertainty could affect crop diversification decisions. This paper is concerned with empirically assessing the effects of risk aversion and rainfall variability on farm level diversity. Unique panel data from Ethiopia consisting of experimentally generated risk aversion measures combined with rainfall data are employed in the analysis. The major contribution of this study is its explicit treatment of individual risk preferences in the decision to diversify, simultaneously controlling for environmental risk in the form of rainfall variability. Covariate shocks from rainfall variability are found to positively contribute to an increased level of diversity with individual risk aversion having a positive but less significant role. We find that rainfall variability in spring has a greater effect than rainfall variability summer??the major rainy season. This finding is in line with similar agronomic-meteorological studies. These results imply that in situ biodiversity conservation could be effective in areas with high rainfall variability. However, reduction in risk aversion, which is associated with poverty reduction, is likely to reduce in situ conservation.     

Rotating Savings and Credit Associations When Participants are Risk Averse*

We model rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) among risk‐averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks. A random Rosca is not advantageous, whereas a bidding Rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. The payoff scheme of a bidding Rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries. The risk‐sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding Roscas simultaneously is as good as that of a linear risk‐sharing contract, and is more enforceable because it carries a fixed rather than a variable contribution.     

Collective Risk Control and Group Security: The Unexpected Consequences of Differential Risk Aversion

We provide an analysis of odds‐improving self‐protection for when it yields collective benefits to groups, such as alliances of nations, for whom risks of loss are public bads and prevention of loss is a public good. Our analysis of common risk reduction shows how diminishing returns in risk improvement can be folded into income effects. These income effects then imply that whether protection is inferior or normal depends on the risk aversion characteristics of underlying utility functions, and on the interaction between these, the level of risk, and marginal effectiveness of risk abatement. We demonstrate how public good inferiority is highly likely when the good is “group risk reduction.” In fact, we discover a natural or endogenous limit on the size of a group and of the amount of risk controlling outlay it will provide under Nash behavior. We call this limit an “Inferior Goods Barrier” to voluntary risk reduction. For the paradigm case of declining risk aversion, increases in group size(wealth) will cause provision of more safety to change from a normal to an inferior good thereby creating such a barrier.     

Happiness and loss aversion: Is utility concave or convex in relative income?

A central finding in happiness research is that a person's life satisfaction depends on the level of her income relative to the average income in her social reference group. This dependence of life satisfaction on relative income can be related to the reference dependence of the value function in Kahneman and Tversky's [Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47, 263–291] prospect theory. In this paper we investigate whether the characteristics of the value function like concavity for gains, convexity for losses, and loss aversion apply to the dependence of life satisfaction on relative income. This is tested with an improved measure for the reference income for a large German panel spanning the years 1984–2001. We find concavity of life satisfaction in positive relative income, but unexpectedly strongly significant concavity of life satisfaction in negative relative income as well. We also present a new method to show the robustness of these concavity results to extreme distortions of the reported-life-satisfaction scale. The concavity for negative relative income implies a rising marginal sensitivity of life satisfaction to more negative values of relative income, and hence loss aversion (in a wide sense). This may be explained in terms of increasing financial obstacles to social participation.     

Attitudes to risk and attitudes to uncertainty: experimental evidence

In a series of experiments the interactions among individual attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, the sign of the outcome domain, and the way uncertainty is represented are tested. This is done in a unified framework, eliciting individual values by means of a second price auction. Results confirm the presence of the well-known fourfold pattern of risk attitude (risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses at high probability, and risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses at low probability) and show that this pattern can also be extended to uncertainty. In the valuation of losses the modal pattern is decreasing risk and uncertainty aversion as the probability of loss increases, while increasing risk and uncertainty aversion is observed for gains. Moreover, it is found that the size of reaction to uncertainty does not depend on the outcome domain, and that it persists in the face of an incentive-compatible mechanism to elicit preferences.     

Labor migration and risk aversion in less developed countries

"In this paper we question the pioneering work of Todaro, which states that rural-to-urban labor migration in less developed countries (LDCs) is an individual response to a higher urban expected income. We demonstrate that rural-to-urban labor migration is perfectly rational even if urban expected income is lower than rural income. We achieve this under a set of fairly stringent conditions: an individual decision-making entity, a one-period planning horizon, and global risk aversion. We obtain the result that a small chance of reaping a high reward is sufficient to trigger rural-to-urban labor migration."     

Invariant risk attitudes

Concepts of constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion have proved useful in the analysis of choice under uncertainty, but are quite restrictive, particularly when they are imposed jointly. A generalization of constant risk aversion, referred to as invariant risk aversion is developed. Invariant risk aversion is closely related to the possibility of representing preferences over state-contingent income vectors in terms of two parameters, the mean and a linearly homogeneous, translation-invariant index of riskiness. The best-known index with such properties is the standard deviation. The properties of the capital asset pricing model, usually expressed in terms of the mean and standard deviation, may be extended to the case of general invariant preferences.     

On the Evaluation of Economic Mobility

This paper presents a framework for the evaluation and measurement of "reversal" and "origin independence" as separate aspects of economic mobility. We show that evaluation depends on aversion to multi-period inequality, aversion to inter-temporal fluctuations, and aversion to future risk. We construct "extended Atkinson indices" that allow us to quantify the relative impact of reversal and origin independence on welfare. We apply our approach to the comparison of income mobility in Germany and in the U.S.. When aversion to inequality is the only consideration, the U.S. gains more from mobility than Germany. This reflects similar gains from reversal in the two countries but greater gains in the U.S. from origin independence. The introduction of aversion to intertemporal fluctuations and aversion to future risk makes the impact of mobility in the two countries more similar.     

Strong,bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.     

RISK AVERSION AND FIELD OF STUDY CHOICE: THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITY

Does the choice of field of study depend on individual risk aversion? The direction of the relationship between individual risk attitudes and type of university degree chosen is potentially ambiguous. On the one hand, risk averse individuals may prefer degree courses which allow high returns in the labour market; on the other hand, if these degrees expose students to a higher probability of dropping out, those who are more risk averse may be induced to choose less challenging fields. Using data from a sample of students enrolled at a middle‐sized Italian public university in 2009, we find that, controlling for a large number of individual characteristics, more risk averse students are more likely to choose any other field (Humanities, Engineering, and Sciences) rather than Social Sciences. We interpret this result bearing in mind that some of these fields, such as Humanities, involve a reduction in the risk of dropping out, while others (such as Engineering and Sciences) involve a lower risk in the labour market. It also emerges that the effect of risk aversion on degree choice is related to student ability. Risk averse students characterized by high abilities tend to prefer Engineering, while the propensity of risk averse students to enrol in Humanities decreases when ability increases, suggesting that the attention paid to labour market risks and drop‐out risk varies according to student skills.     

On the measurement of risk aversion from experimental data

Attitudes towards risk are measured for households in Northern Zambia using an experimental gambling approach with real payoffs that at maximum were equal to 30% of average total annual income per capita. The results of the experiment show decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing partial risk aversion. Determinants of risk aversion are investigated using random effects interval regression model exploiting the panel data structure of the repeated experiments. Wealth indicator variables are found to be significant, and partial relative risk aversion decreases as wealth increases. Females are found to be more risk averse than males.     

Growth,mobility and social progress

We evaluate social progress on the basis of panel data on individual incomes by comparing the value of social welfare in the observed panel data to its value in a situation where individuals receive their first period income in each period. We derive necessary conditions for the welfare gain to be positive, and show how it can be decomposed in an effect of economic growth, a mobility effect and a cost due to aversion to time fluctuations given individuals’ ranks in the income distribution. The mobility effect, generated by reranking in the income distribution has two components: a cost due to time fluctuations in incomes and a benefit, due to equalization in time averaged incomes. We illustrate the analysis using CNEF data for Australia, Korea, Germany, Russia, Switzerland and the US. Our results indicate that the largest component of social progress is the equalization of time averaged income, induced by reranking. In countries with high growth (Australia, Korea and Russia), the growth effect is larger than the mobility effect, but in countries with low growth (Germany, Switzerland and the US), the opposite holds true. The poor performance of the US is explained by the large costs of income fluctuations and the way economic growth is distributed.     

The optimal use of fines and imprisonment

This paper examines the use of fines and imprisonment to deter individuals from engaging in harmful activities. These sanctions are analyzed separately as well as together, first for identical risk-neutral individuals and then for two groups of risk-neutral individuals who differ by wealth. When fines are used alone and individuals are identical, the optimal fine and probability of apprehension are such that there is some ‘underdeterrence’. If individuals differ by wealth, then the optimal fine for the high wealth group exceeds the fine for the low wealth group. When imprisonment is used alone and individuals are identical, the optimal imprisonment term and probability may be such that there is either underdeterrence or overdeterrence. If individuals differ by wealth, the optimal imprisonment term for the high wealth group may be longer or shorter than the term for the low wealth group. When fines and imprisonment are used together, it is desirable to use the fine to its maximum feasible extent before possibly supplementing it with an imprisonment term. The effects of risk aversion of these results are also discussed.     

Does education affect risk aversion? Evidence from the British education reform

Individual risk attitudes are frequently used to predict decisions regarding education. However, using risk attitudes as a control variable for decisions about education has been criticized because of the potential for reverse causality. Causality between risk aversion and education is unclear, and disentangling the different directions it may run is difficult. In this study, we make the first attempt to investigate the causal effects of education on risk aversion by examining the British education reform of 1972, which increased the duration of compulsory schooling from age 15 to age 16. Using regression discontinuity design, we find that this additional year of schooling increases the level of risk aversion, which is contrary to previous findings in the literature, and we also find that this result is particularly strong for individuals with less education. This positive causal effect of education on risk aversion might alleviate concerns regarding the endogeneity/reverse causality issue when using risk aversion as an explanatory variable for decisions about education; the sign would remain credible because the coefficients are underestimated.     

The microeconomic determinants of emigration and return migration of the best and brightest: Evidence from the Pacific

A unique survey which tracks worldwide the best and brightest academic performers from three Pacific countries is used to assess the extent of emigration and return migration among the very highly skilled, and to analyze, at the microeconomic level, the determinants of these migration choices. Although we estimate that the income gains from migration are very large, not everyone migrates and many return. Within this group of highly skilled individuals the emigration decision is found to be most strongly associated with preference variables such as risk aversion and patience, and choice of subjects in secondary school, and not strongly linked to either liquidity constraints or to the gain in income to be had from migrating. Likewise, the decision to return is strongly linked to family and lifestyle reasons, rather than to the income opportunities in different countries. Overall the data suggest a relatively limited role for income maximization in distinguishing migration propensities among the very highly skilled, and a need to pay more attention to other components of the utility maximization decision.     

Evaluation periods and asset prices: Myopic loss aversion at the financial marketplace

Examining myopic loss aversion (MLA [Benartzi, S., Thaler, R., 1995. Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 73–92]) in real financial markets has several merits: in repeated situations investors may learn from each other, aggregate market prices may eliminate individual violations of expected utility, and individuals may decide differently in real situations than in laboratories. We utilize a special feature at the Tel Aviv stock exchange (TASE): occasional shifts of securities from daily to weekly trading. If investors’ decisions are influenced by trading frequency manipulation, then returns should be predictably affected. MLA results in a negative relation between risk aversion and the length of the evaluation period. Thus, the longer the evaluation period is, the lower the expected return is. This intuition also suggests reduced sensitivity to economic events in longer evaluation periods. We find strong support for MLA in the marketplace when testing expected return, as well as return sensitivity.     

The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality

We consider an OLG economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Heterogeneity in individual human capital levels is modelled by a distribution of innate ability across agents. This distribution is common knowledge but, at young age, no agent knows his/her ability. The production of human capital depends on each individual’s investment in education. This investment decision is taken only after observing a signal which is correlated to his/her true ability, and which is used for updating beliefs. Thus, a better information system affects the distribution of human capital in each generation. Assuming separable and identical preferences for all individuals, we derive the following results in equilibrium: (a) If the relative measure of risk aversion is less (more) than 1 then more information raises (reduces) income inequality. (b) When a risk sharing market is available better information results in higher inequality regardless of the measure risk aversion. We are grateful to Alex Cukierman, Zvi Eckstein, Yona Rubinstein and Daniel Tsiddon. An anonymous referee made extremely useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development (GIF) is gratefully acknowledged.     

The relationship between risk attitudes and heuristics in search tasks: A laboratory experiment

Experimental studies of search behavior suggest that individuals stop searching earlier than the optimal, risk-neutral stopping rule predicts. Two different classes of decision rules could generate this behavior: rules that are optimal conditional on utility functions departing from risk neutrality, or heuristics derived from limited cognitive processing capacities and satisficing. To discriminate between these possibilities, we conducted an experiment that consists of a search task as well as a lottery task designed to elicit utility functions. We find that search heuristics are not related to measures of risk aversion, but to measures of loss aversion.     

Risk Aversion and the Investment Horizon: A New Perspective on the Time Diversification Debate

Investment managers generally subscribe to the principle of time diversification. This implies that a larger portion of the portfolio should be devoted to risky assets as the investment horizon increases. In contrast, academics have shown that for investors with utility functions characterized by constant relative risk aversion, the optimal asset-allocation strategy is independent of the investment horizon. The relative risk aversion in these studies is assumed to be constant both with respect to wealth as well as investment horizon. We suggest a utility function that explicitly captures the notion that individuals are more risk tolerant when the investment horizon is long, thereby validating the intuitively appealing time diversification argument.