地区竞争与地方保护主义的产业组织经济学

本文建立了一个简单的产业组织经济学模型来讨论中国分权化改革过程中地区竞争与地方保护主义的经济后果。本文发现，相对于国家垄断而言，在规模报酬递减的技术下，地区竞争一般会带来社会福利的提高；而在规模报酬递增的技术下，地区竞争更有可能降低了社会福利。而地方保护主义会削弱甚至逆转地区竞争相对于国家垄断的效率优势。     

系统市场中企业策略性排他行为分析

本文将系统竞争和组件竞争结合起来，分析系统市场中的企业策略性行为及其对市场竞争和创新的影响。在系统市场上．开放的系统竞争结构是较优的，但是企业并不一定会选择与社会福利目标相一致的组织形式．而是更多地基于策略性需要来进行选择。在系统市场中．创新主导企业有激励通过策略性地选择许可比例来操纵市场竞争。在邻近市场结构中．在位创新垄断企业有激励通过排他性行为将关键技术市场的垄断势力延伸到邻近竞争市场．这些市场封锁行为通常会严重地伤害市场竞争，并阻碍技术创新。     

人力资本专用化的内生公司治理研究

人力资本专用化已日渐成为诸多公司成长与竞争中的一种战略选择，但人力资本专用化在改变公司财富创造的源泉并具有创新意义上的环境动态适应性时，亦会内生出诸如公司主雇双方的“讨价还价”、公司权利分配结构的边际调整、公司治理边界的重新定义以及公司潜在创新需求的治理保障等诸多不同层面的公司治理问题。在人力资本专用化的条件之下，人力资本专用化投资的公司激励机制、基于人力资本专用化的公司财富增长机制以及公司治理理论逻辑与治理结构的相应变革与完善均系公司治理的重要组成部分。     

国有企业主导与行政性垄断下的价格合谋——“京沪空中快线”引发的若干思考

本文基于民航产业的价格同盟进行的模型分析和经验研究，在一定程度上解释了行政垄断和企业间合谋的关系。研究发现，在规制缺失或默许的条件下．包含惩罚方式的价格合谋是一个可行和可实施的机制安排，而寡头垄断和行政垄断的结合是诱发规制者干预价格竞争，最终形成所谓“价格同盟”的结构和制度条件。规制者和垄断国有企业关系的交织和错位下的反竞争行为，是未来《反垄断法》实施的主要障碍。     

美国现行反垄断法对软件产业的适用性探析--以搭售和掠夺性定价为例

本文对软件产业的搭售与掠夺性定价行为进行了法律和经济分析。在美国现行的反垄断法体系中，这是属于典型的滥用市场势力的两种行为。但在软件产业却不能凭借传统标准简单地把这两种行为归结为垄断行为，而应从产业本身的特点和竞争环境出发谨慎对待。如一味运用美国现行的反垄断法惩罚软件产业正当的竞争行为，只会从更大程度上抑制竞争，损害消费者福利。在网络经济条件下，反垄断法应该顺应经济和技术的     

团队精神体现企业核心价值

如今，企业间的竞争已逐步从价格竞争、服务竞争走向文化竞争。企业文化成为企业核心竞争力的重要内容，直接影响着企业的生存与发展。企业文化对内一般表现为共同的愿景、价值观及管理理念，对外表现为员工行为模式等，如上下一心的团队精神。良好的团队精神可以使企业协调运转，形成合力，从而增强市场竞争力。     

感性消费时代服务品牌的功能与策略

现代社会进入了感性消费时代。在重视个性心理满足的“感性消费”时代中，服务的多少及质量的高低成为消费者感受企业产品的主要指标之一。而服务品牌不仅可以消除服务的不确定性和风险性，更重要的是服务品牌揭示了该企业服务与其他企业服务的不同之处：功能价值、愉悦价值和象征价值。因此，服务竞争正逐步取代产品竞争、价格竞争、成为市场致胜的有力武器。     

基于网络外部性的价值模块整合与兼容性选择

本文分析了价值模块的网络外部性特征，并基于网络外部性研究了价值模块整合过程中的兼容性选择和价格竞争行为。研究结果表明：当由进入厂商选择兼容度时，兼容性越高进入厂商的市场份额越大，并能够获得更高的市场价格；当由在位厂商选择兼容度时，兼容度增加将减少消费者的转移成本，使更多的模块需求商转向购买进入厂商的产品，减少了在位厂商的市场份额；当转移成本的兼容性敏感系数较低时，在位模块供应商能够获得更高的价格，而当转移成本对兼容性很敏感时，较高的兼容度将迫使在位模块供应商降低价格。价值模块的网络外部性加剧了模块供应商之间的竞争，进一步促进了价值模块整合和产业融合的过程。     

网络效应、消费偏好与标准竞争

完全信息静态标准竞争可能产生三种市场格局：技术标准市场不存在、个体标准并存、强势标准阻止弱势标准进入。强制标准化的错误来自两个方面：选择了错误的个体标准即弱势个体标准的标准化，错误地选择了标准化，即优势个体标准的标准化市场的社会福利低于竞争市场的社会福利。     

构建和完善建筑市场体系

构建和完善新的建筑市场体系,是我国社会主义市场经济的重要组成部分,是解放与发展建筑业生产力的必然要求,也是投资与建设管理体制和运作方式实现全面更新的前提条件。按照社会主义市场经济体制的要求,构筑新的建筑市场体系,必须加快改革,弃旧图新。 一、改变地方限制、部门保护、行政干预的市场割据状态,实行平等竞争原则,形成社会统一大市场 竞争是商品经济的通行原则,包括价格竞争、质量竞争、市场信息竞争以及企业实力竞争等。竞争给企业以动力和压力,适者生存,优胜劣汰,因而通过竞争能够促进社会资源的合理流动和优化配置,也能推动社会分工,发展全社会分工协作,从而实现社会化大生产有效运行。     

How does income inequality affect market outcomes in vertically differentiated markets?

The distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the structure of a vertically differentiated industry when consumer's willingness to pay depends on her income. This paper computes the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model for a lognormal distribution of consumer incomes to investigate the effect of inequality on firms' entry, product quality, and pricing decisions. The main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants. More intense quality competition raises the average quality of products in the market as firms compete for the shrinking share of higher-income consumers. With zero costs of quality improvements and an upper bound on the top quality or when costs of quality are fixed and rise sufficiently fast, greater heterogeneity of consumer incomes also reduces firms' incentives to differentiate their products. Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. However, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market and charges a higher price. The conclusion is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product differentiation, price level, industry concentration, and consumer welfare.     

Competition in Korean mobile telecommunications market: business strategy and regulatory environment

After the launch of PCS in 1997, the Korean mobile telephony market achieved a remarkable subscriber base growth. The market is composed of a differentiation advantage seeker, SK Telecom; a cost advantage seeker, LG Telecom; and three other carriers: Hansol PCS, Korea Telecom Freetel, and Shunsegi Telecom that do not show clear adherence to any type of advantage. Despite large growth in subscribers, price competition has not occurred after the competition except in handset subsidies. New restrictions on handset subsidies, closing the only door for price competition, favored a differentiation seeker at the expense of a cost advantage seeker. The Ministry of Information and Communication’s provisional plan for quality evaluation without price deregulation runs the risk of quality over-provision that is sub-optimal, and may further distort the business performance of carriers. Overall complete deregulation is necessary, in order to enhance the competitiveness of the Korean mobile telephony industry and to increase consumer welfare.     

Raising Rivals' Costs Strategies via Emission Permits Markets

In the present paper we examine the effect of emissions permit price manipulation within an oligopolistic model. We examine the effect that positioning strategies in permits markets have on the degree of competition in the product market as well as on social welfare. The analysis is based on the concept of raising rivals' cost strategies. We find that competition in the product market can be lessened substantially. The welfare effect is ambiguous. If the leader expands its market share at the expense of a less efficient rival, or if it excludes a less efficient entrant, overall efficiency may increase despite the decrease in the industry's output. When efficiency decreases, or when consumers' protection is a policy priority, the initial distribution of permits can be used to control power in the permits market. Such interventions though, improve efficiency only when policy makers have substantial information on the technological structure of the industry, and thus, should be used with caution. Given the importance of information, sharing of information and coordination of actions between policy makers is very important.     

Competitive customer poaching with asymmetric firms

Conditioning the pricing policies on purchase history is proven to generate a cutthroat price competition enhancing consumer surplus. This result typically relies on a framework where competitors are assumed to be symmetric. This paper demonstrates that under significant asymmetries of competing firms, the strong firm trades off current market share for future market share and the weak firm does the opposite. This inter-temporal market sharing agreement generates unidirectional poaching and entails new and distinctive welfare implications. In particular, if consumers are sufficiently myopic, price discrimination softens price competition in relation to uniform pricing, overturning the conclusion of previous studies.     

本土装备制造业市场空间障碍分析——基于下游行业全球价值链的视角

本文在全球价值链框架下,研究我国本土装备制造业市场空间障碍的产生机制以及实现有效产业升级的政策取向问题。本文发现,作为购买者驱动型全球价值链的主导者,国际大买家将从实现自身最优利润出发,设定从发展中国家消费品厂商采购的最优产品质量要求。为了获得质量更好的消费品,国际大买家愿意提高采购价格。国际大买家的纵向压价行为,与选择以发达国家为主要目标市场的策略,均有利于其方便设定最优产品质量要求。发展中国家消费品厂商被国际大买家俘获后,倾向于选择进口机器设备,这使本土装备制造业面临必然的市场空间障碍。构建国家价值链,提高价值链终端的竞争程度,有助于突破本土装备制造业的市场空间障碍。     

Informative Advertising and Optimal Targeting in a Monopoly

This paper analyzes how the transition from mass to specialized advertising can affect the market outcomes. To that end, we consider a particular technology of information transmission which allows a monopolist to decide the optimal targeting strategy. From this starting point, we show that the use of targeted advertising is likely to increase the market price and reduce the level of advertising, and that the degree of media specialization chosen by the monopolist tends to exceed the socially optimal. Furthermore, our model indicates that the social loss resulting from the greater monopoly power might exceed the gain due to the lower wasting of ads, in such a way that targeting could reduce consumer surplus and, what is more important, the level of social welfare.     

Regulatory Intervention, Corruption and Competition

This paper analyzes the effect of anti-corruption policies in a framework that accounts for the impact of changes in market structure on the incentive structure of bureaucrats in charge of inspecting firms. In this context, potentially adverse consequences of standard anti-corruption policies, including monitoring and random audit, education campaigns and the introduction of competition, which may result in more equilibrium corruption, are discussed. Finally, it is shown that while the total social cost of corruption may be increasing, these policies are always welfare improving, even when they lead to more corruption.     

The Strategic Effect of Bundling: A New Perspective

This paper investigates the strategic effect of the bundling strategy that is adopted by a multi-product firm that produces two complementary goods and faces one single-product rival in each market. I consider both the Cournot and Bertrand cases. When firms compete in quantities, bundling is completely ineffective. Under price competition, selling as a package is profitable when market competition is particularly tough. In such circumstances, the multi-product firm resorts to bundling to dampen the negative impact of low brand differentiation and/or scarce product complementarity. However, overall prices increase as a result of bundling, and not only consumer surplus, but also total social welfare, shrink.     

Estimating consumer surplus in the mobile telecommunications market: The case of Korea

This paper estimates consumer surplus in the Korean mobile telephone services (MTS) market. The Korean mobile telecommunications market has grown rapidly since 1997 when competition was introduced and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology was commercialized. Because consumer surplus is relevant to the controversy over establishing an appropriate price level between consumers and service providers, the need for a robust measurement of benefit from MTS is increasing. The measured net consumer surplus estimated by means of elasticities of demand reached about US$48.8 billion in the period 1996–2004 and the changes amounted to about US$8.8 billion during the same period. In particular, after competition was introduced into the market with an accompanying price decrease and increase in the number of subscribers, consumers have benefited greatly. Therefore, it can be inferred that a facility-based competition policy and the reduction in price of access such as handset subsidies all played a positive role in the early diffusion of MTS in Korea. The estimated consumer surplus in this paper does not include network externality (option externality); if this were considered, the total social welfare of the consumer would be larger.     

市场结构与横向产品差别化的相互关系分析

产品差别化对市场结构的形成有很大的作用,经典的豪特林模型只得出了产品差别最小化和最大化原则,由此模型得到的市场结构为完全竞争市场和寡头垄断市场,但垄断竞争市场却无法得到。文章在豪特林模型的基础上构造出统一框架,不但分析产品最大和最小差别情况,而且提出中间程度差别化的分析模型。得出所时应的三种市场结构。尤其是中间程度的差别化对应的垄断竞争市场。对这三种市场结构进行社会福利分析,得出在消费者不同质时,相对于完全竞争市场,垄断竞争市场是相对较好的选择。