Importance of skewness in decision making: Evidence from the Indian stock exchange

In this paper our goal is to examine the importance of skewness in decision making, in particular on investor utility. We use time-series daily data on sectoral stock returns on the Indian stock exchange. We test for sectoral stock return predictability using commonly used financial ratios, namely, the price-to-book, dividend yield and price-earnings. We find strong evidence of predictability. Using this evidence of predictability, we forecast sectoral stock returns for each of the sectors in our sample, allowing us to devise trading strategies that account for skewness of returns. We discover evidence that accounting for skewness leads not only to higher utility compared to a model that ignores skewness, but utility is sector-dependent.     

Bank stock returns and economic growth

Previous research has established (i) that a country’s financial sector influence future economic growth and (ii) that stock market index returns affect future economic growth. We extend and tie together these two strands of the growth literature by analyzing the relationship between banking industry stock returns and future economic growth. Using dynamic panel techniques to analyze panel data from 18 developed and 18 emerging markets, we find a positive and significant relationship between bank stock returns and future GDP growth that is independent of the previously documented relationship between market index returns and economic growth. We also find that much of the informational content of bank stock returns is captured by country-specific and institutional characteristics, such as bank-accounting-disclosure standards, banking crises, enforcement of insider trading law and government ownership of banks.     

Financial penalties and bank performance

This paper investigates the impact of financial penalties on the profitability and stock performance of banks. Using a unique dataset of 671 financial penalties imposed on 68 international listed banks over the period 2007 to 2014, we find a negative relation between financial penalties and pre-tax profitability but no relation with after-tax profitability. This result is explained by tax savings, as banks are allowed to deduct specific financial penalties from their taxable income. Moreover, our empirical analysis of the stock performance shows a positive relation between financial penalties and buy-and-hold returns, indicating that investors are pleased that cases are closed, that the banks successfully manage the consequences of misconduct, and that the financial penalties imposed are smaller than the accrued economic gains from the banks’ misconduct. This argument is supported by the positive abnormal returns accompanying on the announcement of a financial penalty.     

Litigating crashes? Insights from security class actions

Investors tend to litigate large stock price declines, i.e., file ‘stock-drop lawsuits’. However, it is less clear whether the ex-ante threat of security class actions can deter stock price crashes in the first place. To answer this question, we exploit the 1999 ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that discourages security class actions as a quasi-exogenous shock, and find that reducing the threat of security class actions leads to a significant increase in stock price crash risk measured by negative skewness of stock returns. We reveal that the main effect is partially driven by a reduction in the timeliness of bad news disclosure and worsened earnings quality, which is consistent with the view that bad news hoarding serves as the key factor in the formation of a stock price crash. Our overall findings highlight the importance of security class actions in deterring the occurrence of firm-level negative tail events on the financial market.     

On the risk situation of financial conglomerates: does diversification matter?

In general, conglomeration leads to diversification of risk (the diversification benefit) and a decrease in shareholder value (the conglomerate discount). Diversification benefits in financial conglomerates are typically derived without explicitly accounting for reduced shareholder value. However, a comprehensive analysis requires competitive conditions within the conglomerate, i.e., shareholders and debt holders should receive risk-adequate returns on their investment. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on this topic by comparing the diversification effect in conglomerates with and without accounting for altered shareholder value. We derive results for a holding company, a parent-subsidiary structure, and an integrated model. In addition, we consider different types of capital and risk transfer instruments in the parent-subsidiary model, including intragroup retrocession and guarantees. We conclude that under competitive conditions, diversification does not matter to the extent frequently emphasized in the literature. The analysis contributes to the ongoing discussion on group solvency regulation and enterprise risk management, which is of relevance to insurance groups and other financial conglomerates.     

Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

The financial distress pricing puzzle in banking firms

This paper examines whether the financial distress pricing puzzle observed for non-financial firms is also observed for financial firms and how this puzzle differs according to the extent of short-sale constraints. By using the eight distress measures developed for financial firms, we find that there is a strong negative relation in the cross-section between financial distress and subsequent bank stock returns, regardless of adjustment for risk. However, this distress pricing puzzle is statistically significant only for high short-sale constrained banks, but not for low short-sale constrained banks. Thus, short-sale constraints are at least one non-risk attribute that causes the distress pricing puzzle for financial firms. We also find that despite its simple form, compared to the other complex distress measures, non-performing loans (NPLs) are the most informative in predicting future bank stock returns as well as bankruptcy and failure.     

金融创新、公允价值计量与商业银行股票崩盘风险

选取我国沪深两市A股上市商业银行作为研究对象,利用2007—2017年年报数据,实证研究金融创新对商业银行股票崩盘风险的影响。在此基础上,以公允价值计量作为中介变量研究其在金融创新对商业银行股票崩盘风险影响中的作用机理。研究发现：金融创新与商业银行股票崩盘风险负相关,公允价值计量在其中发挥部分中介效应的同时也增加了商业银行股票崩盘风险。在当前鼓励创新和防范化解重大金融风险的背景下,应当大力提倡金融创新,通过公司治理和内部控制来规范公允价值计量的使用。     

The negative news threshold—An explanation for negative skewness in stock returns

Abstract

A vast literature documents negative skewness in stock index return distributions on several markets. In this paper the issue of negative skewness is approached from a different angle to previous studies by combining the Trueman's 1997 model of management disclosure practices with symmetric market responses in order to explain negative skewness in stock returns. Empirical tests reveal that returns for days when non-scheduled news items are disclosed are the source of negative skewness in stock returns, as predicted. These findings suggest that negative skewness in stock returns is induced by asymmetries in the news disclosure policies of firm management. Furthermore, it is found that the returns are negatively skewed only for non-scheduled firm-specific news disclosures for firms where the management is compensated with stock options.     

The Importance of Cash-Flow News for Financially Distressed Firms

Previous studies have shown that stock prices are moved primarily by news about discount rates (expected returns). I argue that when a firm experiences financial distress, news about cashflows becomes more dominant in driving its stock returns. Applying Campbell's (1991) variance decomposition framework to financially distressed firms supports this argument. Furthermore, I find that more bankruptcies occur after negative shocks to expected cashflows than after positive shocks to discount rates; and that stock prices of distressed firms are less sensitive than those of sound firms to changes in equity risk.     

Skewness in individual stocks at different investment horizons

Abstract

This paper examines the (a)symmetry of several individual stock returns at different investment horizons: daily, weekly and monthly. While some asymmetries are observed in daily returns, they disappear almost completely in weekly and monthly returns. The explanation for this fact lies in the convergence to normality that takes place when the investment horizon increases. These features allow one to question several financial models; in particular, they question the preference for positive skewness as a factor for investments in stock markets.     

Liquidity,Skewness and Stock Returns: Evidence from Chinese Stock Market

In this paper, a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) incorporating liquidity and skewness factors is proposed and tested by using the Chinese stock market data. The empirical results indicate that, under various market conditions, the liquidity-adjusted three-moment CAPM provides a better fit to the realized returns of various stock portfolios. Overall, this research reveals that illiquidity cost, liquidity risk and as well as skewness have important impacts on asset pricing in the Chinese stock market.     

What Drives Firm‐Level Stock Returns?

I use a vector autoregressive model (VAR) to decompose an individual firm's stock return into two components: changes in cash-flow expectations (i.e., cash-flow news) and changes in discount rates (i.e., expected-return news). The VAR yields three main results. First, firm-level stock returns are mainly driven by cash-flow news. For a typical stock, the variance of cash-flow news is more than twice that of expected-return news. Second, shocks to expected returns and cash flows are positively correlated for a typical small stock. Third, expected-return-news series are highly correlated across firms, while cash-flow news can largely be diversified away in aggregate portfolios.     

Interest Rate Risk Rewards in Stock Returns of Financial Corporations: Evidence from Germany

The interest rate sensitivity of stock returns of financial and non-financial corporations is a well-known phenomenon. However, only little is known about the part of total stock returns that is attributable to the compensation an investor receives for being exposed to interest rate risk when investing in equity securities. We pursue here a benchmark portfolio approach, constructing benchmark portfolios having the same interest rate risk exposure as a particular stock. By studying the time series of returns of these asset-specific benchmarks, we find: i) Regardless of the industry considered, the interest rate risk benchmarks of German corporations have mostly earned a significantly positive reward. ii) Returns of interest rate risk benchmarks of financial institutions exceeded significantly those of non-financial corporations. iii) An investor willing to bear nothing but the average interest rate risk of German financial institutions would have earned a mean return of about or even exceeding 70% of the corresponding total stock returns. iv) Returns of the interest rate risk benchmarks of the German insurance sector were significantly higher than those of German banks, which seems to contradict conventional market wisdom that insurances hedge interest rate risks.     

Why Invest in Emerging Markets? The Role of Conditional Return Asymmetry

We propose a quantile‐based measure of conditional skewness, particularly suitable for handling recalcitrant emerging market (EM) returns. The skewness of international stock market returns varies significantly across countries over time, and persists at long horizons. In EMs, skewness is mostly positive and idiosyncratic, and significantly relates to a country's financial and trade openness and balance of payments. In an international portfolio setting, return asymmetry leads to sizeable certainty‐equivalent gains and increases the weight on emerging countries to about 30%. Investing in EMs seems to be about expectations of a higher upside than downside, consistent with recent theories.     

Spin‐offs: Tackling the Conglomerate Discount

Spin‐offs and other restructuring actions have risen sharply in 2011, driven by the need to streamline business models and increase corporate values. These transactions can be an effective tool for addressing the conglomerate valuation discount that has been a pervasive phenomenon over the past decade, affecting conglomerates in most regions across the world. In particular, North American and Western European conglomerates trade at valuation multiples that are roughly 10% lower than those of their pure‐play peers. A conglomerate discount also prevails in some of the emerging markets, including CEEMEA and Asia. Nevertheless, in some regions, notably Japan and Latin America, conglomerates typically trade at a premium. Although the average conglomerate discount narrowed during the financial crisis due to the perceived benefits of diversification during downturns, almost half of the conglomerates globally trade at a discount, and almost a third of all conglomerates have persistently traded at a discount during the past five years. For such companies, fixing the discount requires a simplification of the business model. The authors show that recent announcements of spin‐offs have led to significant share price outperformance by the parent company in both the short and the longterm, highlighting their effectiveness as a tool to enhance valuation. Spin‐offs can be particularly attractive for those conglomerates that operate unrelated business segments since these firms trade at a sharper discount than diversified firms operating in related businesses. The authors discuss how management should think about the financial implications of spin‐offs, including capital structure considerations, dividend policy, and turnover in the shareholder base.     

Variance Spillover and Skewness in Financial Asset Returns

Bond and stock returns have been observed in the literature to exhibit unconditional skewness and temporal persistence in conditional skewness. We demonstrate that observed persistence in conditional third central moments can be due to the spillover of conditional variance dynamics. The confounding of true skewness and a variance spillover effect is problematic for financial modeling. Using market data, we empirically demonstrate that a simple standardization approach removes the variance‐induced skewness persistence. An important implication is that more parsimonious return and asset pricing models result if skewness persistence need not be modeled.     

Conglomerate Investment,Skewness, and the CEO Long‐Shot Bias

Do behavioral biases of executives matter for corporate investment decisions? Using segment‐level capital allocation in multisegment firms (“conglomerates”) as a laboratory, we show that capital expenditure is increasing in the expected skewness of segment returns. Conglomerates invest more in high‐skewness segments than matched stand‐alone firms, and trade at a discount, which indicates overinvestment that is detrimental to shareholder wealth. Using geographical variation in gambling norms, we find that the skewness‐investment relation is particularly pronounced when CEOs are likely to find long shots attractive. Our findings suggest that CEOs allocate capital with a long‐shot bias.     

Implied volatility skews and stock return skewness and kurtosis implied by stock option prices

The Black-Scholes* option pricing model is commonly applied to value a wide range of option contracts. However, the model often inconsistently prices deep in-the-money and deep out-of-the-money options. Options professionals refer to this well-known phenomenon as a volatility ‘skew’ or ‘smile’. In this paper, we examine an extension of the Black-Scholes model developed by Corrado and Su that suggests skewness and kurtosis in the option-implied distributions of stock returns as the source of volatility skews. Adapting their methodology, we estimate option-implied coefficients of skewness and kurtosis for four actively traded stock options. We find significantly nonnormal skewness and kurtosis in the option-implied distributions of stock returns.     

Requiem for a Market Maker: The Case of Drexel Burnham Lambert and Junk Bonds

This article adds to both the financial intermediation and market microstructure literature by examining the market reactions surrounding the withdrawal of a major financial intermediary and market maker from a specific securities market. We examine the exit of Drexel Burnham Lambert (Drexel) from the junk bond market in 1990. At the time Drexel exited the market by declaring bankruptcy, it was the dominant market maker and underwriter of junk bonds. We examine the impact of Drexel's failure on direct and indirect holders of junk bonds by investigating the effect of Drexel's collapse on junk bond returns, and on the stock returns of a group of firms that, on average, held significant amounts of junk bonds. We find that the collapse of Drexel had a significant impact on junk bond prices in general, and a greater impact on the prices of lower-quality junk bonds in particular. We interpret this result to imply that the value of the liquidity services supplied by Drexel was higher for lower-quality junk bonds. Additionally, we find that junk bonds underwritten by Drexel, as opposed to other investment banks, experienced a significant decline in price over the months leading up to Drexel's failure announcement. This suggests that the monitoring services provided by Drexel for the bonds it underwrote would not be replaced easily by other financial intermediaries operating in the junk bond market. Our results also indicate that the stock returns of life insurance companies with relatively high junk bond exposure tended to be affected more negatively by Drexel's financial distress than the stock returns of life insurance companies with relatively low junk bond exposure.