Franchising proportion and network failure

This paper investigates the relationship between franchising proportion of a network and firm failure. Drawing from resource scarcity and agency theories, we show that franchising firms that overfranchise and do not structure their networks in congruence with these two theories have lower survival prospects. We test our arguments with extensive data from nearly 5000 franchising firms listed in Entrepreneur magazine. The findings suggest that franchising proportion has a U-shape relationship with network failure. Additional analysis shows that firm size and geographic scope moderate the relationship between the squared term of franchising proportion and network failure. For franchisors, our results highlight the importance of maintaining an appropriate mix of franchised and firm-owned outlets within a network.     

Agency and institutional influences on franchising decisions

While the franchising literature has typically relied on agency theory, efficiency considerations may not fully explain decisions to expand through franchising or company ownership. In this study, I re-examine franchising decisions using insights from institutional theory. The key tenet of institutional theory is that decisions are influenced by isomorphic pressures arising from the environment. Economic rationales such as the achievement of efficiency are thought of as less pervasive concerns. I begin by investigating whether institutional theory explains variance in franchising decisions beyond what is explained by agency theory. Then, I explore the extent to which institutional considerations moderate the relationships between agency considerations and franchising decisions. Hypotheses are tested on a unique database of 132 French franchise chains. Empirical results suggest that successful competitors' use of franchising explains variance in the focal chain's use of franchising beyond what is explained by the importance of local managerial inputs and the threat of franchisee opportunism. In addition, the threat of franchise opportunism is less strongly related to the focal chain's use of franchising when successful competitors have a high proportion of franchised outlets. Overall, findings from this study suggest that researchers should supplement agency theory with institutional theory to adequately explain franchising decisions.     

The Use of Franchising by U.S.-Based Retailers

The question of whether to franchise or to own has received much research interest in recent years. Two popular approaches used to explain the proportion of franchising (PF) in the franchisor's system are resource-scarcity and agency theories. This study combines both theories to explain the proportion of franchised outlets in the U.S. retailing sector between 1990 and 1997. The findings show mixed results with regard to both previous studies and hypothesized relationships. The study shows that the proportion of franchising used by retailers is positively related to size (number of outlets) and geographical scope, and negatively related to the rate of growth and the level of investment. Age and royalty rates are not found to be significant to the proportion of franchising.     

Why franchise companies expand overseas

Business format franchising is becoming an increasingly international activity. From 1971 to 1985, U.S. franchisors added foreign outlets at a rate of 17% per year, almost twice as fast as they added domestic outlets (Aydin and Kacker 1990). As a result, by 1990 more than 350 U.S. companies had more than 32,000 franchised outlets overseas. By 2000, 60% of all franchisors in the United States are expected to have outlets overseas (Hoffman and Preble 1993).This study examines the 815 largest U.S. franchisors to understand what capabilities encourage them to expand overseas. It finds that the key capability that predicts the intent to expand overseas is superior capability to reduce franchisee opportunism. Franchisors who seek foreign franchisees have developed a greater capability to bond against and monitor potential franchisee opportunism. The data show that these differences are consistent across all industries in which franchising takes place.The results of this study indicate that foreign entrepreneurs can identify the American franchisors most likely to expand overseas by looking at their pricing structure and their monitoring capabilities. The easy identification of characteristics from which to find American franchisors will help to reduce the search costs of potential foreign franchisees. This reduction in search costs will make the establishment of international franchise relationships less expensive.This study also provides guidance to franchisors interested in expanding overseas. The results show how franchisors can structure their franchise relationships to reduce potential franchisee opportunism. This ability to reduce franchisee opportunism will make it easier for franchisors to enter high-growth foreign markets using the franchising business mode.This study also has implications for researchers. It suggests that international business research examine further the mechanisms by which firms make contractual modes of international business work. Whereas many firms may internalize international market transactions under conditions likely to lead to market failure, the large number of franchisors who use franchising as an international expansion mode despite conditions of market failure suggests that more attention be paid to mechanisms that companies can use to reduce the probability of failure of international contractual transactions. By helping to explain how franchisors monitor foreign franchisees or bond them against opportunistic behavior, this study suggests that the international business literature develop a more complex understanding of the workings of international business transactions than the simple choice of internalization or contractual entry modes.     

Franchisor strategy and firm performance: Making the most of strategic resource investments

A key decision for entrepreneurs in many retail and service firms is whether, and how much, to use franchising. If the decision is made to franchise, the actor may assume one of two “identities” or tactics: (1) the “chain builder,” who uses a blend of company and franchised outlets, and (2) the “turnkey,” who sells business opportunities but does not own any outlets. To benefit from their chosen strategy, franchisors must put resources in place to support it. We argue that franchisors use the chain building strategy to strike a balance between standardization and innovation by building resources that foster trust and encourage knowledge sharing with franchisees. In contrast, for turnkeys, a valuable set of operational routines is the critical strategic resource. To better appreciate how franchisors choose between the chain builder and turnkey strategies, we gathered survey information from 263 franchisors. Via this data, and as described herein, we learned that franchisors perform better when they invest in resources that best support their selected strategy.     

Insights into Franchising: A Review of Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives

Business format franchising has expanded rapidly, over the past 40 years as an alternative method of distribution and business development. This literature review analyses the major issues which have been the subject of in-depth research and/or significant debate. These include: the determinants of franchising in theory and practice; why franchisors normally operate both franchised and company-owned outlets, and the factors which influence the balance between them; the role and position of franchisees within the franchisor/franchisee relationship and, finally, the continuing debate surrounding the kind of regulatory framework in which it should operate. These findings are evaluated and aspects of franchising which warrant further investigation are outlined.     

A strategic groups approach to the franchising–performance relationship

Although franchising is a pervasive organizational form, little is known about its performance consequences. Prior studies have not found a direct performance effect, suggesting a need for alternative approaches. Drawing upon agency and resource scarcity theories, we develop the idea that strategic groups exist among franchisors and that performance differs among the groups. Using a sample of 65 restaurant chains, three strategic groups were found. The strategic group most influenced to franchise out of resource scarcity exhibited poorer performance than the other two groups. Results indicate that important, but nonlinear, relationships exist among franchising, its antecedents, and performance.     

Franchising versus corporate ownership: The effect on price dispersion

This paper uses data on the prices charged at fast-food restaurants in the metropolitan Pittsburgh and Detroit areas to assess the effect of franchising on price dispersion within chains in fairly narrowly defined geographical areas. A review of reasons why firms may face more price dispersion under franchising guides the empirical analyses. Results indicate that 1) franchisors do not aim for fully uniform prices even on the corporate side of their chains, 2) the degree of price dispersion is highest for firms with both franchised and company-owned units, as predicted by models implying a systematic price differential between units operated under these different contracting mechanisms, and 3) price dispersion for fully franchised chains is greater than for fully corporate chains. These last two results, combined with evidence from court cases that franchisors sometimes try to control franchisee prices directly, suggest that franchisors indeed lose some amount of control over prices charged to customers when they use franchising as opposed to corporate ownership. Finally, I find a positive effect of the royalty rate on price dispersion. This suggests that double marginalization is behind at least some of the higher prices found in franchised units in the existing literature.     

Structural and strategic dynamics in franchising

In this paper we examine the changes in ownership patterns of franchise systems as they mature. We compare the predictions made by three alternative theories within the context of the fast food industry. Signaling theory predicts that franchise systems will move toward a greater reliance on franchised outlets as systems mature, while resource acquisition theory (or as it is sometimes known, ownership redirection thesis) predicts a tendency in the opposite direction. A third theoretical perspective, tapered integration or plural forms, suggests a tendency toward maintaining a steady state of mixed distribution. Results indicate that although franchisors value the benefits of the mix of ownership types and do maintain that mix over time, there is some evidence of a greater tendency to permanently convert existing franchised outlets to company-owned outlets as fast food systems mature and gain greater access to resources.     

Brand equity heterogeneity among strategic groups in service franchising

Independent franchisees work cooperatively with service franchisors to strengthen the franchisor's brand name. However, agency theory predicts that franchisor inputs such as brand names and operational routines might be harmed by franchisees' free riding. In addition, previous literature has addressed the issues of strategic group emergence and performance differences between groups in recent decades. Thus, this study builds upon an emerging symbiotic view of franchising behind agency theory and incorporates a strategic groups level of analysis to investigate whether franchisees have strong incentives to maintain standards as franchisor seeking market penetration. By investigating potential brand equity differences among service franchisors for Taiwanese telecommunications service chains, this study found that different strategic groups exist in service franchising chains. From replication testing, the current results demonstrate that service franchising brand equity heterogeneities exist among franchisors within and across strategic groups. Therefore, this study broadens agency theory's explanation of service franchising.     

U.S.-Based Fast-Food Restaurants: Factors Influencing the International Expansion of Franchise Systems

Studies of international franchising are scant but increasing and can be divided into two streams of research: those focusing on environmental predictors of internationalization and those focusing on strategic, firm-level characteristics. Examining the latter category, this study empirically explores a set of firm-level attributes as predictors of decision making on whether firms seek international expansion. Using longitudinal data from Bond's Franchise Guide 2001–2008, we draw on a sample of U.S.-based fast-food franchise systems to test our hypotheses. Specifically, our database is composed of 1,058 observations of 158 chains, and we estimate a semi-parametric logistic model for international franchising. The model contributes to the literature by being the first to examine the nonlinearity of international franchising determinants using agency theory. The results show that (a) bonding, (b) the percentage of franchised units, (c) the number of states within which the system operates, and (d) the provision of area development agreements and sub-franchising significantly contribute to the international expansion of U.S.-based fast-food franchisors.     

International multi-unit franchising: an agency theoretic explanation

In spite of its considerable popularity, multi-unit franchising has been considered an anomaly from an agency theory perspective. This paper addresses this anomaly by attempting a comprehensive agency theoretic explanation of international multi-unit franchising. Although past agency theoretic examinations have mostly focused on single-unit franchising, a closer examination of the international context, which is characterized by significant geographic and cultural distance between franchisors and franchisees, suggests that multi-unit franchising may be more appropriate. This paper examines several agency problems inherent in multi-unit franchising. These include: bonding, adverse selection, information flow, shirking, inefficient risk-bearing, free-riding, and quasi-rent appropriation. Consideration of each of these problems using agency theory perspective leads to the suggestion that multi-unit franchising might address agency problems better than single-unit franchising in the international context.     

Franchising choice in retail networks: a multi-level institutional framework

Franchising is one of the most dynamic forms of organization for retail networks. Conceptualized as a hybrid form by transaction cost theory, franchising outlets are supposed, in the long run, to be bought by franchisors in order to capture residual rents. However, franchising persists a long time and still represents one of the favorite means to cover territories. This article suggests that this persistence of franchising in the organization of retail networks can be explained by institutional theory. The article also argues that institutional forces exert their influence at multiple levels. Based on this, a set of seven research propositions are developed, setting out a research agenda in this area.     

Examining the Drivers for Franchised Chains Performance through the Lens of the Dynamic Capabilities Approach

This paper draws on the dynamic capabilities approach to explain the performance of franchised chains. This approach is a useful lens to understand why some chains are more likely to drive superior performance than others. Hence, using this theoretical lens, we explore why and how several characteristics of franchised chains influence sales performance. This study includes 189 retail and service chains operating in the United States. Findings show that experience before franchising, length of training, chain age, franchising fees, and level of internationalization positively impact performance of franchised chains, whereas the proportion of franchised units has a curvilinear influence (inverted‐U shape) on chains' performance. Implications for franchising scholars and practitioners are discussed.     

Corporate Social Disclosure in the Franchising Sector: Insights from French Franchisors’ Websites

This paper explores corporate social responsibility (CSR) within the franchising sector. More specifically, using regulation theory, stakeholder–agency theory, transaction cost analysis, and literature on plural form, along with an empirical study conducted on the franchising sector in the French market, we find significant and positive relationships between chain size and the extent of corporate social disclosure (CSD) on franchisors’ websites and between the percentage of company‐owned units within the chain and the extent of CSD on franchisors’ websites. Moreover, though findings reveal that 86.03 percent of the 136 sampled franchisors communicate about at least one of their CSR activities on their websites, differences in terms of highlighted categories (e.g., environment, human resources, and products) and the extent of available CSR information exist.     

Franchising growth and franchisor entry and exit in the U.S. market: Myth and reality

Franchising has been and continues to be a very popular way to do business for a number of retailers and service businesses. However, the type of franchising that has been growing the most, namely business-format franchising, has not grown at the kind of phenomenal rates that the trade press often suggests. Since the Department of Commerce (DOC) canceled its publication Franchising in the Economy, we no longer have access to census-type data on franchising in the U.S. However, looking at the period during which the DOC did publish these data, one finds that the number of business-format franchisors is highly correlated with the number of units in these chains. Thus, we use data from recent issues of various franchisor directories to assess the number of franchisors in the U.S., and infer from this how business-format franchising has grown in the U.S. We find that business-format franchising has been growing over the last decade at a rate that is, at best, commensurate with the growth of the economy as a whole.We believe that the confusion about the extent of growth in franchising arises, in part, from the fact that many new firms enter into franchising each year, leading to the notion that this way of doing business is growing tremendously. However, we show that many firms also exit from franchising each year, for a net growth rate much below the entry rate.This paper shows that franchising is not a panacea for entrepreneurs, whether franchisor or franchisee. From the franchisor's viewpoint, the high rate of exits suggests that many firms fail despite franchising, and many others choose to stop franchising after trying it for a few years. Clearly, these firms have found that franchising is not right for them. Furthermore, the results show that the characteristics of the chain at the time it becomes involved in franchising, as described in the main franchisor directories—such as the royalty rate, the advertising fee, the franchise fee, the amount of capital required, and the sector of operation—have little capacity to explain “survival.” The main variable that affects “survival” among those that are typically reported in franchisor listings is the number of years that the franchisor has been in business before starting to franchise. Hence our results suggest this is one dimension in which franchisors can make decisions that affect the probability that they will be successful in franchising. Although we are unable to explain most of the variance in outcome, the results mostly imply that other, less easily observed or quantified characteristics of the chain and the franchisor, such as maybe the “innovativeness” of the product, the amount of support provided to franchisees, the financial backing of the franchisor, etc., likely influence “success” the most, and thus, are worth investigating further.From the perspective of franchisees, the amount of exit found here suggests that in the majority of systems, franchisees cannot expect that their franchisor will be around for the whole duration of their contract—which averages about 15 years according to the Department of Commerce. This does not mean that the majority of franchised businesses will find themselves in an “exiting” system—a small minority of very well-established franchisors accounts for the majority of franchised businesses, and these are likely to remain successful for years to come. But entrepreneurs buying franchises from less established systems are likely to face franchisor exit, either failure or departure. This paper confirms that franchisees should thoroughly investigate the franchise system they want to invest in, going beyond the information about royalty rates, advertising rates, rankings, etc., found in franchisor directories, and toward more product, market, and other less easily accessible information about the chain.     

E-Commerce and Encroachment: Evidence From French Franchise Networks

Encroachment is a critical issue affecting relations among franchisees and between franchisees and franchisors. The Internet increases this risk when a franchisor adopts a transactional website, becoming a “ubiquitous outlet.” Using logistic regression we give evidence of the significant impact of the proportion of franchised outlets in the network on transactional website adoption by French franchisors. The analysis is carried out to facilitate comparison with the United States market. A web-to-store strategy and the click-and-collect system implemented by most French supermarket chains are presented as potential solutions to circumventing e-encroachment.     

Franchise management capabilities and franchisor performance under alternative franchise ownership strategies

Franchising is a key entrepreneurial growth strategy, but a well-known downside is franchisee free-riding. Drawing upon alliance capabilities research, we describe franchise management capabilities and suggest that they are one way franchisors reduce free-riding and thus enhance performance. We also submit that these capabilities are especially helpful for “plural form” franchisors who own outlets in parallel with franchisees. Using a sample of 229 franchisors, we show that franchise management capabilities relate positively to franchisor performance among plural form franchisors. For “turnkey” franchisors who franchise all, or almost all, outlets these capabilities relate indirectly to performance through lower opportunism and improved brand reputation. Franchise management capability is therefore an important new theoretical construct linking franchising to franchisor performance.     

Convert to Compete: Competitive Advantage through Conversion Franchising

This paper offers an in–depth treatment of conversion franchising, where new franchisees are added to a franchised system by recruiting existing independent entrepreneurs or competitors' franchisees. The first part of the paper examines conversion franchising as a source of competitive advantage. This discussion leads to the articulation of four propositions. The second part of the paper looks at the empirical results of our study of 72 North American franchisors. Seventy–two percent of these firms use conversion franchising in their domestic markets, and 26 percent use conversions in international locales. The propositions relating to a franchisor's decision to use conversions based on increased levels of experience, economic resources, and to a lesser extent skills/knowledge, all were supported. These results lend support to the literature indicating that resources and skills serve as sources of competitive advantage. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Multi-unit versus single-unit franchising: assessing why franchisors use different ownership strategies

The aim of this article is to examine what factors underlie the choice of organisational form when franchisors add new franchised units to their networks. Franchisors may grant new units to existing franchisees (multi-unit franchising (MUF)) or to new franchisees (single-unit franchising). We find that this choice depends on the existence of contractual problems (namely adverse selection and moral hazard) and several network characteristics influence the magnitude of these problems. In particular, we found a positive relationship between the intensity of the use of MUF and network size, geographical concentration of the units of the network, and industries where customers tend to be non-repetitive.