Recovering markups from production data

In this paper, I discuss, what I call, the Production-Approach to recovering markups. In contrast to the most popular approach in empirical IO, which relies on demand estimation, this approach requires standard production data while allowing for various price-setting models and puts no restrictions on underlying consumer demand. Using production data together with standard cost minimization allows a researcher to obtain markups in a flexible way. After presenting a brief and selective overview of the literature I contrast the production approach to that of the more popular demand estimation approach. This discussion makes it clear that both approaches face important trade-offs and at a minimum empirical economist should have both techniques as part of their toolbox. The hope is that the use of both methods will only depend on the data at hand and the relevant institutional knowledge, paired with the actual research question we are trying to answer.     

Markup pricing in petroleum refining:: A multiproduct framework

This paper describes a structural model of markup pricing under joint production with quasi-fixed inputs of capital, labor, and inventories. The price–cost markups are functions of the inverse price elasticity of demand, an industry average conjectural variation elasticity, and the inventory to sales ratio. Our empirical findings suggest significant markups over marginal cost that differ considerably by product. This study also estimates the elasticities of markups with respect to supply and demand shocks.     

Capacity flexibility allocation in an outsourced supply chain with reservation

We consider a contract manufacturer that serves a limited number of outsourcers (customers) on a single capacitated production line. The outsourcers have different levels of demand uncertainty and the contract manufacturer faces the question how to allocate the contractual capacity flexibility in an optimal way. The contractual capacity flexibility is a contract parameter that sets the amount of demand the contract manufacturer is obliged to accept from the outsourcers. We develop a hierarchical model that consists of two decision levels. At the tactical level, the contract manufacturer allocates the capacity flexibility to the different outsourcers by maximizing the expected profit. Offering more flexibility to the more uncertain outsourcer generates higher expected revenue, but also increases the expected penalty costs. The allocated capacity flexibilities (determined at the tactical level) are input parameters to the lower decision level, where the operational planning decisions are made and actual demands are observed. We perform a numerical study by solving the two-level hierarchical planning problem iteratively. We first solve the higher level problem, which has been formulated as an integer program, and then perform a simulation study, where we solve a mathematical programming model in a rolling horizon setting to measure the operational performance of the system. The simulation results reveal that when the acceptance decision is made (given the allocated capacity flexibility decision), priority is given to the less uncertain outsourcer, whereas when the orders are placed, priority is given to the most uncertain outsourcer. Our insights are helpful for contract manufacturers when having contract negotiations with the outsourcers. Moreover, we show that hierarchical integration and anticipation are required, especially for cases with high penalty cost and tight capacities.     

Contract farming configuration: Smallholders’ preferences for contract design attributes

While Contract Farming (CF) can enhance smallholders’ income in developing countries, empirical research on the motivation of smallholders to participate in CF is scarce. This paper explores farmer preferences for particular contract design attributes. We combined analytical hierarchy process and discrete choice experiments to investigate the importance of contract design attributes. On the basis of data collected among potato farmers in Ethiopia, we found that input market uncertainty is more important than output market uncertainty in smallholders’ decision to participate. Farmers tend to minimize their risk by opting for the buyer firm above the state and NGOs as providers of seed, inputs, and technical assistance. The results imply that the success of a CF scheme depends on the willingness of the firm to incorporate the preferred contract design attributes. Institutional intervention in the input market could induce agribusiness firms to offer attractive contracts for smallholders.     

Pricing over the Cycle

In recent studies, the cyclical behavior of markups is examined, but the role of costs in determining markups is ignored. Here, a pricing equation is estimated that implicitly measures the rate of change in markup as a function of aggregate demand growth, aggregate inflation and industry cost inflation. Results for 21 two-digit SIC industries in the U.S. over 1948 to 1979 show incomplete pass-through from cost into price, implying a negative relationship between cost and the markup. Aggregate inflation positively influences prices and markups. Aggregate demand negatively influences prices and markups in highly concentrated industries, but not otherwise.     

Impact of contracts in high yielding varieties seed production on profits and yield: The case of Nepal

Nepal’s population continues to grow, but the agricultural sector’s performance remains almost stagnant. This has led to a decline in the per capita availability of food. Increasing agricultural productivity is the key to agricultural growth, and one strategy for increasing agricultural productivity is to use improved seeds. This study investigates the impact of contract farming (CF) in high yielding varieties (HYV) of paddy seed production on costs, yield, and profits of smallholder farms in Nepal. Using farm-level data and a non-parametric propensity score matching estimator, the study finds a significant positive impact of contract HYV seed farming on revenues, profits, and yield, and a significant negative impact on total costs of production. Additionally, very small farms (⩽0.43 ha) with CF in HYV paddy seeds tend to gain the most when it comes to yield per hectare. Our estimates reveal that the average smallholder household in Nepal engaged in CF with input conditions receives higher profits. However, farmers engaged in CF with output conditions tend to have higher yields but smaller profits. Finally, farmers engaged in CF in HYV paddy seeds with both input and output conditions have the highest yield gains and significantly higher profits.     

Auctions for Split-Award Contracts

The buyer of a homogeneous input divides his input requirements into two contracts that are awarded to different suppliers. He uses a sequential second-price auction to award a primary and a secondary contract. With a fixed number of suppliers the buyer pays a higher expected price than with a sole-source auction. The premium paid to the winner of the secondary contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost. When entry is endogenous, we identify the conditions under which a secondary contract can increase the number of suppliers and lower the expected price.     

Heterogeneous Firms and Asymmetric Product Differentiation

We introduce asymmetric product differentiation in a model characterized by a linear demand system, endogenous markups and heterogeneous firms (as in Melitz‐Ottaviano [2008]). In particular, a single industry is divided into a number of market segments, each characterized by a different degree of horizontal product differentiation. Such a setup allows us to explain, within a single theoretical framework, the non‐linear relations between firm productivity, size and exporting behavior that have been documented by the empirical literature. The theoretical results are tested empirically by examining the performance of French wine producers operating in market segments characterized by different levels of horizontal product differentiation. Such segments are identified using the official classification of French wines based upon the controlled denomination of origin, i.e., the Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée (AOC) system.     

The role of design method and process technology in stable outsourcing equilibria

We analyze a model of vertical (dis)integration between manufacturing and design in a monopolistically competitive market. Specialized input manufacturers can serve multiple design firms and the manufacturer-designer pairs negotiate a non-binding contract to share input customization cost and production surplus. Hand-collected data on 387 product lines from 118 semiconductor firms are used to predict the firm’s decision to outsource manufacturing. We find that, for instance, the use of design tools that facilitate collaboration and process technologies that facilitate learning are both positively associated with outsourcing, consistent with the model’s prediction.     

Wage councils,product markups and wage markdowns: Evidence from Uruguay

In 2005, after a leftist coalition won the national election for the first time, Uruguay returned to sector-level wage bargaining councils with active government participation. We estimate product markups and wage markdowns using firm-level data for the period 2002–2016, and report decreasing wage markdowns and increasing -to a lesser extent- firm-level product markups. We find statistically significant impacts of minimum mandated wages on product markups and wage markdowns, and additional effects of unions on wage markdowns. The evidence suggests that firms operate in monopsonistic labor markets. Though their bargaining power in the labor market was reduced over time as a result of wage councils, firms were able to pass a sizable part of the increases in labor costs to consumers.     

Rising markups,common ownership,and technological capacities

This paper analyses the impact of common ownership on markups and innovation and adds to the discussion of the recently observed patterns of a long term rise in market power. Using a panel of European manufacturing firms from 2005 to 2016, we structurally infer markups and construct a measure of common ownership. We use a propensity score reweighting estimator to eliminate biases due to observational characteristics and find an increase of firm markups ranging up to 3.3% on average in industries with high technological spillovers after the first exposure to common ownership. For companies directly held by common institutional investors, we also measure a positive effect on citation-weighted patents of up to 9.6% in high-spillover industries on average. Both findings are consistent with recent theoretical findings in López and Vives (2019).     

Input substitutability and vertical integration

Input substitutability in final production is a well-known motive for noncompetitive input producers to integrate with their customers. In models that characterize the noncompetitive input industry as a pure monopoly, whether such integration would increase or decrease final production is ambiguous. The analysis here breaks the total output effect into factor substitution and market power components and discovers that the output ambiguity is sensitive to the specific model of noncompetitive equilibrium assumed. For the empirically most important cases of industrial organization, the sole effect of input substitutability on output is likely to be an unambiguous output increase.For their helpful comments, I am indebted to Stephen Karlson, Li Way Lee, W. G. Shepherd, Stephen Spurr, Hal Varian, and the referee. Any errors in the paper persist in spite of them.     

用投入产出分析法确定石油经济产量规模

文章运用区别于现金流量的投入产出分析法，提出了一套合理测算石油经济产量规模的方法，投入产出分析法是项目后评价的主要方法。主要是把项目实际效果或产出与实际成本或投入进行比较。通过比较。评价项目是否合算，运用该方法研究石油经济产量，可确定在现有技术水平和经济条件下，油田生产获得利润最大化的产量规模。     

Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly with endogenous input costs

This paper examines the output effect of third-degree price discrimination in symmetrically differentiated oligopoly. We find that when the sellers’ input costs are chosen endogenously by an upstream supplier with market power, as opposed to being fixed exogenously, long-standing qualitative conclusions about the effect of price discrimination on aggregate output can be reversed. In contrast to previous findings (e.g., by Holmes, 1989), more intense competition in the strong market than in the weak market can make it less likely that price discrimination raises aggregate output. For linear demand functions, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which the output effect changes sign when input costs are endogenized.     

集成运放的一些使用技巧

目前集成技术飞速发展且集成芯片已被广泛应用 ,为了充分利用集成在一个芯片上的两个运算放大器性能互相匹配的特点 ,本文从三个方面介绍了合理使用集成运算放大器的几种技巧。其中 ,利用集成在一个硅片上的两个运算放大器的输入失调电压极其温度漂移相互补偿的原理 ,组成了失调电压极低的运算放大器 ;根据输入电阻的自举扩展原理 ,利用集成在一个硅片上的两个运算放大器组成的反向比例运算放大器具有很高的输入电阻和较高的电压放大倍数 ;根据差动放大电路的输出电压方式 ,利用集成在一个硅片上的两个运算放大器组成的差动输出运算放大器 ,最大线性输出电压范围比一个集成运算放大器的最大线形输出电压范围大一倍。且适用于不接地负载。     

Entry,imperfect competition,and futures market for the input

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in the literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on the number of firms and production is ambiguous.     

Auctions with contingent payments — An overview

I survey a literature on auctions with contingent payments, that is auctions in which payments are allowed to depend on an ex-post verifiable variable, such as revenues in oil lease auctions. Based on DeMarzo et al. (2005), I describe a partial ranking of auction revenues for auctions that differ in terms of contract forms, pricing rules and seller commitment and why the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply even in an independent private values setup. I discuss models that incorporate adverse selection, moral hazard, competition between auctioneers, common values and the sale of multiple units.     

控制权激励双重性与技术创新动态能力——基于高科技上市公司面板数据的实证分析

高管激励契约对技术创新的显著影响受到理论界与实践界的普遍关注,但以往研究多以显性激励为主。控制权激励作为一种重要的高管隐性激励契约,在本质上具有双重性,应从非线性视角出发对其与技术创新的关联性进行重新审视。本文基于创新经济学相关理论,运用中国高科技上市公司2007—2010年的平衡面板数据,对高管控制权激励与技术创新动态能力的关联性进行实证检验,结果表明:技术创新动态能力由技术创新投入能力、技术创新产出能力、技术创新转化能力三个维度构成;控制权激励与技术创新动态能力之间存在显著的倒U型关系,即当达到极值之前,控制权激励以积极性为主导从而对技术创新动态能力具有促进效应,但超过此极值,控制权激励的消极性逐渐凸显,转而对技术创新动态能力产生明显的抑制效应。因此,保持适度的控制权激励力度、并对显性激励与隐性激励进行合理配置是提升上市公司技术创新动态能力的理性选择。     

Information technology and its changing roles to economic growth and productivity in Australia

In this paper we describe our investigation of the role of investment in information technology (IT) on economic output and productivity in Australia over a period of about four decades. The framework used in this paper is the aggregate production function, where IT capital is considered as a separate input of production along with non-IT capital and labour. The empirical results from the study indicate the evidence of robust technical progress in the Australian economy in the 1990s. IT capital had a significant impact on output, labour productivity and technical progress in the 1990s. In recent years, however, the contribution of IT capital on output and labour productivity has slowed down. Regaining the IT capital productivity therefore remains as a key challenge for Australia, especially in the context of greater IT investment in the future.     

Cartelization Through Buyer Groups

Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to commit credibly to increased input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input costs are then refunded from suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The stability of such an ‘implied cartel’ depends on the retailers’ incentives to source their inputs secretly from a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement at lower input prices. Cheating is limited if retailers sign exclusive dealing or minimum purchase provisions. We discuss the relevancy of our findings for antitrust policy.