A note on Bossert,Pattanaik and Xu's “Choice under complete uncertainty: axiomatic characterization of some decision rules”

Summary. Recent work by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu provides axiomatic characterizations of some decision rules for individual decision making under complete uncertainty. This note shows that, in the case of two of these rules, they do not satisfy one of the axioms used for their characterization. A counterexample illustrating this fact is provided, as well as an alternative way to characterize the two rules under consideration, mantaining as far as possible the original axioms proposed by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu. Received: November 3, 2000; revised version: March 1, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am grateful for the encouragement and support of Professor Prasanta Pattanaik. I thank also the suggestions of two anonymous referees. This work was made during an academic visit to the Department of Economics of the University of California in Riverside (UCR). The visit was possible thanks to an invitation by the UCR and the financial support of the Public University of Navarra, the Government of Navarra, and the CICYT (SEC96-0858).     

A general revealed preference theorem for stochastic demand behavior

Summary. We present a general revealed preference theorem concerning stochastic choice behavior by consumers. We show that, when the consumer spends her entire wealth, the Weak Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preference due to Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999) is equivalent to a restriction on stochastic demand behavior that we call stochastic substitutability. We also show that the relationship between the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and Samuelson's inequality in the deterministic theory, and the main result of Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik (1999) are both special cases of our result.Received: 10 September 2001, Revised: 4 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D11. Correspondence to: Prasanta K. PattanaikOur greatest debt is to the referee of this paper, who made numerous helpful suggestions. We thank Robin Cubitt, Kunal Sengupta and seminar audiences at Jawaharlal Nehru University, Indian Statistical Institute, University of East Anglia, Universidad Carlos III, University of Essex and University of Montreal for their helpful comments. Prasanta K. Pattanaik acknowledges his intellectual debt to Salvador Barbera, Tapas Majumdar and Amartya Sen.     

Characterization of generalized weak orders and revealed preference

Summary This short paper provides an alternative framework to axiomatize various binary preference relations such as semiorder, weak semiorder etc. A set of simple axioms is presented in terms of revealed-preferred and revealed-inferior alternatives which makes the connection between various binary preference relations transparent; and every single axiom is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a binary preference relation of a specified type.We thank Bhasker Dutta, Peter Fishburn, Prasanta Pattanaik, Robert Russell and Thomas Schwartz for helpful suggestions     

Insurance and the behavior of competitive firms under revenue risks: a note

This paper re-examines the model of Ford, Mpuku, and Pattanaik [“Revenue Risks, Insurance, and the Behavior of Competitive Firms”.Journal of Economics 64 (1996): 233–246] wherein a risk-averse competitive firm faces insurable revenue risk. The optimal output and insurance cover of the firm are shown to be deterministically related in that the marginal costs of self-insurance and market insurance are equated. In response to increasing risk aversion, the firm always takes a higher insurance cover. Increasing fixed costs generate an income effect which induces the firm to take a higher insurance cover should the preference of the firm satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion. Market insurance and self-insurance can be either substitutes or complements, depending on the shape of the variable insurance-premium schedule.     

Never choose the uniquely largest a characterization

Summary In this paper we characterize choice behaviour that picks the second largest element if there is a uniquely largest; otherwise, the largest elements are picked. Having defined our choice function, we offer a complete characterization of the latter in terms of pure choice function conditions. Similarities to and divergences from conventional choice theory are explained. We discuss the motivations underlying our exercise and provide several examples for the axiomatized choice behaviour.Helpful discussions with R. Deb, M. R. Johnson, P. K. Pattanaik, A. Sen, Y. Xu, and participants at a seminar on individual and social choice in Osnabrück, November 1993, are gratefully acknowledged. One of the authors wishes to thank the British Council and the University of Osnabrück for financial support. We are also grateful to the Department of Economics at Queen Mary and Westfield College, London, for its hospitality.     

A class of fair distribution rules à la Rawls and Sen

Summary. This paper discusses and develops “non-welfaristic” arguments on distributive justice à la J. Rawls and A. K. Sen, and formalizes, in cooperative production economies, “non-welfaristic” distribution rules as game form types of resource allocation schemes. First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle which the distribution rule should satisfy if this takes individuals' needs into account. Second, one class of distribution rules which satisfy Needs Principle, a class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules, is proposed. Third, axiomatic characterizations of the class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules are provided. Received: July 30, 1999; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal, Professors Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Gravel, Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Prasanta Pattanaik, Kotaro Suzumura, Koich Tadenuma, and Yongsheng Xu for their fruitful comments. An earlier version of this paper was published with the title name, “A Game Form Approach to Theories of Distributive Justice: Formalizing Needs Principle” as the Discussion Paper No. 407 of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, and in the proceedings of the International Conference on Logic, Game, and Social Choice held at Oisterwijk in May 1999. That version was also presented at the 3rd Decentralization Conference in Japan held at Hitotsubashi University in September 1997, at the annual meeting of the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics held at Waseda University in September 1997, and the 4th International Conference of Social Choice and Welfare held at University of British Colombia in July 1998. This research was partially supported by the Japanese Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Correspondence to: N. Yoshihara     

经济学的时间及其革命

时间是人类认识世界的一种基本方式,人类时间观的改变不可避免地影响着人们对经济世界的认知。人类时间概念内涵的变化体现在经济理论发展的不同阶段中。本文阐述了人类时间概念演化史,分析了内涵不同的时间观在经济学理论建构中的地位和作用,以及时间观现代变革对经济学当前发展的意义。     

论财务管理学中若干概念的曲解与纠正

严谨的概念界定和使用是学术研究顺利进行的前提,由概念形成的理念是指导实践的思维形式.本文针对我国财务管理领域流行的若干错误概念或伪概念进行了辨析或批判,运用历史逻辑的方法分析了资本成本、财务风险和资本运营这三个财务管理学中最基本概念的现行错误解释形成的背景、原因以及所造成的不良后果,并借鉴市场经济发达国家相关财务管理学理论成果,重新表述了上述三个概念的正确解释.从而正确把握财务管理若干规范概念的内涵和外延.     

中国纳税服务基本理念缺失的原因分析

纳税服务理念的缺失具有深厚的历史背景:政府的职能定位、个体功利不被重视、企业的经济地位不独立以及纳税人权利与义务的不对等,对纳税服务理念影响深远。随着社会主义市场经济体制的建立和完善,应逐步培养公民的权利意识和政府的责任意识,更新为纳税人服务的理念,并在制度操作层面加以完善,是确立纳税服务理念、促进征管质量和效率提高的客观要求。     

Modeling System Complexity in the Context of Geopolitics Related to Climate Change

Due mainly to the evolution of science and technology, ontic systems have continuously become more complex. Thus, original institutional economics has adopted and advanced the concepts of complex systems. This article further develops complexity concepts and relates them to problems of climate change. Systems complexity is combined with concepts from geopolitics in order to introduce geopolitical analysis about boundaries/borders into complex systems. The addition of geopolitical ideas allows for systems to focus on a designated social and ecological context that fits the problem of interest. The social and ecological components of open geopolitical systems lead to processes that are dynamic and complex. Thus, complex-systems modeling needs the assistance of geopolitical concepts and geopolitical models need to be embedded in complex systems. Each section of the article clarifies its meaning with examples of climate change concerns.     

PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTING AGGREGATES BETWEEN COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

This paper discusses a number of problems arising in comparisons of levels of national accounting aggregates between countries with different economic systems, notably between countries with market economies and countries with centrally planned economies. It considers problems arising from differences in the national accounting concepts used and problems arising from institutional differences, both of which are viewed as relating to the concepts on which the comparison should be based and the adjustment of national data to these concepts. The final section considers index number problems.     

On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms

Here, we establish a relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms. Both concepts have been used to relate the types in one structure to types in a second “larger” structure. In general, the two concepts may differ, in the sense that a hierarchy morphism need not be a type morphism. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which the two concepts coincide. We go on to provide situations under which this condition must be satisfied.     

会计本质的确证及在会计史研究中的解释性应用

本文通过会计本质的哲学讨论对“会计信息系统论”进行批判,论证了“会计是一个以控制为核心的管理体系”的观点。作为这一观点的解释性应用,文章对西方观念中的会计史框架及一些相关观点进行分析,描述了一种以管理控制论观点为基础的会计史框架。     

The art of long-term thinking: A bridge between sustainability science and politics

Policy makers are dependent upon scientific knowledge. However, scientific results cannot be applied straightforwardly in practical decision making. We deploy Kant's term “power of judgment” – the human capacity to apply general insights to specific, contingent situations – to show that this problem is systematic rather than coincidental: decision making requires the power of judgment to make use of scientific knowledge. Power of judgment, in turns, can be supported by heuristics. Against this background, we focus on sustainability politics and outline a heuristic for framing and analyzing sustainability problems. Because time is a key factor in relation to sustainability we distinguish three distinct concepts of time and argue that the economic concepts of “stocks” and “institutions” can be used to foster power of judgment with respect to these time concepts. Based on these concepts, the heuristic serves to bridge the gap between scientific knowledge and practical decision making in sustainability politics.     

Experimental investigation of stationary concepts in cyclic duopoly games

We experimentally test the predictive success of three stationary concepts in two cyclic duopoly games. The concepts are Nash equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium. In the experiment 11 independent subject groups, consisting out of six participants interacting over 200 rounds, were gathered for each game. The comparison of the three concepts with mixed strategies shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: payoff-sampling equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. In addition the data exhibit a weak but significant tendency over time in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.     

The formal system paradogm for studying failures

One way in which general lessons may be learnt from sets of failures and disasters is by using a common conceptual framework for analysis. Many authors have found the use of individual systems concepts useful in their studies of failure. This paper presents a unified model that draws together those concepts and other related concepts. The model that is described forms part of a systemic methodology which has been used successfully in the understanding of failures. It is suggested that the model could be developed further so as to become a predictive and preventative tool.     

Don’t fear risk,learn about it: how familiarity reduces perceived risk

This article suggests that learning about basic concepts concerning the risk and return of assets will reduce perceived risk. We show experimentally that people who learn about these basic concepts are willing to allocate more money to risky assets and consider the asset’s return relative to its risk.